

# DANUBIAN REVIEW

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Count Stephen Csáky †

Rumanians and National Unity

By ZSOMBOR SZASZ

Rumania

By LADISLAS FRITZ

Hungarian Flags in Moscow

By FRANCIS HERCZEG

Evaporation of an Illusion in Slovakia

By LEWIS JÓCSIK

Some Fresh Light on the Situation of the Hungarian  
Minority in Yugoslavia

By IMRE PROKOPY

Hungary's Nationalities

By GEZA RUBLETZKY

Political Mosaic

Political Economy

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## COUNT STEPHEN CSAKY †

The whole Hungarian official world, irrespective of Party, and the people of the country, irrespective of class, have been plunged into deep mourning by the untimely death at the age of forty-six of Count Stephen Csáky, one of Hungary's most capable Foreign Ministers, of whom great things were expected in the future.

Count Csáky became Foreign Minister at the end of 1938. He was forty-four then. He brought a new atmosphere, a new personality, into Hungarian diplomacy. The beginning of his career as a young man coincided with the beginnings of a Hungarian foreign policy that had become independent and was able to shape its own course. His first official journey was undertaken on a sad occasion: for he took part in the work of the Hungarian Peace Delegation in Paris at the close of the last war, and was an eyewitness of how the victors trampled on historical, ethnographical and geographical rights and of how the loudly proclaimed right of self-determination was ruthlessly denied in practice. This left irradicable marks on his soul. With these memories in his heart, this extremely capable, energetic and gifted diplomat set forth on his career. He served his country in foreign lands; he held positions in the most important departments of the Ministry, from the Press Department to the Lord Chamberlain's Department. He was sent abroad on many important missions and made many friends in foreign countries.

Throughout the whole of his dazzling career there was one thing he never forgot, that ran like a guiding line through the intricacies of his work, namely, that he had been the youngest member of the Hungarian Peace Delegation whose extremely valuable and zealous work had been so humiliatingly ignored by the victors in Paris. It was then that the conviction that revision was bound to come, a conviction that was

an Article of Faith to every Hungarian, became a conscious creed with him, and never again could he forget the gnawing bitterness of soul caused by the inhumanity, the criminal carelessness and the cruelty of the Peace Edicts. It was more than symbolic; it was of practical significance that it was Count Csáky who took a prominent part, as his Minister's right hand, in the work of preparing for revision, at the Four Power *pourparlers* and also later on when parts of Upper Hungary were restored, and that it was while he was in office as Foreign Minister that Subcarpathia and parts of Transylvania and Eastern Hungary returned to the mother-country. The same is true of the circumstance that both at the time of the Paris Peace Conference and when preparations were being made for the restoration of a strip of Upper Hungary he was working in collaboration with Count Paul Teleki, during whose Premiership and his own term of office as Foreign Minister the restoration of Subcarpathia and parts of Transylvania and Eastern Hungary took place. And it is certainly more than of symbolic significance that by a special dispensation of Providence Count Teleki is the scion of an ancient Transylvanian family, while Count Csáky was born and brought up in that province.

It was surely by no haphazard chance, but by the wisdom of historical logic that Count Csáky, before he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, as a young diplomat made intimate contacts with the men who were shaping Europe's international politics.

Count Csáky was a member of the Hungarian delegation sent to England for the mournful occasion of King George V.'s funeral, and he was also present in an official capacity at the spectacular Coronation of King George VI.

The only consolation for the Hungarians in their profound grief is that although a soaring career has been cut short by the inscrutable workings of Providence, and the life of a genial and fascinating man has been cut off in its flower, Count Csáky was able to taste the firstfruits of revision, to bask in the sunshine of what promises to be a new, more humane and more equitable era.

# RUMANIANS AND NATIONAL UNITY

BY

ZSOMBOR SZASZ

**H**alf of Transylvania was restored to the mother-country, — and in Rumania there forthwith began a fierce propaganda campaign against the Vienna Award, which Rumania had pledged herself to accept. On what Rumania's present irredentism is based, we cannot say. *The old fiction, the fable of Daco-Rumanian continuity, is still as great a falsehood as ever.* The geographical and economic position of Transylvania is unchanged; *the numerical proportion of Rumanians in the restored areas is smaller than it was in the entire area torn away from Hungary by Trianon;* the history and traditions of the land have undergone no change, and after twenty years of scandalous Rumanian rule the desire of the people to live under the Bucharest régime has grown weaker than it was before the world war.

Not that it was very strong then. The Rumanians like to describe the Gyulafehérvár Resolution as a plebiscite that gave expression to the wish of the population for union with Rumania. *But at the Gyulafehérvár meeting only Rumanians, and barely one per cent of them at that, were present, and when they speak of Gyulafehérvár, no word is said of the signs which indicate that neither before the war nor while it was in progress did the Rumanians of any settlement area evince any desire for union with the Kingdom of Rumania.* Aspirations of that nature were the sporadic results of artificial excitement stirred up by propaganda, and they were offset by the commonsense of the soberminded and their fear of union with Bucharest, for which union no justification was to be found in the contented existence of the populations of Transylvania and Bukovina living under Hungarian and Austrian administra-

tion, or even in the lot of the people living under Russian rule in Bessarabia.

The Rumanians are not a state-building people. During the eight hundred years of Rumanian history they were never once able to create order in their State, either as regards its territory or its organization; in those eight hundred years the extent of their political sovereignty varied in area and measure, as did the territorial size and constitution of the Rumanian State.

In the beginning there were two principalities. After two hundred years of independence both of them came under the suzerainty of Turkey, and remained under it for six hundred years, during which time Russian and Austrian alternated with Turkish occupation. At the end of the eighteenth century Austria detached Bukovina from Moldavia; at the beginning of the nineteenth Russia took possession of Bessarabia, a few counties of which were sometimes restored by international politics and sometimes taken away again. *The two principalities languished under alien suzerainty, without making any effort to throw it off by rebelling and without shedding a drop of blood for their liberty.* At the beginning third decade of the nineteenth century a lieutenant of the gendarmerie, Tudor Vladimirescu, did take up arms, *not, however, for the purpose of delivering the country from alien rule, but in order to put a stop to the depredations of the Boyars. This rebellion died a natural death for lack of supporters.*

The great idealistic movement of the nineteenth century, the conception of self-determination, slowly penetrated to the Rumanian principalities, and *after a feeble attempt in 1848, which was curbed by the Sultan with a single wave of his hand, in 1859, when Moldavia's stubborn resistance had been conquered, the two principalities united at last, taking the name of "Rumania".*

The fairy-tale of Daco-Rumanian continuity was concocted at the beginning of the nineteenth century. According to it, Transylvania was the ancient home of the Rumanian people, and the Rumanians of Transylvania were the direct descendents of the ancient Daco-Rumanians. This fable was the moving power behind the irredentism which laid claim

to Transylvania. *But Transylvania's incorporation in the Kingdom of Rumania presented innumerable and apparently insuperable difficulties, not only of an internal but also of an international nature, and the idea, as a feasible project, was entertained only by a few.*

Transylvania was part of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the difference between the latter and Rumania was too great to allow of any heartfelt longing on the part of the Rumanians of Transylvania for union with the Regate. In Hungary the constitution was a thousand years old, administration was exemplary, jurisprudence just and impartial, and if the laws seemed too severe, their application was tempered with patriarchal clemency. The State was an equivalent part of a Great Power, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the Rumanians of Transylvania were thus the members of a mighty empire the centres of which were Vienna and Budapest. *Even Kolozsvár, the capital of Transylvania, with its age-old past and historical memories exercised a greater power of attraction on them than did Bucharest, a parvenu Balkan town on the Dimbovica, of which a German traveller wrote in 1861 that it was nothing but "a couple of neighbour villages thrown into one".*

*Previous to the nineteenth century, compared with Hungary Rumania had no history to speak of; it was only after the Berlin Congress that it became an independent State in 1878.* In the 60's of the past century the country had received a brand-new paper Constitution, a soulless copy of the democracy of the Western States of Europe, but its provisions were never put into execution; Rumanian administration remained corrupt, Rumanian jurisprudence contemptible and unreliable.

The antithesis between the two States was thrown into greater relief by the difference between the way of life and position of the Rumanians living in each of them.

*The national feelings of the Rumanians of Transylvania were much stronger than those of the Rumanians in the Regate.* Even the peasants in the former had their national pride and national self-consciousness, and financial and economic conditions were much better there than in Rumania. *"In Transylvania — said Grofsoreanu, a member*

of the Bucharest Parliament, during the debate on the Administration Reform Bill — *when serfdom was abolished in 1848 and the peasantry obtained possession of the land on which they had been working, thanks to their own labours and competition with their neighbours they began to prosper; they had farmyards where they built proper, hygienic dwelling-houses. Had the peasants of the Regate found themselves in circumstances similar to those prevailing in Transylvania, they would not be inferior to the Rumanians of that part today. It must be established that, from a cultural as well as a material point of view, the Rumanian peasants of Transylvania are in a much more favourable situation than the Rumanians of the Regate, and that their villages are more prosperous financially.* — “*The Kingdom of Rumania*” — said the leading Liberal organ, the *Adeverul* before the world war — “*is not so well organized as to be able to incorporate such highly civilized countries as Transylvania and Bukovina. The Rumanians of those countries would not be able to stand six months of Rumanian administration.*”

Equally great obstacles in the way of union were raised by the international political situation.

From 1883 on Rumania was a member of the Triple Alliance, in other words, an ally of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. *It ought to have been a point of honour and common decency with her not to pursue an irredentist policy against her allies and to keep her hands off Transylvania and Bukovina.*

It would also have been to Rumania's interest to drop that policy.

Rumania joined the Triple Alliance out of fear of Russia. Already before the Alliance was formed Count Julius Andrassy, the Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, clearly explained to King Carol I Rumania's position, which ought to have made any irredentist policy impossible. “*In my opinion*” — he wrote — “*Rumania's task, both in her own national and Europe's interests, is the same as Austria-Hungary's: to prevent a union of northern and southern Slavs. The slightest deviation from that policy would be very dangerous for the Monarchy,*

*but it would be the ruin of Rumania.*" A lucid explanation of the dangers attending any irredentist policy, any territorial aspirations.

How greatly it was to Rumania's interest that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should remain intact, in other words, how badly irredentism, the union of all the Rumanian people at the price of detaching Transylvania and Bukovina and breaking up the Monarchy, would have served her interests, was clearly recognized by most of the Rumanian politicians in Transylvania. In 1913 Alexander Vajda-Voivod, who later was Rumanian Prime Minister for more than one term of office, wrote an article for the „Österreichische Rundschau" in which he described the assertion that the Rumanians of Transylvania were irredentists as a "tendentious accusation". *"The only policy we, the leaders of the Rumanians of Transylvania, can support — he wrote — is one that keeps the interests of the entire nation in view and does not risk the whole future of the nation. Without a strong Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the full flower of its might the Rumanians on this side of the Carpathians as well as on the other would equally easily fall a prey to Russian Imperialism."*

Later Vajda went further still. In another article, written in the summer of 1916 after Rumania had declared war on the Monarchy, he declared that the leaders of the Rumanians in Hungary and Bukovina had done „all in their power to persuade Bucharest to join the war on the side of the Central Powers, or at least to maintain a loyal neutrality; alas! without avail." *"But — he continued — nothing can shake our belief that Rumania's interests would be served, not by the dissolution of the Monarchy, but by a growth of its power and Rumania's close partnership with it; for without a strong State behind her back Rumania cannot escape being at the mercy of Russian tyranny. Firmly convinced of this, the sane and reliable Rumanian elements have remained at home in their places, and the traditions handed down by their ancestors shine with an added lustre. For us, the Rumanians of the Habsburg Empire, it is an uplifting thought that in these difficult times, despite all previous contention,*

*it was just with the Hungarians that we met with understanding."*

This is certainly not irredentism; on the contrary it is a radical denial of all territorial aspirations.

Later on Alexander Vajda declared that *he had not written this sincerely, but merely as a blind*. Be that as it may, whatever his aim may have been, that would have been the right policy to pursue, the only policy that would have been in accordance with Rumania's position and interests. This is proved by the fact that positive plans were shaping behind this opinion, plans which, far from aiming at the creation of a Greater Rumania, had in view a closer, a very close, connection between the Kingdom of Rumania and the Monarchy.

The Transylvanian Aurel Popovici's idea is sufficiently well known, for he wrote a thick volume about it, advocating the organization of a "United States of Great Austria" to which the Kingdom of Rumania would also have belonged.

It is less well known that a similar plan was broached by two other eminent Rumanian politicians, by Nicholas Filipescu, a leader of the Conservative Party in the Regate, and, more seriously still, by Aurel Onciul, a Rumanian from Bukovina who was a member of the Reichsrath.

Before the world war Filipescu was well-disposed towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. To Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Bucharest, he suggested that the best solution of the Rumanian question would be the union of the Kingdom of Rumania with Transylvania and some form of partnership with the Monarchy, similar to the relations between Bavaria and the German Empire. "*The rulers of both countries*", — he once explained to Vajda, — "*of Austria-Hungary as well as Rumania, are well advanced in years; we must be prepared for their death, and the best thing for Rumania would be to join the Monarchy in all matters pertaining to the constitution, the army and economy. This would be the only way of ensuring that Rumania was protected from Russia.*"

The plan was submitted to Francis Joseph and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, but neither of them thought it feasible, and nothing came of it. When

the world war broke out Filipescu proved a turncoat. He sided with the enemies of the Monarchy and became one of its most bitter foes.

Aurel Onciul, a native of Bukovina, was considered a more serious politician than Filipescu. Before the war he, too, recommended union with the Monarchy as the solution of the Rumanian problem.

In a very interesting letter, written in the April of 1916 before Rumania declared war, he explicitly outlined the possibilities confronting Rumania in the event of her joining the war. "*As regards Rumania, — he wrote, — if Russia wins she is lost whether she fights for or against the Entente, for the simple reason that she is in an unfortunate position; lying as she does in Russia's way, on the latter's route to the Dardanelles, she would lose her independence. Russia's victory would mean Rumania's death, and co-operation with Russia is equivalent to suicide. If the Central Powers are victorious over a Rumania co-operating with Russia. Austria will incorporate Rumania, set up a governorship in Bucharest and introduce honest and good administration. The real Rumanian elements, the peasants, will be rid once and for all of those who for two hundred years ruled over and exploited them. This solution would be really a fortunate thing for the people; we Austro-Hungarian Rumanians would welcome it gladly, for at a stroke it would alter our situation, securing us a leading position in the Habsburg Monarchy. Should Rumania win the war on the side of the Central Powers, she would receive Bessarabia with all its riches down to Odessa. It would be easy for Rumania to defend herself against a Russia thirsting for revenge if she entered into a permanent alliance with victorious Austria. To accomplish this the King of Rumania would have to stand in the same relation to the Emperor of Austria as the King of Bavaria does to the German Emperor.*"

All these plans were swept away when in the August of 1916 Rumania declared war on the Central Powers.

One thing is certain: these plans did not interest the Rumanian people. They did not trouble their heads with them; they had no desire for any change of rule, and it would have been all the same to them whether they had to live

in an Austro-Hungarian form of United States or in a federation like the German Bund so long as they were allowed to do so in peace in the conditions assured to them by the Hungarian State. After the war a Transylvanian delegate, himself a Rumanian, confessed in the Bucharest Parliament that "*prior to the war signs of Rumanian national consciousness began to be noticeable in Transylvania, but by no means to the extent they ought to have been; there were whole districts where no traces thereof were to be found.*" In point of fact, not only was national consciousness lacking in the common Rumanian people in Transylvania; they even regarded the Rumanians of the Regate as strangers and enemies. In the first months of the war King Ferdinand complained to Marghiloman that the Rumanians of Transylvania, instead of welcoming the invading Rumanian troops as liberators, treated them as enemies.

How foreign the idea of uniting all Rumanians by attaching the Rumanian areas in Transylvania and Hungary to Rumania, and with how little enthusiasm and how much hesitation this was effected is clearly proved by the proceedings of the meetings held in Arad in the November of 1918 and at Gyulafehérvár in December at which resolutions deciding on union with Rumania were passed.

In October the Rumanian members of the Hungarian Parliament had demanded the right of self-determination, haughtily and with apparently unwavering determination, and the Rumanian bishops had hastened to forbid their priests to pray for the King of Hungary. But when in the middle of November the Hungarian Government sent delegates to Arad to discuss the Rumanian demands with the Rumanian National Committee, the latter was at a loss whether to demand Transylvania's union with the Kingdom of Rumania or not. Negotiations were held up for twenty-four hours pending the arrival from Vienna of Julius Maniu. While they waited for him two of the most prominent members of the Council, Stephen Pop-Csicsó and Ladislaus Goldis *decided to accept the proposals submitted by the Hungarian delegation: they would give up the idea of union and the Rumanian areas would remain within the framework of the Hungarian State on the pattern of the Eidgenossenschaften in Switzerland.*

*It was not until next day that, in obedience to Maniu's imperative orders, they changed their minds and decided to break away from Hungary.*

The distaste felt for the idea of union with Rumania found voice at the deliberations preceding the Gyulafehérvár meeting, and traces of it are clearly noticeable in the resolutions then adopted. Namely, the question arose: what was to be the form of Transylvania's union with Rumania? Should it become wholly one with that country, or merely be bound to it by loose ties? One prominent personage moved that the meeting should pass a resolution *not to become wholly one*: "*The Rumanians of Transylvania maintain their right to self-government*". And the meeting did actually pass a resolution stating that until a constituent assembly had organized Greater Rumania on the liberal bases laid down in the resolution adopted by the Rumanians of Transylvania, a "*provisional autonomy*" would be demanded for Transylvania."

It was evident that they were afraid of the political methods of the Regate and Bucharest.

The foregoing is merely a brief history of happenings hundreds and hundreds of the minor details of which go to prove that union with Bucharest was never desired sincerely and without anxiety either by Moldavia or Transylvania or Bukovina; not even by Bessarabia under the Russian Czars, and that the idea of national unity is nothing but a fiction. These provinces lived in one political State for twenty years; then came the summer of the last year, and one after another they were lopped off the trunk of "Greater" Rumania. *The desire for Rumanian unity existed on paper; it never existed in the hearts of the people.* That unity was no more real than Rumanian religious unity as represented by the Orthodox Church, which was split by schism in the eighteenth century, never to become united again.

Lesser Rumania wisely decided to acquiesce in the present dissolution without drawing the sword to prevent it. She recognized that nothing else was possible, *that the ties which had bound the now lost areas to her for a few years were not the durable cords of loyalty but fragile cobwebs easily torn asunder by antipathy and disappointment.*

# RUMANIA

BY

LADISLAS FRITZ

**T**he pessimistic New Year manifesto addressed to the Rumanian people by General Antonescu, the "Conducator" of the Rumanian State, admits that Rumania is in process of dissolution. In this manifesto the "Conducator" *inter alia* says that "it was at a most critical period that I undertook to carry the burdens of my country — a dynasty tottering to its fall, Rumanians driven from their homes who had been left on the highroad of hopelessness, no support forthcoming from without, an isolated country not understood by anyone and exposed to insults from all quarters, the State authority gone with the wind, moral disintegration, political interests eager for a clash, — such was the situation when I took over the reins of government. So far as lay in my power, during the past three months I have endeavoured to secure an amelioration of this situation, doing so particularly at the juncture when the State that has in any case forfeited so much of its strength has been endangered by anarchy, foreign occupation and revolution."

Rumania still refuses to understand the trend of today. In the Magyarphobe campaign of incitement carried on by the Rumanian Press and the Rumanian radio — a campaign which quite recently was continued without a break for a whole month — it is only during the current month of January that there has ensued an intermission. And, though the Hungarian Press refused to adopt the tone employed by the Rumanian Press, there has been a serious deterioration in the relations between the two States. In the meantime — at the end of 1940 — things assumed so grave an aspect that the Rumanians formed "free corps" of irregulars for the purpose of fighting against the Vienna Award; and in the vicinity of the Hungarian frontier — at Jósikafalva, a village left under Rumanian rule — Iron Guards on five occasions

demonstrated against the Vienna Award. This means that the Rumania living as a protectorate, though the formal title may be that of "instructorate", is quite prepared to bite the heels even of the Axis Powers. In a leader published in its New Year number "*Curentul*" — a daily appearing in Bucharest — encouraged the Rumanians and emphasised that the result achieved by this movement might well be a re-materialisation of the dream of "from the Tisza to the Dniester". We see, then, that "*Curentul*" has gone the length of inciting not only against Hungary, but also against Soviet Russia.

Foreign countries, which display a lively interest in the chaotic conditions prevailing in Rumania, have already tired of the work being done by Rumania in the way of incitement, threats, irresponsible calumny and unjustifiable hectoring in defiance of Hungary too. Three serious foreign warnings were addressed practically simultaneously to Rumania. The "*Relazioni Internazionali*" — the organ of the Italian Foreign Ministry — closed an article dealing with the relations between Hungary and Rumania and with the Vienna Award with the following words: "The attitude of Rumania towards Budapest must be changed." At the same time the German "Donau" broadcasting station established the manifest fact that "there is no doubt that the Rumania created by Trianon did not possess the indispensable intrinsic right to existence". And in the third place a Swiss paper, the "*Neue Zürcher Nachrichten*" pointed out that the Rumanian people misunderstood the situation today just as completely as it did in 1918, when it believed that the immeasurably aggrandised Rumania could remain an overgrown State for all time and could play the Great Power in the Balkans. At the same time Bucharest is apt to forget that Rumania's immediate neighbours today — as at the end of the Great War — are *Soviet Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary*. The Swiss paper in addition observed that the campaign of propaganda being carried on against Hungary by the Rumanians could not possibly be continued without grave danger. The Moscow radio too spoke of conditions in Rumania in terms of bitter opprobrium and disapproval. Indeed, not so long ago the Soviet Russian Minister in Bucharest handed the Rumanian

Government a Note protesting energetically against the anti-Soviet action taken by the Rumanian authorities on the pretext of retaliation for communistic agitation and demanded the immediate suspension of the "anti-Soviet persecution". And in the Balkans peculiarly great interest is being taken in the situation in Rumania.

Apart from the fact that economic conditions in Rumania are acutely critical, the internal political situation in Rumania too has again become very grave. The uncertainty in internal politics continues; and political murders are still the order of the day: quite recently the legionaries carried into effect a plot resulting in the death of M. Alexianu, a former Royal Governor. The antagonism between General Antonescu and the Iron Guard extremists has already reached such a pitch of bitterness that people in Bucharest fear fresh riots, and the wealthier sections of the population are removing their families from the Capital. During the first week in January for several days all telephonic communication between *Bucharest* and foreign countries was interrupted — a circumstance attributed by official Rumanian circles to blizzards, the same pretext being employed to explain the suspension of certain railway connections.

The extremist section of the *Iron Guard* demands a share in the political power and does not consider the rate of readjustment sufficiently rapid. There is a constant increase of the discontent of the Iron Guard which has not been given any part in the work of government and of its dissatisfaction with General Antonescu; these members of the Guard keep stressing that Antonescu is temporising with the radical ideas of the Party. There is great discontent also in the army; for in recent weeks the authorities have removed military officers — in particular generals — who enjoy great popularity also among the civilian elements.

The latent grave crisis through which the Rumania of the Iron Guard is passing is revealed also by the attacks levelled against the Rumanian *bourgeoisie* by the Iron Guard Press. Articles recently published in "*Curentul*" and "*Buna Vestire*" emphasised that the Legion must be anti-bourgeois. This shows that the Iron Guard movement is really an anti-

bourgeois insurrection of the peasant and semi-bourgeois elements. This explains the arrests being made daily of bourgeois elements. The constantly increasing chaos of the internal political situation in Rumania is shown also by the reports telling of clashes between the Iron Guard and the gendarmes. The uncertainty prevailing in respect of the internal political situation is due in part also to the role played by M. Maniu and his supporters. Not long ago M. Maniu addressed to the Rumanian Government a memorandum in which he complained that no trace had been found yet of the murderers of *M. Madgearu* or of *Professor Jorga* and that the promised retaliatory measures had not been carried into effect against them. A few days ago persons of unknown identity probably belonging to M. Maniu's party sent General Antonescu, the "Conducator", a manifesto in which the General is accused of lending a helping hand in the work of ruining and destroying Rumania. — Rumania's fate is being accomplished!

On January 19th. the internal political situation in Rumania became gravely critical. The antagonism between the Iron Guard Legion and General Antonescu which had long been fermenting beneath the surface broke out into full eruption as a result of the assassination of Major *Döring* of the German General Staff. Although Antonescu took the severest measures and forced General *Petrovicescu*, Minister of the Interior, to resign, appointing as his successor General *Dimitru Popescu*, who believes in the policy of the mailed fist, the situation did not quiet down; on the contrary, on January 20th. and 21st. the Iron Guard legionaries arranged monster demonstrations in support of M. *Horia Sima*, Deputy Prime Minister, — a circumstance proving that the revolt was headed by *Horia Sima*. In the feud that ensued the police actually sided with the Iron Guard legionaries; indeed, it became manifest that the insurgents had been armed by the retiring Minister of the Interior, General *Petrovicescu*. The army supported General *Antonescu*. On January 21st., during the forenoon, General Antonescu issued an order suspending the Commissioner of Police, *Giga*, who belonged to the extreme wing of the legionary party, appointing as his successor General *Leoveanu*. The police officials — who were

also suspended — locked themselves in the headquarters of the police and barricaded the building. General Antonescu ordered troops to the scene; and after serious fighting at close quarters these troops succeeded in seizing the police headquarters; the insurgents fired back; and *there was serious fighting in the streets of Bucharest and in all the town of Rumania. Nearly 2000 persons were killed. The revolution has been brought under control by the army, the task being an exceptionally difficult one; but the insurrection is not yet at an end*, the revolutionary spirit gaining headway continually in Rumania. There has been a clash between the army and the Iron Guard, between Antonescu and the Iron Guard legionaries; *the situation of the leaders has become absolutely precarious, and Rumania is on the brink of a precipice. It may be that Antonescu will temporarily become master of the situation.*

OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

# HUNGARIAN FLAGS IN MOSCOW

BY

FRANCIS HERCZEG

When I visited Moscow, I found it exactly as I had pictured the Bagdad of the "Arabian Nights" in my childhood. It was a fabulous city, so eastern in character that I was almost disappointed not to see camels gliding through the crooked streets. Nodding palm-trees would not have seemed incongruous. Looking down at sunset from Sparrow Hill on the city, with the evening glow reflected by its golden domes and the bells of a thousand churches softly pealing, I understood why Moscow was called "holy", why it was "Little Mother Moscow".

At the time when on my way through Russia I arrived in Moscow from St. Petersburg, we were still as securely cradled in world peace as a shell-fish in the bed of the ocean. My first visit, of course, was to the heart of Holy Russia, the Kremlin. It is difficult to imagine that Peter the Great had any idea wherein lay the strength and beauty of Russia, seeing that he was capable of deserting Moscow for St. Petersburg, that dreary barracks of a town on the Neva. In colour and line the Kremlin is so strikingly exotic that it would make a fit setting for Princes Turandot and her Court. Through the gate by which I entered it was forbidden to pass except with bared head because of some ikon ornamenting the keystone of the arch. There were several palaces and three large churches with golden domes within the fortress walls. They were built by Italian masters, and nothing is more eloquent of the captivating originality of the Russian genius than the fact that, forgetting the *rinascenza* of their own country, those masters became converts to the Orthodox Russian style of architecture.

Beside the old, surprisingly homely Grand Ducal palace, which at the time of my visit was full of magnificent and barbarous weapons and golden cups, the two most important

symbols of the heroic age, stands the modern palace in which part of the coronation ceremonies used to take place. *In the stateroom of that palace were kept the flags of the Hungarian national army carried off as a symbol of his victory by Prince Ivan Pashkiewitch, who after the capitulation at Világos reported to Nicholas II: "Sire, Hungary lies at Your Majesty's feet."*

The centre of the room was occupied by the Russian Imperial Standard used at coronations. Of rich silk, this national symbol rose proudly from an ornamental pedestal. Besides it there were other flags arranged in two groups, all of them trophies of war captured in battle. Most probably they were placed there, instead of in the Hall of Victory in the Military Muzeum at St. Petersburg so that they might lend added prestige to the Imperial Standard and enhance the illusion of Russia's strength. *The effect of these foreign flags was that of a mournful chorus of Trojan women-slaves in a Greek tragedy.*

The captured flags were — as I have said — divided into two groups. One group was adorned with the well-known eagles of the Emperor Napoleon, the other bore the Hungarian national colours. The brass eagles had actually belonged to Napoleon, but the flags were the standards, not of France, but of the Grand Duke of Warsaw. They were captured by the Russians after Napoleon's retreat from Moscow and the defeat of the Grand Duke. I did not see any genuine French flags in Russia; it would seem that when the *Grande Armée* withdrew from the snow-bound plains, it left behind no flags, only its dead.

*The Hungarian flags were all arranged in one single group in containers screwed to the floor. They looked like a great fern bush.* I counted forty-nine of them, but I cannot vouch for that number being correct, for they were stuck together and entangled, and it was not possible to touch them, because they were encircled with a stout silk cord that kept sightseers at a considerable distance. The flags were in a very good condition then. I also saw several embroidered ribbons on the flags, and I distinctly remember that one of them had a ribbon with an inscription stating that it had been presented by the women of Szeged. On the whole my

impression was that *the Russians took great care of the flags and were very proud of those symbols of victory.*

I, the Hungarian tourist, was naturally touched to the heart by the sight of that spectacle, for from it emanated with an awe-inspiring sense of reality the whole glorious atmosphere of the Hungarian War of Independence. These flags had been symbolical of the honour and the future of the Hungarian nation; once upon a time they had waved wildly in the storm of revolution; the eyes of Görgey, Kossuth, Bem, Damjanich and Petöfi had rested on them; after the fall of Budavár they were the centre of scenes of mad enthusiasm; *and at Világos they had been drenched by the tears of a nation mourning its defeat.* Now they were drooping, sadly but with dignity, in the captivity of the Czar of Russia, dreaming perhaps dreams of the youthful, wild winds of another March.

*Already at St. Petersburg I obtained evidence of the high esteem in which the military prowess of the Hungarian nation was held.* One of the rooms in the Winter Palace contained a large painting representing the capitulation of the Hungarian army at Világos. It was the work of a Russian master, and the scene was portrayed with sympathy and in every respect worthy of the tragedy of a nation's surrender. *In the Marshal Hall of the Winter Palace I also saw a life-size portrait of General Görgey painted by order of Nicholas II.* The Czar probably was merely following the example of other aristocratic sportsmen who have a picture made of any particularly handsome head of game they shoot, to remind them of a successful chase.

*If the Russian Soviet Government were now, with a beau geste, to release after twenty years of captivity those Hungarian flags and send them back to Hungary, it would be a gift appreciated by every Hungarian. For — let us remember — those flags are more to us than the mournful witnesses of the defeat at Világos; they are also remembrances of that victorious campaign in the course of which, in a hundred glorious battles, the Hungarian army of National Defence defeated and broke the might of a great military Power.*

# EVAPORATION OF AN ILLUSION IN SLOVAKIA

BY

LEWIS JÓCSIK

The illusion of which mention is made below is merely one of the many that have for a time been forfeited in Slovakia since political independence was achieved, and which have had disastrous consequences for the people of the Slovak Republic.

The New Year's issue of the „Národné Noviny“ boldly questions this statement and publishes data refuting it. For the sake of greater authenticity we shall adhere strictly to the contents of the article in question, omitting none of the data published. In the first place the „Národné Noviny“ puts the question: how could certain statisticians have arrived at so large an export surplus of cattle when it is well known that the consumption of meat in Slovakia at present is extremely low, practically a mere minimum? The article contains a table showing the consumption of meat and fat in the various provinces of the old Czecho-Slovak Republic. We give that table here. —

Consumption of meat and fat per capita per annum in kilogrammes:

<i>Province</i>	<i>Beef</i>	<i>Veal</i>	<i>Pork</i>	<i>Fat</i>
Bohemia	16 kg.	3 kg.	14 kg.	4 kg.
Moravia	14 kg.	2.8 kg.	14.5 kg.	4.6 kg.
Slovakia	6 kg.	2.2 kg.	8 kg.	1.9 kg.

This presents an astonishing picture. A comparison of the figures gives us a precise indication of the conditions under which the several peoples lived in the Czecho-Slovak

Paradise. According to those figures the people of Slovakia consumed less than half the quantity of beef eaten by the Czechs. Per head the Czechs consumed 10 kilogrammes more beef per annum than did the Slovaks.

As regards the consumption of lard, we find that the difference between the quantity consumed by a Czech and a Slovak respectively was 4 and 1.9 kilogrammes, the larger quantity naturally being consumed by the Czech. Only 44 per cent, of the quantity of lard consumed per person per annum in Bohemia fell to the share of an inhabitant of Slovakia.

If we take this minimum consumption as our basis of calculation, what do we find as regards the exportation of animals from Slovakia? Slovakia has 2.700.000 inhabitants (according to the „Národné Noviny“), and if we wish to calculate their aggregate consumption of meat we must reckon it on the basis of 8 kilogrammes (6 of beef and 2 of veal) per person per annum. This amounts to 216.000 quintals *If now we count 480 kilogrammes as the average live weight of an animal and allow a 50% reduction for hide, bones, etc., it is evident that Slovakia requires 90.000 head of cattle for domestic consumption. This is ten per cent of the present stock.*

But — asks the Slovak newspaper — can the consumption of meat and fat remain on this extremely low level? The answer is „No“. The article shows that it is only by estimating domestic consumption at the present low rate that it is possible to show a surplus for exportation. The situation changes when we recognize that the desperately meagre consumption of meat must somehow be raised. This would be the first duty of Slovak social policy. Dr. Martin Kvetko (the author of the article in question), too optimistically, would like to raise the consumption of meat and lard in Slovakia to a higher level than that obtaining in

Bohemia. In that case each inhabitant would have to eat 11 kilogrammes more per annum, a rise of 120 per cent. To supply that quantity 123.750 head of cattle would be required. In connection with this Dr. Kvetko says: — *„If we take this simple comparison as our starting-point and raise the quantities of meat and fat consumed by the poorer classes accordingly, instead of having an export surplus of from 60 to 80 thousand animals, we shall be obliged to import from 45 to 65 thousand.“*

The same methods were employed as in the case of the reports on the export surplus of wheat. There, too, the method of calculating the minimum quantity was by including the whole of the barley needed in Slovakia among the bread cereals. In the present instance, in order to prove the viability of the State as regards its ability to export animals, Slovak statisticians and politicians take as their basis of calculation the present alarmingly low level of meat consumption, and do not trouble to think that it would be time to raise the standard of life in Slovakia above the miserable level at which it was kept during the twenty years of Czech rule. Slovak politicians do not think of this. They cannot afford to think of it, *for were they to do so, they would have to look around for imports, which they cannot obtain except from their southern neighbour.*

If the quantities of meat and fat consumed are to be raised, the live stock must naturally be increased too. Here, because of the light it throws on the subject, it will be interesting to examine the following table, which shows the distribution of live stock per 100 hectares (arable land) in the various provinces of former Czecho-Slovakia.

<i>Province</i>	<i>Horses</i>	<i>Horned cattle</i>	<i>Milch Cows</i>	<i>Goats</i>	<i>Sheep</i>
Slovakia	8.6	36.7	17.4	2	11.1
Bohemia	7.5	68.6	38.2	14	1.1
Moravia	9	52.5	32.3	18.6	0.6

For the sake of comparison we give some of the data for Germany: —

<i>Horned cattle</i>	<i>Goats</i>	<i>Sheep</i>
69	9	15

Here, too, as in the case of the consumption of meat the situation in Slovakia is — to say least of it — a sad one. It would not, however, be impossible to reach the level of the surrounding provinces of former Czecho-Slovakia. But to do so Slovak policy, especially Slovak agrarian policy, must turn over a new leaf. For where is Slovakia to obtain brood animals for the purpose of increasing her live stock? Only from her southern neighbour. Slovakia must therefore reckon with an economic gravitation towards the south. To close her eyes to this would result in a further deterioration of the standard of living. In the „Národné Noviny“ Dr. Martin Kvetko himself writes as follows: — „By 1934 we had not reached the level on which Slovakia stood in 1910 before the world war.“ With these words Dr. Kvetko shows the difference between the Czecho-Slovak „Paradise“ and the years of alleged „oppression“. Neither after the war nor since she became independent has Slovakia been able to reach the level on which she stood in 1910, when the laws of economic gravitation were able to assert themselves freely. This is the real gist of the Slovak statisticians' and agrarian politicians' lamentations.

# SOME FRESH LIGHT ON THE SITUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

BY

IMRE PROKOPY

The focus of interest of the minorities in Yugoslavia — in number, even according to official Yugoslav statistics, 2.600.000 or 2.700.000 — is still the series of important privileges lately granted to the German minority and the Treaty of Friendship concluded on 12th December 1918 between Hungary and that country. In connection with that Treaty M. George Bakács-Bessenyei, Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, gave expression in a statement published in the January 1st issue of the Ujvidék "Reggeli Ujság" to the hope that *the leaders of Yugoslav politics would certainly find means of ensuring that the frequently invoked principle of equality should be able to assert itself fully in Jugoslav minority politics.*

Very interesting comments on the Treaty were made by M. Koshutich, vice-president of the Croat Peasant Party in a statement published in the "A Nép", a Hungarian daily appearing in Zagreb. Amongst other things M. Koshutich said: — *"Croatia welcomes with extreme satisfaction the Treaty of Friendship concluded with Hungary. This has already been expressed by Dr. Matchek, leader of the Croat people, in a well-known statement voicing the opinions and feelings of the entire Croat nation. Providence has ordained that our people should be neighbours in this part of Europe, where by the sweat of their brow they produce bread not only for themselves, but for other countries too. The history of a common past witnesses to the fact that we have suffered much in defence of our own nations and countries and made many sacrifices for Europe as a whole... Our work would be incomplete were we to neglect the development of a reciprocal cultural activity... Actuated by this conviction, as soon as we were in a position to do so, we*

immediately set about realizing in Croatia the principles of the Croat Peasant Party. *Of our own accord, without anyone having asked us to do so, we more than readily allowed our fellow-citizens of Magyar nationality a free hand in the work of cultural organization. We, as is well known, set an example by approving the statutes of the Hungarian Cultural Society of the Banate of Croatia and by allowing that society to function. Hungarian elementary education for Magyar children has been introduced and is being made more extensive. We are glad to say that in all the villages inhabited by Magyars the people show a great interest in and loyalty towards their own national culture. We hope that this situation and these conditions will prove of benefit to the Croats living in Hungary"* (A Nép, Jan. 11.) Our only comment on M. Koshutich's statement is that by granting these "concessions", better said by recognizing the rights guaranteed to the Hungarian racial minority in the Yugoslav Constitution and the minority treaties and allowing the Magyars, to a certain extent at least, to exercise them, the Croatian Peasant Party has made reparation for the shortcomings and mistakes of the past two decades, and has delivered — we hope once and for all — the some 65 or 70 thousand Magyars living in the Banate out of a state of civil disability. We would also say that *M. Matchek's sage initiative most certainly exerted a decisive influence on Belgrade's minority policy, as we see from the fact amongst others that the Government has permitted the formation of a Hungarian Cultural Association in the rest of Yugoslavia too.* Another thing, however, that must be mentioned is that the statutes of this Hungarian Cultural Association, which was formed on the 24th of November, have not yet been approved by the Ministry, although when these lines are being written fully two months have elapsed since its formation.

*In the auspicious atmosphere created by the Treaty of Friendship an agreement was concluded by Yugoslavia and Hungary in terms of which, on 21st December, the two States exchanged quite a considerable proportion of their political prisoners.*

In the sphere of culture a reciprocal approach was furthered by the decision in December of the Committee of

the Hungarian Pen Club to award the three medals for 1940 to three Yugoslav translators of Emery Madách's imperishable work "The Tragedy of Man". Two of them were Serbs, the third was a Slovene. Partly to the Treaty, but in as great measure at least to the wisdom, understanding and reasonableness of the leaders of the Croat people may be ascribed the welcome circumstance that *Hungarian credit co-operatives were founded in the nine Magyar villages of the Banate at the end of the year* and that later in the winter and in the coming spring free courses of instruction for their members are to be arranged by the Zagreb central organization of the Croat agricultural co-operative societies. Provided that these nine co-operatives and any further Hungarian credit or other co-operative societies that may be formed in the Banate of Croatia are allowed to retain their Magyar character and Magyar management, this movement, — for so many years no more than a *pium desiderium*, — which was launched with the benevolent support of the Croat authorities must be regarded as of very great significance, for on its success to a great extent depend the economic prosperity and independence of the Hungarian minority.

The formation on 15th December of *the local branch of the Hungarian Cultural Society of the Banate of Croatia at Eszék* and the opening of a sub-department of the Hungarian Reading Circle at Nagyfény on 22nd December must be regarded as two further stages in the work of organizing the Magyars of Yugoslavia. The same applies to the opening on 22nd December of a new reading-room as a sub-department of the Hungarian Reading Circle of Szabadka.

Two other examples of reawakened energy, increasing readiness for action and businesslike organization are afforded by the movements launched practically simultaneously by the leaders of the Magyar minority in Szabadka (Subotica) and Ujvidék (Novisad). Namely, the Magyars of Szabadka demand a number of seats on the Municipal Council proportionate to their numerical strength, and have also tendered a request that the second vice-mayoral post about to be organized should be given to a Magyar. In the past demands of this nature — which are no more than natural and legitimate — would have raised a storm of pro-

tests in Serb and Bunyevatz circles; now, however, — and this is perhaps one of the things that most clearly show *the change for the better wrought by the Treaty of Friendship — the leaders of the Serb and Bunyevatz citizens of Szabadka heard the request and the legitimate demands of the 45.000 Magyar inhabitants with an astonishing measure of understanding.* On 5th and 12th January the Szabadka "Napló" published the relevant statements made by the Serb and Bunyevatz leaders, the most characteristic of which are given below as examples. In the course of an interview the Mayor, Dr. Lipozenchitz, said to the correspondent of the "Napló": "It is absolutely necessary that the Magyars should be given at least one important post in the Municipality, for in view of their large numbers we need their co-operation badly. Their strength must be reckoned with, especially in economy, and we must remember that the Magyars of Szabadka have always behaved loyally... The Magyar young people speak the official language of the country, so that this cannot now be any obstacle to a Magyar being Vice-Mayor of the town. *A Magyar must be appointed Vice-Mayor of Szabadka.*" Szabadka (Subotica) has 105.000 inhabitants, and is therefore the third largest town in the country. The short statement made by M. Marko Juritch, former member of the Skupshtina, ran as follows: — "*Either there is friendship between us or there is not. But even if a treaty of friendship did not exist between Yugoslavia and Hungary, there are so many Magyars in Szabadka that nothing is more natural than their request that a Magyar should be appointed Vice-Mayor of the town.*" Worthy of special notice is the following statement made by Senator Djido Vukovitch, former leader of the Bacska section of the Croat Peasant Party: — "*The Magyars must be granted all that is their due... We Croats (namely the Bunyevatz and Shokatz people and a few true Croats in the Voivodina. Ed.) and Magyars must fight shoulder to shoulder for human liberty and social justice... The Magyar electors will know who were to blame for their inability to assert themselves in public life and they also know whom they can trust and how far they can trust them...*" M. Rada Lungulor, a former Serb member of the Skupshtina and president of the provin-

cial *Narodna Odbrana* organization said amongst other things: — "...*The question of a Magyar Vice-Mayor ought to be settled along with all the rest of the questions at issue. In my opinion its solution must precede all thoughts of serious, and constructive Municipal politics...*"

Such and similar statements made by Serb, Bunyevatz and Croat politicians in connection with the demands of the Magyars of Szabadka are eloquent of the radical change that has taken place in the opinions and views held by the Serb and Croat *intelligentsia*, thanks to the political and military events of the past eighteen months. A few years ago such reasonable statements, however natural they would have appeared to all people with a sense of justice, would have been condemned as treason, not only by the clamorous ultra-nationalists, but also by the more serious elements of the population.

Almost simultaneously with the Magyars of Szabadka, the leaders of the Magyars in Ujvidék (Novisad) stepped into action, headed by *Louis Horváth*, a Calvinist minister and a retired manufacturer named *Izor Achs*. M. Achs was sent by the Committee to speak with M. Branko Kijurina, the Ban of the Danube Banate, and submit to him the wishes of the Magyars of Ujvidék, which for the present consists merely of a request that the Magyars, who form more than one-third of the population of that town *should receive a number of seats on the Municipal Council (appointed, not elected) in accordance with their numerical proportion, and that in future a reasonable number of Magyar officials should be employed in the Municipal offices*. As things stand today, only 3 of the 50 appointed members of the Municipal Council are Magyars, and scarcely a single official or employee of Magyar nationality is to be found in the Municipal offices. The Ban promised his support and told M. Achs to submit the demands of the Magyars in a written form, which he would present to Premier Tsvetkovitch. We shall soon know whether anything comes of this action on the part of the Magyars of Ujvidék and whether their legitimate demands are going to be granted.

Since our last report all that has taken place in connection with the educational grievances so often aired is that

thanks to the insistence of Dr. Leo Deák, one of the most agile leaders of the Hungarian minority, *a parallel Hungarian section, which had been promised months ago, has finally been opened in the State elementary school at Szond (Sonta), a village in the Bácska. In the four schools belonging to the group of outlying farms around the town of Zenta, there is still no teacher of Magyar nationality or even one who can speak Hungarian.* Consequently over 200 Magyar children are not receiving any elementary education. Having repeatedly made representations, the parents of these children recently again submitted a petition asking the leaders of the Magyar minority to take energetic steps to obtain a redress of this grievance. Another great grievance of the Zenta Magyars is that for five years now there has been no Roman Catholic religious instruction in the local four-class secondary school. Everybody knows that the reason is that the Minister of Education has not yet approved the appointment of the new religion teacher nominated by the Roman Catholic Bishop, the Rt. Rev. M. Budamovitch. That there are many difficulties in connection with the establishment of the promised Hungarian departments in the elementary schools may be gathered from the case of the Magyars of Nagybikács (Bikatch) in the County of Torontal, who, on 8th January, sent a delegation to Senator Dr. Emery Várady, begging him to persuade the Minister of Education to open a parallel Hungarian section for the 38 Magyar scholars who against their parents' wishes had been forced to attend the Serb elementary school.

As the above enumerated instances indicate, the tendency in the field of minority politics is still to deal with single cases, yet *the only way to ensure internal peace and reconciliation would be by effecting a well-considered, radical and — most important of all — institutional settlement of the minority question.*

# HUNGARY'S NATIONALITIES

BY

GÉZA RUBLETZKY

In the world press we find a constant succession of articles containing statistical data relating to Hungary's nationalities which have absolutely no foundation in fact. As was the case when the Paris Peace Treaties were drafted, today also those whose interest it is to do so are still endeavouring to throw a veil of uncertainty over the facts. Not one of the statesmen of the Great Powers which dictated the Paris Treaties had the slightest idea of the true situation of the contry with a past of a thousand years which was then dismembered.

Today, when the columns of newspapers all over the world are again swarming with exhibitions of statistical juggling, we consider it necessary to establish the real facts respecting the territorial and nationality conditions in Hungary. The territorial changes through which Hungary has passed recently are shown by the following statistical data:

<i>Area of Kingdom of Hungary prior to 1920 . . . . .</i>	<i>325,411 sq. kilometres.</i>
<i>Area of "Trianon Hungary" prior to November, 1938 . . . . .</i>	<i>93,073 " "</i>
<i>Area of Hungary after First Vienna Award of November, 1938 . . . . .</i>	<i>105,000 " "</i>
<i>Area of Hungary after Re-incorporation of Sub-Carpathia in March, 1939 . . . . .</i>	<i>117,161 " "</i>
<i>Area of Hungary after Second Vienna Award of August, 1940 . . . . .</i>	<i>160,165 " "</i>

According to the 1910 Census the total population of the Kingdom of Hungary aggregated 20,886,487 souls. The distribution of this total population by mother tongue was as follows: —

<i>Magyars . . . . .</i>	<i>10,050,575</i>
<i>Germans . . . . .</i>	<i>2,037,435</i>

## HUNGARY'S NATIONALITIES



<i>Slovaks</i> . . . .	1,967,970
<i>Rumanians</i> . . . .	2,949,032
<i>Ruthenians</i> . . . .	472,587
<i>Croatians</i> . . . .	1,833,161
<i>Serbians</i> . . . .	1,106,471
<i>Others</i> . . . .	469,255

The development of the population of the country under Hungarian rule during the last 30 years due to territorial aggrandisement and natural increase was as follows: —

	1910	1930	1939
<i>"Trianon Hungary"</i>	7,616,117	8,688,319	9,129,000
<i>Hungary after the first Vienna Award</i> . . . .	8,484,447	9,722,782	10,180,000
<i>Hungary after re-incorporation of Sub-Carpathia</i> . . . . .	8,981,340	10,315,683	10,357,000
<i>Hungary after the Second Vienna Award (territory of present-day Hungary)</i>	11,166,886	12,708,286	13,490,000

Calculated on the basis of the last Census (1910) taken in the Greater Hungary of pre-War days the distribution of nationalities (without taking into account the natural increase) in the territory of present-day Hungary would be as follows: —

<i>Magyars</i> . . . .	8,669,188		77.7%
<i>Germans</i> . . . .	716,634		6.4%
<i>Slovaks</i> . . . .	283,436		2.5%
<i>Rumanians</i> . . . .	959,869		8.6%
<i>Ruthenians</i> . . . .	370,443		3.2%
<i>Others</i> . . . .	164,876		1.5%

Here it should be noted that the above statistical figures included in the group of "Germans" the Jews — far more than 100,000 in number — who spoke Yiddish. That is why this table shows the presence of a considerably larger number of Germans than the previous one. On the basis of a comparative study of the Hungarian, Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian Censuses of 1930 taken at practically the same time, we find that the distribution of nationalities in the

territory of present-day Hungary in that year was as follows: —

<i>Magyars</i>	. . .	8,800,000	. . .	77.3%
<i>Germans</i>	. . .	580,000	. . .	4.6%
<i>Rumanians</i>	. . .	1,150,000	. . .	9.0%
<i>Elovaks</i>	. . .	270,000	. . .	2.1%
<i>Ruthenians</i>	. . .	500,000	. . .	3.3%
<i>Others</i>	. . .	408,000	. . .	3.2%

We would stress that the above statistical figures have been determined by a comparison of the data of the Hungarian, Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian Censuses respectively. These are therefore the most "favourable" figures which the Rumanians and the Slovaks are in a position to produce. On the other hand, however, we have every reason to doubt the correctness and *bona fides* alike of the Rumanian and of the Czecho-Slovak or Slovak statistics respectively. We are particularly entitled to adopt that attitude in view of the fact that the reliability of Rumanian statistics is doubted even by "Universul", the leading organ of the anti-revision party, itself acknowledging the forgeries which have been committed. In its December 24th, 1937, issue "Curentul", referring to an article by Dr. I. Theodorăscu, a former Director of the Rumanian Statistical Bureau, published in the January-February, 1937, number of the "Analele economica si statistica", declared that the data of the 1930 Census were absurd. For that Census showed the presence of 722,000 Jews, whereas 20 years previously the number of Jews living within the territory of Rumania was 844,000. Now, natural increase and the immigration into Rumania of very large numbers of Jews should have considerably increased the quota of Jews and not decreased that quota by more than 100,000. And in a work by him entitled "*Contributiuni la Studiul Evreilor*" Dr. Eugene Tatomir writes as follows: "There can be no doubt as to the grave mistakes committed when registering the Census figures relating to the Jews..."

This admission of the falsity of the Rumanian statistical data was made in 1937, during the term of office of the Goga Government, when the Jews presented to the League of

Nations a memorandum complaining of the persecution of Jews in Rumania. The Rumanian Government offered as its pretext for the anti-Jewish measures the fact that after the end of the first Great War Jews had swarmed into Rumania in exceptionally large numbers, forming a foreign element in that country. Rumania was only prepared to offer them hospitality so long as they did nothing prejudicial to Rumania's interests. Thereupon the Jews, citing the Rumanian official statistical data, stated that according to those data the number of Jews in Rumania in 1930 was 100.000 less than it had been 20 years before. Therefore, the moment the falsification of Rumanian statistics served as an argument against the Rumanians, the most competent factors immediately acknowledged that those statistics had been falsified.

Equally characteristic of the propaganda which makes such a display of Rumanian statistics was the article that appeared in "Universul" on November 19th, 1940. In this article we are told that in the territories re-incorporated in Hungary by the Second Vienna Award there are only 300,000 Magyars and 400,000 Széklers; while on the other hand the Rumanians assert that the number of Magyars left in the parts of Transylvania remaining in Rumanian hands does not exceed 300,000. That would mean that the total number of Magyars living within the territory allotted to Rumania by the Treaty of Trianon was altogether 1.000.000. *Yet even according to the 1930 Rumanian Census the number of Magyars living in that territory was 1,480.000: we would therefore ask what has happened to the other 480.000 Magyars during the intervening ten years?*

Now it is extremely instructive to investigate the data of the Rumanian statistics relating to the natural increase of the various nationalities. According to these data the figures of increase or decrease respectively of the nationalities living in Transylvania between 1910 and 1920 were as follows:

<i>Magyars</i>	<i>1,661,808</i>	<i>1,480,000</i>	<i>—181,093</i>	<i>—10.9%</i>
<i>Germans</i>	<i>564,879</i>	<i>540,793</i>	<i>— 23,996</i>	<i>— 4.2%</i>
<i>Rumanians</i>	<i>2,829,454</i>	<i>3,233,216</i>	<i>+409,762</i>	<i>+14.3%</i>
<i>Slovaks</i>	<i>42,000</i>	<i>40,630</i>	<i>— 1,370</i>	<i>— 3.3%</i>
<i>Serb-Croats</i>	<i>54,055</i>	<i>42,359</i>	<i>— 11,696</i>	<i>—21.8%</i>

According to the above statistical figures, in the 20 years between 1910 and 1930 only the Rumanians showed any natural increase, all the other nationalities showing a decrease in numbers. This Rumania is indeed a strange country — a country in which wombs bear with due respect to nationality!!

*Nor are the data provided by the Slovaks less encouraging.*

According to the Census taken as a complete surprise to everybody on December 31st, 1938, the number of Ruthenians found living within the territory of present-day Slovakia was only 79,000, whereas the Czechs — who were worldfamous for their skill in juggling with statistics — in 1930 registered 111,000 Ruthenians as still living in that territory. In like manner we find 150,000 Magyars shown by the Hungarian Census of 1910 shrinking to 69,000!! But even that number is ignored or regarded as excessive by official Slovak personalities, though it is that given by statistics officially compiled. President *Tiso*, for example, in his speeches mentions only 40,000 Magyars. The Slovak papers estimate the number of Slovaks living in present-day Hungary at 6—700,000 — and indeed at 800,000; though the semi-official "Slovak" in its June 11th, 1939, issue spoke only of 400,000 Slovak being in Hungary. Now, *taking as the basis of calculation the figures of the 1910 Census — and taking into account the natural increase — the number of Slovaks living within the territory of present-day Hungary cannot be estimated at more than 270,000.*

It would appear that people in Bucharest are already beginning to guess that the unsubstantial fabric of lies constructed during twenty years by the aid of statistical juggling will soon collapse. This is suggested by an article in the December 20th, 1940, issue of "Romania Noua" from the pen of *Chitza Pop* suspecting in advance of falsification the Hungarian Census to be taken on January 1st, 1941. The Rumanians are now adopting the tactics of attacking in advance in order to in some degree counteract the effect of the revelation that must as a consequence of the Hungarian Census serve to give the lie to the obstinate Rumanian campaign of forgeries carried on for the last two decades.

## POLITICAL MOSAIC

### THE HUNGARIAN PREMIER ON THE VALUE OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE AND ON ITS NATIONAL DUTIES

At the meeting of the Government Party held at Miskolc on January 12th. the Prime Minister made an important speech in which, among other things, he said:

"The year that has just passed gave us territories. The world is still in a ferment, and we too are surrounded on all sides by dangers which can be foreseen and by such as no one can foresee. People must be prepared to meet all dangers that come their way. The way to do that is simple enough, — *we must be Magyars, refusing to renounce our Magyar character; we must not be of little faith; nor must we allow faintheartedness to drive us to surrender to any one, wherever he may come from: we must cling steadfastly to our Magyarhood.* We have in the course of our history often had to meet recurring dangers; but we have always proved able to cope with those dangers: we have always held our own, and today we are still here in Europe. Today the problems to be solved do not culminate in the question whether we are at war or not? It is greatly to our advantages if we are not involved; but we too have problems to face which are far harder than that. These are the problems, not of today, but of this half-century."

#### *The Magyar Mentality Has Stood the Test of Ten Centuries.*

"The dangers which are now rending Europe — continued Premier *Teleki* — are spiritual ones; and as a consequence every nation must take good care of its own soul and see that that soul remains strong and untainted. If I would define our duty. I would quote the words of St. Stephen — "Our duty to the world in these awful times is to preserve a nation intact: can there be a nobler, greater or finer duty than that?" This is our duty today. We owed the world the duty of preserving our country against the Turks; and Béla IV. also wrote the Pope that *it was his duty to preserve the country for the good of the world. This I too regard as the first of our duties, — to preserve for the good of the world a nation intact and unchanged. This is the only thing we can do today; and we shall have done our duty if we succeed in preserving a nation for the good of the world.* The nation is conscious of the necessity of self-preservation — of the preserva-

tion of its spiritual character. With the nation fully conscious of that there need be no fear of our being lost; and it is well worth working. The nation must be kept united and developed; and it must be made self-conscious. We have peculiar national values of our own which make us exceptionally qualified to direct and develop the Danube Basin. This I have never shrunk from declaring in conversation with Germans and Frenchmen and indeed with every one. What we are doing is *preserving that Magyar mentality which has stood the test of ten centuries. This must not be abandoned or thrown overboard; it must not be played with, for those who play with it are no members of the nation.*"

#### *What Membership of the Nation Means.*

"Those who are working primarily for the community are faced with new duties", said the Premier. "Internationally these duties consist in a coordination of the service and work of the whole nation irrespectively of person, there being no room for favouritism or spite. The second category of duties is that comprised in the conception of *the St. Stephen idea. This means the art of directing and leading a country of many languages. In Hungary membership of the nation does not mean that the member must have been born a Magyar — true-blue Magyar — the child of Magyar parents tracing his origin to Magyar great-grandparents, living in the country where his ancestors too lived; it means that he must undertake the common duties of the Hungarian nation.* Persons of the kind are welcomed by us and received as has been the custom here for ages. This is our conception of the nation — the conception which has been ours for a thousand years. The moment we forget that we are done for. In dealings with the outside world our chief duty today is to vindicate the dignity of the independent Hungarian State. Things are happening which are beginning to very nearly affect our national pride and our national self-respect."

#### *The Concept of Nation Professed by the Magyars for a Thousand Years.*

"If any one compares the idea expressed in the term "nation" as conceived by us with that proclaimed by the "Western Europeans", concluded the Premier, "the future will be found to endorse our conception of the nation as embracing and uniting persons of divergent origin. In this part of Europe the only possible solution is a spiritual understanding. And that is in keeping with our conception of the nation which has been in force for a thousand years; or rather, this conception is best calculated to produce a spiritual understanding. *If by maintaining our original character we are able to contribute something, however*

*little that something may be, we shall have shown the world generally and Europe in particular something that will raise the nation in value high among the nations of Europe. I derive strength from the conviction that there is something able to maintain us which we may present to the world as a gift.*

## THE PRIME MINISTER ON HUNGARY'S SITUATION AND FUTURE TASKS

On 23rd January the Hungarian Prime Minister introduced in Parliament the Bill dealing with Hungary's act of joining the Three Power Pact concluded by Japan, Germany and Italy, as well as the Bill dealing with the enactment of the Hungaro-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship. Both Bills were unanimously passed by the House with great enthusiasm. That same day, after presenting the new Minister of Agriculture, Baron Daniel Bánffy, to the House, the Premier delivered an impressive speech in which, amongst other things, he said: —

"We might say that last year was the year of national achievement. *Our Magyar population was reinforced, not only in number, but also in quality. Compared with last year, which I have described as the year of national achievement, 1941 may be called the first year of reconstruction for the aggrandized country.* This comparison at the same time marks the difference in the nature of our work in the past and in the future. As I see them, the tasks of reconstruction fall into three major categories. What I would call first-line tasks are those which will be of particularly great importance in the near future. They are the varying tasks that must be accomplished within short periods of time in the fields of economy, administration and education. Behind them lies another field, the field of unending national work. There other tasks await us, the tasks of state-building and social construction."

### *Preparations for post-war work.*

"The Minister of Finance, M. Louis Reményi-Schneller, has summed up in his comprehensive and systematic work the spheres of labour of the Ministers and Ministries dealing with national economy. In that programme of work account has been taken of the present difficulties and those awaiting us in the immediate future, *of the need to adapt ourselves to circumstances which will continue to weigh upon us in a warring Europe so long as that war goes on in our immediate neighbourhood.*

"But we must also make preparation for the work of state-building which will await us when the war is over and the need of war labour and the manufacture of war materials have come to an end.

"Some of the immediate problems are of a decidedly acute nature. Such, for instance, is the problem of public supplies.

"In the sphere of administration a whole series of reforms are either ready or in preparation. They will shortly be laid before Parliament. The nation must gradually effect a change of forms, without altering the Constitution, for the substance of the Constitution itself must never be changed. The Minister of Finance will submit a Bill dealing with the taxes to be paid by persons exempt from military service and the taxes on excessive profits, as well as with a new regulation of dues and luxury taxes. The Minister of Industry will also introduce a few new Bills. One of them is a Bill dealing with the National Industrial, Commercial and Mining Chamber of Labour, another with the nationalization of the industrial, commercial and mining labour exchanges and with a modification of the provisions of the engineering bye-laws. A Bill is also under preparation dealing with the regulation of the monopoly of explosives and gunpowder, the status of private employees, and a reorganization of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

"What a young man brings with him from school is not enough to last him his whole life: grown-up people must be educated in each changing stage of life and prepared for new tasks. During the spring session the Minister of Education will introduce a Bill dealing with popular education. About the same time he will also introduce another dealing with physical training, chiefly with the regulation of social sports.

"The Reform of the Constitution is a sacred task, which must not be undertaken except seriously, with a clear brain, in a Hungarian spirit, and with due composure, certainly not as a means of sensation-mongering. *I am so convinced of the nation's strength that I feel sure it will be able to solve the most awkward problems even in the present difficult times. It is important for the world that a Hungarian nation should continue to exist, and it is only by our own strength of soul that we can preserve it alive.*"

## RUMANIAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN HUNGARIAN TRANSYLVANIA

The reorganization of secondary education in the reannexed parts of Transylvania was carried out by the Hungarian Government in October 1940. Needless to say, special care was taken of the education of the Rumanian population in Transylvania.

During the Rumanian régime there was not one single Hungarian secondary school maintained by the State in Transylvania. Only two State schools were provided with Magyar sections: the Gojdu Lyceum in Nagyvárad and the Boys'Commercial School's at Kolozsvár. In the latter the Magyar section was maintained simply because the school had formerly been Hungarian private property before it was confiscated by the State. But even this

section was only nominally Magyar, because only three members of its staff were Magyars, all the others being Rumanians. Even in the purely Magyar cities and counties of Transylvania the Rumanian State maintained only Rumanian secondary schools.

The reorganization of secondary education has now secured the most favourable treatment of the Rumanian population. At present there are 9 Rumanian secondary schools in Transylvania; each of these is attended by large numbers of Rumanian school children, and the members of the staffs are mostly Rumanians. The figures are the following: Nagyvárad, Naszód, Szamosújvár 1 each; Beszterce 2, Kolozsvár 4. The schools include grammar schools, girls high schools, a teacher's training college and professional schools. This shows how earnestly the Hungarian Government is endeavouring to secure the secondary education of the Rumanian minority in Transylvania.

All Rumanian professors from the University of Kolozsvár and the academies in the same cities — which have now resumed their old pre-war work as seats of Hungarian learning — left before the re-annexation, with the exception of Prof. Livius *Lázár* who has been appointed professor of political economy in the Hungarian University of Kolozsvár.

## HUNGARIAN EX-SERVICEMEN ENERGETICALLY PROTEST AGAINST FALSEHOODS

"A meeting of the Committee of the Hungarian Ex-Servicemen's Alliance, with *Count Joseph Takách-Tolvay* in the chair, was held on 15th January. At this meeting one of the subjects discussed was the historically false reports being spread by the Rumanian ex-servicemen. The resolution adopted by the meeting, copies of which were sent to foreign ex-servicemen's organizations, states that in the second year of the 1914—1918 war the Rumanian army swooped down with overwhelming force on the practically defenceless town and villages of Transylvania. During this campaign, which lasted about a year, the Rumanians — says the resolution — distinguished themselves less by their deeds of valour than by *panic-stricken retreat and the surrender of almost the entire area of Rumania. The indisputable fact that when Rumania was recognized in 1878 as an independent country its historical frontiers were demarcated without the inclusion of Transylvania cannot be altered by any attempts at falsifying history.* The Hungarian ex-servicemen energetically protest against the falsehoods reiterated by the Rumanian ex-servicemen. In conclusion the meeting sent greetings to the Bulgarian Ex-Servicemen's Alliance on the occasion of its President's visit to Budapest.

ANTI-SOCIAL AND ANTI-MINORITY TENDENCY  
OF RUMANIAN LAND REFORM

It is a well-known fact that the Rumanian Land Reform, which was carried out after the Great War, had a severely anti-minority tendency and, in addition to this, was anti-social and disregarded the principles of political economy. The total area of land sequestered from the Magyar owners was as much as 2.895.027 yokes; among those who received land under the Land Reform were, among others, 45.628 Magyars, who represent only 16.3% of the entire number: 280.679, although the Magyars represented 31.6% of the entire population of Transylvania; but even these few Magyars received only small lots of land under the Land Reform. The chief purpose of the Land Reform was to destroy the economic foundations of Magyar minority life; a no less important man than the "Conducator", General Antonescu, himself admits this fact in an interview to the reporter of the "Völkischer Beobachter" (September 13, 1940, Vienna edition). Here he says that the chief purpose of the Rumanian Land Reform was political propaganda; we say that if it really served political purposes, its main object was to economically annihilate the Magyar minority. We read, moreover, in M. *Carcilid Constantin's* latest work ("Structura proprietatii rurale in Romania si influenta ei asupra productiei agricole": "The structure of rural properties in Rumania and its influence on agricultural production"), that the Rumanian Land Reform was carried out with so little preparation and produced such an imperfect solution that its effect on national production has been wellnigh disastrous. The production per yoke has decreased as a result of the Land Reform, because intensive cultivation did not follow the break up of large estates. The large estates produced 15.48 q. of wheat per hectare, while the small holding produced only 13.42 q.; of rye the large estate and small holding produced 17.99 q. and 14.26 q. respectively. What is the cause of this?, the Rumanian author inquires. The true cause is that *the small holdings have not been equipped with draught-animals and agricultural implements. To the Rumanian author's reply we may add: One of the chief causes, at any rate, certainly was that the land had been given to people who had no training in agricultural work.* The Rumanians had been herdsmen in Transylvania and, though they did receive land under the Land Reform, did not know anything about agriculture. The effects of this untoward action are now making themselves more and more felt in Rumania's national life: the supply of cities with corn is becoming increasingly difficult, and the possibilities of exportation are almost nil. And it is not easy to see how this situation could be mended when we consider that 35.8% of the arable land has been split up into tiny lots of not more than 5 hectares each.



despicable character and its determination to seize every opportunity to shake off the responsibilities forced upon it.

"We have always stood for a peaceful revision of the Treaty of Neuilly. At the time there were persons who believed that a revision of the peace treaties could be achieved only by a war and that revision therefore meant war. The Bulgarian Government however held other views; for it desired to employ peaceful means and did not want to fight. It knew that war was not of much use as a means of forcing something on the other Party.

"And this policy did indeed prove successful. I would remind you first of all of the Salonika Agreement signed in 1932, which was the first revision of the Edict of Neuilly. As is well known, on that occasion the military provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly were invalidated, and Bulgaria once more acquired the right to arm and to establish an army of her own.

"Then followed a second revision of the Treaty of Neuilly — that which resulted in the re-incorporation in the mother country of the Southern Dobrudja . . .

"The adjustment of this question would certainly not have ensued so easily and so rapidly without the intervention and friendly mediation of the Axis Powers, Germany and Italy. The Bulgarian people has expressed its gratitude to the German Empire and to Italy in the Sobranje and in many other places.

"Here I must note further that in the Dobrudja question we obtained the support and approval of the Soviet Union — a Power also interested in the solution of that question. There can be no doubt that this circumstance contributed very largely to facilitate the solution of this problem. I must however add that this territorial revision, which had originally been regarded as absolutely impossible, was achieved by the aid of direct negotiations and reciprocal concessions . . . For that reason we are convinced that *we must continue to follow this path; and I believe that the Bulgarian people would be happy if there were before long a possibility that the other wrongs done to Bulgaria would be righted.*" (from "Bulgarische Wochenschau", 14th. January, 1941.)

# POLITICAL ECONOMY

## HUNGARY

### ORGANIZATION OF WOOD EXPORT OF SZEKLERLAND

The Hungarian Government is keenly supporting carrying into effect various schemes which serve to quicken up the economic activity of the reannexed parts of Transylvania. Among other things, it has provided for an organization to deal with the problems of wood export in Szeklerland. *This organization not only serves as an official authority to direct and control wood export, but it also furnishes farmers with loans wherever necessary.* The new organization works under the control of the State and will assist the farmers in the exportation of their products — as for instance, the export of Transylvanian pine-wood to Germany — at short intervals, whereby it secures the continuity and practicality of their work. Another important fact is that the new organization grants *payments in advance* on quotas awaiting exportation, whereby the wood-production of Transylvania is able to secure *permanent work for thousands* of Szekler and other workers there.

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

### HUNGARY TO BUILD OCEAN SHIPS

The Hungarian shipping companies have decided to have two larger vessels of 2.300 tons each built, to be employed on the route Budapest-South America. Thus Hungary will be able to transport coffee direct from the Brazils to Budapest. This increase in the number of Hungarian ships will be a great asset for the further development of Hungary's foreign trade.

## RUMANIA

### THIRTY MILLION PENGŐ "FROZEN" CLAIMS OF TRANSYLVANIAN INDUSTRY IN RUMANIA

At a meeting of the Association of Manufacturers of Transylvania M. Sándor *Böszörményi*, acting manager, declared that the Government had accepted all proposals submitted to them with a view to strengthening and improving the manufacturing industry of Transylvania and were endeavouring to satisfy the special demands of Transylvania as far as possible under present circumstances. *The settlement of claims against Rumania* — dat-

ing from the time of the Rumanian régime- and representing a sum of nearly 30 million pengő — is making very slow progress. Since most of the factories and companies have little or no mobile capital at their disposal, the loss of this sum would confront them with a serious problem. Various proposals were made at the meeting with regard to the clearing of this amount of claims.

### DIFFICULTIES OF RUMANIAN WOOD TRANSPORT

In the wood depots of Galatz and Constanza 200.000 m<sup>3</sup> of wood are waiting to be transported, but there are no possibilities of transportation abroad. The new frontiers of Transylvania have left the centres of wood exploitation on the Rumanian side, in the forests near the river *Kőrös*. The cities of *Kolozsvár*, *Nagyvárad* and *Bánffyhyunyad* are situated in the neighbourhood of these centres, but the Rumanian Government does not allow the wood to be taken away from here. Thus Rumania's exploitation of wood is faced with the utmost difficulties. Companies possessing only little capital are already winding up one after the other. (Excelsior, Dec. 15, 1940).

### HOME CONSUMPTION OF RUMANIAN PETROLEUM

*The home consumption of Rumanian petroleum was almost 25% less last September than in the September of the previous year.* It was 128.997 tons, as compared with 163.908 in September 1939. This decline is all the more striking in view of the fact that home consumption between 1st January and 1st September 1940 was more than in the corresponding period last year, when it was 1.288.472 tons, as compared with 1.421.740 (an excess of 11%) in the period from 1st January to 1st September 1940.

These figures show that unstable political conditions not only adversely affect Rumania's exports, but are also responsible for a sharp decline in her inland consumption. Unfortunately the Rumanians do not seem able to learn from experience, for they continue in an utterly incomprehensible manner and systematically to spoil political relations with their neighbours, who are honestly desirous of coming to an agreement with them.

## SLOVAKIA

### DECREASE OF SLOVAK NATIONAL REVENUE

The first attempt of the Slovak National Bank to offer an estimate of the national revenue was awaited with great expectation both by the public opinion of Slovakia and in foreign quarters. Both at home and abroad a reply was eagerly awaited to the question whether the new State has developed its economic

situation since the establishment of its independence, and whether it has been able to raise the standard of life of its population? The latest calculations of the Slovak National Bank however fails to furnish any satisfactory reply to these questions.

It appears from this report that the Slovak national income amounts altogether to 5.564.003.120 Slovak crowns. If this sum is divided by the number of inhabitants (2.700.000), we get a quota of 2.060 crowns per head.

Let us now see what results we get if we compare these figures with previous data. We have reliable data from the year 1931, when the quota per head stood at 2.100 crowns, i. e. 40 crowns more than now, a decrease of nearly 2%.

A study of the distribution of the national income also produces some interesting results. The total of 5.500 millions of national income is divided among the various branches of occupation as follows:

Agriculture . . . . .	46.3%
Industry . . . . .	34.9%
Commerce . . . . .	16.7%
Capital Income . . . . .	2.1%

These records show that agriculture plays the leading part in the development of the national income. This is all the more surprizing as Slovakia has hitherto been looked upon as an essentially industrial country. The economists of Slovakia, too, have declared that Slovakia is an industrial country dependent on the production of its industry. The truth is however, that Slovakia's industry only contributed 34.9% of the national income. Slovakia's staple branch of production is agriculture; in other words, Slovakia's industry has not yet reached a satisfactory stage of development, although it certainly does possess all the facilities which Nature could possibly provide it with. An inquiry into the causes of this state of affairs lies outside our province.

Records from 1931 show the following distribution of the quotas of the various branches of occupation:

Agriculture . . . . .	43.5%
Industry . . . . .	35.3%
Commerce . . . . .	19.4%
Capital Income . . . . .	1.8%

A comparison of the records with those quoted above enables us to draw the following conclusions. In the first place, we see that *agriculture has increased in importance*: in 1931 its contribution to the national income was 43.5%, today it is 46.3%;

*the contribution of industry, on the other hand, has decreased from 35.3% to 34.9%.*

This circumstance may be due to Slovakia being still in a state of de-industrialization; or it may be that the productive capacity of its industry is constantly decreasing. This process, it will be remembered, was started by the Czechs, who, during their régime, purposely destroyed that flourishing industry of the former Hungarian regions which had been created by Hungary many years before. These territories were then reduced to an almost purely agricultural character, a circumstance that had many detrimental effects on their further development. To take only a few of these; — in the first place, this procedure (i. e. the reduction of industrial activity) arrested the development of city life and emphasized the importance of the provinces; life was made more rustic. People came to be guided by obsolete instincts, and for a long time the political life of Slovakia was unable to free itself from the influence of the village vicarages. Life lost all traces of modernism and excitement and became oriental. People's minds came to be governed by the agrarian population of the villages. Cultural life also suffered in consequence of the dissolution of its emporiums in the cities. Let us remember, by way of contrast, that the Third Empire has done more for the development of Germany's industrial and city life than the régime of Wilhelm II. and the Weimar Republic together. The same has happened in Fascist Italy. It shows that industrialization has in both empires produced a high standard of development.

In little Slovakia the reverse of all this seems to be happening. *The worst of it is that the new State is not able to arrest the process of destruction and annihilation commenced by the Czechs.* Its industry is continually decreasing in importance, though at the present stage of development it is — to say the least — almost impossible to lead an independent national life without a national industry.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### FAVOURABLE PROGRESS IN YUGOSLAV-HUNGARIAN CLEARING TRANSACTIONS.

Official records show that Yugoslavia's trade relations with the States of the Danube Basin and the Balkans have recently undergone an extremely favourable development. The following figures show the exchange of goods in the first ten months of 1939/40; the figures being in millions of dinars:

## POLITICAL ECONOMY

	Exports		Imports		Surplus	Deficit
	1940	1939	1940	1939	1940	1940
Albania	69.3	18.0	0.1	0.4	+ 69.2	+ 17.9
Bulgaria	31.3	5.0	51.1	12.7	— 19.8	+ 2.3
Greece	100.0	106.9	75.1	39.1	+ 24.9	+ 67.8
Hungary	363.8	226.3	195.8	146.5	+166.3	+ 79.8
Rumania	55.4	48.7	265.8	97.5	—210.4	— 48.8
Turkey	58.7	5.2	10.2	3.2	+ 48.5	+ 2.0
<b>Total:</b>	<b>678.5</b>	<b>410.1</b>	<b>599.8</b>	<b>289.4</b>	<b>+ 79.5</b>	<b>+120.7</b>

In the past year Yugoslavia sent 12.08% of her exports to the above States, while in 1939 she sent only 9.83% there. As regards her imports, she acquired 12.28% from the Danube and Balkan States, in 1939 only 7.25%. *In the last ten months of the past year the value of Yugoslavia's exports to the above States increased by 268.4 million dinars, — i. e. 65.45% as compared with 1939.* At the same time, her imports from these countries increased by 107.25%. The trade balance of 1940 shows an excess of exports of 78.7 million dinars, in 1939 the excess of exports was 120.7 millions. *Of the States of the Danube Basin it is with Hungary that Yugoslavia maintains the liveliest trade relations.* At the same time, however, her exports to, and imports from, Turkey and Bulgaria have also increased.

### THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

Commenting on the financial situation and the raising of taxes, the "Politika" points out that the financial resources of the State are first of all employed for the purposes of national defence. These expenses were covered chiefly from the loan given by the *Narodna Banka*, so that the debts of the State to the *Narodna Banka* have, since the outbreak of the war, now risen by 7.800 millions, which has occasioned the amount of bank notes to be raised by 5.870 million dinars. It would be most unwise however to continue raising the amount of bank notes, because such an operation would involve a weakening of the purchasing power of the dinar.

The financial investments of the State have to be completely reorganized. The "Slovenetz" points out that the state of neutrality demands financial sacrifices almost as high as those demanded by the war. It is wrong to transfer the debts of the State, now accruing from necessary expenses, to the generations to come. It is much better *to raise a national loan at home and to increase the national defence tax.* This has been so in other States too. At the same time, however, dishonesty in tax paying must be eradicated. Investments intended for peace time must be suspended in order to devote the sums thus set free to the pur-

poses of national defence. ("Politika", January 14, 1941; "Novosty", January 15).

### YUGOSLAVIA'S JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES

According to the statistics published in "Yugoslavenski Kurir", the entire capital of all the limited liability companies in Yugoslavia was, in 1937. 7.441 million dinars. 1937 this sum increased by 3.92%, in 1938 by 5.08%, in 1939 by 3.45%, and in 1940 by 7.42%. In 1940 the increase of the share capital amounted to 823.5 million dinars. Out of this sum 338.9 millions go to the capital of 84 new companies, 540.6 millions go to the increase, of capital by 54 old companies, while 16 companies have diminished their capital by 56 millions. The State invested 126.9 millions in the foundation of new companies, 200 millions in the raising of capital by old companies, i. e. a total of 326.9 million dinars. *Out of the 84 new companies 54 (66.6%) were founded in Belgrade, 11 (13.4%) at Zagreb and in the area of the Banate of Croatia, while 15 (20%) in other parts of the country.* The newly invested capital was divided as follows: Belgrade 152.2 millions (75.78%), Zagreb and the Banate of Croatia 20.5 millions (9.65%), and the other parts of the country 39.3 millions (18.5%). The largest part of this new capital was invested in the metal and machine industry: 272.6 millions, 100.7 millions in shipping companies, and 99.7 millions in the textile industry. As regards the first, the State had the majority of the shares. ("Obzor, Politika", January 14, 1941).

### RAISING OF TAXES IN YUGOSLAVIA

The Government has issued a number of ordinances ordering the raising of taxes, from January 1st, by 25 to 150%. The railway rates were raised by 20%, the purchase taxes by 25 to 150%, other similar taxes from 2.5% to 3%, and „luxury” taxes from 12—20% to 15 to 40%.

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