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BENES AND PAN-SLAVISM

BY

FRANCIS HERCZEG

There has never been any real substance in the Pan-Slavonic idea: apart from a few muddle-headed enthusiasts no one has ever really believed in the possibility of realizing its aims; for a century, however, the idea has proved to be an effectual instrument of agitation and subversion. Ultimately, *it would involve the domination of Russia over all the Slav peoples.* In St. Petersburg, of course, there were at all times politicians and writers ready to exploit the longing for power and greatness of the small Slav peoples which looked upon themselves as oppressed, for the purpose of furthering the imperialistic schemes of the Empire of the Russian Czars. The Russian Czars themselves — in particular those who were more independent-minded — at such times remembered that they were in reality the representatives of a conservative principle and that in consequence it was hardly proper for them to encourage revolutionary movements in the neighbouring countries. But in Russia it was not always the will of the Czar that prevailed. And *an interesting sidelight is thrown on the contradictions inherent in the very essence of Pan-Slavonic policy that those Slav peoples which were brought under the power of Russia and experienced in their own persons the real character of Slav brotherhood, are found fighting tooth and nail against Pan-Slavism.*

The most resolute gambler in the game of Pan-Slavism is Edward Beneš. In his capacity, first as Foreign Minister and then as President of Czecho-Slovakia, he was fully able to realize that the Republic which had been pieced together out of territories wrested from the neighbouring countries was completely void of all inner vitality and could only remain in existence if supported by outside forces. In 1933 the scheme invented by Tardieu, the "faiseur" of

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the Little Entente, with the idea of furthering a union of the Danubian States for purposes of mutual security (Hungary, for instance was to have been expected to take up arms in a given case to "secure" the Czechs the possession of Komárom and Kassa!), proved abortive; while the attitude of the Sudeten district and the Hungarian Highlands was anything but encouraging for the future: so, in 1935, Beneš concluded with the Soviet Union a mutual assistance convention. It goes without saying that of the contracting Parties it was not the Soviet Union, with its 180.000.000 inhabitants, that stood in need of Beneš's assistance. The real meaning of the Convention was revealed by the aerodromes constructed for the use of the Red Army at Ungvár, Munkács and other places in the Carpathian Basin. These airfields were to act as spring-boards for action against Western Europe! In order to gain time and a breathing-space Edward Beneš, this illstarred politician, was prepared to let the Bolshevik pack of tigers loose on the European sheep-cotes. He would appear to have trusted the good hearts of the tigers. In any case he behaved as if he was unaware that the Party with whom we had concluded a mutual assistance convention was Death personified.

The pleasant sensations experienced by the Slav peoples enjoying the tender solitude of Moscow, may be gathered from the recent diplomatic history of the Czech and Polish "refugee" Governments. In 1941, at Aberdeen, Beneš declared that the negotiations for a Czech-Polish federation had been brought to a happy conclusion *for the purpose of serving the cause of the New Europe desired by Great Britain by the organization of "larger territorial and economic units."* The Members of the mixed commission appointed for the purpose of determining the fundamental principles of this Confederacy, failed to agree in the questions of frontiers; indeed, the Czechs and the Poles fell to loggerheads, finally and irretrievably, over the possession of Teschen. From Beneš's point of view the Confederacy did nevertheless prove of some advantage, seeing that the Czecho-Slovak idea — or rather delusion — once more gained to some extent in significance and authority, Great Britain having acknowledged the Sramek "refugee" Govern-

ment on the basis of the same. Then, in June, 1942, Beneš sent General Ingr to Moscow to conclude an agreement respecting a common Czecho-Russian frontier. Such a *common frontier between the "living-spaces" of the two countries is of course only conceivable in the event of Galicia being in Russian hands...* Since then Soviet diplomacy has ruthlessly curtailed the ambitions of the Poles; while the Poles have realized that it is not advisable to sit at the same table as Edward Beneš. The latter is in the habit of overstraining every point; and a good many of his fellow-"refugees" have taken fright at his gambling policy, — Osusky, a former Czech diplomat, Milan Hodzsa, former Czecho-Slovak Premier, and General Ingr in succession having turned their backs on him. Profiting by past experience, these men would prefer to organize the empire of their dreams — the Czecho-Slovakia of the future — on a federal basis, granting autonomy to the Slovaks, the Sudeten Germans and the Ruthenians: but Beneš clings desperately and obstinately to the idea of a united and indivisible Czecho-Slovak national State.

The former Czecho-Slovak President is gradually but surely losing credit with the peoples of the West; and in consequence he pins his faith exclusively on the virulence of the Pan-Slavonic idea. His policy is not likely to be in the least influenced by any fear that European culture might fall a victim to the Pan-Slavism inoculated with Bolshevism. He is not a statesman likely to be deterred by any sense of moral responsibility. When judging the character of Beneš's policy we must not for a moment forget — and this is well known all over Europe — that with all his shrewdness and cunning he is a statesman of very defective judgment, far too self-confident to be able to learn the lessons of his own failures. Consequently, he may once again prove incapable of gauging the logical and inevitable consequences of his policy. *He may very possibly find his policy leading him ultimately to results quite different from those he would achieve; though that does not in any way diminish — but far rather enhances the dangerous character of Public Enemy No. 1. of European Peace.*

KING FERDINAND OF RUMANIA

BY

ZSOMBOR DE SZASZ

VII. BUKOVINA¹

There is a marked contrast between the pre-war history of Bukovina and that of Bessarabia. Before 1774 Bukovina formed a part of the Moldavian Principality; perpetually harried in the course of the Russo-Turkish wars, it was a completely neglected and uncivilised country before it came under Austrian domination. Ethnically as well as religiously it was the most chequered land in Europe. In 1910, in a population of 798,355, there were

Ruthenes	Rumanians	Germans	Poles	Magyars
305,101	273,354	168,851	36,310	10,391

besides Armenians and Jews. The denominational situation was similarly kaleidoscopic. The majority of the population, being Slav and Rumanian, was Greek Orthodox, but there were large minorities belonging to the Roman Catholic and Armeno-Catholic creeds, Uniates, and Protestants of various shades, and Jews professing the Mosaic faith.

Under Moldavian rule the cultural standard of the people was as low as it could be. Some traces of civilisation were introduced by the German and Magyar settlers who came to the land before 1774, but the rest of the population was in a lamentably backward state. "The Austrians", — writes Professor Seton-Watson, — "when they took over found not a single doctor or apothecary in the whole country, no bridges, and scarcely any roads, and only two recognised schools, apart from two or three private institutions. The

¹ See previous articles under the same title in the August, October and December 1942 and the January, March and April 1943 issues of this review

greater part of the land belonged to the monasteries, of which there were twenty-six."

The Austrian administration set to work to amend this shocking state of affairs — attributed by Professor Seton-Watson to Turkish rule, although in point of fact it was the outcome of Rumanian misgovernment — and succeeded "with permanently beneficial results."

Before 1849 the country had a hybrid constitutional status; it was joined to Galicia, but had a separate and efficient military administration; it had no legislative body of its own, but was represented, since 1817, in the Galician Diet. In 1861 it was raised to the status of an autonomous *Kronland* and obtained a separate Diet, in which the various nationalities were proportionately represented by means of a complicated electoral procedure.

The provincial constitution of 1850 declared that "all the races inhabiting the province are equal and have an inviolable right to the care and preservation of their nationality and language". No restrictions were laid on the use of any language; an order of the *Statthaltereien* pronounced Ruthene and Rumanian to be official languages — *Landessprachen* — together with German; nor were any obstacles placed in the way of the other minority languages; even the use of the cyrillic alphabet was permitted in official intercourse.

At the same time effective measures were taken to raise the cultural standard of the population. Professor Seton-Watson, writing of the university of Czernowitz, says that "every effort was made to promote Rumanian and Ruthene culture at the same time; "and his words might apply to the whole cultural organisation of the province. In 1914 there were 63 German, 87 Ruthene and 185 Rumanian elementary schools; 4 German, 2 Ruthene and 4 German-Ruthene normal schools, and since 1875 a German university at Czernowitz. It cannot be denied that in the sphere of higher education the German-speaking inhabitants were more favoured than the others, but it must be remembered that the Austria of 1914 was after all a German State, and as the Bukovina Germans stood on a higher cultural level than either the

Ruthenes or the Rumanians, it was only natural that they should have higher educational demands.

Under such circumstances it is no matter for wonder that the population of Bukovina lived tranquilly under Austrian rule and showed no signs of disaffection. In 1848 the Rumanians, obedient to the wise advice of their leader, the eminent historian E. Hurmuzaki, refrained from demanding re-annexation to Moldavia; all they desired was provincial self-government within the framework of the Habsburg Empire. And this notwithstanding the fact that from an ethnical point of view Bukowina was well adapted for the fostering of irredentism, the northern part being wholly Ruthene and the southern mostly Rumanian, each territory having on its border the ethnically related mother country, Russia and Rumania. But it so happened that the internal conditions which breed irredentism were completely lacking. The disaffection which began to spread among the Ruthenes at the end of the nineteenth century was fomented by Russia, and the irredentistic endeavours of the Rumanians during the last stage of the Great War were instigated from the Rumanian kingdom.

At this point a slight digression may perhaps be permitted in order to show, by means of a private letter, not only the general Bukovinian attitude, but also the manner in which sensible Rumanians who lived outside the contagious atmosphere of Bucharest and Transylvania wished to solve the Rumanian question.

The letter was written by Aurel Onciul, an outstanding figure among the few Rumanian politicians of Bukovina and a member of the Austrian *Reichsrat*. It was addressed to Colonel Edward Fischer, commander of the Austro-Hungarian forces in Bukovina, a valiant soldier and an excellent organiser.

It is not proposed to print this letter in its entirety, but a few words must be said about the circumstances under which it was written, and the description of which forms its introduction.

In April 1916, writes Onciul, he was visited by Professor Stere, a Bessarabian whom the reader may remember as

the principal exponent of the policy which demanded that Rumania should join the Central Powers, fight against Russia, and, postponing the solution of the Transylvanian question, proceed to the liberation of the Bessarabian Rumanians. Stere was in the confidence of the Rumanian Prime Minister Brătianu, who employed him on various missions to the Transylvanian Rumanians in order to induce them to come to terms with the Hungarians and thereby make possible the alliance with the Central Powers, the chief obstacle to which, according to Stere, was the intransigent attitude of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza. He, (Stere), came to Onciul to persuade him of the necessity of a concerted move on the part of the Austrian Rumanians for the purpose of exercising pressure on the Hungarians through the medium of the Viennese Government.

Stere rested on a misunderstanding of the relations between Budapest and Vienna and more especially of the character of Count Tisza and was consequently doomed to failure, but it gave an opportunity for Onciul to expound the Rumanian policy of a Bukovinian as he saw it.

He began by saying that Vienna could not interfere with Hungary's internal policy, and that an attempt to do so might risk the wholehearted participation in the war by the Hungarians, a loss for which Rumanian cooperation would be but poor compensation. In point of fact, — he continued, — the Allied Powers themselves are not particularly eager to obtain Rumania's help, being convinced that they will win the war with or without Rumania or even against her.

Very different would be the consequences for Rumania if she decided to enter the war.

If Russia was victorious, Rumania would perish whichever side she was on, simply because, geographically, she was in the unfortunate position of blocking Russia's way towards the Dardanelles. "Russia's victory would mean the death of Rumania, cooperation with Russia would be tantamount to suicide."

If Rumania was defeated on the side of Russia, she would be annexed by Austria-Hungary, for the Monarchy could not suffer to have an independent Rumania at her back.

She would be transformed into a province with a decent and honest administration and her people would be freed from their Greek masters who for two hundred years had sucked the country's life-blood under a false national flag. "This solution would be a piece of real good fortune for the Rumanian people, and we, the Rumanians of Austria-Hungary, would hail it with joy, for it would alter our situation and secure for us a leading role in the Monarchy."

If, finally, Rumania were to be on the side of the victorious Central Powers, she would win Bessarabia as far as Odessa. The alliance with Austria-Hungary would guard her against Russia's revenge. "In this case the King of Rumania would have to establish with the Emperor of Austria relations similar to those of the King of Bavaria with the German Emperor." This would put an end to the fear of a Hungarian invasion, which for the rest was never more than a myth. Count Tisza had stated that Hungary was already so saturated with Rumanians that he had no wish to increase their number, least of all by the acquisition of such spilt children as were the Bukovinian Rumanians."

The acquisition of Bessarabia would solve also the Transylvanian question. Aggrandised by this province, the Rumanian State would have an area of 300,000 sq kilometres with a population of 12 millions, whereas it could easily support 24 millions. It would be greatly to the advantage both of Hungary and Rumania to transfer to the latter the three million Rumanians of Hungary. The cost would not exceed 800 to 1000 million crowns, and the scheme could not but appeal to the Hungarians.

Such was the plan devised by a Bukovina statesman for the solution of the Rumanian problem. It had no sequel, for the fate of the Rumanians was decided at the Paris Conference. And now let us return to the story of Bukovina's annexation.

It was mentioned in previous articles that, during the period of Rumanian neutrality, Bukovina had formed one of the objects of bargaining between Rumania and the belligerent parties. Rumania claimed the province as the "ancestral cradle" of the Rumanian people, and the Allies

were willing to cede to her the southern half, inhabited principally by Rumanians, while Russia demanded the northern half, the population of which was wholly Ukrainian. In the first two years of the war the Central Powers were also disposed to let Rumania have southern Bukovina, if she entered the war on their side. Subsequently, after Rumania had sided against them, they formed new and different plans for the province.

During the war Bukovina suffered more severely from invasions than any other part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As a "threecornered land" with borders towards Austria, Russia and Rumania, it had great political and strategic importance for all three countries.

It was first invaded by the Russians in September 1914. Evacuated by the Russian forces in February 1915, it was invaded by them again in June 1916 in the course of the Brussilof offensive. Shortly after this the Rumanians entered the war. In August 1917 the Russians once again withdrew from the northern part of the country, and in March 1918, as a result of the preliminary peace of Buftea, the whole province was returned to Austria.

With the entry into the country of the Russian forces the attitude of a certain section of the Rumanian population underwent a complete change. The benefits of the excellent Austrian administration and civilisatory measures were promptly forgotten and the enemy was received with the utmost cordiality. "As a result of the friendly conduct of the Russians," — writes Constantine Kirițescu, the Rumanian historian of the war, — "sympathetic relations were established between them and the Rumanian people. In the border districts military and civil officials established close connections with the Russians and took part in cordial manifestations which were turned into political demonstrations aiming at the realisation of the Rumanian national ideal."

The Austrian authorities could hardly be expected to put up with this sort of thing in war-time, and they dealt summarily with those who maintained "friendly" political relations with the enemy. Such were chiefly to be found among the members of the Russophile Orthodox Churches, whether

Ruthene or Rumanian. But the great mass of the Rumanian people was unmoved; it was, as C. Kirilăescu states, "guiltless of the crimes which the authorities imputed to it", that is, it had not caught the disease of irredentism.

When, in the autumn of 1918, it became evident that the Monarchy was on the verge of collapse, various plans for its reconstruction were brought forward. In the Hussarek scheme Bukovina was to be kept as a Crownland. The Rumanian members of the *Reichsrat* drew up a scheme for turning Austria-Hungary into a federation of States, with the Rumanian territories, including Bukovina, as one or the member States. This was a revival of Aurel Popovici's and Onciul's idea. The Rumanian members constituted a National Council which was to have established connections with the Transylvanian Rumanians. But by that time the latter had declared in the Hungarian Parliament that they intended to settle their own destiny independently of the Hungarian legislature, and the Bukovina enterprise petered out.

The Bukovina problem was complicated by the Ruthene question, which was one of the stumbling-blocks at Brest-Litowsk. It was hopelessly entangled with the creation of the new Polish and Ukrainian States, and no agreement had been reached concerning it between the German, Austrian and Hungarian statesmen. The Ruthene leaders were reasonable, they demanded no more than the northern Ruthene territories, but the Rumanians were refractory, they would not hear of a partition of the province.

The few Rumanian leaders who had not escaped from the country during the war years, convoked for October 27 an assembly in the hall of the Diet. Ruthenes and other nationalities were not invited to attend. After a short discussion it was decided that the meeting was a constituent assembly, *adunarea constituantă*, of the "Rumanian land". It was resolved that Bukovina should enter into a union with the Rumanian kingdom, and a National Council of forty-eight members was elected to represent the country at the prospective peace conference. The assembly passed a resolution declaring that any attempt at a partition of the country must be firmly rejected.

The Reverend Bejan, the aged *popa* who presided at the meeting, closed it with the words of the Gospel: „Now lettest thou thy servant depart, O Lord, according to thy word, in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation which thou hast prepared before the face of all peoples.”

The leader of the Rumanians, Jancu Flondor, was despatched to the *Statthalter*, Count Etdorf. Simultaneously a crowd gathered before the palace of the *Statthaltereii*, shouting *trească Romania Mare, trească Regele Ferdinand* — long live Greater Rumania, long live King Ferdinand! Flondor appeared before the *Statthalter* and demanded that the government should be handed over to the Rumanians. Count Etdorf politely declared that he would not dream of such a thing. The Rumanians did not insist, and the crowd dispersed peaceably. The capital was still garrisoned by Hungarian and Croatian military.

In the first days of November the situation of the irredentist Rumanians became critical. Ukrainian troops entered Czernowitz and set up a government of their own. But the Rumanians took prompt measures to frustrate this enterprise.

On November 4 a young man of the name of Bodnarescu appeared in Iassy before the Prime Minister Marghiloman. He presented the text of the resolution of the constituent assembly and his authorisation to beg the Rumanian Government for moral and material support.

Marghiloman congratulated the Bukovinians on setting so good an example to the Transylvanians, who were always expecting outside help. He promised his moral support, and the material help of an organised constabulary. He explained that the Rumanian army would only be able to intervene if revolutionary excesses were to endanger the life and property of the Rumanian inhabitants.

Bodnerescu needed no more than this. He returned at once to Czernowitz, and already the day after Marghiloman received telegrams announcing that Suceava, Ițcani, Gura Humorului, Botoșani had been pillaged and Dorna Vatra devastated by the Ukrainians and Bolsheviks, and that the Rumanian constabulary was helpless in the face of these

outrages. Also, that the Ukrainians had occupied Bukovina as far as the line of the Seret. A telegram signed by Flondor asked for the intervention of the Rumanian army, failing which the most disastrous consequences might be expected for the "national cause."

Marghiloman immediately gave orders for the eighth army under General Zadik to enter Bukovina. According to his instructions, the army's task was "to protect the Rumanian population against outrages". The commander of the troops, however, was more sincere. In his army order General Zadik explained that frontiers drawn a hundred years before were powerless to separate Rumanian hearts and that the army was on its way to offer the Rumanian nation's devotion and assistance towards "the realisation of desires springing from the legitimate right of every people to determine its own fate."

On November 9 leaflets dropped from Rumanian aeroplanes informed the population that the Rumanian forces had crossed the frontier and were actually in the country. On the same day the disorganised Ukrainian army retreated and evacuated Czernowitz. But General Zadik did not know this, and — to borrow the words of the Rumanian historian Dr. Nandris, — he halted "with prudent circumspection" at a distance of eight kilometres from the town. The Rumanian inhabitants of Czernowitz had beflagged their houses and dressed themselves in festive garb to do honour to the entering troops, but "Saturday passed, Sunday passed, the crowds stood waiting in the streets, and nothing happened. The Ukrainians had long ago crossed the Pruth and still the General did not move. The people began to fear that the Ukrainians would return and that a terrible carnage would ensue." At last, on Sunday night, unable to wait any longer, the inhabitants of Czernowitz sent a deputation to General Zadik to tell him that he had nothing to fear, the enemy had left the town. Thereupon, on November 11, the troops were set in motion, and "on this historic day for Bukovina the victorious Rumanian army entered the town amid the tears and the showered flowers of the inhabitants."

Flondor, surrounded by the members of the National Council, received the General and, in his own words, "they

embraced as embrace, after a long and grievous separation, two loving brothers who are not to be parted again." A telegram was sent to King Ferdinand thanking him for the liberation of Bukovina from the Austrian yoke.

Yet the Rumanians were still dissatisfied. The resolution of October, writes C. Kirîţescu, had only expressed the "desire" for a union, but had contained "no statement that the union had been achieved". Besides, confesses Kirîţescu, the resolution having been passed without the concurrence of the other peoples of the country, "some formula had to be found which would confer an incontestable right" to carry out the act of union."

For this purpose the National Council was reinforced by twelve further members, selected from among the Bukovinian Rumanians who had previously fled the country but had now returned to it. It was convoked, under the name of "General Congress", for November 28. Soon a Bessarabian delegation arrived on the scene whose leader, Pan Halippa, Vice-President of the *Statul*, explained to the Bukovinians that the reason why Bessarabia had not accepted unconditional union had lain in the fact that Rumania had had a Conservative, Germanophile government at the time; now that its place had been taken by a Liberal government friendly to the Allied Powers, they would withdraw their conditions and accept complete union.

The congress was held in the palace of the Metropolitan, and there the Act of Union was passed. It might have been expected that its text would be drawn up in the dignified tone of an international document; instead of which, it was as vituperative as a hustings speech, filled with slanderous accusations against that Austria which had raised the Bukovinian Rumanians from Phanariote obscurity to a European level.

Starting with an account of the treacherous annexation by Austria of the ancestral Rumanian land, the old seat and burialplace of the early Moldavian Princes, in 1774, the Act goes on to describe the "terrible sufferings of the Bukovinian people under the foreign yoke during a period of a hundred and forty-four years." They had had to shed their

blood for their oppressors on all the European battle-fields; their language had been banned alike in public life, in the churches and in the schools, and their people had been prevented from sharing in the riches of the soil. In spite of all this, they had never lost their faith in an ultimate re-union with their mother country, and now, at last, thanks to the heroic efforts of the Rumanian nation and its powerful allies, and relying on the principle of the self-determination of the peoples, they were able to declare the unconditional and eternal union of Bukovina with the motherland.

The great war has produced few more repellent documents than this unfair and mendacious composition. But it served its purpose, for by its means Bukovina became an integral part of the Kingdom of Rumania.

In the square outside the palace General Zadik explained to his soldiers the happy results of their glorious feat of arms, whereupon the soldiers, in the exuberance of their joy, caught hold of the passing Rumanian wenches and began dancing with them the *Hora unrii*, or jig of union, "so that the ground, the ancestral soil of the ancient Moldavian Voivodes, shook under their feet."

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This affair of the Bukovina had a peculiar repercussion in Rumanian politics.

In the first days of November, when the Bukovinians appealed to Iassy for help, the Central Powers had already collapsed, revolution was in full swing both in Austria and in Hungary, and the diplomats of the Allied Powers were becoming daily more influential in Rumania. Thus when Marghiloman, in the afternoon of November 5, announced the dispatch of troops to Bukovina and expressed the opinion that the diplomatic representatives of the Allies would have to be informed of the occurrence, the King assented with an eager: "Oui, oui, oui!"

Next morning Marghiloman sent a Note to Sir George Barclay, the British Minister in Iassy, which was an open avowal of irredentistic activities. "The Rumanian Government", — it ran, — "would have failed in their duty if they

had remained passive onlookers of the systematic destruction of the Rumanian inhabitants of this province."

On that same morning of November 5 Marghiloman was summoned to the king's presence at eleven a. m. — whether before or after the reception of his Note by the British Minister, it would be impossible to say. The ensuing interview has been described by himself in his *Mémoires*:

"I was somewhat astonished by the summons. General Remniceanu's face and the King's air told me at once that something was wrong. Accordingly I abridged the contents of the telegrams. There was a pause. Then the King, very red in the face, said in a trembling voice: 'I have a painful communication to make to you. After you left me yesterday afternoon, the Ministers of the Allied Powers came to see me and informed me that they have no confidence in your government. And just now... the Allied Powers... as you know... They reproached us for having sent troops to occupy Bukovina, without having consulted them, whereas we should have come to an arrangement with them in regard to the disposal of this territory.' I said: 'My resignation is at Your Majesty's disposal, but I handled the Bukovina question with Your Majesty's entire approval and it was I who reminded Your Majesty that it would be well to inform the Allied Powers, in token of our amicable sentiments, of what we had done.'"

The king left this observation unanswered, and simply told Marghiloman that it was his purpose to form a non-party government. At the same time he assured him of his goodwill and begged for his support.

Marghiloman learned later that King Ferdinand had already the night before entrusted General Coanda with the formation of a new government: also, that he had known beforehand of the *démarche* of the Allied Powers.

In the afternoon of November 6 Marghiloman announced in the Senate the resignation of the Cabinet.

"I will not enlarge upon the causes of our going out", — he said, — "else I should be forced to make some unpalatable revelations concerning a certain intimate policy which is being carried on in this country. My withdrawal is

by no means a desertion. And at least it occurs as the final act of an apotheosis — Bukovina and Northern Bessarabia. We have saved the dynasty and the army, and have given the country Bessarabia and Bukovina in their territorial integrity . . . We shall be found on the side of all that works for the maintenance of order and the greatness of our country; and resolutely opposed to every immoral and fraudulent régime of the sort by which we have hitherto been poisoned."

The commentary to this speech was supplied by Senator Bardescu, who remarked:

"This that has happened is a very dangerous thing; everywhere else anarchy comes from below; with us, it comes from the top. There is need of a constitutional reform to check the royal power.

(To be continued.)

OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

EXCERPTS FROM THE RUMANIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE

BY

LADISLAS DE FRITZ

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

The March 26th., 1943, issue (No. 72) of the "*Monitorul Oficial*" *inter alia* publishes an ordinance (No. 4885) of General Constantin Pantais (*general de divizie*), National Defence Minister (MINISTERUL AFARARII NAZIONALE) relating to the dissolution of eight associations. These associations, which were headed by the names of prominent patriots, had been the scenes of widespread malversation; and the scandal, which created a considerable sensation even in the public opinion of Rumania so inured to events of the kind, throws a glaring light on the corrupt state of Rumanian club life. The ministerial ordinance (*deciziune*) in question refers to the report submitted by the "Comitetul de control al Asociațiilor de foști luptători" (*Committee for the Control of Associations of Veterans*), which establishes the failure of the following associations to comply with the objects determined in their statutes: —

1. ("*Federatia Nationale a Asociatiunilor Luptători Regele Ferdinand I.*" (National Federation of Association of Veterans of King Ferdinand I.): the 1937 operations of this federation with headquarters in Bucharest which until that year had not functioned at all, closed with a deficit; the federation had failed to observe the provisions of the law relating to fictitious persons, and had not submitted its balance-sheet and its accounts (*registrele*) either to the ministry or to the competent court of law, while it had not complied with any one of the objects defined in its statutes.

2. "*Liga Foștilor Luptători Grade Inferioare*" (Union of Former Soldiers — Veterans — of Inferior Rank). This association — also with headquarters in Bucharest — had managed its affairs (*gestio*) irregularly, *had illegally collected various sums from members, while the management had through carelessness (negligentia) inflicted upon the association losses amounting to 72,324 lei; the association had failed to realize the objects determined in the statutes, and as from 1941 had altogether ceased to function.*

3. "*Asociația Făuritori României Mari*" (Association of Founders of Greater Rumania). The administration and accountancy work (*contabilitatea*) of this association with headquarters in Bucharest had since 1938 been carried on in defiance of both byelaws and laws (*neregulă și ilegală*), and had *illegally spent an amount of 568,632 lei intended for the purchase of an aeroplane (suma destinată unui avion): the association had obtained receipts affecting its prestige and had further since February 2, 1940, failed to convene a general meeting.*

4. "*Societatea Mărășești a foștilor luptători din câmpurile 1913—1916—1918*" (Mărășești Association of Veterans who fought in Wars of 1913, 1916 and 1918), an association with its headquarters in Bucharest the management of which — in the years 1938—43 — inflicted losses on the association *by granting illegal loans never repaid and endangered the prestige of the association by the conclusion with various persons of disadvantageous contracts* inflicting material losses on the association (*contracte oneroase și pagubitoare*), and had failed to submit for certification its balance-sheet and accounts.

5. "*Societatea demobilizatorilor Fii Apărători și Patriei*" (Association Founded by Demobilized Sons of Defenders of the Country), an association with headquarters at Modgigia in County Constanta dissolved by the Minister for National Defence because since 1938 it had not functioned at all.

6. "*Asociatia generale a decoratilor on medalia Victoria*" (General Association of Persons decorated with the Victoria Order), an association with its headquarters in Bucharest which in the last five years had failed to subject its operations to official control and was therefore to be regarded as having ceased to function.

7. "*Societatea Apărătorii Patriei*" (Association of Defenders of the Country), an association with headquarters in Bucharest which in 1942 applied for an order for its dissolution and, when summoned by the committee of control to present a report of its proceedings for the purpose of verification and supervision, had failed to comply with the summons.

8. "*Societatea Eroii Noamului*" (Society of National Heroes), an association with headquarters in Bucharest dissolved — *inter alia* — for having illegally appropriated for personal purposes considerable sums out of the society's assets and having carried on its business irregularly and illegally.

NEWS FROM CROATIA

BY

IMRE PROKOPY

In our May issue we published abstracts from the statements broadcast by a few Members of the Serbian Government on the second anniversary of the notorious Belgrade "putsch" which led to the collapse of Yugoslavia, and from articles contributed to the press on the same occasion by eminent Serbian politicians. The chief topics of these statements and declarations were — exasperation at the falling to pieces of the Yugoslav State, public denunciation of the unscrupulous authors and ringleaders of the upheaval leading to the catastrophe and the civil war that followed, and the education of the Serbian nation to cope with the new and arduous tasks awaiting it.

Quite different was the character of the anniversary celebrations held on April 10th. by Croatians all over the country to commemorate the second anniversary of the proclamation of an independent Croatian State. *The ground tone of the speeches made at these anniversary festivals was inspired by enthusiastic delight at the achievement of Croatia's liberty and the exalting consciousness that "after so many sufferings and so many feuds, despite the many misfortunes inflicted upon it", the Croatian nation had, with the effectual assistance of the Axis Powers, regained its full sovereignty.* This state of mind of the Croatian people — or of the vast majority of that people —, its self-confidence enhanced by the results achieved during the two years that have passed since Croatia obtained her independence in respect of the organization and adjustment of the machinery of the new State, and its firm and unshakable faith in its future, combined with a resolute determination to challenge all enemies, whether at home or abroad, — all these moments were reflected in a manner worthy of the occasion in the official declarations made at the national celebrations and in the

Croatian Press, from which we quote below a few excerpts in illustration of the situation.

The April 8th. issue of the "*Seljačko Ognjište*" (Peasant Hearth) published an article by Matije Kovačić entitled "*On the Eve of the Great Day*" in which the writer, *inter alia*, declared that „during the past two years, as a result of its position in international politics, the new, independent Croatian State has become internationally too a reality which cannot be spirited away, — mainly because against its known enemies it is supported by friendly States which have enabled the Croatian nation to shake off the fetters of the past and to live an independent life in the new European Order... *In the second year of our existence as an independent State we have had arduous days and have experienced hours in which many Croatians faltered.. Now, however, the terror is on the wane and the bolshevik danger appearing under the guise of "partisan" activity has already become merely a secondary trouble that will shortly cease to exist altogether. The main forces of the "partisans" have been routed, while the small detachments still engaged in the work of devastation will not be able much longer to escape utter extermination...*" "Last year was a year of sacrifices, though also of experience. Even the naivest of our compatriots have already realized that the Croatian nation has to choose between two paths, — either the vindication of its independent State existence leading to the safeguarding of life and the ensuring of the future, or the dark path of Bolshevism, which would involve the loss by the Croatian people of its liberty and the gradual extinction even of its very existence" ("*Hrvattski Narod*", April 8th., 1943).

Statements by MM. Lorković and Budak and the Poglavnik.

We find a number of interesting and most instructive moments in the address broadcast on April 10th. by Dr. Mladen Lorković, former Croatian Foreign Minister, which presented — *for the re-assurance of the Croatian nation — a colourful and encouraging account "of the two years of Croatia's existence as an independent State". "Two years ago*

today", said M. Lorković, *inter alia*, "amid an enthusiasm in keeping with the grandeur of the historical event, success at last crowned the endeavours and arduous struggles of many generations of Croatians, and historical justice was finally asserted. The Croatian nation had achieved what it had fought for in so many a manner — had achieved what was its due. . . The New Europe of Hitler and Mussolini, those two great leaders, had given it what the older Europe had for centuries denied it, — the right to political independence and thereby to a life worthy of its traditions. Today, when we are celebrating the second anniversary of the declaration of our independence, we must realize more clearly than ever before the significance of the two moments upon which the independence of our State is based. The first of the moments ensuring our independence is the unyielding struggle of the Croatian people to achieve its liberty, to which a definitive framework has been given by M. Pavelić, our Poglavnik. The other moment ensuring our national independence is the recognition and the practical assistance accorded us by New Italy and the New German Empire".

In speaking of Yugoslav rule M. Lorković said: — "One of the most serious questions confronting the Croatian State at the very outset of its political independence was the Yugoslav heritage. *The moral and political virus of the Yugoslav system, its economic exploitation and devastations, combined with the systematic endeavour to disrupt Croatian society, have left traces of their corruptive influence on the Croatian nation. In our work of building up our State we find ourselves daily up against the noxious aftermath of Yugoslav rule*".

Speaking of the relations between Serbians and Croatians, M. Lorković added: — "For the solution of the problems confronting us great efforts must be made, exceptional perseverance and resolution displayed, — particularly in view of the fact that the sworn enemies of the Croatian people, of our national independence and our liberty — those who for twenty-two years veritably crucified Croatia — almost immediately after the collapse of Yugoslavia joined hands to nip in the bud and frustrate the work of organizing the Croatian national State which had been initiated with such

great enthusiasm . . . The old enemies of the Croatian nation vented their spite on Croatia because Croatia was in the way of their insane chauvinism and because our State owes its origin to that New Europe which they hate so profoundly. *To help them in the implementation of their wicked scheme they have secured the unconditional support of London and Moscow. And, whereas the Axis Powers, inspired by a spirit of justice, have magnanimously espoused the cause of a small and much-afflicted people, London and Moscow — with the co-operation of political desperadoes, refugees from Yugoslavia who figure as some nondescript "Yugoslav Government" and whose ranks unfortunately include one or two Croatian traitors, though the latter hold only posts of minor importance — have organized robber-bands. The task assigned to these men is to penetrate into Croatia from "abroad" (sc. from Serbia), and then, joining with shady elements like themselves, to devastate the villages and towns of Croatia with fire and sword, to murder the defenceless inhabitants, to destroy their food supplies and to blow up lines of communication, — in short, to employ all the means of barbarism to endanger the lives and the very existence of the Croatian people and the Croatian State . . . Our enemies are however mistaken. On the present anniversary day we are already in a position to affirm with absolute certainty that the efforts of the subterranean forces to destroy the independent Croatian State have failed. Thanks to the self-consciousness of the Croatian nation, to its virility and its selflessness, — to the statesmanship of our Poglavnik and to the magnanimity and generous support of the Führer and the Duce and of the German and Italian Governments —, the Croatian State has already overcome the gravest of its ordeals and is about to enter a period of reconciliation and undisturbed construction. It is in this firm conviction that the Croatian people crosses the threshold of the third year of its national and political independence" ("Hrvatski Nord", April 11th., 1943).*

This extremely interesting — and indeed in many respects extremely remarkable — broadcast was the last official appearance of M. Lorković as Foreign Minister — of the man who after the establishment of the independent Croatian State organized the Foreign Ministry and who,

being only 34 years of age, was probably the youngest foreign minister in Europe. For two weeks later, on April 24th., the Poglavnik accepted his resignation, granting him the title of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in recognition of his services, and appointed as his successor Dr. *Mile Budak*, the eminent novelist who prior to his appointment to the post of Croatian Minister in Berlin had been the first Minister of Education of the new Croatian State. On May 12th., on the occasion of his departure from Berlin, M. Budak broadcast over the wave-length of the Donau-Alpen station a short address in which, *inter alia*, he declared that *he regarded it as one of the chief objects of the foreign policy of Croatia now entrusted to his direction to continue to secure the friendship and assistance of the Axis Powers with which Croatia was allied and which, the Croatians should be reminded, did not desire to treat Croatia as a vassal State, being on the contrary anxious to see a strong and independent Croatia. This declaration therefore shows that there will be no change of tendency in the foreign policy of Croatia.*

At the opening of an Ustasha course arranged early in May, Dr. Ante *Pavelić*, Head of the Croatian State, defined the guiding principles of Croatian domestic policy in the following terms: — *“Our Ustasha soldiers have never acknowledged — and do not acknowledge today either — that there is such a thing as classwar . . . There must be no barriers raised between Croatian and Croatian; for such barriers prevent the people being united and strong and make it an easy prey for outsiders. The Ustasha spirit today permeates the whole Croatian people; in Croatia today work is a greater value than gold or silver. Only those nations can emerge victorious from the war which work laboriously and have an unswerving faith in their own future. That people which does not possess a State of its own will be lost to sight among the peoples and will disappear, and no one will ever be able to raise it to life again . . . Every one must be inspired by the sublime idea of an independent State and by the exalting consciousness that the Croatian people is once more living in a free and independent country . . . Croatia will leave no stone unturned to ensure the permanence of her existence*

as a State; for that reason she will fight with every means in her power against Bolshevism, the greatest enemy of Europe and humanity. Every one must regard it as his sacred duty to support the Croatian nation and the Croatian State wholeheartedly in this struggle against Communism."

In conclusion the Poglavnik declared further that the whole Croatian people was to be organized within the framework of the Ustasha movement in order to thereby ensure the union of popular forces and the unbroken unity of the internal political life of the country. (v. *Croatian newspapers and "Délvidéki Magyarorság", May 6th., 1943*).

As may be seen from the few excerpts given above, the leaders of the Croatian people — despite the difficulties in evidence in international and domestic politics, the latter difficulties being due primarily to the fact that the authorities have not succeeded in completely liquidating the depredations of the insurgent bands — repose unwavering trust in the virility of the Croatian people and are striving indefatigably to ensure order in the country and to promote the material welfare of the inhabitants.

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

TRANSYLVANIA'S CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

LADISLAS SZENCZEI

Quite recently M. Olimpiu Boitos published a book entitled "*The Cultural Development of Transylvania*" which deals with the results of Rumanian rule in Transylvania. In his book M. Boitos devotes particular attention to the development of public education. In this chapter the author complains that in 1910, in the Hungarian areas allotted to Rumania the number of illiterates represented 43.10 and — in the territory of historical Transylvania proper — 49.50% respectively of the total population. Illiteracy was particularly unbounded in the counties with Rumanian populations. In Alsófehér County, for instance, the proportion of illiterates was 59.20%, in Tordaaranyos County 62.90%, in Szolnok-Doboka County 72.40%, in Kolozs County 64.40% and in Máramaros County 73.20%. In 1910 the number of persons able to read and write in the territory of historical Transylvania was only 51.50%. In the course of the next twenty years this proportion advanced to 67% (in 1930). During the fifteen years between 1920 and 1936 the Rumanian State built 729 new schools.

Without wishing in any way to disparage the educational efforts of the Rumanian Governments, *we must protest a limine against every attempt to enhance the merits of Rumanian education by underrating the efforts made by the Hungarian educational authorities.* Taken absolutely, the development of Rumanian education is numerically a praiseworthy achievement: but it is relatively speaking open to criticism in its particulars. As for the illiteracy of so striking a character in evidence among the Rumanian inhabitants of Hungary, it cannot under any circumstances

be laid at the doors of the Hungarian Government, for in 1912, for instance, the proportion of illiterates in the "Regat" (Old Rumania) was 60.7%, — a state of things considerably worse than that prevailing in Transylvania. And, though there were certain counties in Transylvania in which in 1910 the proportion of illiterates was 64.40%, 71.40% and even 73.20%, an investigation of the conditions then prevailing in the "Regat" will reveal the fact that there were a large number of counties in that kingdom in which the proportion of illiterates was just as large, or even larger. In the counties of Valcea, Arges, Dambovita, Suzau, Tecuci, Husi and Botosani, for instance, the proportion of illiterates ranged from 60% to 65%; in the counties of Mehedinti, Dolj, Gorj, Romanati, Bacau, Roman and Vaslui the proportion of illiterates was 65—70%; and in the counties of Olt, Teleorman, Drohoiu and Constanta 70—75%. And there was one county in which the proportion of illiterates was almost 80%. *The illiteracy of so striking a character in evidence among the Rumanians cannot thereby by any means be explained as having been the result of foreign — in particular Magyar oppression: for in 1912 the number of Rumanians able to read and write was proportionately far larger in Hungary than in "free" Rumania.* This follows naturally also from the fact that, whereas in 1914, in the days of Hungarian rule, there was 1 elementary school using Rumanian as the medium of instruction for every 1116 Rumanian inhabitants, the proportion of such schools in the "Regat" at the same period was only 1 for every 1718 inhabitants. Great as may have been the advance in the number of Rumanians able to read and write during the first 10 years of Greater Rumania — the proportion having risen in the "Regat" from 39.3% (1920) to 55.8% (1930) —, the number of illiterates in 1930 was still a startlingly large one; for in that year, in the whole territory of Rumania, 43% of the inhabitants over six years of age were unable to read or write. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the number of persons able to read

and write quoted in this connection includes also the Magyars, Germans and Jews who comprise considerably larger proportions of persons able to read and write, thereby contributing in a very great measure to improve the general ratio for the whole country. It is not very probable that the proportion of the ethnically Rumanian population able to read and write was in 1930 more than 55%. *This figure, however, reveals the existence of an enormous proportion of illiterates, — especially when we consider that in 1930, in Dismembered Hungary, the proportion of illiterates was only 9.8% of the number of persons over 6 years of age (not, as in Rumania, of those over 7 years of age).* The illiteracy of the Rumanians in Transylvania cannot be attributed to factors outside the Rumanians themselves, — e. g. to so-called foreign oppression —, but solely and exclusively to the specific moments guiding the destiny of the Rumanian people, — the fact that their settlements are of a relatively recent date, and the circumstance that the bulk of the Rumanian people were still engaged primarily in pastoral pursuits as recently as the eighteenth century, only turning to agriculture as a pursuit in the nineteenth century. In view of the original exceptional backwardness of the Rumanians in this respect, the advance of the proportion of persons able to read and write from 39% to 55% is a rather indifferent result. The indifferent character of the result is confirmed also by the figures which disclose the failure of Rumanian elementary education. Whereas in the period between 1921 and 1932 only 59.8% of Rumanian children of schooling age attended school regularly, in Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary the corresponding proportions were 100% and 95% respectively. The number of children enrolled in schools who in Rumania during the same ten years had to repeat their classes, abandoned their studies or were expelled from school, was 6.989.358. This figure represents no less than 37.8% of the total number of children of schooling age enrolled in the schools. The proportion of pupils compelled to repeat their classes was

actually 30% of the total number of pupils of schooling age enrolled! There is no other country in Europe showing a failure of public education of such glaring dimensions and so undisguised a character. The efforts made by Rumania in the field of elementary education cannot be described as great even in financial respects, a circumstance revealed chiefly by the fact that, whereas in the ten years 1921—1932 Dismembered Hungary — a country which had far less headway to make in elementary education than Rumania — appropriated on the average 14.2% of its total Budget for public education purposes, Rumania appropriated for the same purposes only 12.5%. *That being so, there can be hardly any doubt that, if it had been left in the possession of Hungary, Transylvania would be able to show far greater results in the field of elementary education.*

In the chapter of his book dealing with secondary education M. Olimpiu Boitos notes with gratification that, whereas in 1918—19 the number of "lyceums" in Transylvania was only 25 and that of lower-grade secondary schools only 66, ten years later, in the school-year 1928-29, the number of "lyceums" had risen to 49 and that of lower-grade secondary schools to 77. The explanation is that the new rulers of Transylvania were anxious to educate with magic rapidity a Rumanian middle class to replace the Magyar and German middle classes which had previously served in the public administration and in the economic life of the province. After the putting into force of the Treaty of Trianon some 200.000 Magyars — mostly belonging to the middle classes — had to leave their native land and move to Dismembered Hungary. *The bitter fruits of this absurd procedure very soon made their effects sensibly felt by the Rumanian State and Rumanian society too; the new Rumanian middle class was so rapidly organized, being recruited from riff-raff elements, so poorly provided intellectually and so completely over-dimensioned, that the intellectual proletariat thus artificially expanded shook the*

foundations of the whole country. It is to this intellectual proletariat that must be traced the origin of the Iron Guard movement of so destructive and anarchical a character; and it was from that source that it derived its dubious political pretensions.

When, in 1919, the Rumanians occupied Transylvania, they found at Kolozsvár a splendidly equipped university. M. Boitos ventures to bring against the Francis Joseph University of Kolozsvár the charge that from the days of its foundation in 1872 it never served scientific aims, being merely an instrument for the furtherance of magyarization. This charge will not hold water. The Kolozsvár University was the scene of valuable scientific work; a circumstance proved most clearly by the fact that it was the home of the labours of world-famed *savants* such as Stephen Apáthy, one of the founders of modern physiology. M. Boitos takes pride in recording the fact that the Rumanians organized 22 new chairs in addition to those already in existence in the University. The only question is, — how did the Rumanians provide for the housing of the several scores of new chairs, scientific institutes, and laboratories? For the objective critic is compelled to establish that the new masters of the University did not show any particular zeal as builders. The magnificent building of the University Library and the impressive, dome-crowned building of the Pasteur Institute were both creations of that Hungarian rule of which M. Boitos maliciously alleges that in founding the University the Hungarians had in view, not scientific, but only chauvinistic aims. During the 22 years of Rumanian rule the extensive series of buildings belonging to the Kolozsvár University was extended only by the addition of a single structure — the two-storied building serving clinical purposes erected opposite the Mikó-utca Clinic which however even externally looks exceedingly insignificant beside the magnificent building of the University Library dating from the days of Hungarian rule. And what a peculiar method of comparison is that adopted by M. Boitos in setting

over against one another the number of publications issued by the Francis Joseph University between 1872 and 1882 (the first decade of its existence) and that of the publications issued by the Regale Ferdinand University between 1918 and 1928 (the first decade of its existence), drawing from the fact that in the first ten years of its existence the Hungarian university issued fewer publications than the Rumanian university in the first ten years of its existence conclusions of a most crushing character respecting the scientific activity of the Francis Joseph University. In his prepossession M. Boitos forgets the simple fact that in the decade between 1872 and 1882 modern printing technique was as yet unknown, as were also the modern methods of scientific publication, and that the volume of scientific knowledge too was far less then than half a century later, so that the number of publications issued by the Hungarian university most certainly answered even the most exacting requirements of the science of the day. 1928 was separated from 1882 by 46 years — i. e. by almost half a century; and, though the Rumanian university may have been able to issue in 1928 a number of publications exceeding that published by its predecessor fifty years earlier, no conclusions can be drawn from this fact relative to the respective scientific levels of the two universities.

It would be a waste of time to deal with the other chapters treating of the development of *belles lettres*, art, music, etc.: nothing is more natural than that life should have continued to pulsate in Transylvania after 1918 too; and it is extremely difficult to gauge the value of the development. One thing is however indubitable, — viz. that the upswing of Rumanian culture was almost necessarily accompanied by a set-back in Hungarian culture. In 1918 the Hungarian Thalia was driven from the splendid home erected for her by the generosity of Hungarian society and the Hungarian State and compelled to retire to more humble quarters in the summer theatre. It was in vain that the Magyar theatrical world of Kolozsvár appealed for the

restoration of its old, patinated home, which had been built for its use in old-world Farkas-utca more than a hundred years previously by the liberality of Hungarian society; the request was refused, though the Hungarian National Theatre of Kolozsvár, an institution with a past of a century and a half which was the oldest stage in South-Eastern Europe — a stage with glorious traditions —, would certainly have deserved so much consideration. The request was refused, because the new rulers veritably revelled in the sight of Hungarian histrionic art consigned to the ignominy of a suburban music-hall. And, whereas the ASTRA (the cultural association of the Rumanians of Transylvania) was able to work intensively during the 22 years of Rumanian rule for the realization of its aims, the EMKE (the cultural association of the Magyars of Transylvania) had to suspend its activity, because the Rumanian Government refused to approve its statutes.

Do what we will with M. Boitos's book, we cannot find in it any chapter of logical clearness calculated to convince us that during the 22 years of Rumanian rule Transylvania passed through an unbroken cultural development. All results have foretokens of either a positive or a negative character; and very often, taken absolutely, the negative considerations weigh more in the balance than the positive ones . . .

ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE SOLDIERS RETURNING FROM THE FRONT

The whole Hungarian nation welcomed with exceptional cordiality General vitéz Gustavus Jány, commander of the Second National Defence Army which had fought so gloriously on the eastern front, on his return home on May 1st.

In the early hours of the afternoon military and other detachments filed into their places in the square facing the arrival platform of the Eastern Railway Terminus, Budapest. Outside the cordon tens of thousands of spectators lined up to witness the arrival of General Jány and to welcome him home with cheers and the waving of handkerchiefs, in his person greeting the Second "Honvéd" Army.

The large reception hall of the Terminus was decorated with palms and carpets, the walls being draped with the national tricolor and the arms of Hungary.

At 5.40 sharp the special train glided slowly into the station. A *thunder of cheers* greeted General vitéz Gustavus Jány as he stood at the salute at the door of his car. The General was welcomed home by M. Nicholas de Kallay, Prime Minister, in the following terms: —

"I welcome you, General, as the gallant commander of the Second Army now returning from the front and as the wounded Honvéd soldier returning with the comrades of your struggles. And in your person I welcome the whole National Defence Army which fought and suffered for its country far from home, on the Russian battlefield. I welcome all those who have arrived home with you and who are coming home after you, — while *I mourn deeply and with all the sympathy of my heart for those heroes who will never return!*

"In the distant Russian battlefield the army under

your command, General, was a symbol of duty unquestioningly performed, — performing its duty in obedience to the command of the Supreme War Lord and to the decision originating from the obligation devolving upon us too to share in the defence of our country, our race, our Christian faith and our civilization in the world-conflagration now raging. I welcome all alike, though primarily and above all those who have fought and suffered most and have shown the greatest determination, — the good officers and the Hungarian "Honvéd" soldiers fighting so faithfully and obediently, so gallantly and so heroically.

"It is the duty of this nation — a duty which I myself undertake and the fulfilment of which I regard as a sacred obligation — to provide that every warrior, every officer and private, shall find his home on his return at least in the state in which he left it. But if our country, our homeland, is able to provide more bread, better opportunities and a better life, that is due first and foremost to you, and above all to those of you who have left behind you a reputation for gallantry and have made sacrifices, — to those who have left widows and orphans to mourn their loss —, to those who have won distinction in the field or who in the course of the struggle have had their vitality weakened or suffered disablement."

In his reply General vitéz Gustavus Jány made the following declaration: —

"Your Excellency, I thank you most heartily for the warm words spoken by you, which I was proud to hear. These words are addressed primarily to those who fought so gallantly on the shores of the Don and prevented the Red Terror plunging its bloody talons into the sacred soil of our native land. Appreciation, glory and honour is due to those who fought so strenuously on the far-distant fields of battle. Praise is due to those who stemmed the mighty tide of our enemies, dealing annihilating blows, though those enemies were far superior to us in tanks and armour."

The speeches of the Prime Minister and General Jány were received with loud and prolonged cheers and applause. The Premier and the Minister for War then cordially embraced the army commander.

General vitéz Jány Speaks of Winter Campaign of National Defence Army.

The Leader and Chancellor of the German Empire has conferred on General vitéz Gustavus Jány the Knight's Cross of the German Iron Cross Order. On the occasion of the formal presentation of this distinction the members of the National Defence Army War Correspondents Company were received in audience by the General, who made an exhaustive statement respecting the winter campaign of the National Defence Army.

"The most important events in the winter campaign in which the Russians made their mass attacks were *the bitter preventive actions of our soldiers*. In these fierce struggles we were faced, not only by an enormous superiority of numbers, but by the opposition of natural conditions too; for that was the only period during the whole winter when the temperature fell to -45° . And in these struggles the National Defence soldiers, though unable to stop the advance of the enormously superior odds, *held out without flinching and crumbled to pieces some fifteen divisions and 4—5 armoured brigades*. This is proved by the fact that later on not a single enemy armoured car pursued us from the east, only inferior detachments having attempted to attack us. The danger that really menaced us was from enemy forces that had broken through to the south and penetrated to our rear.

"*This phase of the operations is over*. It came to an end when, on March 22nd., what remained of the armoured division and the battalions assembled under the direction of the command of the twenty-third division which had fought a successful and unselfish rearguard action, withdrew from participation in the operations.

"When once familiar with his weapons and inured to the climate and accustomed to the terrain, the National Defence soldier *was of supreme excellence in attack and in defence — though that is less adapted to his temperament — also held his ground in an unexceptionable manner*. This is proved by the three engagements fought at the Uryw bridgehead and by the two battles of Sustye and Korotojak,

in which we frustrated the attempts of the inconceivably superior Bolshevik odds to break through. The magnificent spirit of attack of our National Defence soldiers is documented by the many sorties undertaken by them regularly and successfully between the autumn and the January battles. The magnificent character of this spirit is shown also by the fact that at the time of the January offensive the battalions withdrawn from the sections of the front which were not affected carried out their counter-attacks in the breaches made with such vigour and vehemence and clung so obstinately to the snow defences which had been scraped together in face of vastly superior odds, that these troops deserve the highest praise.

“Though according to recent experience the clothing of the National Defence soldiers from the hip downwards did not offer quite adequate protection against the extremely severe Russian winter, *nevertheless those soldiers stood the cold in a manner deserving the highest praise.* In defensive positions and immobile warfare respectively their winter equipment was quite adequate; for the rank and file had repeated opportunities of taking shelter and warming themselves in the trenches. But those engaged in counter-attacks, as well as those who could not find room in the trenches, were often benumbed by the cold and the snow. *So intense was the cold that if you took your hand out of your glove and touched the iron of your rifle with your bare fingers, the latter simply froze.* The oil on the weapons often froze too. During the coldest days the machine guns too froze now and again, while it proved almost or absolutely impossible to turn the towers of the tanks, and the cartridge-levers of many rifles were simply split in two by the cold. And even under such circumstances the Hungarian National Defence soldier showed his readiness to make every sacrifice for his country. For that reason practically every one of our formations deserves nothing but appreciation and praise. *In the course of the final battles our troops shot up 150 tanks.* This is a first-rate achievement; for we were relatively poor in anti-tank weapons. But the artillery — which, it should be added, threw itself into the struggle regardless of sacrifices — wrought enormous havoc among

the tanks. Just before it was relieved our most southern division again crossed the Don and penetrated the enemy positions. Those of our divisions which were operating on the southern wing put up a strenuous defence even against the vastly superior numbers of the enemy which had penetrated to their rear and were attempting to crumple up our lines. And the Hungarian division stationed at Korotojak joined hands with a German division to defeat the encircling movement; then, after having completed its task, it broke through the encircling forces, crushing the ring of enemies and proceeding as rearguard to the position appointed for it. *The Hungarian division stationed at Storozhevoje also fought obstinately even when outflanked by the enemy, who had penetrated to its rear.* Then, joining hands with the Komárom division, it retired, in obedience to orders, step by step, ensuring the retreat of the German forces from the Voronyezh bridgehead. That is how the said Hungarian troops, which were the last to leave the Don, became the rearguard of the rearguard. *I have therefore nothing but praise and appreciation for the heroic struggles of our National Defence soldiers; and I must pay a tribute of sincere homage and respect to the memory of those who sacrificed their lives to enable the rest of their comrades to extricate themselves from the ring by which they were encircled. The memory of our dead heroes will live in the hearts of every National Defence soldier. Their lives will serve as a pledge that the Hungarian National Defence Army shall never forget what it owes to the "Honvéd" name or what its duty is."*

POLITICAL MOSAIC

M. PAUL BALLA, ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY,
SPEAKS OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN-
SERBIAN RELATIONS

At a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Society held on May 11th. a paper written by M. Paul Balla, Assistant Under-Secretary, *describing the development of Hungarian-Serbian political relations* was read in which the author — inter alia — made the following highly significant statements: —

"Of late Hungarian public opinion has shown a peculiar interest in the Serbian question, which it regards from various standpoints. Public opinion is naturally interested rather in the actual aspects of the question, though it does not leave out of account the possibilities of the future development of Hungarian-Serbian relations either. In my opinion the only way to arrive at a proper appreciation of this problem is to project it against the background of the historical development of Hungarian-Serbian relations, — in other words, to investigate and thereby make ourselves fully familiar with the factors which have, during centuries of symbiosis, exercised a decisive influence upon the relations between the two peoples and upon their political situation.

"I feel sure that we all agree that the future development of Hungarian-Serbian political relations *will not only be of importance as affecting the interests of the two peoples, but is bound to indirectly affect the political conditions and the balance of power of all the peoples living on the banks of the Danube; we may therefore without exaggeration say that this question is of general interest to Europe as a whole.*

"The unjust territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon and the harsh treatment meted out by Belgrade to the more than half a million Magyars subjected by that Treaty to its rule, naturally exercised an unfavourable influence upon the political connections between Hungary and Serbia. *The Hungarians could not be expected to renounce their legitimate claims to a territorial re-adjustment; nor could they help being incensed at the disfranchisement of the Magyars living in Yugoslavia.* On the other hand, Belgrade clung obstinately to its determination to stabilize the situation created by Trianon; and, in order to ensure the realization of that object, as a Member of the Little Entente brought into being by Beneš, played an active role in the diplomatic machinations the object of which

was to perpetuate the political fettering of Hungary. Nor did Belgrade show any inclination to change this attitude when, *in 1926, His Highness the Regent of Hungary, in the speech made by him at Mohács which aroused general interest everywhere, voiced the readiness of the Hungarians — a readiness based upon practical political considerations — to adjust their relations with their southern neighbours by means of a modus vivendi.* It was only much later — when towards the end of the thirties there ensued a material change in the European political situation and, as a consequence of the collapse of Czecho-Slovakia, the Little Entente was dissolved — that Belgrade began to display a certain readiness to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. A realization of the reciprocal interests attaching to a prevention of the extension of the European war that broke out in 1939 led in 1941 to the conclusion between the two States of a treaty of perpetual amity. The treaty, however, failed to assert its beneficial effect in practice; for a few weeks later, as a consequence of the Shimovitch "putsch" and the subsequent aggressive attitude displayed by Belgrade, a new situation arose which ultimately led to the collapse of Yugoslavia and to our restoration of the thousand-year-old southern frontier of Hungary.

"We Hungarians would fain believe this turn of affairs to be the definitive conclusion of an old dispute — a dispute dating back over a century *which was not originated by us but in which we were the passive Party. We are merely defending our thousand-year-old rights in desiring that the territorial question should cease to figure as one of the factors calculated to influence Hungarian-Serbian relations in the future either in internal or in international politics.* We are particularly anxious that this should be so, because we are fully conscious of the community of interests existing in many respects as between the two peoples — and indeed of the interdependence of those peoples —, and because we realize that we shall be able more effectually to hold our own and to fulfil the mission allotted to us by Fate in this part of Europe, if we are enabled once more to enter the path leading to undisturbed co-operation and a unity of advantage to all.

"*We Hungarians*" — so ran the concluding passage of M. Balla's paper — "*are ready at all times to renew the sincere unity of old; doing so — and that every one (both in Hungary and beyond the frontiers of Hungary) cannot fail to understand — not at the price of allowing our right to the territory which for a thousand years was ours to be again called in question — a territory our claim to which cannot be questioned either historically or geographically or economically or even ethnically.*"

NIKIFOR CRAINIO ON GERMAN-RUMANIAN SOCIETY

M. Nikifor *Crainio*, former Rumanian Propaganda Minister, at present Member of the Presidential Board of the Bucharest Rumanian-German Society, has published, in the "*Bukarester Tageblatt*", an article dealing with the establishment of the German-Rumanian Society in which he first of all stresses that the Rumanian-German Society established last summer in Bucharest is delighted to welcome the establishment in Berlin of a German-Rumanian Society.

"*This renewed, exceptionally cordial manifestation of the friendship of the German people*" — says Crainio — "has profoundly affected the Rumanian people. Rumanian nationalism, of which Marshal Antonescu is today the leading representative, long ago already *persistently demanded an alliance with Germany.*

"Today too" — continues Crainio — "we cannot but feel admiration for the infallible instinct of the Germans which enabled that people to choose between the two opposed kinds of Rumanians — the official Rumania clinging to the Utopian policy of the League of Nations and the real Rumania of the nationalism deeply rooted in the Rumanian people. Today there is no longer in Bucharest an artificial policy defying national feeling. European unity is the *sine qua non* of today — to protect Europe in the East being subjected to the oppression of Soviet-Jewish bolshevism and in the West to the oppression of Anglo-Americanism. This danger must awake in the minds of each individual people a pride in the European idea, a consciousness of Europe's world-mission and of the need for European union."

Professor Crainio then stresses that Germany and Rumania are naturally inter-complementary economically too; and, in a passage dealing with the character of German-Rumanian cultural connections, declares that it is an established fact that *German culture has exercised a fertilizing effect upon the young culture of Rumania.* The most important and most genuine Rumanian poets, thinkers and statesmen have been trained in the school of German culture. It is to this fact that is due the endeavour on the part of Rumania to achieve as valuable a co-operation in the intellectual field too. Crainio regards as an important factor of *German-Rumanian friendship* also the common struggle being fought in the East. It will be impossible in the future to speak of the sacrifices made by Rumania without mention being made of the heroic struggle of the mighty German people. The Rumanians will never be able to forget that it was due to their alliance with Germany that they recovered the provinces of Bukovina and Bessarabia which had been stolen from them by the Soviet.

"We know" — says Crainio in conclusion — "that without the gigantic power of Germany all the heroism of our soldiers would have failed to prevent our being overcome by superior odds and subjected to Asiatic barbarism. For that very reason our deeply religious people — from the highest officers down to the rank and file — is fighting in the East in the *unwavering consciousness* that it is taking part in the greatest Crusade of all time. Our Orthodox Church — the mightiest national and religious institution of the Rumanian State — sees the finger of Providence in the decision of Germany to defy Bolshevism."

HOW THE SOVIET HELPED TO PROVOKE HOSTILITIES IN THE BALKANS

The April 10th. issue of the Belgrade "Donauzeitung" published an article based upon data supplied by George Peritch, head of the Serbian State Propaganda Bureau, which throws fresh light on the events of March, 1941, that ultimately led to the "Putsch" staged on March 27th. and plunged the Balkans into war. *This article, inter alia, makes the following disclosures: —*

In the autumn of 1939, immediately after the outbreak of the European War, a campaign was set on foot in Yugoslavia with the object of bringing about a rapprochement with the Soviet. This pro-Soviet campaign, started chiefly by extremist elements belonging to the radical parties, did not to begin with achieve any particular success. The political public opinion of Yugoslavia, which was mainly under the influence of the Western democracies, had been disappointed in the Soviet for having adopted an attitude of passivity in the armed conflict between the Western Powers and the Axis. Later on, however, when Great Britain began once more to turn her attention to Moscow, the democratic elements of Yugoslavia suddenly became enthusiastic supporters of the idea of friendship with the Soviet.

The Government endeavoured to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet; and those relations were actually resumed in June, 1940. This was a concession made to the Anglophile elements, to the radicals and to the public opinion of the country which had been misled. This is proved most strikingly by the appointment of the first Minister to Russia — in the person of Dr. Milan Gavrilovitch, who was at the same time the leader of a semi-Bolshevik party.

Activity of Agents of Soviet Union.

Immediately after his arrival in Moscow Gavrilovitch initiated actions the details of which have not yet been fully ascertained; equally obscure are the particulars of the even "darker" activity of his private secretary, Bozhin Simitch, a

former lieutenant in the army who had been degraded and who maintained the most intimate relations with the leading personalities of the Red Army. Nevertheless, the activity of the Yugoslav Minister attracted attention; he was dubbed "Little Cripps"; and this *sobriquet* in itself suffices to suggest the direction taken by that activity.

Govrilovitch's efforts were concentrated principally upon withholding the Yugoslav Government from any *rapprochement* with the Axis Powers; and he asserted that this endeavour of his was regarded with displeasure in Moscow, which was reported to be anxious that the Balkan States should not join either of the belligerent Parties, but should remain neutral, thereby facilitating the work of the Soviet in its endeavour to keep South-Eastern Europe out of the war. A similar attitude was suggested to the Yugoslav Government by Victor Andrejevitch Plotnjukov, Soviet Minister in Belgrade, who after his arrival in the Serbian Capital displayed a most zealous political activity in the political circles of Belgrade. *Large numbers of Soviet agents were busy trying to paint the character of the Soviet Union in colours pleasing to the public opinion of Yugoslavia.*

Not another word was said of the proletarian Paradise or of the world-revolution. Yugoslav public opinion was given to understand that the Soviet Union was as national, democratic sister State anxious to undertake the role of protector of the small nations. Neither Govrilovitch, however, nor Plotnijkov nor the Anglo-Saxon warmongers succeeded in preventing an understanding between Yugoslavia and the Axis Powers. A few days prior to the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact Govrilovitch sent to Belgrade a long telegram in which, on the strength of *pourparlers* with authoritative Soviet circles, he advised his Government *for the moment to refrain from adhering to the Three-Power Pact and to temporize.* At the same time he informed his Government that official Soviet circles were about to commission Bozhin Simitch to offer Yugoslavia a military alliance and military assistance in the event of her security being threatened.

The Machinations of an Adventurer.

Yugoslav Government circles were surprised, not only by the offer, but also by the manner in which that offer was made. For that reason they instructed their Minister in Moscow to furnish further information. In this connection they ordered Simitch to return to Belgrade, where he arrived just prior to the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact. After his arrival it was revealed that the offer relating to a military alliance had been made by representatives of the Red Army, but that the final decision in this matter had not yet been taken,

the Kremlin desiring first to be informed of the views of Belgrade. After his arrival Simitch asked for an audience with the Regent, Prince Paul. *The Regent however absolutely refused to receive the adventurer*, against whom criminal proceedings had been instituted for a plot against the life of King Alexander already in 1917, when he had been sentenced to twenty years' penal servitude.

The Yugoslav Government refused to consider the Soviet's offer, which it regarded as in every respect unacceptable; and it continued its negotiations with Germany, with the result that, on March 25th., Yugoslavia adhered to the Three-Power Pact. However, even at the Cabinet Council held on March 20th., at which it was decided that Yugoslavia should sign the Pact, Govrilovitch —referring to the offer of a military alliance made by the Soviet — opposed the idea of Yugoslavia's signing the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister, M. Tsintsar-Markovitch, informed the Cabinet that the Soviet offer had not been received through an official channel, adding that, even if it had arrived through that channel, it would not be acceptable, seeing that the foreign policy of Yugoslavia insisted upon remaining consistently faithful to the line already adopted.

How the Fate of Yugoslavia Was Sealed.

The fate of Yugoslavia was nevertheless sealed and her adherence to the Soviet decided at Perlovka, in the house of the British Ambassador. Articles written by an American journalist disclosed the fact that in the villa at Perlovka Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador in Moscow, Visinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Govrilovitch, Yugoslav Minister to Russia, had *discussed the ways and means of bringing about an armed conflict between Yugoslavia and the Axis Powers*. Govrilovitch informed his fellow-conspirators that a certain group of Yugoslav military officers headed by General Simitch opposed the peace policy of the Government and showed an attitude of hostility towards Germany. At the first meeting the question was discussed as to what assistance the Soviet would offer the conspirators. The Kremlin offered every assistance; it refused, however, to make its decision public, considering that the time was not yet ripe to reveal its work of incitement. When, on March 27th., the conspirators overthrew the legitimate Yugoslav Government and seized the reins of power, Visinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent for Govrilovitch and congratulated him on the turn events had taken in Belgrade, though he made no detailed statement on that occasion either respecting the assistance to be given by the Soviet. The questions addressed to him in this matter he simply refused to answer, on the ground that he had not yet received any instructions from Stalin. In the meanwhile time

passed. It was a much easier task for the conspirators to take over the reins of government than to begin hostilities.

Moscow's Double-Dealing.

Simovitch and his accomplices were saved from their dilemma by Moscow. Five days after the *coup-d'état*, on April 1st., Lebedjev, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade, handed Simovitch the text of a treaty of defensive alliance. In this treaty the Soviet offered Yugoslavia military assistance in the event of her being threatened. Simovitch was delighted. Without the slightest hesitation he informed the Members of his Government of the contents of the draft treaty submitted to him; and the following day he dispatched two of his adherents — Dragutin Sávitch and Stanko Zhifkovitch, colonels of the general staff — to Moscow to definitively conclude the alliance.

This Soviet offer had the desired effect. *The war party again gained the upper hand* in the Government. The intervention of Moscow having frustrated every hope of a friendly solution between Yugoslavia and the Axis Powers, the Soviet made one more attempt to shake off — at least on paper — the responsibility for the further extension of hostilities. On April 4th. Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, received the Yugoslav Minister, Govrilovitch, and informed him that he had not yet adequately examined the text of the military treaty and that that treaty could not be put into force at once. *Govrilovitch realized that he had been taken in, but could see no way out.* He begged Molotov to conclude with Yugoslavia with the least possible delay some sort of treaty (no matter what sort) and thereby save Simovitch's face. Molotov however refused to make any promise whatsoever. It was only on the personal intervention of the British Ambassador, Cripps, that he agreed to the Kremlin concluding with Yugoslavia a treaty of amity and non-aggression. This treaty was signed late in the evening of April 5th.; but *by the following day it had already lost its value and significance*, for the German troops had begun their advance through the Vardar and Morava valleys.

The Soviet attempted to denounce even this treaty. The moment people in Moscow saw the rapidity with which Yugoslavia collapsed, immediately after the fall of Belgrade they informed Govrilovitch that he could not continue to reside in Moscow as Yugoslav Minister, seeing that "Yugoslavia had ceased to exist". *That was the method adopted by Moscow for the purpose of camouflaging its intervention in Balkan affairs and of convincing the Axis of its friendly intentions.*

The endeavour however proved abortive. On July 22nd., 1941, Europe began the great settlement of accounts with the Soviet which involved the final liquidation of its influence in the Balkans and in the whole of the Continent.

CULTURAL ACTIVITY IN TRANSYLVANIA.

On March 27th., 1943, on the five-hundredth anniversary of the birth of King Matthias Corvinus, the great Hungarian Renaissance sovereign, there were jubilee celebrations at Kolozsvár, one of the outstanding items in the programme being the inauguration of the latest cultural institution created by the city, the Art Gallery. It was on March 31st, 1942, that the municipal council of the city of Kolozsvár decided to build the *Art Gallery*; after a year of intensive effort the building is now complete, so that its inauguration could be included in the programme of jubilee celebrations commemorating the five-hundredth anniversary of King Matthias's birth. The Government was represented at the ceremony of inauguration by Secretary-of-State *Fáy*; and the ceremony was attended also by those taking part in the other jubilee celebrations. The first item on the programme was the National Creed, sung by the chorus of the Kolozsvár National Theatre. Then Dr. Tibor *Keledi*, Mayor of *Kolozsvár*, outlined the history of the events leading to the building of the Art Gallery, speaking in the warmest terms of the Hungarian Government, of the generosity of the citizens of Kolozsvár, of the architect who planned the building, and of all those who had contributed their abilities and the work of their hands towards the construction of this new cultural institution. After the Mayor had finished speaking the meeting was addressed by Dr. *Fáy*, Secretary-of-State in the Ministry of Education, who, *inter alia*, made the following statements:

"In the history of the arts Kolozsvár deserves to have a chapter of its own. The St. George statue executed by *George and Martin Kolozsváry* is the finest creation of medieval Gothic art, being the first equestrian statue since the days of classical sculpture to completely rise above its surroundings and break with the conventional relievó solutions. Thomas Kolozsváry, who lived at a later period, in the first half of the fifteenth century, has left us only a single creation of his art, — the altar at Garamszentbenedek; but this reveals exceptional artistic qualities and is in no respect inferior to the most eminent creations of the European art of his age. Kolozsvár was also one of the leading homes of the metalworkers who practised this peculiarly Magyar art; and its silversmiths' guild — a corporation of great authority — fully deserved the reputation it obtained throughout Europe."

There is a large-scale activity in progress also in the field of popular education. The greatest success in this field is that obtained by the activity of the "EMKE" (the Cultural Association of the Magyars of Transylvania). Its popular education — popularly known as the "Fairy Car" — every month visits a score of Transylvanian villages, giving concerts, producing films and arranging economic and national defence courses for the benefit

of the villagers. In the month of March, for instance, the caravan visited the villages of Kolozs, Móra, Kiskapus, Magyarkapus, Szászfenes, Magyarlón, Köteland, Magyargorgó, Türe, Kisesküllő and Ördögkeresztur, treating the inhabitants of each village to a series of intimate and enjoyable performances and lectures. The interest shown by the people was so great that at Kolozs 700, at Móra, Magyarkapus and Magyarlón 400 and at Szászfenes 600 persons attended the performances and lectures respectively. The programmes everywhere included films, chorus-singing, recitations and concerts, etc. Naturally social and economic problems more nearly concerning the village also figured on the programme, — these including, for instance, questions of economics and animal hygiene. The gratifying success thus achieved has encouraged the "EMKE" to put other caravans too in operation in order that it may be able to carry culture to the remotest corners of Transylvania. to all places where during the days of foreign occupation the Magyar inhabitants were deprived of all possibilities of cultural contact and were unable to develop their economic knowledge in a measure in keeping with the standard of the age. The cultural work being this carried on is revealing more and more sensibly the detrimental effects of the lack of village "cultural homes" and in general of premises suitable for the arrangement of performances and courses of the kind. The "EMKE" desires to extend its cultural work to as wide a circle as possible; that is why it is using its moral influence to further in the villages of Transylvania the building of "cultural homes". The backwardness of the villages of Transylvania in this respect is revealed most strikingly by the fact that quite recently, in a village in that province, the public education courses and performances had to be arranged in a garage, and in another of the villages in a large barn.

NEW PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTION IN TRANSYLVANIA.

Immediately after the re-incorporation of part of that province startling data were revealed concerning the public health conditions prevailing in Northern Transylvania. Particularly startling was the figure showing the enormous proportion of consumptives among the schoolchildren of Transylvania. The moment these figures were brought to his nation, Count *John Zichy*, founder and president of the *Hungarian School Sanatorium Association*, immediately convened a meeting of his co-presidents, — *Albert Radvánszky*, *Bishop Ladislas Ravasz*, *Countess Julius Károlyi*, *Professor Julius Kornis* and others; and at the conference thus convened it was decided that the Association should immediately establish a third school sanatorium in Transylvania.

After a survey of the buildings proposed, it was ascertained

that the most suitable plan would be to purchase the so-called "Kozmuca Sanatorium", at Kolozsvár, which was surrounded by a park of some four cadastral yokes, at a height of 450 metres above sealevel, and possessed 5 pavilions providing accommodation for 200 persons. With the assistance of the Ministry of Worship and Public Education the School Sanatorium Association then purchased the said sanatorium, which it is now re-constructing and equipping at great expense to make it suitable to meet the requirements of a school sanatorium. Not only is the Ministry of Education contributing a considerable sum for the purpose of the school sanatorium; in reply to an appeal made by Dr. Joseph Varga, former Minister for Industry and Commerce, many industrial and commercial undertakings have offered large sums for the same purpose. The National Bank of Hungary alone has contributed 60,000 pengő towards this noble institution. The Association is to open the splendidly equipped and extended sanatorium on September 1st., 1943.

Noteworthy public health activity is in progress also in the villages of Transylvania. The infant schools functioning in the villages are being expanded into day nurseries. Infant school-day nurseries of the kind are already functioning at *Bánfihunyad*, *Kalotaszentkirály*, *Magyarzombor*, *Kolozs*, *Szamosfalva* and *Szucság*. Great importance attaches to the day nurseries, — particularly today, when as a result of the lack of men due to the war the young women are more intensively than ever tied down by field work. Mothers are able to work without feeling anxious; for they know that their children are being well looked after in the day nurseries. They need not fear that their children may by accident set their houses on fire or cause some other accident. *There are summer day nurseries already in practically all the larger villages.* The Green Cross health homes are doing veritable life-saving work in the Transylvanian villages. In each of the counties of Transylvania on an average 6—7 such Green Cross health homes have been established; but there are hardly any villages not possessing at least a Green Cross adviser. Green Cross Sisters pay regular visits to the village houses and immediately report any cases of illness that come to their notice. Generally speaking the health homes are provided with Röntgen-ray apparatuses and dental surgeries.

Quite recently the *Joint Women's Camp* and the *National Alliance of Hungarian Women* convened a general labour community meeting to discuss the question of day nurseries; during the discussions the Joint Women's Camp and the National Association of Hungarian Women submitted reports of the activity so far displayed by them, as also of their future plans. The public opinion of Transylvania was gratified and delighted to learn from these discussions that *in the year 1941 107 day nurseries had been established and equipped at considerable expense.*

LAST YEAR'S HUNGARIAN FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE SHOWS EXCESS OF EXPORTS OF 220.000.000 PENGŐ

The latest publication of the Central Hungarian Bureau of Statistics gives figures showing the development of Hungarian foreign trade in 1942 and the distribution of that trade by countries. These figures show that *the value of our export trade in 1942 — which increased considerably in particular towards the end of the year — amounted to 1.143.5 million pengő, as against 796.6 million pengő in the previous year: while the value of our imports in 1942 amounted to 922.9 million pengő, as against 739.6 million pengő in 1941. This means that in 1942 Hungary's foreign trade balance showed an excess of exports of 220.6 million pengő, as against the excess of exports of 57 million pengő recorded for the year 1941.*

The quota of our imports claimed by Germany in the year 1942 was 51.8%, — as against 58.06% in the previous year; the quota of our exports falling to the share of that country in 1942 being 54.9%, — as against 59.88% in the year 1941. *Our trade with Germany in the year 1942 shows an excess of exports in our favour representing a value of 149.7 million pengő.* The quota of our imports claimed by Italy in 1942 was 24.55% (as against 21%); the quota of our exports falling to the share of that country being 19.94% (14.24%). *Our trade with Italy in 1942 showed an excess of exports in our favour representing a value of 1.400.000 pengő.*

Ötvenedik Számfolyó Könyv

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