

DANUBIAN REVIEW

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THE FATE OF „ROMANIA MARE“

BY

ANDREW BAJCSY-ZSILINSZKY

Greater Rumania was brought into existence by Rumanian greed and megalomania and by the unscrupulous recklessness of the Great Powers which were victorious in the Great War. We have not yet forgotten the astounding statement made a few years ago by André Tardieu, a former French Premier, to the effect that it was only by his forcible insistence that it proved possible during the peace negotiations to reinstate Rumania as ally of the Western Powers. At that time the leading statesmen of France and Great Britain insisted for long on declaring that owing to the separate Peace of Bucharest made with the Central Powers Rumania had forfeited her rights as their ally. In the end, however, — as in so many other Central European questions then adjusted — the victory rested with the attitude — that of Tardieu — which was less intelligent and less logical, less natural and less defensible.

These "behind the scenes" secrets were revealed by Tardieu when infuriated by Rumania beginning to betray signs of disloyalty to France, actually almost straying into the other orbit during the short-lived régime of the Goga Government.

And since then the world has been treated to the marvellous jugglery of Rumanian policy in the face of the menaces of the Soviet Empire. First the Rumanians accepted British guarantees and then, during the German-Polish war, cautiously wriggled out of them. They first made a military alliance with Poland and then, in the hour of danger, turned their backs on the alliance and left Poland in the lurch. They first encouraged the ambitions of the Iron Guards, chiefly in order to have at their disposal terrorist detachments to frustrate the Hungarian revisionist movement, and

then exterminated the leaders of the same Iron Guards, now finally endeavouring to govern with the aid of the Iron Guards left alive. When there were signs of a menace of a French-British action in the Near East and these "Pan-Rumanians" felt they were under the protection of the British and French armies, they once more began to adopt a swaggering attitude towards Germany; and then, when there was no longer a possibility of having protectors near them, they again had recourse to a policy of coquetting with the Third Empire. First they sold their oil to the British and then they sold the same oil to the Germans and attempted to trim their obligations to fit the fluctuations and "daily quotations" of European politics, leaning first towards the one and then towards the other Party. Bucharest developed into a veritable Political Exchange. The Rumanians displayed conciliation and more or less suppleness in every direction, even towards Bulgaria too; and practically the only "securities" not quoted on the Bucharest Political Exchange were the political and economic "securities" of Hungary. They pursued the same policy as the Czechs pursued two years ago, — the lower they bowed and cringed before their mighty neighbours, the greater the oppression meted out to the poor Magyar minorities. Titulescu of old pursued a Russophile policy simply in order to save Bessarabia, while at the same time he courted the friendship also of the victorious Great Powers, playing fast and loose with the guarantees of the latter in order thereby to ensure his country's spoils on the other side. Titulescu's policy was already directed chiefly against Hungary and the Hungarians. *This Magyarphobia has been the only stable and unalterable element of Rumanian policy ever since the creation of Greater Rumania ("Romania Mare").* And yet the mountebank quackery of the Bucharest Exchange has failed, — as indeed usually happens with political jugglery which entirely lacks a basis and natural forces and relies exclusively on machinations and terrorism.

It seems as if it were only yesterday that King Carol visited Bessarabia and made that hectoring speech in Kishenev in which he vowed energetically that Rumania would not give up one single square inch of Bessarabia. Our Finnish

brethren protested indeed much less, but when they had to defend themselves they showed an unparalleled courage. The world of course knows that the Rumanians are not Finns; but the two months which passed between the making of that vow and the recent submission seem somehow to be a rather short period. For it is a fact that the Rumanians yielded in absolute submission to the Soviet Russian ultimatum! *Sic transit gloria mundi!* . . .

We do not wish to offend the honest and well-meaning Rumanian people, particularly in the grave situation in which that people finds itself today; but it would on the other hand be difficult for us when speaking of the Rumanians to pass over in silence that shameful series of abject cringings before their more powerful neighbours, of everlasting intrigues and betrayals of allies, of oppressions and hectorings in dealings with small peoples like themselves which began fully two centuries ago, when — early in the eighteenth century — the Russian Czars first seized hold of Bessarabia, and has lasted down to the present, to their restoration of Bessarabia, which even the 1878 Berlin Congress left in the possession of Russia, though at the same time very seriously damaging the laurels and curtailing the claims of the Russian Great Power that had been victorious in the last Turco-Russian war. Yet history does hold a mirror up to every intelligent people. That is why it sounds almost incredible that Rumania should ever have been able to conceive that Russia would really renounce her claim to Bessarabia, which has the justification of history.

The only question remaining now is how the problems of Hungarian-Rumanian and Bulgarian-Rumanian revision respectively will be solved. We cannot for one moment imagine that the recovery by Russia of Bessarabia and North Bukovina has closed the question of revision. *Today there is not a single victorious or defeated or non-belligerent Great Power or indeed nation or country in Europe — or for the matter of that in the other Continents either — whose interest would impel it to obstruct the realisation of Hungarian or Bulgarian revision.* No thinking person can surely have any doubt today that Rumania *in herself* does not represent any *independent* or important force. It is no

mere accident that Rumania — even the Lesser Rumania of earlier days — was established, not by the Rumanian nation, but by the will of the Great Powers. Lesser Rumania — “historical” Rumania — was created by the mighty Members of the Berlin Congress; Greater Rumania by the Powers victorious in the Great War — as a reward for the betrayal of Hungary and the insidious attack against that country. And we must remember that the Paris Treaties of Peace show the traces of unlimited falsification of history by the Rumanians and of lying propoganda. *The new order of the Danube Valley must certainly not be built upon a moral, political and military desert — upon sand — such as “Romania Mare” has proved to be.*

The new order of the Danube Valley cannot possibly be good, profitable and lasting unless it first and foremost — apart from and irrespective of the ethnographical principle — yields their due places to geography and history.

OSZK

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