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THE FIGHT FOR PEACE

BY

Dr. ANDREW FALL

After the Four-Power Conference in Munich the peoples longing for peace and the opportunity to work experienced feelings of delight and satisfaction, for that Conference had averted the catastrophe of a horrible world-conflict, and the spirit of peace had triumphed. This feeling of general delight and satisfaction did not however last long; very soon a new tension ensued in the international political situation, and war-clouds loomed large in the European sky. This is in our opinion due to the fact that all that was done at Munich was to solve the question of the moment then threatening Europe with the danger of war, without settling simultaneously all the great questions dividing the peoples. The Powers in council in Munich did not penetrate to the roots of the evils; and for that very reason the antagonisms very soon became active again and produced a fresh crisis.

If we would discover the causes of the antagonisms and the unceasing tension prevailing in Europe, we must look for them in the provisions of the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon. These Peace Edicts inflicted deep wounds on certain European nations; and there can be no healing of those wounds if they are treated separately and not all at once. Munich too brought about what was merely a partial cure; and the wounds inflicted by the Peace Edicts are most of them still

festering on the bodies of certain European nations. There is no denying that what happened in Munich was a considerable advance towards general peace; it was indeed a triumph of the spirit of peace: but what was done there in theory has not yet been put into practice. This circumstance is due to the Peace Edicts having institutionally divided the peoples of Europe into two camps, each of which puts a different interpretation on the conception of peace. The camp of the victors regards as the sole guarantee of a lasting peace a rigid adherence to the status quo; while the vanquished countries — the camp of the humiliated and stripped — regard the abandonment of the status quo as a sine qua non of their subsistence and of their obtaining the means of livelihood and consequently of the establishment and maintenance of a lasting peace. And this far-reaching difference of outlook between the two camps broke into flame shortly after the Munich Conference. A feeling of unrest ensued in the Danube Valley; the dissension ruling in the Mediterranean question continued: and the claims for colonies revived. But the spirit of peace which had won the day in Munich was not dead; and the great European statesmen — in particular Signor Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister of Italy, Herr Adolphus Hitler, Leader and Chancellor of Germany, and Mr. Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Great Britain — deserve the greatest credit for their efforts by means of a feverish diplomatic activity to eliminate the antagonisms and establish peace.

The visits to foreign countries of the various Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers and their discussions with one another followed in rapid succession. The first of the important visits of the kind was that paid to Budapest on December 19th, 1938, by Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, for the purpose of meeting Count Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister. By its enthusiastic, magnificent reception of Count Ciano the Hungarian people offered striking evidence of the unswerving friendship rooted deep in the souls of the Italian and Hungarian peoples. But the meeting in Budapest is likely to prove

an active episode in the development of political events in the Danube Basin. Hungary, whose territory and importance alike has increased, is destined to fulfil more and more intensively her historical mission in the Valley of the Danube. The exceptional importance of Count Ciano's visit consists primarily in the work of preparation leading to a further development of the friendship between Yugoslavia and Hungary which is so essential to the interests of both countries alike. Count Ciano's visit was undertaken in the spirit of Munich and paved the way towards an understanding between the peoples of the Danube Valley.

From the point of view of the development of the political situation in Central Europe great importance attaches to the visit to Berlin, in the middle of January, 1939, of Count Stephen Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister. The latter was received by official Germany with a cordiality and warmth exceeding even the most sanguine expectations; and this reception in itself sufficed to prove that there was no difference of opinion between the German Empire and Hungary. Count Stephen Csáky was received in audience by Herr Adolphus Hitler, Leader and Chancellor, who spent an hour and a half with his guest; and the Hungarian Foreign Minister had long discussions also with Baron von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, and with Marshal Göring. During these discussions the fact was established by both Parties that the two States were in perfect agreement and that all future plans they might have were to be characterised by a sincere desire to maintain and strengthen the cause of peace. Count Csáky's visit to Berlin also helped to further the crystallisation of the political situation in Central Europe. The importance of this visit was explained by Count Csáky in the speech made by him before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Lower House, with which we have dealt in another article published in this issue of our Review. From this speech we learn that on the occasion of the Hungarian Foreign Minister's visit to Berlin — apart from the crystallisation of the relation between the German

Empire and Hungary — the fact was established that in questions of international politics there was no clash of interests as between the two States, but that on the contrary they had many interests in common, the direction of foreign policy in these matters being the same in both countries. The discussions in Berlin considerably strengthened Hungary's situation in Central Europe and render possible a continuation of that peaceful policy of evolution which the Hungarian people has been pursuing for the last twenty years in the cause of a peace based upon justice. The aims of the two peoples — the German and the Hungarian peoples — are identical; both peoples alike are struggling to expand the curtailed possibilities of subsistence and to establish that peace based upon justice.

For the purpose of discussing the questions connected with a general European re-construction, on January 11th, 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, and Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, visited Rome. The discussions between Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax on the one part and Signor Mussolini and members of the Italian Cabinet on the other part were not intended exclusively as a means of finalising the Italian-British Agreement concluded on April 16th., 1938, but had other political objects of much wider import. The British statesmen had realised that the Italian factor in Mediterranean matters had also been completely transformed, and formulated fresh claims. Mr. Chamberlain acted in the spirit of Munich in his desire to ascertain what Italy claimed and to divert the endeavour to realise those claims into a peaceful channel. And the desire for peace manifested by Mr. Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini had its result; the discussions in Rome were followed by a clarification of the atmosphere: the tension between Italy and France was lessened, so that in the less sultry atmosphere resulting it will be possible to begin negotiations between these two countries as desired by Mr. Chamberlain,

and indeed by France herself and even more ardently by Signor Mussolini.

The investigation of the general European situation and therewith also of the situation in the Danube Basin was the object served by the visit to Belgrade, on January 18th., 1939, of Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister. The discussions between Count Ciano and the Yugoslav Premier, M. Stoyadinovitch, were not confined to the question of strengthening the political and economic relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, but laid great stress also upon the necessity for an improvement of the relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary, and for the elimination of any obstacles that might be in the way of a friendship between the two countries. That this endeavour was eminently successful, may be seen from the words used by Count Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister, in the speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The clarification of the Central European situation and the consolidation of peace were the objects served also by the visit to Herr Hitler (on January 5th., 1939) of the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, and then of the visit to Warsaw (on January 25th.) of the German Foreign Minister, Baron von Ribbentrop. This latter visit had been awaited with peculiar interest by the public opinion of the world, seeing that after the re-formation of Czecho-Slovakia numerous questions had arisen as between Warsaw and Berlin the settlement of which had been postulated by the non-aggression treaty concluded in 1934 between Germany and Poland. It was not a mere accident that von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw had been timed for January 26th., that being the fifth anniversary of the signature of the German-Polish treaty of friendship. The five years which had passed had shown that the political genius of Marshal Pilsudski had judged aright when deciding the direction of the foreign policy to be pursued by Poland for a long period to come; in these five years so pregnant with critical events the relations between Germany and Poland had stood the test unscathed. Von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw resulted in documenting

that for the five years which the German-Polish treaty has still to run the German-Polish alliance is a guarantee that the two countries will always be able to create the harmony essential to a co-operation in all questions of common interest to these two Powers. The strengthening of the German-Polish alliance has also reinforced Poland's position in Central Europe; and that is a noteworthy result also in respect of the common aims of Poland and Hungary. The question of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier has advanced a step nearer solution; and the realisation of that common frontier will be bound to lead to a consolidation of peace in Central Europe.

It was while all these remarkable events were still the focus of interest in the international situation that, early in February, 1939, M. Gafencu, Rumanian Foreign Minister, visited Belgrade. The principal endeavour of M. Gafencu at the present moment is to obtain the mediation of Yugoslavia in order to conclude agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria. For Rumania's rigid adherence to the status quo is driving that country more and more into the impasse of complete isolation. M. Gafencu is anxious to save Rumania from the consequences of that complete isolation. The success of M. Gafencu's efforts must naturally depend upon whether Rumania is prepared to reckon with realities and to make peaceful concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria. If Rumania does so and the policy of Rumania is permeated with the spirit of Munich, that country will be doing the cause of European peace an inestimable service. Should she fail to do so, Rumania is bound to remain in isolation and would have to make very considerable sacrifices in order to be given her due place in the Central European community of nations.

The final word respecting the objects of all these visits of foreign ministers and prime ministers was said by Herr Hitler in his great speech delivered before the German Reichs-Assembly on January 30th. In this mighty oration Herr Hitler stated unequivocally that Germany desired peace and did not wish to deprive any other people of its means or opportunity of subsistence, adding however that the German people demanded the opportunity of establishing its own subsistence. The German Leader and Chancellor believes

that the problems of the nations can be solved peacefully and believes in the possibility of peace. But that peace has its price. With undisguised frankness the Leader of the German people laid bare the problems facing the German Empire and determined the means of solution. And, barely twenty-four hours later, Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, replied to Herr Hitler's speech and declared on his part too that there was no question that could not be settled by peaceful discussion. We have heard the speeches: and now the millions — the peoples — are anxious to see actions. Action must be taken at once on all points and by universal agreement. The Hungarian people has taken to heart the words spoken by Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain and expects these speeches to be followed in Central Europe by deeds too and by Hungary being given the means and the opportunity of subsistence in the spirit of Munich.

If the just and legitimate demands do not fall on deaf ears, — if the spirit of Versailles and Trianon is liquidated —, the visits of the foreign ministers and prime ministers will prove fruitful in the cause of international peace.

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

COUNT STEPHEN CSÁKY, HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SPEAKS BEFORE PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament met on 26th January. Before the meeting settled down to a discussion of the order of the day, the Chairmann, Count Joseph Takách-Tolvay, addressed a few words of welcome on behalf of the Committee to Count Csáky on the occasion of his first appearance among them as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Count Csáky thanked the Chairman for his cordial words and then proceeded to deliver an exposé discussing all the questions of the moment, in the course of which he precisely defined the salient principles of Hungary's foreign policy and the lines along which it progressed. The Foreign Minister's exposé, it should be remembered, was made subsequently to the exhaustive conversations he had with Count Ciano after his appointment to office and to his visit to Berlin, where he had an opportunity of speaking frankly and openly with Germany's leading statesmen. It was these pourparlers that lent an added significance to what Count Csáky had to say.

Herr Hitler Declares Frontier Between Hungary and Germany Inviolable.

"I was sincerely glad" — said Count Csáky — "to have the chance of speaking frankly and openly in Berlin with the leaders of the Reich. During my stay there, which passed off in an atmosphere of the greatest cordiality, I was able to establish contacts with all Germany's leading statesmen. In

the course of our conversations, we discussed every question of foreign politics that had any bearing on both countries. The Hungarian point of view was met with sympathetic understanding. After a scrupulous and exhaustive discussion of all these problems, the leaders of the German Reich, and I came to the conclusion that our interests, far from being antagonistic, were in many cases identical.

"The aim of Germany's foreign policy in Central Europe and the Balkans is to maintain the best of relations with every State.

"In Berlin people were very pleased to learn that Hungary was desirous to preserve the same friendly relations with both countries of the Axis. This I had also told to Count Ciano at our last meeting, and he fully approved of our attitude.

"When I took leave of the German Foreign Minister, he expressed the conviction that a new account had been opened in the ledger of Hungary's contacts with Germany, and that both countries would probably be satisfied when it came to be balanced.

"In the course of our conversations I mentioned certain undesirable phenomena noticeable among the Germans in Hungary which were calculated to disturb the good relations existing now for centuries between the Hungarians and the German-speaking populations. In reply, I was repeatedly told by those in authority that they would be grateful for concrete data, as they were ready to punish severely any illegal movement directed from Germany against Hungary.

"The question of her minorities is one of the most delicate problems confronting the Third Reich. So long as the legitimate demands of the German minorities as defined in laws and ordinances are satisfied, the German Reich is ready to acknowledge the friendly gesture with a similar measure of courtesy.

"It is perhaps unnecessary to say that in the course of our negotiations Herr Hitler spontaneously declared that he naturally regarded the frontier between Hungary and Germany as inviolable.

"One point I would however emphasize, and that is that no question was broached by any responsible German

which would have signified the slightest measure of interference in Hungary's domestic policy. The leaders of the Reich consider a strong, independent and contented Hungary, able to give support instead of leaning on others for it, important to Germany's interests.

"I have already had an opportunity of stating that our independence is not threatened by the German Reich, either directly or indirectly. I was not asked for anything by Germany, nor did I ask for anything concrete myself. But I think that it has been possible to create an atmosphere in which concrete results may at any moment materialize. In many respects we shall be able to co-operate with Germany to the common benefit of both countries."

*Hungary's Relations with Italy, Yugoslavia,
Poland and Rumania.*

Passing on to the question of Hungary's relations with Italy, the Foreign Minister said that Count Ciano's visit in December had taken place in an atmosphere of sincere and traditional friendship.

"All the questions" — continued Count Csáky — "that affect the two countries, either jointly or separately — and here it is very difficult to make a close distinction — were discussed. It is no mere phrase to say, in the over-familiar language of official documents, that we established the identity of our opinions and views.

"In connection with Count Ciano's Belgrade visit, I wish to stress the point" — said the Foreign Minister — "that our contacts with Yugoslavia, gradually established by the exercise of patience, discretion and reciprocal trust, have increased perceptibly of late.

"Strong ties of tradition and reciprocal sympathy bind us, now as in the past, to Poland. During the past few months attempts to weaken these ties have been made in certain countries. Newspapers claiming to be considered serious press organs first wrote that Hungary, Poland and certain other States proposed to form an anti-German bloc. Then, abandoning this opinion, they went to the other extreme, declaring in connection with my visit to Berlin, that Hungary had turned the cold shoulder on Poland and that relations between those

two countries had become strained. Needless to say, when Hungary's friendship with Poland was spoken of in Berlin, it was always with sympathetic comments on the part of the Germans.

"Nor is it necessary for me to say that I know the sources and aims of these virulent rumours. It would be a pity to waste time discussing them. Our friendship with Poland is a political reality with which, sooner or later, everybody will have to reckon.

"It is with great interest" — continued Count Csáky — that we follow the situation of the Hungarian minority in Rumania. After all, this is the key to our relations with that country.

"Our relations with Czecho-Slovakia have unfortunately been made very uncertain by a series of frontier incidents. We hope that the Munkács incident, in which the Czech artillery participated, was the last of the series. In the strained atmosphere following a major upheaval I can understand minor incidents between the patrols on the new frontier, but not an attack supported by artillery. The Munkács incident has been closed. The Czecho-Slovak Government has expressed regret, and, although it refuses to shoulder the entire responsibility, has nevertheless announced its willingness, in the interests of more normal relations, to pay an indemnity, to be determined jointly, for the damage done and punish the officials whose guilt has been established. The Hungarian Government has expressed itself satisfied with this. The mixed committee formed in terms of the Vienna decision will now resume negotiations, and the Hungarian Minister will be sent back to his post in Prague. I sincerely hope that Hungary's goodwill towards Czecho-Slovakia, of which ample proof has been given more than once since December, will be adequately appreciated in Prague.

"Since the Munich Conference the Western Great Powers have shown but little interest in Central Europe. We, for our part, can do nothing but take cognizance of this fact. We are forced to the conclusion that after the Munich, and in particular the Vienna, decision the Western Powers, for political reasons, decided to leave the task of reconstructing Central Europe to the Axis Powers. And yet, now when many

share the conviction that the anti-Hungarian political and military alliance known as the Little Entente, which was formed under the aegis of the Western Powers, must cease to exist even formally, it may be that on many questions less separates us from the Western Powers than formerly. Undoubtedly Hungary would always welcome a strengthening of the existing cultural and economic ties between this country and the countries of the West.

"I should like to say a few words about our becoming a signatory of the Anti-Comintern Pact. For technical reasons this has not been possible yet, but it will take place in the near future. The Pact is purely one of self-defence against the destructive forces menacing the internal harmony and the independence of certain States.

"The Hungarian Government also wished to give expression to the fact that Hungary shared the view of the three friendly Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, on this issue. The Pact is not directed against any country."

Count Csáky's exposé dealt with every question with the utmost frankness. There was no beating about the bush. He tells us that Hungary's attitude is understood in Berlin; that Herr Hitler regards the frontier between Hungary and Germany as inviolable; that the responsible German statesmen consider a strong, independent and contented Hungary, able to give support instead of leaning on others for it, important to Germany's interests. The clouds lowering over Hungary's relations with Germany have thus been dispelled, for it is now evident that Hungary's independence is not threatened directly or indirectly by Germany. Count Csáky spoke very warmly of Italy as a State whose friendship and support Hungary has enjoyed for more than a decade. "Hungary", said the Foreign Minister, "is desirous to preserve the same friendly relations with both countries of the Axis."

Our intimate friendship with Italy is of long standing. It was thanks to Italy that Hungary emerged out of its post-war isolation in the field of international politics. It is therefore only natural that after treating of Hungary's relations with Germany, the second longest part of the Foreign Minister's exposé was devoted to the links connecting this country and Italy.

His appreciation of the friendship between Italy and Hungary led him to mention Count Ciano's visit to Bélye and provided Count Csáky with an opportunity of informing the Committee about Hungary's relations with Yugoslavia. Developments — he said — had been very satisfactory of late and Hungarian public opinion might be pleased to see that the Italian Foreign Minister's visit signified a happy milestone in the history of Hungary's relations with Yugoslavia.

Count Csáky's exposé discounted the malevolent rumours, intentionally spread, that Hungary and Poland were no longer on good terms. That this is not so may be gathered from the sentence in which the Foreign Minister said that "the friendship between the two countries is a political reality with which, sooner or later, everybody will have to reckon."

Speaking of Hungary's relations with Rumania, Count Csáky spoke the plain truth when he said that they depended on the situation of the Hungarian minority in that country. He hoped it would be possible to lead Rumania's public opinion to a reasonable understanding of the rights of the Hungarian minority.

Hungarian public opinion was reassured to hear what the Foreign Minister had to say about Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia.

Count Csáky also spoke of the attempts made by Hungarian foreign policy to approach the Western Powers. "Since the Munich Conference the Western Powers have shown but little interest in Central Europe. We, for our part, can do nothing but take cognizance of this fact," he said, and then added that now that the time had come for the Little Entente to cease to exist even formally "it may be that on many questions less separates us from the Western Powers than formerly." He hoped it would be possible to strengthen our cultural and economic contacts with them.

The closing sentence of Count Csáky's exposé contained the gist of the fundamental principles of Hungary's foreign policy: strict adherence to the principle of continuity and a policy of independence and peace. These had been our guiding principles for twenty years and would continue to be Hungary's foreign policy in the future too.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK SITUATION

BY

EDMUND TARJÁN

All the things that have happened in Czecho-Slovakia since the Munich Agreement and the Vienna award respectively show that it is just as impossible today to create healthy, viable States by force as it was in the days when the Peace Edicts were drafted which have proved so unsuitable and so unworkable in that respect. Stability and viability can only be shown by State formations — at least that is the lesson of history — in which the will of the peoples is supported by the traditions of the past and by those geopolitical conditions which are alone capable of supplying the indispensable basic foundations of economic viability without which there cannot be either political independence or economic and cultural development.

That the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain and Trianon have disappointed the expectations even of the victors, and that the unfortunate liquidation of the Great War has perpetuated in Europe, and indeed in the whole world, a state of uncertainty and a universal re-armament mania of everybody against everybody else, the result being that the apparent state of peace is in reality nothing more or less than a continuation with other weapons of the Great War, — these circumstances prove that the reconciliation of the world cannot be ensured by the methods employed in 1919. If the world is genuinely and really anxious for peace, a sine qua non of that issue is a complete moral regeneration which shall

base co-operation between the peoples on foundations of justice and absolute equality and ensure that there shall not ensue a clash between the political principles professed and the experiences of everyday life such as the peoples must have observed as being in existence within the framework of the activity of the League of Nations.

In terms of the Munich Agreement and the Vienna award Czecho-Slovakia has been re-constructed, having handed over her German, Magyar and Polish minorities and thereby suffering a shifting in respect of economic and political viability offering little prospect of the process of time bringing into being in the re-constructed State the conditions without which consolidation is impossible. In this new State too the Czechs are anxious to continue to wield the actual power, despite the fact that they have been forced by circumstances to meet the wishes of the Slovaks and Ruthenians and to grant them the autonomy which they had been demanding for 20 years.

The present state of things, and still more so the probable development of the situation, will be bound to induce a conflict between the interests of the provinces wrested from Hungary — Slovakia and Ruthenia — and those of Prague. What has so far happened has shown that the formal recognition of the rights of self-government of Slovakia and Ruthenia has not produced the desired results and has not brought about a harmonious co-operation between Prague on the one hand and Pozsony and Huszt on the other; and we have every reason to expect an even more serious aggravation of the antagonism in the immediate future.

So far the Slovak and Ruthenian peoples have not profited at all by the recognition of their rights of self-government; for the present leaders of those peoples have not yet been able to solve even the most elementary problems connected with the organisation of their State machinery: still less are they in a position to formulate a programme calculated to strengthen the political independence now ceded in appearance by means of the weapons of economic independence and of financial independence of Prague. The only manifest results so far achieved are no results at all, — a petty

scrambling and the assertion of the personal interests of a few individuals. The conflict between the governments of Prague, Pozsony and Huszt respectively at times assumes the most grotesque forms. Unprecedented, for example, is the protest addressed by the Government of the Ruthenian Premier, Mr. Volosin, direct to Berlin against the appointment as Ruthenian Minister of the Czech General Prchala. The energetic criticism and open threats against Prague used by the Slovak Premier, M. Tiso, prove that the present State structure offers no possibilities of constructive co-operation even within this framework of the new Republic itself.

The recognition of the rights of self-government of Slovakia and Ruthenia does not by any means denote the acknowledgment in real life of the legitimate demands of the Slovak and Ruthenian peoples. Both the Tiso and the Volosin Governments are still entirely dependent financially upon Prague, that preventing their efforts to eliminate the hated Czech bureaucracy and to replace the Czech officials by Slovaks and Ruthenians respectively. Another circumstance rendering the self-government of the former Hungarian territories quite valueless and illusory is the continued occupation of these territories by the Czech army. It is these circumstances that have prevented the elimination of the conflict existing between Prague on the one hand and Pozsony and Huszt on the other, which they have actually served to aggravate. MM. Tiso and Volosin are quite unable to show any results likely to meet the expectations of their peoples, and are therefore driven to divert attention from the actual conditions either by abuse of Prague or by confiscating the rights of the minorities entrusted to their care. And in this connection there would appear to be no limit to their excesses. They seem to be serenely ignorant of the existence of international treaties guaranteeing the rights of the Magyar, German and Polish minorities living in their countries. The data of the Census effected by surprise on December 31st last — data the authenticity of which we have no means of checking — cannot possibly serve as justification for the invalidation of the Minority Treaty concluded at Saint Germain-en-Laye in September, 1919, to which Czecho-Slovakia was also a signatory, for the dissolution of political parties,

and for compelling the German and Magyar minorities to figure at the elections on the Government's official list. The object of this procedure was to provide that those minorities should only receive a fraction of the representation due to them in law and even more to force them to make a breach in the system of minority protection guaranteed by international treaty. This is what happened in Slovakia: but the Volosin Government has gone farther still, dissolving the only Magyar party and preventing the Magyars from taking any part at all in the elections in Carpatho-Russia. These are all short-sighted, petty tricks impeding the possibility of tranquillity in the country concerned and calculated to provisionally satisfy the expectations of certain extreme nationalist quarters.

The difficulties in international relations with which Prague is faced are bound to increase in gravity as a result of the financial and economic situation of the State; and the aggravation of those difficulties must be accompanied by a parallel aggravation of the conflict between the interests of the historical provinces and those of Slovakia and Ruthenia, the provinces wrested by Trianon from pre-War Hungary. For Prague will continue to direct all its efforts towards the elimination of its own difficulties (already practically insuperable), the interests involved being absolutely incompatible with those of Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia, which countries — alike for geopolitical reasons and owing to the transport conditions in force — cannot ensure their economic viability except by co-operation with Hungary.

What is going on today in Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia is nothing more or less than a wild scramble. The Tiso and Volosin Governments simply do not know what to do with the mock autonomy which has been given them. They are quite unable to provide the inhabitants with the conditions of subsistence; unemployment is greater than ever before; the receipts cover only a fraction of the expenditure: as a consequence Prague can at all times employ the weapon of financial dependence to force the Slovak and Ruthenian Governments into obedience and subservience. The Tiso and Volosin Governments therefore assert their power against

the minorities in order to divert attention from their utter incapacity and helplessness. Not only the State and the other authorities, but even private undertakings are dismissing from their service employees and officials belonging to the Magyar and German minorities; and expulsions from the countries are everyday occurrences. The Magyar minority — estimated at 150.000 souls — has only one secondary school remaining at its disposal (in Pozsony), despite the fact that in the territory re-incorporated in Hungary 5 secondary schools are at the disposal of the Slovak minority.

Unrest and uncertainty is in evidence everywhere, together with an atmosphere of hatred and chaos, this state of things being due ultimately to the circumstance that the new formations are unviable owing to the fact that the arbitrarily drawn new frontiers — although to a large extent based upon ethnic considerations — do not conform with the wishes of the peoples concerned, which have so far been deprived of an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination.

OSZK
Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár

RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DANUBE VALLEY ?

BY

ANDREW BAJCSY-ZSILINSZKY

It would be a mistake to ignore the fact that the Munich Four-Power Agreement has not brought about an easing of the tension in European and international politics in a measure calculated to reassure the civilized world. We Hungarians, for instance, would find it difficult to contradict the statement contained in the leading article of "Le Temps" on 16th January which said that, although Hungarian public opinion rejoiced over the restoration of a million Hungarians in Upper Hungary, it was depressed by the refusal to grant the right of self-determination to Ruthenia and Slovakia and by the discrimination against the principle of the Holy Crown in favour of the ethnic principle.

We must state our case clearly to Europe. More than once in the course of history the Hungarians were wellnigh exterminated, here, in the heart of Europe, by overwhelmingly superior forces inspired by hostile intent. In defending ourselves we were also defending Europe, but Europe usually took no notice of us, or in the best case came to our aid when it was too late or, as in the case of the retaking of Buda from the Turks, when we had, of our own strength and at a terrible price, first broken the power of an Empire bent on the destruction of Christian civilization. But however hopeless the situation was, however critical the time, we have never relinquished St. Stephen's idea, and we will not be disloyal to it in the future either. On the other hand, it has been stated times without number by all our politicians of

importance, who are scrupulously conscious of their responsibility, that we do not wish to enforce our historical rights by means of fresh conquests, but that we are willing to leave the question of the territories beyond the Hungarian ethnographic borders to the self-determination of the non-Magyar races which for centuries lived under the shadow of the Sacred Crown, and that we are content to accept their decision. Therefore though we insist on our historical rights, we leave their enforcement to the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. Why, then, are the Ruthenians not allowed to exercise that natural right of self-determination which has so often been preached and which at the time of the Sudeten German crisis was so loudly proclaimed?

This is one of the questions that, we frankly admit, are very distressing to Hungarian national public opinion and which hold out but little hope that a new and better order in general will be established in Central Europe and that the internal peace of that region will be ensured. But we have also another reason for grave anxiety.

With bated breath we follow events in Europe and America, and read with great interest and excitement the news of the journeys to and fro of the world's diplomats and the results of their pourparlers. Count Ciano's visit to Budapest, Mr. Chamberlain's negotiations in Rome, Colonel Beck's conversations with Herr Hitler, Count Ciano's shooting party at Bélye and his stay in Belgrade, the trip to Germany of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Csáky, and Prince Paul of Yugoslavia's recent talks with King Carol of Rumania — all these occurrences show that the responsible statesmen of both "axes" are conscientiously labouring to find the means of a general European appeasement. Events in the Far East play their role in affairs, just as do the developments in the Spanish civil war and the increased interest displayed by the U. S. A. in European matters, an eloquent proof of which was the reception accorded in America to Mr. Eden. But may we Hungarians be allowed to say something frankly? May we be allowed to quote the good old proverb about too many cooks spoiling the broth? Something like that appears to threaten. And the broth that we would like to

enjoy is the reconstruction of Central Europe, in particular of the Danube Valley, with a better order of things and real peace. We even dare to say that of all the broths being cooked at present by diplomacy none is of such great importance as this. We know that we are not the only people in the world, and that within the framework of their own Empires and spheres of interest the Great Powers of Europe have problems enough to solve. But the European Great Powers must not be allowed to think that with the Munich Four-Power Pact everything in Central Europe has been settled, or even that the problems are on the way to settling themselves.

This Central Europe east of the German Reich, this Central Europe where it has not been possible to establish the common Polish-Hungarian frontier so important to universal European interests, is today in a state of almost as great insecurity and confusion as it was some years ago. And even though, with the territorial and political curtailment of a perfidious and suicidally ambitious Czecho-Slovakia, the iron ring of the Little Entente round poor Dismembered Hungary has been broken, it does not mean that the innumerable and senseless antagonisms dividing the diverse peoples of the Danube countries have been bridged over. Our historical conceptions are not limited to the St. Stephen idea; they extend to wider spheres. The drafters of the Paris Peace Treaties, under the influence of war psychosis, threw aside the teachings of history when they created a new and artificial order in Central Europe, an order for which they themselves have already paid dearly. It is to be feared that they are once more about to ignore the lessons of centuries — of a thousand years — of European history. To take one instance, they refuse to recognize the need for a sound and close co-operation between Poland and Hungary. Or again, they are making no effort to set Central Europe on its own feet, and do not expend enough energy on the task of eliminating the differences dividing the nations of the Danube Valley. True, there are reassuring and comforting symptoms. Count Ciano's visit to Belgrade will obviously make it easier for Hungary and Yugoslavia to find a path leading to understanding.

Signs are also in evidence showing that the alliance between Poland and Rumania and Poland's historical friendship with Hungary, which has become an important political factor, will exercise a certain beneficial influence towards inducing a rapprochement between Hungary and Rumania. Naturally Hungary's minimum claims must be recognized. A Hungaro-Yugoslav rapprochement is likely to improve the relations between Hungary and Rumania. Also, in point of fact, as regards the question of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, just because of the complete confusion and civil warfare reigning in Ruthenia, a certain inclination begins to spread through Europe to consider with greater favour the possibilities of facilitating closer co-operation between Poland and Hungary.

The situation, then, is not quite hopeless, and we Hungarians are not a people to lose heart easily. About 1050 years ago, before the Hungarians took possession of Hungary, it was written by Leo the Wise, Emperor of Byzantium, that the Hungarians were not like the rest of the nations who confessed themselves conquered after a single defeat.

Europe must learn that a hundred defeats cannot break the spirit of the Hungarian race. Viewed from a historical perspective and weighed in the balance of history, this nation shows the attributes of the fabulous dragon on whose shoulders ten new heads grew the moment one was cut off.

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THE MINORITIES AND THE RUMANIAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

BY

LADISLAS FRITZ

The Edict (decret-lege) dated March 31st, 1938, dissolved all the political parties, associations and groups existing in Rumania. The dissolution of the political parties most seriously affected the national minorities — in particular the Hungarian national minority comprising two million persons. For by the dissolution of the minority parties the minorities were left entirely without support of any kind for the defence of their political, cultural, economic and other rights; the minority parties not having been merely the representatives of political interests, but — as may be seen in the case of the Hungarian minority living in Rumania, the two million members of which were all included in the National Hungarian (Magyar) Party of Rumania — bodies representing organically and comprehensively every phase of the respective national minority's life.

Nearly twelve months later there was established the only party allowed to exist — the "National Renaissance Front" — within the framework of which the national minorities were enabled to "assert, within the framework of their own sub-sections, all the rights ensured them by the laws in force." The national minorities of Rumania — being left no choice in the matter — opened negotiations with the Government and came to an agreement. The German minority was allotted one seat (1) on the board (directorium) of the United

Party consisting of 30 Members and six (6) seats on the Executive Committee (Supreme National Council) consisting of 150 Members.

In terms of the agreement concluded on January 17th, 1939, between the leaders of the Hungarian (Magyar) minority of Rumania and the Government, the Hungarians are also to join the sole political party — the "National Renaissance Front" — *en bloc*, in which party — according to the statement made by Government — all Rumanian citizens, irrespectively of their racial origin, are to be treated with absolute equality. The Hungarian national minority living in Rumania is to be given one (1) seat on the Party's Executive Committee consisting of 30 Members and six (6) seats on the Supreme National Council consisting of 150 Members. In parishes (villages) of mixed population separate Hungarian (Magyar) sections will be established. Hungarians too are to be appointed to the party secretariats in numbers in proportion to their quota of the population.

In terms of the agreement all the professional organisations of the Hungarians are to be absorbed *en bloc* in the respective professional organisations now existing, they being guaranteed a proportionate representation in the executive bodies. And, finally, the agreement ensures the Hungarian minority the right to establish a separate organisation for cultural, economic and social purposes — no political manifestations being allowed however in that organisation, such manifestations being allowed only in the "National Renaissance Front".

The fact may be established that the national minorities of Rumania were left no other choice, the only possibility of obtaining political representation being to join the sole political party *en bloc*.

Only the practical experience of the future will show whether the national minorities will really enjoy the treatment which they are entitled to claim by virtue of their quotas of the population and of their economic and moral importance? Events so far seem to prove just the opposite. The fact may already be established that the minorities — and in particular the Hungarian (Magyar) minority comprising two

million souls — have not been given any representation in the intellectual professions section of the Supreme National Council of the sole political party in the country. The only sign that this section — which contains 50 Members — is aware at all of the existence of the national minorities is that a seat has been allotted therein to Dragomir Silviu, the Minority Government Commissioner. Nor is there any representative of the minorities in the intellectual professions group of the Central Directorium either.

The new adjustment of professions, which concentrates the several branches of occupation in separate corporations, has already placed the minorities in the group of "second-rate" citizens, the building contractors belonging to minorities being classed by the Draft Bill as "Members with restricted rights".

We cannot but comment on the recent broadcast address on the minority question of the Rumanian Minister of the Interior, M. Calinescu. In the first place we cannot refrain from calling in question the statement made by M. Calinescu to the effect that nowhere in the world is the lot of minorities better or the treatment meted out to them more favourable than in Rumania. As against this statement the fact is that the national minorities driven within the new frontiers of Rumania have for the past twenty years been deprived of even their most elementary rights, the Rumanian Government not having fulfilled one jot or tittle of the obligations undertaken by Rumania under the Minority Treaty. The Rumanian Constitution itself takes absolutely no cognizance whatsoever of the national minorities — nearly five million souls — living in Rumania, declaring Rumania to be "a united national State without respect of racial origin or of denomination". Numbers of Rumanian laws, orders and official measures run counter to and are in open defiance of the provisions of the Minority Treaty. Furthermore, the manner of execution of the laws and orders is quite different in the case of the minorities, a circumstance which leaves no doubt as to those minorities being regarded as "second-rate" citizens. Nor is there any truth in the statement of the Minister to the effect that the minorities may freely use their mother tongues; just the opposite is

true, as may be seen from the innumerable grievances of the kind dealt with in the columns of our Review. In courts of law the minorities can use their own languages only through interpreters; and even in commercial life there are restrictions on the use of minority languages — e. g. in the texts of shop-signs etc. The minorities are not allotted — as they should be under Article 10 of the Minority Treaty — an “equitable share” of the public assets; while the amounts granted to the minorities out of the State grants to the churches are veritably mere gifts of charity. It is true, indeed, that minority citizens may be public servants; but the ranks of such are decimated by the language test that has already become an institution, by the application of which minority public servants who had served their country faithfully for decades have been dismissed and thrown on the streets without pensions or even composition. And, finally, the minorities, which have been practically dispossessed by the Rumanian Government, in their economic development too have to suffer from a lack of that equitable treatment which the Rumanian Minister of the Interior would fain have us believe is a reality.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN BLOC AND ITS REALISATION

BY

COUNT VLADIMIR BEM DE COSBAN*

Perhaps — now that Czecho-Slovakia has suffered the changes through which it has passed recently — we may expect the truth to dawn upon those people in Poland who have dreamed of a political friendship between Poland and Bohemia. There have been dreamers in Poland who have thought that the Czechs — although during the period when their policy played a leading role in Central Europe they never counted on the friendship of Poland — now that they have suffered changes and their policy has proved an utter failure, would approach Poland in a spirit of penitence and humility. These dreamers believed that after what had happened Bohemia would also join the Central European Bloc.

Although the conception is a very sound one, — chiefly because it would strengthen Poland's position in Central Europe —, nevertheless the idea of Bohemia or Czecho-Moravia respectively joining the Bloc is a mere dream. A cursory glance at the map of the Czecho-Moravia of today will suffice to convince every one that those countries are surrounded on three sides by Germany and that the only

* The "Danubian Review" has much pleasure in publishing the above article by Count Vladimir Bem de Cosban, Colonel (Retired) in the Polish Army, whose words throw light on the Central European question from the Polish point of view.

possible channel of communication with Poland and Slovakia is a very narrow strip of territory.

The Czecho-Moravia of today looks as if it were merely waiting for Germany to swallow it definitively. But, even if that were not the case, is there any Polish politician of any account who would wish to spoil the relations between Poland and the German Empire for the sake of saving the Czechs? Thank Heaven, however, the Czechs are far more practical-minded in this matter than their alleged Polish patrons. For weeks past the Polish Press has been discussing the question of a Czech-Polish compromise, doing so in the name of Slav brotherhood; and notwithstanding, the Czechs are very cool and reserved in their answers, unequivocally giving us to understand that they are not prepared to join any bloc antagonistic to Germany. Since M. Chvalkovszky's visit to Berlin the Czech people, which has never been remarkable for its romanticism or its chivalrous sentiments, — though in return it is blessed with a strong sense of business —, has not hesitated to acknowledge its complete dependence upon Germany... "Business is the main thing"... Those fully familiar with the mental structure of the Czechs, were not in the least surprised at that. A year ago Monsignor Jehlicska, — one of the men most familiar with the Czech people — speaking to me of the Polish Czechophile and other persons grouped round the "Kurjera Warszawski" made the following statement: — "These gentlemen are very mistaken in their opinion of the Czechs. Even in the event of their being reduced to the last extremity, the Czechs would rather subject themselves to German hegemony than join hands in friendship with the Poles. Their antipathy to the Poles is much greater than their dislike of the Germans, — though they do not dare to confess it; and in addition they are shrewd enough to calculate that they could do much better business under German direction than in the event of their joining hands with the Poles." These words so full of bitter irony have proved true; it is therefore high time for our political dreamers at long last to leave out of account Czecho-Moravia if they have serious ambitions in respect of the establishment of a Central European Bloc from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea.

It is another question whether it would be quite opportune to include Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia in the Bloc. I am thankful to say that our Foreign Ministry has recently been doing everything in its power to ensure that Carpatho-Russia shall, while retaining its autonomy, be incorporated in Hungary, thereby building the first connecting bridge between Hungary and Poland. Unfortunately Slovakia, that ill-starred country the fate of which is in the hands of Tiso and his "parochial" policy, and which is completely misled by the apparent endeavour of the People's Party to secure autonomy, — Slovakia has not yet accepted the idea of an alliance with Hungary. Yet the Slovaks might really take a lesson from their neighbours, the practical-minded Czechs, who have shown that it is possible without incurring any disadvantage to conclude an alliance with the enemy of yesterday. There can be no doubt that in the event of Slovakia separating entirely from Bohemia the Slovaks will also very soon realise that it is much more to their advantage — though at the outset perhaps only economically — to make an alliance with the Crown of St. Stephen. And until they arrive at the conviction there is no reason whatsoever why an independent Slovakia should not join the proposed Central European Bloc. In the event of even the loosest connection being maintained with Bohemia, however, that would be quite impossible. At the present moment there does not appear to be any likelihood of our being able to persuade Yugoslavia — and still less Rumania — to join the Central European Bloc. The obstacle in the way of that issue is the perfectly legitimate revision movement prevailing in Hungary. Hungary's claims against Yugoslavia are indeed not very serious ones, the only area involved being Szabadka and environs. It is very likely that by means of proper negotiations these two Parties, Hungary and Yugoslavia, would be able to come to a compromise in the matter.

But what about Rumania?

We are Rumania's allies; it is therefore our duty to offer Rumania our good wishes. But we must confess that post-war territorial greed was a great mistake. Just glance at the map of Transylvania and the Banate. Are these two provinces really ethnically Rumanian? In Transylvania itself the quota of Rumanians is only 50%; the rest of the popula-

tion consisting for the most part of Magyars, with a sprinkling of Saxons. It is manifest that it is in the interest of Rumania to endeavour to solve the problem of Transylvania and the Banate today, under auspicious circumstances, by amicable agreement with Hungary. The Poles — Rumania's allies and Hungary's friends — fervently desire such an issue. It was for that purpose that Colonel Beck attempted to intervene with King Charles. Rumour has it that Poland's intervention did not have any palpable results. The annexation of Carpatho-Russia to Hungary and the rapprochement between Rumania and Hungary was — we are told — made conditional on Hungary's recognising the permanent character of Rumania's present frontiers! It goes without saying that the Hungarians would be lunatics to give Rumania the guarantee demanded; for to do so would be equivalent to renouncing once for all their territorial claims against Rumania and to abandoning the two and a half million Magyars who are longing eigerly to be liberated from the Rumanian yoke. No Hungarian Foreign Office would ever dare to undertake to give such a guarantee even against the re-incorporation in Hungary of Carpatho-Russia, — if only because it is well known that Carpatho-Russia is an ineffably poor region which Hungary even in pre-war times was compelled to support economically. Every Hungarian desires a common Polish-Hungarian frontier and is anxious to join the Polish Bloc; but certainly not at the cost of renouncing the claim to a reparation of the injustice committed by Rumania. So, for the moment the only Central European Bloc likely to come into existence would be one including only Poland, Slovakia, Carpatho-Russia and Hungary. Poland must leave no stone unturned and throw her whole weight into the balance in order to bring that bloc into existence; and in particular she must endeavour to prevail upon Rumania not to oppose the incorporation in Hungary of Carpatho-Russia.

THE ATTACK ON MUNKÁCS

BY

ERNEST SCHMIDT-PAPP

In the early hours of the morning of Epiphany Day (January 6th) a daring outrage of an unpardonable character was committed against the territory of the Hungarian State. Taking advantage of the shelter of the darkness, Czech troops surreptitiously broke into the sleeping vottage of Oroszvég and town of Munkács. During the attack, carried out with the aid of up-to-date appliances of war, the town of Munkács was bombarded by Czech artillery.

The attack is of an incredible character, as coming only a few weeks after the Vienna award, which Czecho-Slovakia had solemnly accepted as binding upon her, and being directed without provocation of any kind against a peaceful town with the deliberate intention of taking possession of that town by force.

The attempt — which cannot be treated simply as a mere "incident" — ended in a fiasco and throws a searching light on the dangerous political atmosphere originating in particular from the Ruthenia subjected to the rule of the Volosin Government which has converted this section of the map of Europe into a hotbed of unrest endangering the peace of Europe. Though at the cost of considerable losses, the local Hungarian garrison heroically repulsed the treacherous attack, which has been proved beyond a doubt to have been a deliberate action systematically prepared and planned days in advance. An action the responsibility for which rests exclusively with Prague. This fact is shown also by the commentaries and explanations accompanying the reports of the events at Munkács published in the world press. Apart from the conclusions drawn by the British, Italian and Polish presses, particular interest attaches to the communiqué issued by the "Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz", which stresses the point that events of the kind are a direct defiance of the spirit of the Vienna award, adding that the responsibility for what happened at Munkács must be laid at the door of a system of malicious propaganda of a most deliberate character.

In connection with the events which occurred at Munkács and in the neighbourhood on Epiphany Day (January 6th.) last the Hungarian Government instituted an investigation of a most careful and thorough character. The investigation was opened already while the Czech attack was being repulsed; subsequently the work of the investigating authorities was co-ordinated with that of the mixed Czechoslovak-Hungarian Military Commission delegated by agreement between the Prague and Budapest Governments to find out what really happened.

The organs entrusted with the conduct of the investigation have endeavoured to thoroughly ascertain every single detail of the happenings in question, doing so for the purpose of determining the question of responsibility. That question is very closely connected with the aggressive attitude of the Czecho-Slovak troops. This question is to be determined internationally.

In order to render fully comprehensible what happened at Munkács it is necessary to describe the geographical situation in which the town of Munkács was placed by the Vienna award. The line of demarcation runs immediately beside the outlying sections of the town or rather of the village of Oroszvég, which forms the outskirts of the town, being separated therefrom only by the bed of the Latorca. Indeed, in places that line actually intersects the gardens attached to the houses. Only a few hundred metres from the town rises suddenly (from territory which to that point is flat in character) the first steep chain of the Wooded Carpathians, which is still in the hands of the Czechs. This mountain chain surrounds the town so closely — and at so short a distance — that from a military point of view the situation of Munkács is decidedly precarious. So long as the present frontiers remain in force, it will be an easy matter for any one with evil intentions to cross the boundary line.

It was this absurd situation of the frontier that the Czechs took advantage of to carry out their treacherous and surreptitious attack, in the conviction that their plan must succeed and that by the aid of their false propaganda they would be able to cajole the outside world into believing that the town of Munkács was not Hungarian after all. As it happened, however, the treacherous attack of the Czechs was repulsed in a striking manner by the inhabitants of Munkács themselves, who drove the Czech intruders out and proved for all time that the town of Munkács has always been and will always remain Hungarian.

This is how the treacherous and surreptitious attack of the Czechs was carried out: — At 3 a. m. on the morning of January 6th, under cover of the night darkness, the Hungarian frontier guards — altogether four persons — stationed at the eastern corner of Oroszvég were surprised by an attack by 3 Czech armoured cars and several hundred Czech regulars. The small Hungarian

guard stood their ground manfully until three of their number had been overpowered and the fourth seriously wounded by the attacking party. The heroic defence put up by this tiny detachment had however given the Hungarian troops stationed farther back time to get ready to take part in the action. The advance of the Czech infantry was checked by the stubborn resistance of this latter detachment, a small force of some ten men who showed the utmost courage and determination. Only one of the three armoured cars succeeded in advancing any distance — almost to the bridge over the Latorca.

Simultaneously with these events an attack was made by a superior force of Czech infantry on the Hungarian frontier guard stationed at the western entrance to the village of Oroszvég. Here too the Hungarian guard behaved with exemplary courage, retiring gradually and fighting every inch of ground, doing so in order to give the Hungarian garrison and the inhabitants of Munkács time to prepare to deliver a counter-attack.

The attacks of the numerically superior Czech forces were checked heroically by the admirably stubborn resistance of the small Hungarian detachments defending the frontier. A Hungarian policeman of Ruthenian nationality of the name of Pazuchanitch by constantly discharging his rifle disconcerted the driver and crew of the Czech armoured car. The tiny Hungarian detachment fired a volley at the car. The driver of the latter lost his head and drove the car into a ditch. The soldiers in the car jumped out and took to flight. The heroic Ruthenian policeman referred to above jumped on the Czech armoured car, removed one of the mitrailleuses (which he immediately put out of action) and then with two other men advanced to the bank of the Latorca, to a point from which a company of Czech infantry were approaching the town. Pazuchanitch then treated the Czech infantry to a severe drum-fire; and the Czechs made away as fast as they could.

Reports of the attack being made by the Czechs were very soon communicated to the battalion of Hungarian soldiers stationed in Munkács. The sections of the battalion already in marching order were immediately instructed to cross the bridge over the Latorca and support the frontier guards in their fight. After the alarm had been received the police of the town of Munkács at once joined the fray. They were joined also by the Hungarian ordnance officers functioning in Munkács; nor was any hesitation shown by the patriotic inhabitants of Munkács, who voluntarily reported themselves for military service and gallantly undertook their share in the work of driving out the treacherous enemy. Meanwhile Czech artillery began to bombard the defenceless town and awoke the sleeping inhabitants. The theatre was hit by a shell; so was the cinema and several other big buildings.

The treacherous Czech attack — supported by all kinds of up-to-date war equipment — failed; the numerically very inferior Hun-

garian force triumphantly repulsed the Czech assailants. Unfortunately the treacherous assault cost the Hungarians a number of valuable lives: the Hungarian soldiers who fell in defence of their country were Lieut. Joseph F. Csapó, Lieut. Joseph Koncz, Ensign Joseph Rozs, Artillery Sergeant Stephen Szarka and Corporal Peter Krisztin. In addition, the Czech bullets killed a Ruthenian woman too, — Mrs. Csubirka, who has left ten orphans to mourn her. Later on, two more of the injured combatants died of the effects of their wounds. There were a large number of wounded. The Czechs removed their dead and wounded.

From documents found on Czech prisoners the fact may be established that the attack was made deliberately and was carried out by Czech regular troops detached for the purpose. The heinousness of this dastardly and unprecedented attempt is enhanced by the circumstance that, though the Czechs notified the authorities in Munkács that they were anxious to hold a parley with the competent Hungarian officials, the car occupied by the Hungarian delegates — Lieut.-Colonel Szentiványi and Dr. Béla Dudinszky, Chief Constable of Munkács —, though provided with the regulation white flag and though marked white as provided in international usage, was subjected by the Czechs to the fire of machine-guns, Chief Constable Dudinszky being wounded in the neck. And, while the respective delegates were parleying in the Town Hall, the Czechs continued to bombard the town. When the Czech colonel who headed the Czech delegation was asked how such a thing could happen, — how the Czechs could continue to bombard the town while they were negotiating —, the colonel replied that he too thought it strange, but that it was not in his power to stop the firing.

It is a remarkable fact worth special mention that at 9 p. m. on January 7th, on the confines of the village of Nagygeőcz, near Ungvár, Czechoslovak regulars made another attempt to invade Hungarian territory: on that occasion, however, the attack was repulsed with the greatest ease by the Hungarian frontier guards, who were already prepared for such contingencies.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Hungarians will receive international satisfaction for the dastardly and cowardly surprise attack made by the Czechs. However, there is no possibility of full confidence and re-assurance being restored until the question of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier is satisfactorily settled and until the Prague Government makes up its mind to discontinue its machinations. Another *sine qua non* without which no adjustment of the question can ever prove satisfactory or lasting, is that the Czech Government must disarm the bands of Ukrainian Bolshevik terrorists and must give the Ruthenian people the right of self-determination which is that people's due.

POLITICAL MOSAIC

MUNKÁCS ALWAYS HAS BEEN, AND ALWAYS WILL BE A HUNGARIAN TOWN

On 15th January, the Magyars, Ruthenians and Germans of the district around Munkács held a mass meeting at which, with impressive unanimity, they declared that they desired to belong to Hungary for ever. They were ready to fight to their last breath to ensure that Munkács should remain what it had always been — a Hungarian town. The meeting was opened by M. Aladár R. Vozáry, M. P. for Munkács, who, among other things, said: — "We have met to protest against the base and treacherous behaviour of the Czechs in attacking the town and to demand redress and reparation before the tribunal of international public opinion. Should the attack be repeated, we shall not halt at the present line of demarcation, but shall drive the aggressors back as far as Verecke. An attack of this sort, executed surreptitiously and with armoured cars, cannon and machine-guns, against a peaceful town, is unprecedented in the history of Europe. The Czechs wished to take advantage of the honourable attitude of the Hungarian Government, which with due respect for international agreements, did not leave in Munkács a larger garrison than is usual in a peaceful town. The treacherous plan failed, and failed because the people of Munkács themselves proved what good Hungarians they were, and repulsed the attacks of far superior forces armed to the teeth..."

M. Vozáry's speech was frequently interrupted by loud cheers and, like a magnificent Greek chorus, cries of "Back to Verecke!" resounded again and again. When he concluded, the meeting was first addressed by M. Stephen Majoros, delegate of the Hungarian National Alliance, and then by Dr. Andrew Fall, director of the Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League, who stated that the attack on Munkács was intended by the Czechs to prove that it was not a Hungarian town. But the people of Munkács had given the lie direct to that insinuation and had shed their blood to

demonstrate that Munkács had always been, and would continue to remain, Hungarian.

"Europe is groaning under the curse of the Trianon peace edict" — said the speaker. — "Twenty years have passed since it was pronounced, but no reconciliation has taken place among the nations. No order is even conceivable in the Danube Valley until the affairs of the peoples living there are settled equitably. In Vienna only the nationality principle was enforced; the right of the nations to self-determination was ignored. Frontiers were drawn in Vienna that threaten our Slovak and Ruthenian brethren with a terrible future. The millions of Magyars in Hungary demand self-determination for their Slovak and Ruthenian brethren, in order that these peoples may be able to throw off the Czech yoke and give free expression to their own wishes by means of a plebiscite."

M. Ladislas Szánthó, one of the leaders of the men who defended the town, described in spirited words how the Magyars, Ruthenians and Germans had co-operated in that work. M. Michael Demkő, a leader of the Ruthenians living near Munkács, addressed the meeting in Ruthenian, and, speaking of the spirit of fraternity existing for a thousand years between the Magyars and the Ruthenians, laid stress on the point that the reason why the Czechs were opposed to a plebiscite was that, given a choice, 90% of the Ruthenian people would have voted for incorporation in Hungary. At the close of M. Demkő's speech the assembly sang the Ruthenian anthem.

Herr Francis Marton, a German teacher from Palánka, spoke to the meeting in German. He said that the Germans of the district had been shocked by the treacherous attack made by the Czechs and that they had immediately felt it their duty to join the Magyars and Ruthenians in their armed resistance to that act of aggression and their defence of the town and of Hungarian soil. "We who live in this German language enclave" — he said — "have always been on friendly terms with the Magyars and it would have been cowardly of us to hold back when the country that gave us our bread was threatened. There is not one man among us of whom our ancestors who rest in Hungarian soil would have to be ashamed for failure to do his duty to his country."

After these speeches M. Vozáry read out the text of a resolution, which was then unanimously adopted by the meeting. In it the people of Munkács demand reprisals and full compensation for the damage done and ask for permission to pursue the enemy beyond the present line of demarcation in the event of a fresh Czech inroad. The resolution begs the Hungarian Government to address an appeal to the Great Powers asking for a definitive revision of the Trianon Treaty and requesting them to order a

plebiscite on the principle of self-determination in the areas wrested from Hungary.

Telegrams conveying the homage of the assembly were sent to the Regent, Admiral Horthy, Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini, Colonel Beck, Polish Foreign Minister, and the Hungarian Premier, Dr. Imrédy.

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BULGARIAN PREMIER ANNOUNCES BULGARIA'S REVISIONIST DEMANDS

Restoration of Bulgarian Territories Attached to Rumania and Greece Demanded in Sofia Parliament.

On 27th and 28th January there was a great foreign affairs debate in the Bulgarian Parliament. Practically all the leading members of the Opposition, most of them ex-ministers, spoke during the course of the debate. All the speakers demanded the revision of the Neuilly Treaty, especially in connection with the areas assigned to Rumania and Greece. Relations with Yugoslavia and Turkey were discussed in a particularly friendly tone by nearly all the speakers.

In his reply, Premier Kioseivanov said that the Government was resolved to devote its special attention, in an even more marked degree than hitherto, to foreign politics. Bulgaria would try to settle the questions at issue with Rumania and Greece in the near future. The Saloniki Agreement was the first step towards a revision of the Neuilly Treaty.

Today the little States could no longer have any confidence in the League of Nations, for that organization had proved impotent. Bulgaria had come to the decision that she would ask the aid of the Great Powers to help in settling her problems, but the Government was determined to pursue a foreign policy that left no scope for adventures.

The Premier made no secret of his anxiety for the future of the country. Nowadays — he said — when, not without reason, international events filled everybody, but especially the little nations, with fear and dread, it was more than ever important that those minor nations should strengthen the links of friendship binding them one to the other, and that they should form other friendly connections.

During the course of the debate several Members voiced a demand for the restoration of certain territories at present in the possession of their neighbours, Rumania and Greece. When in his speech ex-Premier Cankov mentioned merely the rights of the Bulgarian minority in Rumania, several Members cried: "We demand territory too. We want the Dobruja!"

M. Govedarov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said amongst other things that he would gladly welcome a Belgrade-Sofia axis extending as far as Angora.

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FRENCH DEPUTIES ON THE RUTHENIAN QUESTION

During the recent discussions on foreign affairs in the French Chamber of Deputies very interesting statements were made on the Ruthenian question, — a circumstance that at the same time proves that French policy is devoting considerable attention to the matter.

The first speaker was M. Ernest Pezet, one of the leading authorities on the Central European questions. M. Pezet pointed out (on January 20th., 1939) that the Munich Agreement signified the triumph of the principle of revision. Speaking of the Hungarians, the speaker said it was quite natural that they should have asked for urgent measures; for they had been waiting patiently for very long. The justice of their demands was enhanced by the fact that those demands were supported both by the ethnic principle and by historical rights. In the speaker's opinion there would be nothing illogical in Hungary subsequently demanding from Rumania the restoration of the frontier regions of Transylvania inhabited by Magyars. A principle recognised as valid this side of the Tisza must necessarily be valid beyond the Tisza too.

M. Pezet was followed by M. Philippe Henriot, who is also an authority on conditions in Central Europe, where he has studied those conditions on the spot.

"Prior to the Great War" — said M. Henriot — "Ruthenia was a territory belonging politically to Hungary. Its inhabitants lived in seclusion up in the mountains, their homes being accessible only by roads and paths difficult to traverse. This circumstance ensured them a kind of autonomy.

"After the War their National Council, which was entitled "Ruthenian-Magyar Council", on November 24th, 1919, proclaimed the autonomy of Ruthenia. Subsequently, as the result of certain stratagems and innumerable intrigues, Ruthenia was incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia.

"Our fellow-deputy, M. Guernier, who acted as rapporteur on the Treaty of Trianon in the Chamber of Deputies, in his report made the following statement concerning the Ruthenian question:

"The plenipotentiaries concentrated their energy chiefly on separating Ruthenia from that Hungary with which its whole economic life connected it inseparably.

"It is manifest that the situation in which the Ruthenians have been placed is not final or definitive, and that they will sooner or later return to Hungary or join East Galicia."

"This foresight on the part of our fellow-deputy was proved to have been justified when after the decision taken at Munich

Hungary demanded a plebiscite in Ruthenia to enable the people to decide its own fate.

"The Hungarian proposal was at once seconded by Poland; and indeed since 1920 a book had been published in that country urging the union of Ruthenia and Hungary in order to ensure the realisation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier."

M. Henriot then said that Hungary did not wish simply to occupy the territory in question, but had demanded that the Ruthenians should enjoy local self-government within the framework of the Hungarian State.

Four days later (on January 24th., 1939) M. Xavier Vallat, the leader of the Hungarian section of the Central European Group of the French Chamber of Deputies, spoke again on the Ruthenian question. He established the fact that, if plebiscites had been held in Ruthenia and Slovakia, the results of the same would have been very unfavourable to Prague. In illustration of the methods still employed by Prague in its dealings with the Ruthenians M. Vallat referred to the case of M. Andrew Bródy:

"When circumstances left them no other choice" — said M. Vallat — "the central Czech Government granted Ruthenia autonomy — which in terms of the Treaty of Saint Germain should have been granted already in 1920 and which in its present form has so far proved of very dubitable value; and Marshal Sirovy himself appointed Andrew Bródy Prime Minister of Ruthenia.

"The choice was a perfectly natural one. Bródy was Editor of the only Ruthenian daily, and was President of the Ruthenian Autonomist Party, while the political tendency represented by him was after all the most important of the three political tendencies in Ruthenia.

"For there are three political parties functioning in Ruthenia, — the Ruthenian Autonomist Party, of which Bródy is President, the Great Russian Party and the Ukrainian Party, the weakest of the three, of which M. Volosin is President.

"In Ruthenia an energetic movement has been started to further the idea of re-incorporation in Hungary. This territory was for a thousand years — from the days of Charlemagne until the end of the Great War — an integral part of the dominions of the Holy Crown, its inhabitants having been named "gens fidelissima" by Prince Rákóczy, the great hero of the Hungarian struggle for independence. Therefore, between November 2nd. and November 10th., — i. e. prior to the actual re-occupation by Hungary of the areas allotted to her —, the heads of 200 out of the 320 Greek-Catholic (Uniate) parishes functioning within the territory of Ruthenia called on Bishop

Stojka at Munkács and in the name of their parishioners demanded the incorporation in Hungary of Carpatho-Russia.

"And the inhabitants of the 200 Ruthenian villages submitted a petition to that effect to the Hungarian Government.

"On November 3rd, — in this case, too, prior to the entry of the Hungarian troops —, the leading Ruthenian associations held a mass meeting at Ungvár, at which Minister Fencsik (now Member of the Hungarian Lower House) and Bishop Stojka and many others made speeches. The mass meeting also decided in favour of annexation to Hungary.

"In view of these repeated expressions of the common will of his people Premier Bródy, at the first meeting of the central Prague Government attended by him, demanded that a plebiscite should be held in Ruthenia.

"Marshal Sirovy immediately made Bródy resign and without delay sent a telegram appointing to the office of Premier M. Volosin, who is a Member of the Czech People's Party and — as I must once more remind you — leader of the weakest political party in Ruthenia — the Ukrainian Party with the assistance of which he and his freinds would fain realise a Greater Ukraine.

"Bródy was arrested and is being charged with high treason in connection with Poland."

UTTER CONFUSION CHARACTERIZES OPERATIONS OF THE VOLOSIN GOVERNMENT

Signs of dissolution are apparent in Sub-Carpathia. There is not an inch of solid ground upon which the Volosin Government can build. The people would like to join Hungary and are hostile towards the Government, which, in order to break the political will of the people, has decided to entroduce a one-party system that would serve its own aims. With this end in view the Volosin Government has completely deprived the Hungarians of the use of their political rights and suppresses all their attempts at political self-expression. At the same time the Ruthenian Government is at loggerheads with its superior, the Prague Government, as may be seen from the Prchala affair, the details of which will be found in another part of this issue. In addition to the political blunders and the indecision characterizing the activity of the Volosin Government, another thing that makes matters worse is the extremely oppressive economic situation with which, under the circumstances at present obtaining in Ruthenia, even a more capable Government with a greater routine in administration would be quite unable to cope. The present Government has lost its head completely, and the sorry plight in which it finds itself will be evident to the reader of the following incontestable facts.

On 22nd January the Volosin Government issued an order dissolving and suppressing all the political parties and organizations in Ruthenia and making the party of Ukrainian National Unity the sole official political organization in Sub-Carpathia. The Hungarian Party was not even allowed to send a representative to the Ruthenian Diet, as in view of the numerical strength of the Hungarians it would certainly have been entitled to do. At the same time the activity of the United Hungarian Party of Czecho-Slovakia was forbidden, the Party premises were closed down, and the officials of the Party dismissed.

According to Volosin's election Ordinance the votes must be either "Yes" or "No", but those who vote "No" must write their names and addresses on the papers, or else their votes will be considered invalid. With this method of "secret" elections Volosin is able, of course, to ensure his own party securing a majority. The "Gazetta Polska" of Warsaw writing of this system on 20th January aptly describes it as "Premier Volosin's conjuring trick". In protest against it, and chiefly because of the grave violation of the rights of the Hungarians, Count John Esterházy, General President of the United Hungarian Party, sent the following telegram to M. Hacha, President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic:

"It is the duty of the United Hungarian Party to represent the interests of the Magyars living in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. It is also a well-known fact that a large number of Magyars remained in the Republic after the Vienna award. Their vital interests demand that their Hungarian character should be ensured in the field of politics through the medium of this Party. Premier Volosin has prohibited the activity of the United Hungarian Party in Sub-Carpathia, has closed and sealed its premises, and forbidden the secretaries and other functionaries of the Party to do any work for it. By these measures the Magyars of Ruthenia have been deprived of their most elementary human rights, as guaranteed to them in the Constitution. The Hungarians have now no means of protection against the official reign of terror (with detention in concentration camps) that has followed the Vienna award. As the President of this Party I beg to inform you, Sir, the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, that I refuse to take cognizance of this order of Premier Volosin's and I appeal to you, Mr. President, for urgent redress, confident that justice will triumph."

But instead of redressing the wrongs done to the Magyars, the Volosin Government ordered the agents of the United Hungarian Party who had been circulating papers canvassing votes for the Party to be interned. This was the beginning of a more ruthless persecution of the Magyars and Ruthenians of the Opposition. In the first place, it is forbidden to speak Hungarian and Russian in public places, and the local authorities have issued

orders that even in private the population must speak either Czech or Ukrainian. Atrocities became the order of the day. In Huszt, for instance, when the Sics, i. e. the Ukrainian Guards, assaulted M. Kossei, former M. P., and two of his companions, the gendarmes, instead of arresting the aggressors, marched the three victims off to police headquarters. Many members of the Opposition have been arrested, several people have been maltreated and in Szolyva 52 Magyars and Ruthenians have received orders to leave the country. The people thus expelled have not been allowed to take their moveables across the frontier.

Grave differences have arisen between the Volosin and the Prague Governments. This in itself is remarkable, for it would be hard to find a similar case of a provincial government openly defying the central government of the country to which it is subordinate. The whole affair began with the Slovak official census, according to which there are, in Slovakia, 2,291,000 Slovaks, 51,907 Czechs, 41,691 Moravians, 128,000 Germans, 79,000 Ruthenians, 67,000 Magyars, 29,928 Jews and 27,000 gypsies. Against these census returns (which are quite false from a Hungarian and German point of view) the "Nova Szloboda", the official organ of the Volosin Government, protested, declaring that there were at least 200,000 Ruthenians in Slovakia. Hostile feelings were aggravated by another article in the same paper in which it was stated the Volosin Government insisted on a frontier readjustment (discriminating in favour of Ruthenia) between the latter and Slovakia. M. Sidor, Slovak Minister, immediately announced that Slovakia refused to agree to a readjustment of the frontier, and would not yield one acre of land to Ruthenia. Thereupon the "Nova Szloboda" launched a virulent attack against M. Sidor, for which the paper was confiscated by the military authorities.

On 26th January, M. Sidor made another statement in the Slovak newspapers, again expressly declaring that there could be no question of frontier readjustment, since the 79,000 Ruthenians in Slovakia had their own Parliamentary representation, their own schools, and bishopric in Eperjes, and had therefore no reason not to be happy in Slovakia.

The antagonism between the two Governments is growing more and more bitter. A proof of this is that the Volosin Government has discharged 60 police officials employed partly in Huszt and partly in Szolyva. The discharged officials were sent to Prague to be "at the disposal of the Czech Government." Their posts are being filled with Ukrainian Guardists, members of the so-called Sics.

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PROGRAMME OF UNITED HUNGARIAN (MAGYAR) PARTY
OF SLOVAKIA

The Executive Committee of the United Hungarian Party of Slovakia on January 19th, held its first meeting since the Vienna award, that meeting being followed by a conference of the leaders of the Party. At the latter Count John Esterházy outlined the Party's programme in the changed circumstances.

In the first part of his speech Count Esterházy expressed his appreciation of, and gratitude to, the Hungarians now restored to the mother country for their loyalty and endurance during the vicissitudes of the past twenty years. They would never forget — he said — how those people, whether they had toiled with their brains or their hands, in towns or villages, had maintained through two decades of oppression, and amidst all the trials of their lot as a minority, their loyalty to the Hungarian language and the Hungarian soil; how they had fostered their national consciousness and guarded against anything that would have been a stain on Hungarian honour. If now they were enjoying the fruits of that conduct, it was a matter of satisfaction to the United Hungarian Party too.

Count Esterházy then went on to speak of their faithful comrades, the Sudeten Germans and their leader, Herr Henlein. They have worked together in a spirit of sincere friendship, and the cordial relations that had developed between the Hungarians and the Sudeten Germans during the past twenty years would have to be further cultivated and fostered. The Hungarian Party must never fall into the fatal mistake of attempting to enforce their rights at the expense of, or by cheating, another racial group.

The Slovaks had reached the first station of their emancipation as conceived by Andrew Hlinka, but they had not fully attained their object yet. The Slovak people might absolutely rely on the constructive co-operation of the Magyars of Slovakia in their work of state-building. The national and political interests of the Slovaks demanded that every racial group should enjoy full rights. This alone would ensure universal contentment. Sound development was possible only if the last vestiges of the old Czecho-Slovak system and spirit were ruthlessly rooted out. The classification of the minorities as second and third-rate citizens would have to cease.

Count Esterházy stressed the point that his criticism was not directed against the Slovak people itself and that his only object was to eliminate the institutional wrongs and just causes of complaint that were a hindrance to peaceful co-operation. It would be absurd — he said — if now when the Slovak people had obtained executive power it should use that power as a means of placing other racial groups at a disadvantage, groups that had

always sympathized with the aims of the Slovaks and which now expressly stated their willingness to continue to co-operate. Slovak public opinion should regard the speaker as a friend, ready always to enter the lists for the rightful demands of their Slovak brethren across the frontier. And no amount of fault-finding or ingratitude would ever make him desist from his labours.

Hitherto — he continued — the Party programme had rested on three pillars: nationalism, Christian ideas, and social justice. The programme would now be extended to embrace the idea of racialism and to implant that idea in the Magyar ethnic group. They had become fewer in number, but it did not follow that they had grown weaker, provided they accepted all the implications of that idea, which meant that all Christian Magyars in Slovakia were members of the Hungarian national group there if they clung to Hungarian traditions and were ready to struggle disinterestedly for the aspirations of the Hungarian people.

Count Esterházy closed his speech with the following words: "The measures of Providence as regards our lot are not what we hoped they would be, but the dejection caused by this must be only temporary. A new, greater, and nobler vocation awaits us, and we must accept it. In the changed circumstances our devotion to our former Hungarian fatherland will suffer no decline, while at the same time we will scrupulously do our duty as citizens of this country. With heads uplifted we take our stand before the whole world under the immaculate, snow-white standard of the Virgin and proclaim to all: Here we stand as Hungarian sentinels; law, right and justice are our weapons and God is our shield; to Him we commit the future of the Hungarian people, looking to Him for the triumph of the Hungarian cause."

Count Esterházy's speech was warmly applauded by the meeting, and the Party unanimously accepted the programme outlined therein. Expression was also given to the unanimous opinion of the leaders of the Party that the provisions of the Vienna award relating to the rights of the Magyars in Slovakia, and their guarantees, could not be made dependent on reciprocity, or on any circumstance over which they had no control.

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RUTHENIA UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION BY CZECHS

On January 16th., M. Hacha, President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, appointed as Carpatho-Russian Minister General Leo Prchala, who had previously functioned as military commander in Slovakia — although Prchala is not a Ruthenian but a Czech. The news of this arbitrary measure prevailed upon M. Volosin, Prime Minister of Ruthenia, to protest against a Czech general being appointed by Prague to function as Minister in Ruthenia. In his protest the Ruthenian Premier stressed the circumstance

that he had nominated two persons for appointment to the ministerial office in question, but that these nominations had been rejected by Prague. He emphasised further that Ruthenia could never under any circumstances acquiesce in the appointment of General Prchala. He would leave no stone unturned — said M. Volosin — to prevent Prchala entering upon his official functions.

On January 17th., there were great demonstrations all over Ruthenia, the population unanimously protesting against the appointment of General Prchala, while at the same time warning Prague that it would prevent Prchala from entering the territory of Carpatho-Russia. On this occasion the demonstrators everywhere shouted: — "Down with the Czechs! We do not want Czechs!"

On hearing of the demonstrations the Czech Government made a statement to the Press according to which the appointment of General Prchala to the office of Ruthenian Minister had to be made in order to ensure the restoration of order in Ruthenia, seeing that the Ruthenian Government had lost control of the situation.

On January 19th., Minister Fedor Revaj and M. Brascsajko, delegate of Carpatho-Russia, called on M. Beran, Czech Prime Minister, who was then at Huszt, for the purpose of protesting once more against the appointment and of reiterating the arguments which had already been communicated by wire to the Prague Government — above all stressing the point that only Carpatho-Russian politicians could be appointed Ruthenian Ministers, and not Czech soldiers. The discussion however led to no result, the Prague Government not being prepared to reconsider its original decision.

Seeing the intransigence of the Prague Government, the Ukrainian Minister Revaj sent the following telegram to the German Foreign Minister, Baron Ribbentrop:

"Prague has refused to take cognizance of our protests against the appointment of Prchala to the office of Minister. Despite our protest Hacha, President of the Republic, has administered the oath to General Prchala. The tension at Huszt is great. The population is embittered. Yesterday there was a great demonstration at Huszt in which the people and the members of our party took part spontaneously and of their own accord. The Czech officials and excise officers threaten to strike. The Czech military authorities have forbidden every form of communication; and the oppression of the inhabitants may lead to great difficulties. The Huszt Czech National Council, though condemning the action of Prague, is unable to achieve any results by intervention. Should Prchala assume his duties at Huszt, the situation may become disastrous. I feel it my duty to inform Your Excellency

of all these matters. In Prague even our official notifications are confiscated."

And nevertheless, on January 21st., General Prchala appeared in the Governor's Office at Huszt for the purpose of paying his respects to Premier Volosin. The latter, in the presence of Minister Revaj, had an hour's discussion with General Prchala. Ukrainian official quarters issued a communiqué respecting the discussion in which they asserted that Prchala had been convinced that his appointment had been effected with the approval of the Members of the Volosin Government. He had realised, however, that he had been mistaken and that the inhabitants of Ruthenia opposed his appointment. And in consequence he had refused to accept office as Minister and had returned to Prague. At the same time the Volosin Government had sent the Prague Government a message through General Prchala informing that Government that it was prepared to enter into negotiations respecting the appointment of a third Minister, though the new minister must be a person of Ukrainian nationality, whose appointment would then be approved. Otherwise the Ukrainians would appeal to the German Government and ask that Government to act as arbitrator.

The above statement made by Ukrainian official quarters was answered on January 30th., by a Prague statement — also originating from competent quarters — refuting the allegations of the same. According to the statement made by the Czechs the only reason why General Prchala had returned to Prague was to inform the Czech Government of the situation in Ruthenia. He had not however resigned his office as Ruthenian Minister. He had on the contrary left Prague that day (January 30th.) for Huszt for the purpose of beginning his work as third Minister of Carpatho-Russia.

The reply given to this statement made of official Czech quarters by Volosin and his colleague was a counter-declaration published the same day — January 30th., — in their Press. In this declaration the Volosin Government asserted that there was no truth whatsoever in the report that General Prchala was returning to Huszt, seeing that the serious difference of opinion arising as between Huszt and the central Prague Government as a consequence of Prchala's appointment had not been settled. General Prchala would remain for the moment in Prague, where he was negotiating with the central Government respecting his mission in Carpatho-Russia and the tasks awaiting him there. The central Government still insisted upon General Prchala's assuming office as Minister, regarding that as a guarantee of the assertion in Huszt too of the will of Prague. On January 29th. Revaj, Carpatho-Russian Minister, had spent an hour and a half discussing with the Czech Prime Minister Beran the question of

Prchala's appointment; but the discussion had not led to any result. On January 30th. Minister Revaj had once more had an audience with Prime Minister Beran.

The complications caused by the appointment of General Prchala strikingly illustrate the differences of opinion existing between the Ukrainian Government of Volosin and the Prague Government. This case shows clearly that Prague is subjecting to a military dictatorship the so-called "autonomous province of Carpatho-Russia", the government of which has been entrusted to Ukrainian terrorists. However, now that they are comfortably settled in the posts for which they yearned, the latter are defying their Prague patrons and demand absolute liberty of action for the purpose of being able to arbitrarily impose their rule on a people — the Ruthenians — which is loud in its protests against "Ukrainianism."

ANTI-MINORITY PROVISIONS OF NEW RUMANIAN NATIONALITY ACT

In its January 19th., 1939, issue the Rumanian Official Gazette (Monitorul Oficial) published the text of the new Rumanian Nationality Act which is to come into force on February 1st, 1939, a law which contains provisions involving exceptionally grave consequences to persons belonging to the Magyar minority living in Rumania. These provisions deprive all citizens of minority status — and in particular Magyars — who have so far for purely formal reasons not obtained the rights of citizenship (have not been naturalised) of the possibility to become Rumanian citizens by de post facto inclusion in the list of those citizens.

Now this politically disabling provision threatens the very existence of a very large section of Rumanian citizens. It is most unjust towards those who are materially entitled to obtain Rumanian citizenship but who were originally omitted from the list of citizens on the ground that they had not reported themselves. Those pensionaries who have no certificates of nationality have not received their pensions for three months; while the officials, craftsmen, tradesmen and employees belonging to non-Rumanian nationalities are in danger of losing their posts owing to their not possessing nationality (citizenship) certificates. The latter, seeing that they failed to report themselves for enrolment in the list of citizens by the last date appointed for the purpose (September 30th., 1933), under the new Act cannot be given Rumanian citizenship except by the process of naturalisation. As to the proportion of persons belonging to minorities involved, that is shown by the report presented to the Pension Fund by the Mayor of Nagyvárad, according to which of the 86,000 inhabitants of the town at the present moment only 53,925 have been entered in the list of citizens, 19,268 of the person involved being heads of

families. We see, therefore, that in Nagyvárad alone roughly 32.000 persons have been omitted from the list of citizens through no fault of theirs. According to an approximative estimate there are nearly 400.000 persons who failed to report themselves for enrolment during the term originally fixed for that purpose, roughly 90% of these persons being Magyars. Their omission from the citizenship roll is particularly unjustifiable in view of the circumstance that both the treaty of peace and § 56 of the original Nationality Act unequivocally stipulated that every person who on December 1st., 1918, possessed rights of citizenship (*pertinenza*) in territory previously forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy transferred to Rumania should obtain ipso facto Rumanian nationality and should therefore be regarded as Rumanian citizens without being compelled to comply with any formality whatsoever.

§ 62 of the new Rumanian Nationality Act that is now coming into force instead of providing facilities for persons omitted from the citizenship roll to have themselves enrolled *de post facto* — stipulates that "those who have not complied with the conditions postulated in the Act of February 24th., 1924, shall be regarded as having renounced Rumanian citizenship as defined in the provisions of the treaties of peace and in the measures of general import." Thus, the Act contains a categorical stipulation and deprives those who have not yet obtained Rumanian citizenship of the possibility of doing so.

The only way open to these persons is to obtain citizenship by naturalisation. One of the conditions indispensable to the obtaining of Rumanian citizenship by naturalisation is ten years' uninterrupted residence in Rumania (Point 4. of § 10.) However, applicants will find that it is for nothing that they have lived their whole life in the territory now belonging to Rumania, for the period of ten years is reckoned only from the day on which applications are filed. It is true that under § 11 of the Act in cases where such procedure appears justifiable applicants may be exempted from the obligation of a ten year's period of probation; but there will be only very few cases in which applicants belonging to minorities will be allowed to avail themselves of this privilege. One of the conditions prescribed in such cases is that the applicant shall be married to a Rumanian woman. But it must be remembered that in practice it has long become the rule that only marriages with women who are ethnically pure Rumanians shall be considered as marriages coming under this provision.

It is quite evident, therefore, that the non-Rumanian minorities here too suffer from an inequality of treatment. This fact is reflected even more strikingly in the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice issued on June 5th., 1938, which required the inhabitants who are ethnically of Rumanian origin to submit applications for the recognition of their citizenship. In order to prevent

the non-Rumanian minorities from being given an opportunity to report themselves de post facto, the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice postulated that all applicants should procure from the mayors of their townships and from the ecclesiastical authorities certificates of their ethnic origin, of the faith professed by them and of their not having opted for the nationality of any other State. This Ordinance of the Minister of Justice deprived persons belonging to minorities — i. e. persons not ethnically Rumanians — of the possibility of being entered de post facto in the citizenship roll and thereby offered proof positive of the inequality of treatment meted out to persons belonging to minorities.

THE MINORITY SITUATION MISREPRESENTED BY THE "UNIVERSUL" AND THE "VREME"

Two newspaper articles from Bucharest attack the Hungarian point of view, which has been recognized as just by international public opinion. The one appeared in the "Universul", a Rumanian newspaper notoriously given to stirring up strife, the other, in the "Vreme" of Belgrad. The latter, which of course was written in Serb, had been sent from Bucharest and bore all the hall-marks of Rumanian anti-Hungarian propaganda.

In the first-mentioned article, which appeared in the "Universul" of 28th January, the Trianon Treaty is described as "the justest act in history." This statement gives the lie to all the leaders of international politics who have recognized and frankly admitted that it was a great mistake, for which the slogan of the nationality principle, was responsible, but which subjected masses of people belonging to civilized nations to a degree of oppression hitherto unparalleled in the history of minorities. The "Universul" denies the statement made by "Le Temps" which admits that Hungary was cruelly dismembered by the Treaty of Trianon. That Paris does not require information from the "Universul" was proved by nothing better than by the opinions voiced when questions on matters of foreign policy were put in the French Chamber some days before the above-mentioned article appeared in the Bucharest newspaper. In his statements made on that occasion (January 20), M. Pezet established the fact that Hungary deserved to be rewarded for the patience with which she had waited for the enforcement of her rights and legitimate demands. M. Pezet also said that French foreign policy should have advised the Governments of the Little Entente in time. We know that these opinions are shared by the men who shape England's foreign policy, and it was but lately that M. Chamberlain declared that the League of Nations ought to have applied those paragraphs of the Covenant which in fact prescribe readjustments in accordance with the ethnic principle. But the spirit of which the "Universul" is the mouthpiece ignores advice and refuses

to listen to warnings. Articles of this nature merely serve to hinder a peaceful evolution towards the "Right". Perhaps they are intended to do so. But the case of Czecho-Slovakia shows that justice triumphant is able to break, unarmed, through lines of fortifications and set the oppressed free.

The article in the Belgrade "Vreme" is an echo of Bucharest's opinions, and it reveals the same tendency to frustrate peaceful effort. The Bucharest author of this leading article would have his readers believe that all the minority problems confronting Europe were definitively settled at the Munich Conference. He says that the questions of the minorities in Rumania were discussed then and the complete and perfect tranquility reigning within the Rumanian frontiers established in consequence.

Strange to say, nobody else has any knowledge of a general settlement extending to the whole of Europe having been arrived at in Munich. So far as the rest of us know, the decision pronounced in the case of Czecho-Slovakia by the leaders of the Great Powers assembled in Munich paved the way towards new arrangements on the ethnic principle and made the enforcement of legitimate rights theoretically possible.

The article strives to prove that peace and contentment reign within the present borders of Rumania, and that the masses of the minorities have no complaints, no wishes, and no demands. The author ventures to make some very bold statements. He says, for instance, that the large estates were divided among the peasantry by a Liberal Parliament without respect of nationality. This is a very risky thing to say, for internal conditions in Rumania are very well known to the Great Powers and to the whole of Europe. Large estates were divided among the peasants, but we all know that the land in Hungarian hands, even that belonging to the small farmers, was ruthlessly and mercilessly confiscated and handed over to Rumanian peasants, in order to further nationalist aims. Poor people whose only property was an acre or two had their land expropriated, Rumanian churches, Rumanian schools and Rumanian institutions being built on these plots of land.

The principal argument employed by the writer of the "Vreme" article is that the minorities have joined the Rumanian Party — the only party permitted by the present régime. Does this mean that the minorities are content? If the Edict issued by a military dictatorship does not allow more than one party and orders every citizen to join it, what are the poor minorities, who are at the tender mercies of the authorities, to do? Were the formation of other parties permitted, the Hungarians would belong to the Hungarian Party, and the Germans to the German one, as they did so long as that was possible. The article finds fault with the minority treaties and complains that they were forced on the Succession States. They were, in any case, very weak and

inadequate guarantees of minority rights. But if the nationalities in Rumania are really content, what fault can the author have to find with these weak guarantees? — y —

BRITISH M. P.'s IN HUNGARY

In the middle of January, Major Henry Procter, M. P. again visited Hungary to study the situation in Central Europe after Munich. While he was here, he met a number of our leading politicians, who gave him detailed information about the Hungarian standpoint. As it was just on the eve of his arrival that Czech regular troops made an unsuccessful attack on Munkács, Major Procter decided to visit that town, and on his return he said:

"I had an opportunity of speaking with all sorts and conditions of people in Munkács, with the Mayor and the soldiers, with scientists, missionary sisters, merchants and peasants, all of whom were eye-witnesses of the events. I myself went over the scene of the battle three times. I investigated the affair from every angle, and can say with a clear conscience that undoubtedly the Czechs were the aggressors. I cannot quite understand what they actually wanted, but anyhow, from a military point of view, the manoeuvre was clumsily executed."

The Editor-in-chief of the "Pesti Hírlap", Dr. Otto Légrády, gave a dinner in honour of Major Procter to which his Budapest friends and several politicians were also invited. M. George Lukács, Privy Councillor, proposed the health of Major Procter, who replied in a long speech. Below we publish certain interesting passages therefrom.

"The first time I came to Hungary," — said Major Procter, — "a tourist's curiosity brought me. Afterwards, however, when I become acquainted with the work of the Revision League and Dr. Otto Légrády's activities, my heart was filled with a growing attachment and respect for the Hungarian people and Hungarian institutions. I heartily congratulate both on the good work they did in difficult circumstances.

"When I say this in general I must in particular express my great admiration of Hungarian diplomacy for the self-discipline manifested at the time of the Munich and Vienna negotiations wherewith a major service was rendered, not only to Hungary, but also to the whole of mankind. This was greatly appreciated by Great Britain . . .

"I look around on the political horizon and see two things. The one is the conscientiousness of Mr. Chamberlain, the strongest Prime Minister of the past fifty years. The other is the perseverance of the Hungarian nation . . . This perseverance would not have been possible without the Revision League and the work of

Dr. Otto Legrády, nor would the struggle for revision have ever been crowned with success without their efforts.

"Hungary's policy of peaceful revision will surely continue... The need for that policy is manifest if we consider what happened at Munkács. Yesterday and the day before I had an opportunity of examining the Czech triangle that reaches down under that town. This is an absolutely absurd frontier, which was drawn without any idea of local conditions."

The "Szepesi Szövetség (Zipser Alliance), the representative organization of the Germans who had been forced to flee from former Upper Hungary, appeared before Major Procter. The leaders of this Alliance stated their unswerving determination to insist upon a plebiscite being held without delay, not only in County Szepes, the part of former Upper Hungary (now Slovakia) inhabited by Germans, but also in the whole of Slovakia. The representatives of the Germans of Upper Hungary expressed the hope that Major Procter would support their cause in the British Parliament.

Another British M. P. to pay a few days' visit to Hungary was Mr. Arthur Henderson. During his stay in Budapest he made contacts with several prominent Hungarian politicians, with whom he had lengthy conversations about the Central European problems of the moment. This was not Mr. Henderson's first visit to Hungary, and he has many friends and acquaintances here. While in Budapest he made a statement to the Press in which he pointed out the importance of Hungary's role in economic and political co-operation with her neighbours. Mr. Henderson also emphasized the necessity of maintaining peace. "But" — he added — "a hatred of war is not enough for this purpose; peace must be founded on political and economic justice."

— y —

HOW MINORITIES LIVE

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

THE DEMOLITION OF THE PREMISES OF HUNGARIAN NEWSPAPER IN POZSONY (BRATISLAVA)

A band of 30 Slovaks invaded the editorial premises of the Hungarian daily "Esti Ujság" (Evening News) at Pozsony (Bratislava) and threatened the editor with revolvers; they declared to the terrified and cowed officials that they would not allow any Hungarian newspapers to appear in Slovakia any more. At the same time they demolished everything on the premises, so that typewriters, the telephone sets and the whole furniture lay there shattered to pieces after they had left the premises. ("Dilo", January 1).

— y —

NUMEROUS MINORITY EMPLOYEES DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT OF BUSINESS FIRMS IN POZSONY (BRATISLAVA)

Countless numbers of employees have recently been dismissed from the employment of the cable factory, the rubber factory and other private firms in Pozsony (Bratislava). The dismissals are not without motivation, as the new boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia have led to a narrowing of the market available to the factories of Pozsony. Already in the first of these dismissals it became evident that the action was directed chiefly against workers of Magyar or German nationality. The Hungarian Party in Slovakia at once applied to M. Simko, Governor of Slovakia, to find a way by which the anti-minority tendency of these dismissals could somehow be minimized. It then appeared that the dismissals had been ordered by the Police Prefect of Pozsony. Thereupon MM. Tibor Neumann and János Csibok, delegates of the United Hungarian Party, appeared before M. Joseph Jusko, Prefect of Police, on January 17th, asking him to revoke the above mentioned unjust orders. In reply to this request M. Jusko declared that he could only do so by order of the Government. It is evident, therefore, that the dismissals were suggested and supported by the official Slovak Government. ("Uj Hirek".)

— y —

THE SLOVAKS REFUSE THE REQUEST OF 100.000
RUTHENIANS

One hundred thousand Ruthenians living in Slovakia demand the annexation of their territory to Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian Ukrania). M. Charles Sidor, Czecho-Slovak State Minister, has recently made a statement concerning the official point of view of the political leaders of Slovakia; he declared that the utmost they could possibly do for the Ruthenians was to offer them two seats in the Slovak Parliament. The Ruthenian leaders, however, protested most vehemently against this proposition, the more so as Slovakia exercises a most lively propagandistic activity among the Slovaks living in other countries. — y —

RUTHENIA DOES NOT NEED THE UKRANIAN LANGUAGE

Canon Volosin, the Premier of Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian Ukrania), asked the Parents' Councils (parents' representative bodies co-operating with the schools) to deliver their votes as to which language they would like to have introduced in the schools for the instruction of their children. Though Volosin's party propagate the introduction of the Ukranian language, the first results of the voting in two counties show that the parents voted for the introduction of the Ruthenian language. — y —

SUFFERINGS OF HOMELESS HUNGARIANS AT POZSONY
(BRATISLAVA) AND OTHER PLACES IN SLOVAKIA

The recent census in Slovakia has brought the leaders of Slovakia into a difficult situation. It will be remembered that the records of this census show that the population of Pozsony (Bratislava) show only 15% of Slovaks, while the Magyar element represented 39%. The Slovak leaders are now thinking of palliating the disagreeable impression of this "surprize-census" by refusing to prolong the Slovak citizenship of those Magyars who obtained it ten years ago. Countless complaints have recently been lodged at the town-hall of Pozsony, from which it appears that many of those families are unable to obtain their citizenship certificates which have lived in Pozsony for many generations: some of them are able to produce documents proving that the family has been living in Pozsony for a hundred years without interruption.

But this state of affairs is not limited to the city of Pozsony. There are about fifty thousand Magyars all over Slovakia who are still "homeless" and deprived of the possibility of exercising their political rights, so that they are entirely at the mercy of the authorities, though there are very many families among them which have lived in Slovakia for a very long time. Unfortunately, most of these miserable and "homeless" people, the slaves of our modern age, are Magyars and Germans (Uj Hirek.) — y —

RUMANIA

CONVICTION OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENCE

The Military Court of Kolozsvár (Cluj) recently tried the case of Baroness Lidia Aczél, who appeared to answer a charge of entering Rumania without a passport, and that of M. Hugo Roth and his son, M. Bódog Roth, both of them solicitors in Kolozsvár, who had represented the Baroness before the Military Court previously. Namely, at one of the preceding hearings of the case it became evident that the two lawyers were not unfamiliar with the fact that the defendant was intending to cross the frontier without a passport. The Baroness stated in evidence that she had entered the country to settle a question of inheritance, while the two lawyers declared that professional discretion had forbidden them to reveal the unlawful action of the Baroness. The hearing was also attended by a representative of the Chamber of Solicitors of Kolozsvár (Cluj), who declared that the solicitors of Kolozsvár were of the opinion that professional discretion had, indeed, bound the two lawyers to keep the matter secret. The Military Court found the Baroness guilty of the charge and sentenced her to one year's imprisonment to be followed by banishment from the country; the younger counsel, M. Bódog Roth, was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, while his father was sentenced to two months. ("Néplap", January 22, 1922.) — y —

SERIES OF COURT MARTIAL SENTENCES AGAINST HUNGARIANS

The Military Court of Kolozsvár (Cluj) has sentenced to seven months imprisonment M. Károly Böszörményi, landowner, of Pettyén (County of Szatmár), while his son, the 19-year-old Sándor Böszörményi, a student of the Faculty of Political Economy in Budapest, has been sentenced to 40 days' imprisonment. The charge brought against the father was that a letter had been found at his home which contained a highly derogatory criticism of Rumania's civil administration. His son, on the other hand, had to appear before the Military Court to answer for certain unfavourable statements he had made concerning Rumania in his lecture on the situation of the Hungarian minority in Rumania, delivered at Sárospatak (Hungary) in 1936.

The Military Court of Brassó has passed a sentence of two years' imprisonment on M. Gáspár Tamás, a journalist in Sepsiszentgyörgy and editor of the Hungarian weekly "Székely Nép" ("The Székler People"); at the same time, M. Gábor Gabay, a solicitor responsible for the above mentioned weekly, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. M. Tamás was found guilty of high treason, while M. Gabay's conviction was due to alleged breaches of the provisions of the ordinance concerning the

control of the Press. In addition to this M. Gabay had to answer the charge of improper conduct against the authorities, for which he was sentenced to another three months' imprisonment.

The defendants appealed against this verdict to the Supreme Military Court at Bucharest; the appeal resulted in the quashing of the original sentence, and the re-trial of the case was referred to the Military Court at Galatz.

According to the sentence of the Military Court at Galatz, M. Tamás was acquitted of the charge and consequences, but M. Gabay was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for infraction of the provisions of the ordinance concerning the control of the Press and to another two months' imprisonment for improper conduct against the authorities. Both defendants were, however, at once set free, M. Gabay's detention during trial having been accepted as corresponding to his term of imprisonment. The sentence is final. ("Népujság", January 13, 1939). — y —

DISMISSAL OF RAILWAY AND POST OFFICE EMPLOYEES ORDERED BY MINISTRY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT

One of the favourite means of molesting the minorities in Rumania has always been the language test. — Thousands and thousands of minority employees have been dismissed without any pension or composition on the ground that they had failed to pass these language tests. The dismissed railway and Post Office employees then applied for their reappointment; subsequent inquiries revealed the fact that their dismissal was by no means due to the arbitrary measures of the subordinate authorities, but that it was actually ordered by the Ministry of Public Transport.

Besides these general actions the dismissed employees have repeatedly submitted individual applications for reappointment, with due reference to the Minority Statutes, to the existing laws of the country, and, last but not least, to the services rendered by them while in active service. In reply to these applications directorates of the State Railways and the Post Office respectively first invited the applicants to prove their Rumanian ethnic origin, but later on they waived this demand. In one instance the Directorate of the State Railway at Kolozsvár (Cluj), did, indeed, pass a favourable sentence, ordering the reappointment of a pointsman who had previously been dismissed. Recently, however, the directorates declare in every case that the Ministry of Public Transport alone is responsible for the dismissals; however the case may be, the penniless railway and Post Office employees, who have been dismissed without any pension and have no other source of income, have again lost all hope of having their case settled within a reasonable time. ("Magyar Ujság", January 19.)

— y —

YUGOSLAVIA

Dr. IMRE VÁRADY APPOINTED SENATOR

On 21st January Dr. Imre Várady was appointed Senator by the Regency Council. Dr. Várady was one of the chairmen of the General Hungarian Party dissolved on 6th January, 1929. Since then he has been one of the most popular of the leaders of the Hungarian national minority in Yugoslavia. His present appointment took place seven and a half years after the promulgation of the Senate Act of 30th September, 1931. He had to wait all that time for it, although the German minority have had a Senator in the person of Dr. George Grassl for several years now. But apart from this consideration, however welcome his appointment may be as a slight reparation for years of neglect, the fact remains that in proportion to their numerical strength the Hungarian and German minorities would be entitled each to three seats on a Senate which consists of 92 members (46 elected and the rest appointed.) Here it may also be noted that the Hungarian minority numbering about half a million people, and a similarly large German minority have only 1 representative each in the Skupshtina, whereas they would be entitled to 12 or 13.

— y —

TOWN COUNCIL OF SZABADKA APPOINTED

On 21st January M. Rayitsch, Ban of the Danube Banate, having obtained the consent of the Minister of the Interior, appointed the new Town Council of Szabadka (Subotica). The Council consists of 72 members, 34 of whom belong to the Bunyevatz people, while 20 are Serbs, 15 Magyars and 3 Jews. According to the 1931 census, Szabadka has a population of 101.050 souls, of whom 8000 are Serbs and 41.000 Magyars. Thus the Serbs would be entitled to 8 seats on the Town Council and the Magyars to 30 — just double what they have received.

— y —

MUNICIPAL OFFICIAL STAFF WITHOUT MINORITY OFFICIALS

The appointed Town Council of Ujvidék (Novisad) held a general meeting on 25th January at which the municipal officials were re-elected. Twenty officials who had been employed before the new Statutes were enforced and who under these Statutes were not qualified for the posts they held, were re-elected, after which four Municipal Councillors were elected. From a minority point of view these elections constitute a grievance, for there is not one single Magyar or German among the 28 officials despite the fact that one-third of the inhabitants of the town are Magyars.

B O O K S

Peters, Wolfgang: „Ungarns Kampf um sein Recht“ (Brunnen Verlag, Berlin, 1938: 128 pp.)

The author is a well-known German journalist who is a leading member of the editorial staff of the "Berliner Tageblatt". Last summer he spent a considerable time in Central Europe, the result of this visit appearing in the autumn in the form of the present work, which is extremely interesting and at the time created no small stir. The circumstance that the author made his investigations on the spot enhances the importance of the book; for as a consequence the conclusions drawn by him are based upon the most reliable of all sources — personal experience.

The first part of the work deals with Hungarian history and with the conception of the Holy Crown. We have not often seen a book by a foreigner giving so good and so comprehensive an interpretation of this latter theory. The description of the stirring and stormy past of the Hungarian nation is followed by an account of the depressing present. In the chapter entitled "The Bleeding Frontier" we read the following interesting passage:

"The historical achievement of Magyardom — the creation of a bulwark of defence against the East by the establishment in the Danube Basin of a great State — has on more than one occasion been acknowledged by foreigners too. Even today, at noon, the "Angelus" or midday bell is rung every day in Catholic districts by order of the Pope to commemorate the victory over the Turks achieved by John Hunyadi. Can we take umbrage at the bitterness shown by Hungarians when they remind us that this bell was rung also on the day on which the Trianon Edict was foisted on the Hungarians — the day on which Europe showed her gratitude by robbing Hungary of three-fourths of her territory?"

Very remarkable too is the manner in which the author describes Hungary's minority policy. In his opinion the "nationalities" most seriously hit were those severed from Hungary, who — in the service of foreign interests — were torn by force from

their natural surroundings and incorporated in new formations of an artificial character. Concerning their situation in pre-War Hungary the author writes as follows:

"They had become quite acclimatised and were on good terms with the Magyars. It is an irrefutable fact that in Hungary the Magyars and the Hungarian citizens belonging to other nationalities — above all the Germans — have always lived, and are still living, in a friendly and peaceful symbiosis, and that there is no sign of hatred or dissension as between the several ethnic groups.

"Historical justice demands that we should establish the fact that the Hungarian nationality policy of pre-War days, which in many points was certainly open to exception, has never at any time made any continuous effort to institute forcible oppression, for otherwise the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary would never have been able to retain their property for centuries practically unchanged. The relation between the Magyars and the other nationalities living in the country has indeed taken a different shape due to the historical development. The non-Magyar nationalities have at all times identified themselves in sentiment with the Hungarian State idea, — with the idea of a strong united power dominating the Danube Valley under Magyar leadership, — i. e. with the sublime political conception to which St. Stephen of Hungary gave a lasting expression and which is symbolised by the theory of the Holy Crown, which despite all differences of opinion in questions of detail has bound them together in a close union."

A considerable part of the book is devoted to the Hungarian soldier and his achievements:

"The Hungarian army of the future must and will be once more strong enough to be able to successfully fulfil its historical mission, the defence of Central Europe on the heights of the Carpathians."

The most important — and the most interesting chapter is, however, that entitled "Slovaks and Ruthenians" which deals with the vital problems of the two peoples concerned. With an objectivity rarely met with Peters describes the sufferings of the Slovak people. Since the days when it was handed over to the Czechs this people's history is an unbroken record of injustices and acts of violence committed by the Prague Government. But even more noteworthy are the declarations made by the author in connection with the Ruthenian question:

"The language conditions prevailing in this district are peculiar in that, while the educated Ruthenians speak Russian, the lower classes have a peculiar dialect of their own. Now the Czechs, for political reasons, have thrown the gates wide open to admit an invasion of the language of Great-Ukraine. This inroad of a foreign idiom is opposed very energetically by the Carpatho-

Russians — first because they realise that this is a menace to their own race, and secondly also because they recognise clearly the danger of the Bolshevik propaganda which is being admitted openly and unimpeded through the channel of this "cultural policy".

As for the future of the Slovak and Ruthenian regions, those regions are not in a position today to bring about an improvement out of their own resources:

"This is true in particular of the Carpatho-Ukrainian region, which cannot possibly exist economically except by intercourse with the Hungarian Lowlands, as also of Slovakia, which is equally dependent economically upon its intercourse with the Danube Basin".

Not much need be added to the words of the author. The conclusions in keeping with justice drawn by him, combined with his acumen, made the book peculiarly worth commending to the attention of all persons anxious to study the Central European — or more particularly the Hungarian — question.

OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

POLITICAL ECONOMY

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

220 MILLION CZECH CROWNS DEFICIT IN THE FIRST BUDGET ESTIMATES OF RUTHENIA

The Government of Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian Ukraina) has now completed the Budget estimates for the coming financial year. Though the expenditure on road building is not included, the deficit is expected to amount to a very high sum. The total amount of the Budget rises to 300 million Czech Crowns, while the revenues are estimated as low as 80 million Crowns in all. The highest figure on the expense list is that of the personal expenses (official staff, etc.), which amounts to 124 million Crowns. That is, the revenues are expected to amount to only two thirds of the personal expenses. It is understood, therefore, that the Volosin Cabinet is going to undertake a reduction in the number of State employees. In the first place, they will dismiss those Czech Government officials who are still serving in Ruthenia. At the same time, however, Canon Volosin will most probably seize the opportunity to discard those officials as well who, as yet, protest against his Ukrainian policy and wish to preserve the national character of the Ruthenian people. Canon Volosin intends to raise a loan in order to be able to cope with the 220 million Crowns deficit, which, if he succeeds in securing it, will make Ruthenia the vassal of the country which is prepared to issue the loan in question. ("Uj Hirek", January 27.)

SLOVAKIA'S ECONOMIC VALUE

The opinion of German economic circles respecting the economic value of Slovakia has changed radically recently. After the Vienna award Slovak circles made every effort to recruit the support of German capital for the exploitation of the natural resources of Slovakia. German experts spent a considerable time studying conditions in that province and finally came to the unanimous conclusion that present-day Slovakia did not offer German capital any opportunity for safe investment. What

particularly damped the interest of the Germans concerned was the circumstance that — even according to the first rough estimate — the budget of Slovakia showed an annual deficit of 750,000.000 Czech crowns.

What must undoubtedly have interested the inquirers most particularly was the forest industry of Slovakia. The lumbering production in the older territory — altogether some 2.8 million hectares in area — was last year 2.8 million cubic metres. The probable production of the area remaining in Slovakia may be estimated at 2.2 million cubic metres a year. Slovak experts have calculated the value of the quantity of wood and timber available for export after deduction of the inland requirements of the province at the amount of 25,000.000 Czech crowns a year, — an amount of no great significance as compared with the dimensions of the whole turn-over of the economic life of the country. In this respect Carpatho-Russia is in a more favourable position, seeing that its export trade in lumbering products is considerably greater, not merely relatively speaking, but in absolute figures too.

FACTORIES IN SLOVAKIA SEEK PROTECTION AGAINST CZECH OPPRESSION

Nine tenths of the factories in Czechoslovakia are in Czech-Moravia. Aided by the political factors of Czechoslovakia, the Czech-Moravian factories have literally rolled down the manufacturing industry of Slovakia in the very first years of the life of the Republic. One after the other the factories of Korompa, Liptó-szentmiklós, Porács, etc. had to shut their gates. Even to-day the few remaining factories in Slovakia are hardly able to compete against their rivals in Czech-Moravia. The latter enjoy a number of facilities, such as reduction of taxes and railway tariffs, in addition to which they also have the advantage of being situated near the collieries. The business concerns of Liptó and Szepes (Zipsia) have now submitted a memorandum to the Slovak Government asking them to offer a more effective State aid to the existing factories in Slovakia and to those which are going to be established there in future. They demand the same measure of reduction in taxes as the factories in Czech-Moravia. ("Uj Hírek", January 1.)

— v —

HUNGARY

THE BANKNOTE CIRCULATION HAS DECREASED BY 13.9 MILLION PENGŐ

The records of the National Bank concerning the relation of debts and demands on January 23rd show that in the third week of the month there was a decrease in the banknote circulation

by 13.9 million to 763.3 million. This fact is due to repayments on discount accounts and payments on giro accounts. The repayments on discount accounts exceeded the amount of new payments by 13.5 millions, whereby the amount of the discount accounts fell to 448.2 millions. The total amount of giro accounts has increased to 224.4 million; the amount of increase was 5.5 millions; 1.5 million on the State account and 4 million for other accounts. Out of the total amount of the giro accounts, 195.2 millions are dealt with on State accounts. The liabilities of the State figure 269.5 millions in the records; out of this amount, 192.9 millions go to long term credit payment, while 76.6 millions derive from the exchange of Czech banknotes and coins in the recently re-annexed territories of Hungary. The amount of other assets has increased by 2 millions to 330.8 millions, while the amount of other debts fell by 0.4 millions to 173.8 millions. The metal reserve rose by 1,596.011 Pengő to 218,007.918 millions, out of which 124 millions may be counted for the gold stock and 93.3 millions for the stock of foreign currency. — y —

YUGOSLAVIA

THE EFFECT OF MEETING AT BÉLLYE ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND ITALY

A report from Belgrade states that during the conversations between the Yugoslav Premier and the Italian Foreign Minister economic questions immediately affecting Italy and Yugoslavia were also discussed. It is well known that in Yugoslavia, as well as in Italy, the ruling circles are labouring to strengthen the economic links between the two mutually friendly States and to increase the exchange of commodities between them. It would be to the interest of both countries that the exchange of goods between Yugoslavia and Italy should regain its former level. A great hindrance, however, is the method of payment.

Leading circles in Italy would view with favour an improvement in Yugoslav industry and are willing to render the support necessary to this end. The reports that Italy is prepared to extend goods credit to the value of 500 million lire to Yugoslavia are not new. But the loan which was to have been employed to provide Yugoslavia with armaments has not yet been taken up. The

endeavour to increase the volume of the trade in goods between Yugoslavia and Italy is not directed against the economic interests of any other country. — y —

FOR THE MOMENT THE NARODNA BANKA DOES NOT ASK EXPORTERS TO SURRENDER THEIR CHEAP POUNDS

In circular No. 103/1938, the Narodna Banka intimates to all authorized banks and exchange offices that the bank does not for the moment wish to buy 25% export exchanges according to which rate 1 pound is worth 238 dinars, the result being that exporters must only sell 25% of their foreign exchanges at the official rate to the Narodna Banka. Exporters may sell free the remaining 75% in the inland market. — y —

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