

# DANUBIAN REVIEW

## (DANUBIAN NEWS)

A REVIEW DEVOTED TO RESEARCH INTO PROBLEMS OF THE  
DANUBIAN BASIN

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**Arbitrators' Decision Regarding Territory to be Restored  
to Hungary**

**The Course of Hungary's Just Cause**  
By **ELEMÉR SZUDY**

**Prague Pursues Its Old Policy**  
By **ÖDÖN TARJÁN**

**The Clay-Footed Dwarf**  
By **FRANCIS HERCZEG**

**Poland's Efforts to Obtain a Common Frontier With Hungary**  
By **NICHOLAS UDVARDY**

**Minority Rights in Rumania**  
By **Dr. ISTVÁN ZÁGONI**

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## ARBITRATORS' DECISION REGARDING TERRITORY TO BE RESTORED TO HUNGARY

**I**n Vienna, at six o'clock on 2nd November, the arbitrators announced their decision, the text of which runs as follows:

In response to the request addressed to the German and the Royal Italian Governments by the Royal Hungarian and the Czecho-Slovak Governments that Germany and Italy should act as arbitrators on the question of the territories to be ceded to Hungary by Czecho-Slovakia, and on the basis of the notes exchanged on 30th October, 1938, between the Governments concerned, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Count Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Minister of His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Abyssinia, met today in Vienna and after a discussion, conducted on behalf of their respective Governments, with M. de Kánya and Dr. Chvalkovsky, Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministers pronounced the following arbitral decision:

1. The territories to be ceded to Hungary by Czecho-Slovakia are marked on the attached map. The final delimitation of the frontiers shall be effected by a joint Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Committee.
2. The evacuation of the territories to be ceded by Czecho-Slovakia and their occupation by Hungary shall begin on 5th November, 1938, and must be completed by 10th November 1938. A joint Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Committee shall without delay determine the different stages and methods of the evacuation and occupation.
3. The Czecho-Slovak Government shall take steps to insure that the territories to be ceded remain in their normal condition during evacuation.
4. The Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak Committee shall settle all the minor question arising in connection with the cession of the territories to be handed over, especially the questions of citizenship and optation.

5. In a similar manner the Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak Committee shall determine the most immediate measures to be taken in order to protect the Hungarians remaining in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia and the non-Hungarians remaining in the territory to be ceded to Hungary. This Committee shall in particular take steps to insure that the Hungarian ethnic group in Pozsony shall enjoy the same rights as the other ethnic groups there.

6. Should the territory remaining to Czecho-Slovakia suffer any disadvantages, or encounter any difficulties, of an economic nature or in connection with the technique of communication owing to the cession of these territories to Hungary, the Royal Hungarian Government shall, in concurrence with the Czecho-Slovak Government, do everything possible to eliminate such disadvantages or difficulties.

7. Should any difficulties or doubts arise in the course of the effectuation of of this arbitral decision, the Royal Hungarian and the Czecho-Slovak Governments shall settle the points at issue by direct negotiation. Should it be impossible for them to agree on any point, the question at issue shall be submitted for arbitration to the German and the Royal Italian Governments.


Vienna, November 2, 1938.

(signed) Joachim von Ribbentrop (signed) Galeazzo Ciano

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A protocol to the arbitral decision was drawn up and signed by the German, Italian, Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministers. This protocol states that Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano, German and Italian Foreign Ministers, met in Vienna on Tuesday to arbitrate on behalf of their respective Governments between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia on the question of the territories to be ceded to Hungary. M. de Kánya and Dr. Chvalkovsky, Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministers, had been invited to Vienna in order to be given another opportunity of stating the views of their respective Governments. The meeting of the four Foreign Ministers took place at the Belvedere Castle where after an exhaustive *pourparler* the German and Italian Foreign Ministers pronounced their decision. This decision and a map were handed to the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Ministers.

# OFFICIAL MAP OF THE NEW FRONTIER



ARBITRATOR'S DECISION IN VIENNA

As the basis of the territorial claims raised against Czecho-Slovakia in terms of the Munich Agreement of 29th September, 1938, the 1938 ethnic frontiers (according to the 1910 census), i. e. the areas in which the proportion of Germans (*per analogiam* Hungarians and Poles) exceeded 50% of the total population were accepted.

According to the figures of the 1910 census, in the part of former Upper Hungary attached to Czecho-Slovakia there were 13 towns and 830 villages — with an area of 12,316 square kilometres — in which the Hungarians were in absolute majority. The populations of these places numbered 907,278 souls, of which 818,401 (90.2%) were Hungarian nationals, 51,373 (5.7%) Slovaks, 19,641 (2.2%) Germans and 1.1% others.

The original Hungarian demand asked for the restitution of 812 villages and 12 towns. The area claimed was 14,153 square kilometres with a population of 1,090,569. Scattered, singly or in sporadic groups, in the territory demanded by the Hungarian Government there were also villages where the majority of the inhabitants belonged to non-Hungarian nationalities. These villages numbered 180 and in 143 of them the Slovaks predominated.

Many of these places, together with a few predominantly Hungarian villages, were not adjudged to Hungary by the final award; but in extent the restored territory corresponds almost exactly to the area of all the places in Upper Hungary with a Hungarian majority. The area of the latter is 12,316 square kilometres, and according to anticipatory estimates, the territory restored is 12,420 square kilometres. In 1910 the total population of the restored territories numbered 899,718, while the total number of inhabitants in the places with a Hungarian majority in 1910 was 907,278. The number of Hungarians in places with a Hungarian majority was 818,401 in 1910, and according to that year's census the number of Hungarian inhabitants in the restored communities was 899,718.

Hungary's demands, as based on the enforcement of the Munich principles, extended to an area which according to the 1910 census had a population of 1,091,000 souls. On the nationality principle, of course, only areas with a predominantly Hungarian population could be included in our demands. The fact that the proportion of Hungarians in the

whole strip of territory demanded was 78% in 1910 clearly shows the moderate nature of Hungary's claims. The areas refused to Hungary by the Vienna award were primarily those in which the population was more mixed, as is shown by the circumstance that the proportion of Hungarians in the restored areas was 85% in 1910.

In terms of the Vienna decision, on 2nd November, 1938, the area of Dismembered Hungary (93,000 square kilometres) has been enlarged by 12,400 or 13% and her population, according to the statistics for 1930, by 12%. In other words the area and population of Hungary today are one-eighth larger than those of Trianon Hungary.

In 1910 the proportion of Hungarians in the towns restored to Hungary was as follows: over 90% in three, between 80% and 90% in six and from 70% to 80% in two. The strongly Hungarian character of these towns may be seen from the circumstance that in 1880 the proportion of Hungarians in eight of them varied from 70% to over 80%.

The density of the population in Trianon Hungary was 93.4 souls to a square kilometre, that of the areas restored was 86 souls, and on the basis of the 1930 census that of enlarged Hungary will be 92.5. According to these figures, the density of the population in the restored areas is slightly lower than in Dismembered Hungary, but considering that Budapest was the capital of the whole of pre-Trianon Hungary, it would be practical to eliminate Budapest and its immediate vicinity when comparing the density of the populations of Trianon Hungary and the returning territories. Not reckoning Greater Budapest, the density of the population in Trianon Hungary was 79 souls to a square kilometre, that of the returning territories is somewhat greater, for according to 1930 statistics, there were 86 souls to every square kilometre of that area.

# THE COURSE OF HUNGARY'S JUST CAUSE

BY  
ELEMÉR SZUDY

The gates of Hungary's prison have opened! At 10 o'clock on 5th November Hungarian troops crossed the Trianon frontier, and entered the region marked out by the German-Italian tribunal of arbitration in Vienna as Hungary's new territories. These territories, which are inhabited by an almost purely Hungarian population, were torn away from the mother-country just twenty years ago. In this the hour of their restoration we are forced to recognize that Divine Providence is a force more powerful than any transient human achievement and all man's puny efforts. This is dramatically illustrated by the fate of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, which shows that without a moral foundation and contrary to the laws of equity no human institution can be permanent. On one of the first pages of this paper will be found a map. We should like to explain to our readers in a few pithy words what that map, which shows the new frontier between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, means for the Hungarian nation, and also what it does not mean.

It means a historical turn of the wheel in the life of the Hungarian nation, but it does not mean that all our vital interests are guaranteed.

It means a great triumph for the idea of revision, but it does not mean a realization of all for which the Hungarian nation has struggled and for which it will continue to struggle. It means that Hungary has been accorded some slight compensation for the wrongs and injustices done to her, but it does not mean full reparation. It means that at long last a definite and serious step has been taken towards the establishment of a new order in the Danube Valley, but it does not mean that the safeguards of justice and security have been restored in full measure. And, lastly, it means that the Hungarian

demand that the essentially Hungarian areas contiguous to the frontier of Dismembered Hungary must automatically return to the mother-country has — with certain restrictions — been fulfilled, but it does not mean an enforcement of the principle of self-determination; the Slovaks and Ruthenians, who for a thousand years lived in symbiosis with the Hungarian nation, are not allowed to exercise that natural right. The first to oppose it was the Czecho-Slovak State itself, which so emphatically invoked that very principle at the time when the Peace Conference was induced to dismember the Realm of St. Stephen.

This is the balance-sheet. An examination of the map mentioned above will show that in preparing it we have not been unduly optimistic or pessimistic. We are fully aware of the extremely great significance of the events that led to this turn of affairs, but we cannot refrain from establishing facts that, being historical truths, are the essence and spirit of the whole Hungarian struggle for revision.

No, this is not complete fulfilment; it is merely the beginning of a process, which, however, may well be described as a breach in the enemy's ranks. The foundations which are now being laid in the historical soil of Hungary will prove solid and capable of withstanding storm and stress. We may safely build on them, for the Hungarian nation will always know its duty towards those of its brethren whom destiny has led back to us.

The Hungarian Frontier Re-adjustment League sees with satisfaction that its aims and programme, which rested on two strong pillars, the nationality principle and the right of the peoples to self-determination, have been justified by events. That the attitude adopted by this League was right is now evident, for the gratifying turn of events which has now taken place in Hungary's lot, thanks to a partial revision of the Treaty of Trianon, signifies that one of the fundamental items of our programme, the enforcement of the nationality principle, has been realized — if not fully, at least tolerably well — in the case of Czecho-Slovakia. In the spirit of the Munich Four Power Agreement we have recovered 12.400 square kilometres of the areas wrested from Hungary in 1918 and about 1.100.000 of the 4.000.000 odd inhabitants. The Hun-

garian nation is fully aware that this result would never have been achieved without the dynamic force of the mighty German Reich and the support of two friendly countries, Italy and Poland.

Unfortunately the Munich, that is to say Vienna, decision by no means signifies the realization of the second fundamental idea of our programme, namely the right of the peoples to self-determination. Neither the Slovaks nor the Ruthenians were given the chance to decide their own future freely and without any external influence being brought to bear on them, or to tell the world that their mind has long been made up and that they wish to continue their existence as nations within the framework of the Hungarian State and not in Czecho-Slovakia. In Vienna as well as in Komárom the Hungarian delegation fought resolutely for the victory of this lofty principle. Their efforts were seconded to the utmost by Poland, a fact which has earned our undying gratitude; yet the arbitrators decided that they could not accede to Hungary's demands on this point. But life and history go on, and for this reason, neither the Hungarian Frontier Re-adjustment League nor Hungarian public opinion consider that the question has been settled definitely and beyond hope of revision.

# PRAGUE PURSUES ITS OLD POLICY UNDER A NEW CLOAK

BY  
ODÓN TARJÁN

**I**n terms of the Munich Four Power Pact, Czecho-Slovakia has handed over the demarcated territories to Germany, Poland and Hungary. Although under that agreement the principle of self-determination should have been enforced when they were being ceded, it was not, and for this the Czecho-Slovak Government was to blame. Prague protested against a plebiscite, even in the disputed areas with a mixed population, surely because in the case of a plebiscite the autochthonous inhabitants of Slovakia and Ruthenia would have exercised their right of self-determination, which would have been synonymous with breaking away from Prague.

Thus it happened that under the pressure of circumstances Prague was forced to take cognizance of the Slovak resolution pronounced at Zsolna, but Dr. Joseph Tiso's appointment as Slovak Prime Minister was contrary to the will of the people, and the organization of the new State was begun in the same spirit that characterized the work of Beneš and his Czech colleagues at the Peace Conference. Needless to say, the results could not be expected to fulfil Prague's expectations.

Dr. Tiso was appointed Slovak Prime Minister by General Sirovy, to whom he took an oath of allegiance. M. Andrew Bródy, Ruthenian Premier, was also appointed by General Sirovy. If there was any reason in the first days to doubt Prague's intention to suppress at any price the manifestation of the real will of the people, there is none today, for events have shown that the Slovaks and Ruthenians are fully justified in showing an utter lack of confidence in the Sirovy Government.

The autonomy of Slovakia and Ruthenia is nothing but

an unscrupulous farce. The Slovak and Ruthenian Ministers were appointed by the Czech Premier, who can throw them out of office when he chooses. He has done so, in fact, whenever any of the Ministers of the allegedly self-governing Slovakia and Ruthenia dared to oppose Prague. In four short weeks more than half a dozen Ministers lost their portfolios. Brödy, the Ruthenian Prime Minister was accused of treason, because he had the temerity to demand a plebiscite. His assets were confiscated by his successor, Premier Volosin, without any legal procedure. Today Brödy is a prisoner in a Prague gaol. Dr. Fencik, another Ruthenian Minister, proclaimed his solidarity with Brödy and resigned his office.

A serious clash of interests arose between Prague and Pozsony, Prague and Ruthenia and Ruthenia and Slovakia. The Slovak Government demanded the right to have a say in the questions of foreign affairs affecting Slovakia. This was refused point-blank by Prague. Slovakia would like to establish a Slovak bank of issue. Prague refuses to hear of it, for one of the Czech Government's chief political manoeuvres is the intention to keep the Governments of Slovakia in subjection by making that province's financial difficulties permanent. The public are fully aware of this, and, as a result, 20% of the bank deposits have already been withdrawn.

Another cause of serious antagonism between Prague and Pozsony is the movement of about 300.000 Slovaks in Moravia, who want to join Slovakia. A deputation of about 2,000 of those Slovaks was prevented by Czech gendarmes from attending a meeting held at Szokolca and demanding a plebiscite. The judiciary and the body of attorneys in Slovakia have announced their complete separation from Prague.

Grave differences have arisen between the Slovak and Ruthenian Governments on the question of the demarcation of the western frontier of Ruthenia. The Ruthenian Government lays claim to the whole of the northern frontier zone, as far as Poprád and including the town of Eperjes, on the grounds that there are Ruthenians living in that area. The organ of the Slovak Government, the "Slovenska Pravda", in an article entitled "Ruthenian megalomania" rejects the demands of the Ruthenian Government.

The new arrangements are anything but a proof that the Government feels the support of public opinion behind it. The activity of the Tiso Government is characterized by indecision and a system of barefaced "influence". Notaries public who did not support Tiso's régime were transferred to Hungarian towns a few days before the latter were restored to Hungary; their appointments were given to others as a reward for political services, and highly salaried Government commissioners were set over the newspapers, printing offices and industrial undertakings.

The lot of the minorities shows no signs of improvement. It is true that the Tiso Government was obliged to appoint a German Secretary of State, but, on the other hand, it dissolved the Hungaro-German National Council of Szepes, just as the Volosin Government dissolved the political parties and confiscated their assets.

In vain do we seek to find a spirit of conciliation and circumspection in the activity hitherto displayed by the Tiso Government. The provisions of the Munich Pact are being evaded by means of petty chicaneries, not only in the field of politics, but also in the sphere of economics. To quote one instance: by order of the Pozsony Government the equipments of the famous observatory at Ógyalla, which has now passed into Hungary's possession, were dismantled and removed to Eperjes. This observatory had been equipped by a landowner, M. Julius Konkoly-Thege, who presented it to the Hungarian State. With this measure the Tiso Government has purloined property of purely Hungarian origin.

Everything that could possibly be carried away from the territories restored to Hungary was transported to Bohemia or at least to Slovakia. The fittings of the hospitals, Roentgen lamps, and even the beds were carried off as was the parquet flooring of the public buildings. Vandalism assumed such proportions that materials not worth the cost of transportation were also taken.

The Czech and Slovak Governments will have themselves to thank if, by this behaviour, they provide legal grounds for reparation claims that will not be calculated to promote neighbourly relations with Hungary.

# THE CLAY-FOOTED DWARF

BY

FRANCIS HERCZEG

**T**he readers of the Pesti Hirlap can bear witness to the fact that we never believed that Czecho-Slovakia could continue to exist in the form given to her by the midwives of Trianon. We repeatedly set down in our columns that the vermiform State would perish — if not the arms of an external foe, its own interior absurdity would be the cause of its end. May I ask the question whether anyone has heard of a greater absurdity than an imperialist State which keeps half of its citizens in fetters, not on its own strength but on that of England and France. As soon as the lamentable secret of Czecho-Slovakia's plight was disclosed to the Council of Great Powers, the State devised by Benes, disappeared into the void, like the mythological sphinx whose mystery was unravelled.

Nothing better indicates how far the policy of Prague had been thin air than a saying we once heard from Edward Benes' mouth. "Rather the Anschluss than the Habsburgs." This was supposed to be an instance of Czech bluff intended to frighten recalcitrant royalist children. However, the genius of history permitted itself a joke and took Edward Benes at his word — just as the wolf did with the shepherd-boy. He got the Anschluss, not only the Austrian, but the Sudeten German one too, and, more than that, he was given the Polish Anschluss at Teschen in addition. To-day nothing prevents the ex-President of the Republic from spending his ample leisure in touring through America.

Edward Benes is for the time being a dead man politically. For how long, we do not know. But his ghost haunts us still. It thoroughly plagued several honourable Hungarian gentlemen in Komárom. For I do not suppose anyone

doubts that the happenings at Komárom were a very characteristic manifestation of the petty, sly and underhand diplomacy of the Hradsin. This policy of the Hradsin can be distinguished by its refusal to recognize the forces directing the fate of the world except the material ones and by its never taking cognizance of ethical forces. The honest, Christian spirit of the Slovak people has nothing in common with this; and we do not presume that Slovak gentlemen could have played this role — forced upon them by the Prague policy — without blushing.

We assert that the Prague policy is an unparalleled phenomenon, which is but natural, for it springs straight from the soul of the Czech race. The German Empire trampled under foot the frontiers of the Czech State, and Prague accomplished something no other people in the world would have been capable of doing, viz. after having built their entire system of foreign politics on Germanophobia they broke — so to say in a few minutes — with the past and offered Berlin a heart bursting with love. To be arrogant, wicked and insatiable where it can be done with impunity is incidental to this way of thinking. The Czech attitude towards us Hungarians is just as provocative now as it used to be towards the Germans at the time when the Czechs still believed that if it came to the point they could rely on the arms of three Great Powers. It seems the Czechs wanted to compensate at Komárom the inferiority complex they contracted at Munich.

At Komárom they again begun to cog the dice in the same way as Edward Benes did when he lost the most valuable province of Bohemia as well as his own presidential office. Nevertheless they will be losers for the second time — more certainly than before — for no normal person in Europe, unless a Bolshevik, will ever understand why Hungarian towns and Hungarian counties should be left under foreign sway for strategic reasons and in the interests of communication.

The young Slovak state starts with a heavy and shameful burden if it engages to be the gaoler of hundreds of thousands of Hungarians. The honest Slovak people will one day curse those who doomed a nation of two millions to

an imperialist policy. We must not forget that the Hungarian towns and counties of Upper Hungary, which after Trianon realized that they were the victims of a universal historical tragedy, will know this time that they are being kept in fetters by the vain and greedy leaders of a small people.

On the other hand we may take it for granted that though everyone is irritated by the happenings at Komárom, not a single Magyar is disheartened by them. The Council of Four Powers foresaw what was likely to happen and this was why it offered to be the tribunal of appeal. The Great Powers agreed as to the principles according to which the Czecho-Slovak bankrupt's estate was to be liquidated, and we await with great interest to see how they intend to enforce their principles in practice. Honest liquidators know that every single one of the creditors of the bankrupt Czech State must receive the same treatment.

OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

# POLAND'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A COMMON FRONTIER WITH HUNGARY

BY

NICHOLAS UDVARDY

**T**he Munich Pact has thrown into prominence the question of a Polish-Hungarian frontier, which as one of the most important factors of peace and equilibrium in Central Europe must be established speedily and once and for all. On 13th October the semi-official Polish newspaper, the "Gazeta Polska" set forth the Polish point of view as follows:

"Hungary's demands that the principle of self-determination be enforced must result in the restoration of Ruthenia to that country. This solution, which is made imperative by the geographical factors, is the only just, wise, rational and logical one. It would bring with it a particularly important political development: *a common Polish-Hungarian frontier*, and would thus lay the foundations of a new order of peace and equilibrium in Central Europe. This solution would affect the vital interests both of Poland and Hungary and would also serve Rumania's ultimate interests, for it would preclude the possibility of Czecho-Russian philandering in the future". In the evening on Thursday, 14th October, the Youth Group of the Party of National Unity distributed leaflets in Warsaw with the following text:

"The will of the nation must triumph. We Poles do not want a plebiscite. A plebiscite would be a waste of energy; it would demoralize the population and end in bargaining and a compromise. The Polish nation demands the immediate attachment to Poland of all the Polish areas under the Czech yoke . . . *We also demand a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. The century-old wishes of the two sister nations must be fulfilled. We fight for the Poland of the Jagellos and the Chobris.* The frontiers of Poland will be drawn by Poland

herself as a Great Power and will not be the object of international haggling. Long live the great and powerful Polish nation! Long live the Polish army! Long live Commander-in-Chief Marshall Rydz-Smigly!"

The statement made in the "Pesti Hirlap" of 14th October by M. Joseph Bobkowski, Poland's Deputy Minister of Air Affairs, is worthy of special attention. M. Bobkowski says that it is the desire of every Pole to see the links of friendship with Hungary strengthened. The very school-children in Poland talk about a common Polish-Hungarian frontier.

"I have often told people in Poland — says M. Bobkowski — that the Hungarians are all heart and that their friendship is a treasure that is worth any sacrifice. For these reasons I should like to see a common Polish-Hungarian frontier; I should be happy to think that the people of the two countries were able to meet each other more frequently and had better opportunities of warming to each other. We are firm in our hope that in a short time the people of Hungary and Poland will be able to meet on a common frontier."

The question of a common frontier became an item of Poland's official programme when Colonel Beck, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, suddenly left for Rumania by aeroplane on 18th October. Before he started, Colonel Beck had a long conversation with M. Andrew Hory, Hungarian Minister in Warsaw. The object of the Polish Foreign Minister's visit to Rumania was to convince Rumanian political circles of the necessity for a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. Notes were also sent by him to Paris, Rome and Berlin, in which it was duly emphasized that *the Polish Government considered the question of creating a common Polish-Hungarian frontier to be the pivotal problem of the whole conflict.*

Colonel Beck first had a long conversation with M. Comen, Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and then was received in audience by King Carol on his yacht *Luccatelu!* on 19th October. The King had namely been sojourning in Galatz for the Rumanian manoeuvres. The official communiqué issued states that Colonel Beck's conversations with Rumanian statesmen were of a friendly nature and dealt with the international questions affecting both countries.

When Colonel Beck returned to Warsaw, the "Kurjer Poranny", a newspaper closely connected with the Government, on 19th October, emphasized the point that it was Poland's desire that the Hungarians and Slovaks should be on good terms. Consolidation demanded the co-operation of all the countries concerned, especially on the question of Ruthenia, which affected not only Hungary and Poland, but also Rumania. Colonel Beck's visit to Bucharest was a sign of harmonious co-operation between Poland and Rumania.

In Warsaw, on 18th October, the representatives of 17 conservative papers and papers with leanings towards the "right," which are pro-Hungarian in their sympathies, held a spirited meeting and formed a committee to work for a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. The committee despatched a large delegation to the Polish Foreign Office to tell the Minister that public opinion demanded energetic measures in the interest of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. The leader of the delegation, M. Julian Babinsky, voiced the anxiety of the population caused by the situation that had arisen out of the question of a common frontier, and emphatically declared that the question was one of Poland's most vital problems which would have to be solved *even if the price was mobilization*. In conclusion the delegation assured the Minister that the Government could count on the nation to support this policy with heart and soul. The committee also informed the Hungarian Legation in Warsaw that the Poles were ready to shed their blood in order to assist Hungary.

About the same date M. Sidor, a leader of the Slovaks, in a statement to the Polish Press emphasized the point that the plan of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier could not be realized unless there was concord between the Hungarians and the Slovaks.

Meanwhile a series of demonstrations in favour of a common frontier took place in various towns throughout Poland. In Warsaw, Lemberg, Cracow, etc. eager crowds manifested their sympathies for Hungary and loudly demanded the establishment of a common frontier by any means necessary.

On 20th October there was a great demonstration in Budapest in favour of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. The crowds of demonstrators kept shouting: "A common

Polish-Hungarian frontier! A common Hungarian-Polish frontier!" The leaders of the Polish nation were also loudly cheered: Shouts of "Long live Moscicki! Long live Rydz-Smigly!" were to be heard every second minute, and sustained cheering greeted the name of Colonel Beck, who at that time was in Rumania discussing the question of a common frontier. All the speakers at the meeting urged the necessity of that frontier and when they had had their say, the crowds marched to the Polish Legation, where they cheered Poland with wild enthusiasm.

On 29th October the Polish committee formed to work for a common Polish-Hungarian frontier arranged a mass demonstration in Warsaw's biggest theatre, at which several prominent men in political life addressed the audience. Crowds of demonstrators cheered Admiral Horthy and the Hungarian army and loudly demanded a common frontier with Hungary. Lieutenant-colonel Béla Lengyel, Hungarian military attaché, thanked the crowds cheering the Hungarian Legation for their sympathy towards Hungary.

*The desire for a common Polish-Hungarian frontier has also assumed a more concrete form. On 31st October volunteer regiments ready to fight for it were recruited in Warsaw, Cracow, Vilna and Lemberg. A few days earlier a delegation from the "Falanga," a youth organization of the "right" wing, went to the Hungarian Legation and offered to form a free corps and send it to help Hungary. The Hungarian Minister in Warsaw also received a letter from the leader of a volunteer legion in Vejherovo. The letter contained a solemn statement to the effect that the corps of volunteers recruited in the district of Kassub was ready to fight for the national cause of the Hungarians.*

On the same date — October 31 — the Polish War Cripples' Association sent a Hungarian telegram to the Hungarian General National Association of War Cripples, War Widows and Orphans. The telegram said that the war cripples in Poland fully sympathized with the legitimate desire of the Hungarian nation to deliver the Hungarians in Czecho-Slovakia from the Czech yoke, and that they also demanded a common frontier with Hungary. "We are waiting — says

the telegram in conclusion — for the happy moment when we can shake hands across a common frontier."

The Vienna decision was welcomed by the Polish Press with great jubilation. Nevertheless the newspapers emphatically declared that Poland could not accept the decision as final because the question of Ruthenia had not been settled by it. The "Kurjer Poranny" said that the Vienna decision had sustained almost in their entirety the territorial demands made by Hungary on an ethnographical basis. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that this had solved the problem of Ruthenia. The decision did not exclude the possibility of the entire population of Ruthenia giving free expression to their wishes regarding future arrangements in that province.

Hungarian public opinion received the news of the pro-Hungary demonstrations in Poland with unbounded pleasure and gratitude, and there is no member of the Hungarian nation who would not be willing to lay down his life, if by that means Hungary's and Poland's common aim could be realized.

# MINORITY RIGHTS IN RUMANIA NEW GOVERNMENT EDICT CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF RIGHTS

BY  
Dr. ISTVÁN ZÁGONI

Some time ago the whole of the European press reported the news of the publication of the Minority Statutes in Rumania. But the public opinion of the world has not been informed of the text of that edict which Bucharest has dished up as "Minority Statutes." The development of relations between the peoples in the Danube Basin largely depends on the future prospects of the national minorities in Rumania, and it is also important for the peace of Europe to investigate what the minorities of Rumania may expect from this recent regulation of minority rights. Has it brought any change, or does it give any assurance that promises will at last be fulfilled?

## Not a royal decree, nor a decree-law (*decrèt-lège*).

In No. 178., issued on August 1, 1938, the Rumanian gazette ("Monitorul Official") published three *royal decrees* and three *royal decree-laws*. One of the royal decrees, No. 2761, provides for the establishment of the Commissariat of Minority Affairs, defining the fundamental principles on which it is to work and its sphere of authority. Another royal decree contains the appointment of the Commissioner of Minority Affairs. Nine royal decrees, provided with the Sovereign's signature and the promulgation clause, announce the Rumanian citizenship of nine residents in Rumania; each decree is preceded by a preamble, from which it appears that some of the residents concerned owe their Rumanian citizenship to the fact that they have married Ruman-

in women. Royal *decree-laws* provide for the closing hours of barbers' and hairdressers' shops, for shop holidays on Sundays, and for the working hours of private (commercial) employees. Other *decree-laws* contain the appointment of engineers and other technical employees to the State Railways and various other departments. This single issue of the Rumanian gazette is, therefore, enough to convince the reader that the Sovereign holds not only the supreme power of legislation in his hands but also the responsibility for all essential tasks of government.

The first and major half of the official gazette is concerned with royal decrees and decree-laws of this kind. Each of these is provided with a preamble containing the proposals of the Cabinet Council, while in the final clause the King exercises his right of sanctioning (or sealing), promulgation and enforcement, or — in the case of the decree-laws — the legislative power. In the second part of the gazette, in a more unpretending place, we find the edict which was described as the "Minority Statutes", under the following title: "*Journal of the Cabinet Council*" ("Jurnalul ale consilului de ministri"), under No. 1750. This is followed by other two short minutes of the Cabinet Council, concerned with minor affairs, such as the approbation of two tenders, superannuations, suspensions, transfers, auctions.

That is to say, the *Journal of the Cabinet Council*, which has been published under the title of "*Minority Statutes*", is neither a royal decree nor a decree-law. Nevertheless, it was published only in this gazette because the newspapers in Rumania were not allowed to print it. One week later the Censor gave permission for the publication in the newspapers of the *royal decree* concerning the sphere of authority of the Commissariat of Minority Affairs, but even after this date the *Journal of the Cabinet Council* — described as "Minority Statutes" — was not allowed to be published in the newspapers.

### No guarantee.

To begin with, the very character of these regulations makes us raise the question: why has the regulation of the

minority problem not taken the form of a decree with the binding force of a law? In the present system of government in Rumania, as we know, the *decree-law* fills the place of parliamentary legislation, so much so that even police regulations of minor importance are often put into this form. The regulation of the minority problem has assumed the simple form of an Order in Council, or to use the literal translation of the Roumanian term, the form of a *Journal of the Cabinet Council*, which really means an edict of the Government. There is an essential difference between the decree-laws of a dictatorial régime and a Government edict. The decree-law did always have the binding force of a law in the political life of Rumania, even before the present régime, and it would still possess the same power if this dictatorial form of government would subsequently be remodelled either according to the new Constitution or otherwise. In Rumania, there is a much greater difference between laws and edicts than elsewhere, owing to the frequent changes of Government, for the Government in office seldom respects the edicts of the previous Government and very soon annuls whatever its predecessors have ordered. Such factors as the signature of the Sovereign, the promulgation, the Sovereign's seal, under any circumstances bear more weight than the signature of the members of the Cabinet. They would be decidedly more valuable, if only for the simple reason that it is impossible to know the attitude of the military authorities towards the edicts of a civilian Government. Rumania is now in a state of siege; the division generals have supreme command over the lives of the civilian population; the counties are governed by high army officers in active service, since the military commanders of the county capitals are also the county prefects, and the heads of the provinces are not high commissioners but *royal deputies* (governors). Criminal proceedings, particularly those relating to political cases, are in the hands of the military courts, and the control of the press (censorship) is also carried out by the Army. Under these circumstances the question of guarantee is a source of extreme anxiety. What makes us most anxious about it is the question *why?* We must take it for granted that this form of a *Government*

*edict* has been chosen after serious deliberations, and there must have been some reason or other why the idea of a *decree-law* — which is certain to have occurred to the Government — was rejected. Since a law can only be modified today by means of a *decree-law* this decision really implies that no laws are to be modified in the meantime. Moreover, even the idea of a royal decree has been rejected. There must be a grave reason why they have not decided upon a more substantial form of guarantee.

It is clearly stated in the Government's edict that it does not contain provisions but *instructions* concerning the interpretation and application of previous laws, for the guidance of the *ministries, authorities and public departments*. This means that all the numerous unjust measures and provisions contained in the previous laws will be upheld without any change. This is another reason why the form of a Government edict was chosen instead of a *decree-law*.

The introductory part of the edict defines the immediate purpose of the edict as follows: "*to give direct instructions to the Commissariat of Minority Affairs*", notwithstanding the fact that a separate royal decree has been issued containing those principles which the Commissariat has to follow. This decree also contains certain instructions, but these are not identical with those laid down in the Government's edict. If, however, the two were identical in their principles, it would have been enough to lay down the fundamental principles in a regulative legal (royal) decree and simply refer to it in the edict. The two different ways of wording raise the suspicion that the differences cannot be ascribed to pure accident.

The more elaborate instructions of the edict containing the regulation of the minority problem refer to three main branches of public life: *education, church life, and public administration*. There are also minor instructions in it concerning such matters as the appointments to Government departments, language tests, the use of minority languages in the law courts, etc.; some of them touch on private life and private finances; a short paragraph promises a settlement of the condition of three Hungarian scientific and cultural institutions, while another paragraph contains encouraging

assurances concerning the regular activity of the Hungarian Agricultural Society. Let us now examine more closely what these provisions mean, and what practical results may be expected from them?

### The determination of nationality

The first eight of the twenty-six paragraphs are concerned with *minority education*. They do not embrace the problem in its entirety, but they show a certain inclination to do away with some of the most glaring injustices and absurdities.

In the first place, we must point out the most important paragraph, which is also the most essential part not only of the section on education, but also of the whole edict: *the persons responsible for the child's education (father, mother or guardian) alone are entitled to decide to which ethnic group the child belongs.* (Sec. 5.) This is the only paragraph which would relieve the minority families in Rumania from a terrible pressure, if only we could hope that it would be carried out in practice. The children can not be taken away any more — by violent measures — from their parents, their denomination, their nation, and from the minority schools. This is an elementary human right of which no one would have thought to deprive people in Hungary, but of which Rumania has deprived the parents of the Hungarian children in Transylvania. One sentence in the edict, which gives one the impression that this elementary right — the "sine qua non" of the freedom of education — will now be restored, has created an intense feeling of relief. The child is every one's dearest treasure, and it was this alienation of the child that inflicted the deepest wounds on people's souls in the past. This problem has caused a great deal of bitterness and worry to the Hungarian families; the Hungarian minority had to devote the better half of its energies to this struggle for the child, and this struggle has never achieved a better result than 30—40%. Yet even this paragraph leaves no hope for a 100% solution; for it is to be feared that this exclusive right of determination — which is now given to the parents — will be misused to harass the

people's leaders by those means of coercion which are only too well known to all of us. To mention only one example: many Hungarian clergymen have been placed under the charge of hostile activity against the State, merely because they informed their parishioners that they were entitled to send their children to the denominational Hungarian schools. It is a great question, above all, *what results this promise of rights will be able to achieve in practice without the necessary sanctions.*

The term "nationality" is not mentioned at all in the edict. It is clear, therefore, that it does not recognize *nationality* as a term applied to a group of citizens. As regards the determination of the ethnic character, the edict mentions it only in connection with children and with the free choice of school. As far as the adults are concerned, the edict does not recognize their right to choose their own nationality. Consequently, there is nothing to guarantee the right of a Rumanian subject to determine his own nationality in civil life. Why could it not be laid down as a general rule that the citizen's own free will must be regarded as the determining factor in respect of nationality? This should have been the basic principle of the regulation of the minority problem, but this was left out of the edict.

### **The Minority Pact and the educational policy of Rumania**

There is a general statement in the edict — described as "Minority Statutes" — to the effect that the minorities of race, religion and language may maintain schools and teach in their own language. There is, however, nothing new in this statement; it is essentially the repetition of a statement contained in the "Minority Treaty", an agreement concluded between the Allied Powers and Rumania in Paris, on December 19, 1919. The Minority Treaty was ratified on September 26, 1920, and has since then become *one of Rumania's basic laws*. The obligations which Rumania undertook in it have not been fulfilled. Even this law, this basic law, which is at the same time an international agreement guaranteed by the League of Nations, was not enough to induce Rumania to fulfill her obligations. Nor is this abstract

principle any more firmly guaranteed by the simple fact that it was repeatedly laid down in an ordinary Government edict.

Moreover, the edict was not satisfied with the simple repetition of the above abstract statement, but provided it with a clause which flatly contradicts the Minority Treaty. It says, namely, that *the provisions of the Private Education Act of 1925 remain unaltered in the case of elementary education*. Now, this is a reference to the ill-famed Anghelescu-Law (named after the Minister of Education Anghelescu who was responsible for it) which chiefly aims at the complete destruction of minority education, and against which the Hungarian Churches were obliged to appeal to the League of Nations. The League's proceedings in the case ended with a report from the Rumanian Government in which the latter declared that the matter would be settled internally by peaceful means. Nevertheless, no "peaceful settlement" of this kind has taken place in those twelve years which have elapsed since that date.

The Anghelescu-Law refuses the fulfilment of those obligations which Roumania has undertaken by an international agreement. It makes teaching in minority languages impossible, it aims at the eradication of the denominational minority schools — which it degrades to the rank of private schools (in the literal sense of the term) — and that system of teaching which it has introduced leaves hardly any room even for the teaching of reading in the minority languages. For the Szeklers — the largest group of Hungarians in Transylvania —, for instance, the Minority Treaty guarantees *national autonomy in matters of education and religion*. The Anghelescu-Law not only ignores and denies this privilege but introduces certain measures which compel the Hungarians of the "Szeklerland" to send their children to Rumanian schools. Hosts of Rumanian teachers were sent to Transylvania from the old Kingdom to accomplish the task of Rumanization, for which service they were given high premiums in addition to their salaries. By the frequent closing of schools and other methods of official pressure *they have succeeded in sending two-thirds of the Hungarian children*

*to Rumanian schools in an area to which the Minority Treaty has guaranteed educational autonomy.*

In the Minority Treaty Rumania has, among other things, pledged herself to give the minority schools an *equitable share* out of the budgets of the State and municipalities in general. This promise has not been fulfilled. In one year only — in the budgetary year of 1930—31 — did the minority schools receive an insignificant grant from the State. The Government now omits the obligation contained both in the law and in the international agreement and inserts the following text in the place of the term "equitable share":

*The State will offer facilities, under the Budget, to the authorities responsible for the maintenance of these schools.*

It is by no means identical whether we recognize someone's lawful *claim to an equitable share* or just graciously offer him the *gift of certain facilities*.

It appears, however, from the above passage that even this uncertain gift of facilities is offered merely under the *State Budget*, and not under the various municipal budgets (parishes, counties, etc.) as well. *This, too, shows a remarkable difference between the Minority Treaty and the Government edict in question.* In order to palliate this contradiction to some extent, the following section has been inserted in the edict:

*The minority schools are entitled to an adequate share of the 14% municipal tax.*

The term "*adequate share*" is not very far from the definition of what really ought to be done. But the word "adequate" has such an enormous variety of meanings in Rumania that it will serve for the rejection of any claim. There is, moreover, a secret trap hidden behind it. Namely, there is no such thing as a 14% municipal tax in Rumania; nor is it mentioned in the recently promulgated decree-law concerning the new system of government. *No adequate share can be promised out of a thing that does not exist.* This 14% tax has no legal foundation, but it has a history.

A decree which was passed during the last century in the Old Kingdom compelled the villages of Rumania to establish schools *for the State*. For this purpose the villages were ordered to levy a new tax corresponding to 14% of

their budgets. The same old and obsolete decree was again unearthed when the Hungarian villages of the Szeklerland were ordered to build schools for the Rumanian State. This non-existent, illegal tax was imposed on an ever increasing number of Hungarian villages and evoked an endless stream of protests and complaints. Once, by chance or otherwise, a paragraph was inserted in a law — the law dealing with the sphere of authority of the Ministry of Education after its separation from the Ministry of Arts — which provides that the sums for education in the municipal budgets must be divided among the schools of the parishes concerned. This paragraph naturally, did not escape the attention of the minorities who began to claim their share wherever this tax was imposed upon them. By and by protest against the tax became more and more rare, and a division of the funds began in those villages where the municipal elections helped the candidates of the population into power. Thereupon *the Rumanian authorities cancelled the 14% tax, and the Rumanian schools did not demand it*; this was easy enough for them, as the tax had never really existed. In the large cities, for instance, it would have amounted to such enormous sums that it was rather left out of their budgets altogether.

It was easy for the Rumanian schools not to claim their share of this tax, as the parishes have to provide for the maintenance of Rumanian State schools in any case, without any special tax being imposed on them.

According to the Rumanian laws, the parishes have to provide for the establishment and maintenance of the State schools, while the State itself contributes only the salary of the teachers. The authorities show no mercy towards the Hungarian parishes when it comes to the payment of the expenses of the Rumanian schools. And every parish, even the smallest one, has to maintain a Rumanian State school. Those poor people who remain faithful to their minority schools at all costs and without any help from either State or the parishes must, therefore pay *three times as much as the costs imposed upon them under the title of contributions towards the expenses of education*. They have to pay their tax to the State, though it does not provide for the maintenance of its own schools. In the second place, they have to

pay a tax to the parish for the maintenance of the State school. And in addition to this the people undertake to pay — because they feel they have to — for the maintenance of their own minority schools.

This system obviously aims at causing minority education to collapse of itself, because *the minority population, which is heavily burdened by taxes and, as it is, generally lives in most precarious conditions will not be able to support this incredible burden very much longer.* And to ask help from abroad for the maintenance of minority schools would be considered as a most unfriendly act against the State and is — in any case — punished with the utmost severity.

If we add to all this the fact that *it is looked upon as one of the most severely punishable acts to teach Hungarian reading and spelling to those young Hungarians who attend Rumanian schools,* the whole political tendency of the present educational system stands clear before us. If any one dares to give somebody a Hungarian spelling book in a village, he is liable to prosecution. It is strictly forbidden to publish or propagate such books. The idea is to prevent the younger generation from keeping in touch with their nation.

No relief from any of these burdens and prohibitions has been brought by the new Government edict; on the contrary, it merely perpetuates and strengthens the old tendency. During the Hungarian regime, on the other hand, the Rumanian Churches maintained their own schools, elementary as well as secondary schools, from those regular grants which they received from the Hungarian State.

### **Difficulties in the teaching of religion and in the final examinations**

The anti-minority tendency of M. Anghelescu's educational policy has also doomed the minority secondary schools to slow extinction. The Churches maintain them with the utmost difficulty. Innumerable obstacles have been placed in the way of the secondary education of the minorities with the aim of bringing about its ultimate collapse. We shall here deal with two of these obstacles, since the Government edict also discusses only these two:

Schoolmasters in Rumania must, after the completion of their studies at the Rumanian Universities, appear before another *qualifying* committee of examiners in the Ministry before their definite appointment. On the other hand, there is a law which provides for the obligatory number of definitely appointed school-masters in the different secondary schools; and if a school is not able to produce this obligatory number it runs the risk of being closed. Out of those Hungarian schoolmasters who have left the Rumanian Universities with excellent results since the war, 99% could not take this final *qualifying examination*. For about ten years there were no such examinations held at all, while in those few examinations that actually did take place the Hungarian candidates failed, no matter how excellent their previous qualifications may have been. A royal decree, published in January this year, provides, that in certain subjects — such as history, political science, geography, Rumanian language and literature — *only persons of pure Rumanian ethnic origin may be admitted to the examination*. Another royal decree exempts the Germans — in exceptional cases — from this prohibition. Under such circumstances it is impossible for the minority schools to appoint their masters definitely. Consequently, they cannot produce the necessary number of definitely appointed masters, and that they are now faced with the danger of being closed.

What facilities does the present Government edict offer against this insupportable state of affairs? None at all. It declares, however, that the Churches are allowed to employ their own priests as religion teachers in their own schools, but these priests, too, have to take the same obligatory *qualifying examination* as the other qualified schoolmasters. In other words the obligation of an impossible examination is also imposed upon the religion masters. The Hungarians in Transylvania demanded a general settlement of the problem in such a way that *pupils should receive their education in religion from the priests of their own denomination*. This request, however, was not granted; instead of this, only the denominational schools have obtained permission to employ their own religion masters under the above strict reservations.

Another obstacle which the secondary education of the minorities must face is presented by the *final examinations* in Rumania. Those pupils who have completed their secondary studies are not examined in their own schools and by their own masters, but by a committee of examiners composed of masters from other schools who do not even know the pupils' language. The idea underlying this system of examination is to prevent the minority youth from going to the Universities. The results were, indeed, excellent. By and by the parents began to think that it was aimless to send their children to such schools where they could not even obtain a higher leaving certificate and from where they could not obtain admission to the University. And with this blow the present system has struck at the very roots of the minority secondary schools.

On this point the Government edict has, indeed, brought a certain improvement of the lamentable situation of minority youth. It provides that in those subjects which the pupils had learnt in their own language they must be examined by teachers who know that language. It must be known that the minority schools have to teach some of the subjects in Rumanian. In these subjects the method of examination will remain the same as before, and the pupils will continue to be examined by teachers from other schools. The same applies to the subjects taught in the pupils' own language, with the difference that the examiners must possess a knowledge of the language in which those subjects are taught in the minority schools. This latter concession certainly means a relief to the minority pupils preparing for their finals. It is, however, still very far from a really generous solution, because *the minority schoolmasters still remain excluded from the committee of examiners*. The pupils are examined by hostile Rumanian schoolmasters whose judgement is not guided by the pupils' knowledge but by their own chauvinistic hatred. This chauvinism nips the careers of many thousands of able minority youths in the bud, so that their ruined lives may hinder their nation in its future development!

### Church and religion under control

The national Church of Rumania is the Greek Oriental (or Orthodox) Church; this means the enjoyment of privileges and political power. Under such circumstances it would be extremely important to guarantee the freedom of religion in that country. The national minorities in Transylvania do not belong to the Greek Oriental Church, so that an international guarantee of their religious freedom would be an *indispensable necessity* to them. The Minority Pact really does contain certain provisions to this effect, but the practical execution of the generalizing statements introduced in the basic law of Rumania is left to the discretion of the State. It promises the freedom of religious practice and Church activities in so far as they are not inconsistent with the order of the State and with public morals. It was forgotten that the narrow-mindedness of Rumanian village clerks, gendarme sergeants and higher public functionaries identifies the State with the Greek Oriental Church, and that their judgement of public morals is guided by their own individual way of thinking. In their hands, *proselytizing often becomes an instrument of official coercion, and their unbridled freedom to interfere with religious practice has not unfrequently led to the disturbance of the people's peace of mind.*

The Government edict dished up as "Minority Statutes" makes the same statement concerning Church and religion as the Minority Treaty. Accordingly, no Government authority — it only mentions Government authorities — is allowed to hinder the Churches in their activity, nor is it allowed to withhold the permissions necessary for the activities of the Church authorities, provided that this activity is *not inconsistent with the order of the State*. As to what is to be considered as "inconsistent with the order of the State" is still left to the discretion of the authorities, *without any possibility of appeal and without any sanctions against the abuse of official power*. In other words, it continues to leave Church and religion at the mercy of the authorities. It is a gross insult both to the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Churches to place them from the standpoint of public morals, under the

control of Rumanian village clerks and it is equally insulting to invest the Government authorities with the power of controlling their activities as affecting the order of the State. The order of the State is, in any case, so strictly guarded both by the criminal laws of Rumania and the civil and military courts that the control of the authorities is nothing more than an annoying interference with the internal life of the Church.

The sacred abode of religion: the church is now exempted from this control. The Government's edict declares that *the authorities will not be allowed in future to interfere with matters of Divine Service*. At last they begin to realize that it is impossible to order religious services on occasions prohibited by the canons of the Church, that it is absurd to interfere with the prescribed order of rites, and that it is nonsense to prescribe the subject and contents of religious sermons. Unfortunately, *this restriction is imposed only on the Government authorities*, and not on all authorities in general. For gendarmes, for instance, who are most frequently guilty of interference with the freedom of religious service, are regular soldiers in Rumania and are subject to military discipline.

### Minority law in the new system of government

In the matter of Government administration it would be essential to bring about such a regulation of minority rights as would guarantee equality of rights in general. With the evolution of the system of Hungarian public administration, in the course of ten centuries minority law in Transylvania had attained a very high standard of development due to the extension of the self-government of the counties and municipalities. The Hungarian Minority Act of 1868 (Art. 44) was such a safeguard of the rights of the Transylvanian minorities — i. e. in those days the Germans and the Rumanians — that *the present Hungarian minority in Transylvania would experience an intense relief if it was accorded a similar regulation of its rights by the Rumanians*. The national assembly of the Transylvanian Rumanians which the supporters of Rumania's aspirations

arranged at Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) on the eve of the Peace Treaty, December 1, 1919, declared as the "conditio sine qua non" of union with Rumania that *every nation of Transylvania was to govern itself in its own language and through its own freely elected sons*. This resolution was also incorporated as a solemn declaration in the laws of Rumania.

There is a deep gulf between the resolution of Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) and the present Government edict. The same gulf separates the edict from the constitutional development of Hungarian nationality administration the principles of which were followed in the above resolution. The system of Hungarian Government administration was based on the pure self-government of the municipalities and counties as large territorial units. *Within the limits of this self-government, every nationality was free to live its own life*. Every municipality and village could choose its own official language, and every individual was allowed to use his own mother-tongue too. The minute-books of the counties were written in several languages, according to the number of languages spoken by the population, so that there were municipalities whose minute-books were written in three languages: Hungarian, German and Rumanian, in the case of a mixed population. In such self-governing territories, those Rumanians who now play an active part in the present political life of Rumania used only their own language at the council meetings.

The Government administration of post-war Rumania underwent numerous changes, and every change resulted in a fresh curtailment of self-government, until it was completely submerged in the present centralistic system. *The Rumanians, therefore, do not even propose to speak of a nationality law similar to that which the minorities of the Hungarian State enjoyed*.

The "Statute"-edict contains the following concessions:

1. In the councils of those municipalities where there is *a considerable percentage of minority population* the members may also address the meetings in their own language.

2. In those municipalities where *a considerable percentage* of the population belongs to the minorities, the sheriff — or

the deputy-sheriff — must be chosen from the minority population.

3. The functionaries of a "*minority municipality*" must know the language of the minority.

4. If the minority inhabitants of such municipalities *have not yet acquired a sufficient command of Rumanian*, they may be allowed to submit their applications in their own language, but in this case the application must be accompanied by an officially certified Rumanian translation.

The publication of the "Statute"-edict was followed, two weeks later, by the promulgation of the royal decree concerning the new system of Government administration. *Of the above four points this decree contains only two, and even these two have undergone significant alterations.* Within two weeks the promises previously made were changed so that the minority languages may only be used in the councils of those municipalities where the majority of the population belongs to one nationality; if there are more nationalities in the municipality, only the language of the largest nationality group may be used at council meetings, and any address delivered in a minority language must be translated at once into Rumanian. This system of compulsory interpretation (translation) means that the council meetings of a purely Hungarian or German municipality may not be held in Hungarian or German. Which national minorities will obtain the benefit of figuring as the majority group (in the case of more nationalities in the same place) is, as yet, doubtful.

Again the decree states that one of the positions — that of the sheriff or the deputy-sheriff, or the burgomaster or the vice-burgomaster — may be filled by a person belonging to the *majority group* (the nationality representing the highest percentage). The fact that these posts are filled *by appointment means that, instead of obtaining a privilege, the population is really deprived of one of its privileges.* Judging by our former experiences of Rumania we may say that such promises of appointment are particularly dangerous, since such posts are usually filled by renegades, vile hirelings, who are known as the paid enemies of the minorities and of minority culture.

The passage providing that the functionaries employed in minority municipalities must know the language of the minority was thus left out of the above royal decree. In any case, it has not been decided yet as to what percentage the minority population must represent in what is to be (or may be) recognized as a "minority municipality". The compulsory knowledge of minority language, in itself, does not offer much help to the population. The corresponding passage of the Hungarian Minority Act, which was here taken over in a mutilated form, runs as follows:

— In their intercourse with the citizens the public functionaries *must use* the language of the population.

Nor does the royal decree mention that in certain villages applications may be submitted also in the vernacular. It may be said that such a concession might follow at a later date, or that the Government's edict is quite sufficient for that purpose. For this reason it is important to investigate whether the above Government edict offers any facilities to the minority population? None whatsoever. In the first place, it offers only a *temporary concession* to those "*who have not yet acquired* a sufficient command of Rumanian". It is left to the discretion of the public functionaries to believe the applicants that they have not yet learned Rumanian sufficiently. Nor is it specified as to which national groups are allowed to enjoy this concession in the various municipalities. And what is still worse: a certified Rumanian translation must accompany the Hungarian applications. In a Hungarian village, where the people do not know enough Rumanian, the application has to be translated either by a solicitor or the village clerk; this translation must then be taken to the nearest town — which means sometimes a whole day's walk — or to some other place where it can be certified by the notary public. This, again, means extra outlay: translation and certification fees, travelling expenses, loss of labour, etc.; these make the "privilege" of the "free" use of the mother-tongue so expensive and troublesome that it is impossible to avail oneself of it. Yet an application must be submitted even for a simple local certificate.

To all this we must add that *even this slight minority*

*privilege is strictly limited to the municipalities;* in the higher organizations of Government administration, such as the counties or the provinces (a province is a group of counties), the minorities have *no privilege whatsoever*. Those concessions which were given to the municipalities are of no value, since there is no self-government. The municipal council, where the language of the minority population might be used, is a body of no importance and with no sphere of authority; it holds a meeting every six months, and the population of the village is not allowed to delegate more than three members of its own choice to it, while all the other members are either appointed officially, or else they are members of the council by virtue of their position as public functionaries. At the present moment however, there are no municipal councils, and the new system of election is, as yet, unknown.

### The inaccessibility of public posts

There is a negative statement both in the Minority Treaty and in the Constitution Act, which says that no individual may be prevented on account of his race or religion from *occupying* a public post. This negative statement has not prevented the Rumanian State from ousting the minority elements, especially the Hungarians, from the public posts, public undertakings, or from the workshops belonging either to the State or to the counties and municipalities. The same negative statement is again repeated in the "Statute"-edict, because it means no obligation, no promise that minority individuals will be employed anywhere or that, at least, those who by chance have remained in active service in offices or workshops will not be turned out of their posts. Anyone who is not appointed cannot occupy a public post.

Thousands and thousands of Hungarians have been dismissed from the public service. The cause of — or, rather, the excuse for — their dismissal was an "insufficient knowledge of the language of the State". That this was merely an excuse may be seen from the fact that many people were made to fail in subsequent examinations though they had succeeded in the preceding language tests, and that many of these people possessed Rumanian diplomas. Now that

they have succeeded in eradicating the minority element from the public service, the Government edict offers this concession that those who possess Rumanian diplomas and have already passed an examination in the Rumanian language will not be required to take another examination. *It does not mention a single word about the reappointment of those who in the past were dismissed from the public service under that pretext, nor does it say anything about the appointment of minority individuals in the future. It does not even mention the lawful claim to a pension, or at least a partial indemnification, of the dismissed minority employees. The exemption from the language tests — in which anyhow the candidates are always made to fail — means nothing to the Hungarians, because they have already been dismissed from the public service, and God alone knows how they all live now. This concession is like a merciful reprieve signed after the execution of the criminal.*

#### Use of minority languages — with an eightfold tax

In the Minority Treaty Rumania has solemnly pledged herself to guarantee the unlimited use of peoples mother-tongue in private life as well as in business and economic life. This applies, of course, to the language of the minority press and to minority literature and culture, too. In business and commercial life this solemnly guaranteed free use of language was rendered impracticable in such a way that all those minority undertakings which do not keep their books in Rumanian have to pay — according to the law — higher taxes.

The minority press has not been prevented from writing in its own language, but it was placed under the unrestricted control of the censors. It was, however, prohibited to use the minority names of geographical places, mountains, valleys, rivers, etc., and the corresponding Rumanian names had to be printed instead. The Hungarian régime had imposed no restrictions on the Rumanian press in Transylvania, which was allowed to use the Roumanian names without any limitations. The old Hungarian newspaper "*Temesvári Hirlap*" now bears the following title:

*"Timișoarei Hirlap, Gazeta Timișoarei".*

In this long title there is only one Hungarian word: "Hirlap" (journal).

The "Statute"-edict has now brought this concession that on the title page the heading may bear the Hungarian name of the place in brackets. Thus the original name of the "*Temesvári Hirlap*" will now be changed in the following manner:

*Timișoarei (Temesvári) Hirlap*  
*Gazeta Timișoarei.*

So, after the execution of the above edict, the title of this newspaper will have two Hungarian words in it. Up to this moment the edict has not been enforced yet; at any rate, the censors of the press have not taken any cognizance of it so far. The edict states that it will be allowed to print the minority names of places in the text.

There is another passage in the edict, which deals with the question of sign-boards. So far, sign-boards were not allowed to bear inscriptions in the minority languages, *so that a foreign visitor arriving in a town or a village should not see that it was not inhabited by Rumanians*. At the beginning of this year all the tradesmen, merchants, commercial companies, solicitors, doctors, etc. were ordered to put up new sign-boards according to the new regulations, with even their own names in the Rumanian form. The same edict also ordered the removal from the shop-windows of any inscriptions giving information concerning quality or price etc. in the language of the minority population. The edict, furthermore, *entitled policemen to remove the death notices from biers at funerals if they were not printed only in Rumanian*. The death notice of an eminent Hungarian poet in Transylvania was torn off his bier during his funeral at Kolozsvár (Cluj) this year, for even the death notice of a Hungarian poet was not allowed to be printed in Hungarian . . .

The "Statute"-edict now promises this concession that the sign-boards may henceforth bear inscriptions in the minority languages in addition to those in Rumanian, but they must not be any larger than the Rumanian inscriptions.

Not one single sign-board has been exchanged for bilingual ones since the publication of the above edict, and it is most unlikely that this process of exchange will take place in the

near future. Everyone has now put up new and expensive sign-boards according to the regulations of the previous edict. No one will dare to remove them, as every one is afraid of a further official regulation of the question. Nor is it to be hoped that the military commanders, who also rule supreme over civil life, will obey the orders published in the Cabinet Council diary of a civilian Government.

The decree dealing with the new system of Government administration contains a different regulation of the question of bilingual sign-boards: it orders that *all non-Rumanian sign-boards must be taxed eight times as high as the Rumanian ones*. Since all the edicts agree in this that no sign-boards in Rumania may bear inscriptions in more than two languages, it appears that this eight-fold communal tax is to be imposed on those sign-boards on which the Rumanian inscription is smaller than the inscription in the other language. This, being left to the discretion of the authorities, no one is prepared to run the risk of eight-fold taxation.

In any country where the minority population is really meant to live in peace, no authority would ever think of imposing a heavier tax on business accounts and books written in their mother-tongue, and no one would invent such deterrent ideas as the eight-fold taxation of minority sign-boards.

### Equality of rights before the law and in economic life.

The equality of rights before the law is based on the elementary right of the defendant in a law-suit to defend himself in his own mother-tongue. The Hungarian régime gave full play to this privilege of the minorities, and there were always sworn interpreters available at every law court. *The laws of Rumania*, on the other hand, *do not admit the use of minority languages in the courts*, nor do they provide for sworn interpreters in the courts.

The "Statute"-edict now makes the following statement: "Facilities will be offered to the minority citizens to defend themselves in their own language, if they are not represented by a counsel". It is, then, only an empty promise that facilities *may be offered some time in the future*, and even this help is restricted to those cases where the defendant has not employed

a counsel. Does this mean to say that if a minority citizen has a counsel to speak for him he may not be allowed to use his own language in the courts? Imagine the unequal situation of a minority citizen, who is prevented from giving evidence against his Rumanian opponent in his own language!

Furthermore, the edict also states that provisions will be made for the presence of interpreters in the law courts. It does not say that they will be *sworn interpreters*. The willful commission of the qualifying term "*sworn*" shows that they were fully aware of the high importance of that term in law.

The mass of promises, which we find accumulated in this passage, is a striking illustration of the inequality of rights in Rumania to-day. And one of the most disquieting questions of the future, is whether this state of affairs will ever change?

The same conclusion may be drawn from the passage which offers the non-Rumanian members of the teaching staff (in State schools) a *50% reduction of the railway fares, to which every State employee is entitled in any case*. In other words, this passage really admits the fact that the minority teachers of the State schools — unlike the Rumanians — were hitherto deprived of the benefit of a 50% reduction on the railways. Whatever the case may be, the above promise has no practical value, because the State does not employ any minority teachers in its schools.

As regards economic life, the edict states that the commercial undertakings, cooperative societies and the banks of the minorities will be allowed to operate *under the same conditions* as those of the Rumanians. This, too, is a mere generalizing statement, and it is not easy to estimate its practical value. A great deal depends on the interpretation of the term "same (or equal) conditions", as it may easily have something to do with such factors as services rendered to the nation, or the nationality (ethnic origin) of the employees.

Another passage relating to economic life provides that minority merchants, tradesmen and agriculturists may also be electing members of the chambers of commerce, trade and agriculture respectively. Anyone who is not sufficiently familiar with conditions in Rumania would not believe that it was possible to leave out individuals of the same profession

from the list of electors merely because they did not belong to the Rumanian race.

Will this, we ask, be sufficient for the re-establishment of the equality of rights in economic life, and will it be enough to solve all those cumbersome problems which have made the life of the minorities so difficult?

The last two sections of the "Statute"-edict are concerned exclusively with the Hungarian minority. The first promises to settle the status of three highly important Hungarian cultural institutions, with due regard to their deeds of endowment. This refers to three inestimable cultural estates — libraries and museums — which were established by public contribution for the purposes of national culture. There is no room here to describe their situation in detail, or to give an account of their unending struggle against the attacks on their existence. One of them, the Museum of Transylvania, had its collections and its library seized by the University of Kolozsvár (Cluj) the latter having no permission to do so. No rent was paid and the Museum was not able to establish its claims as proprietor.

It is not easy to imagine what the edict means by the settlement of the problem of this private Hungarian cultural estate. Former attempts show that *the Rumanians endeavoured to prevail upon the Hungarian minority to resign its claim to the whole, or at least to one part of these treasures*. Since, however, it is the case of an inherited national estate, the Hungarian minority has no right to resign its rights.

In addition to these the Hungarian minority has a considerable number of cultural societies, institutions, museums and halls for cultural purposes, but the edict makes no reference to them even collectively, though in each case their status is still unsettled.

The last section of the edict provides for the regular activity of the Agricultural Society of Transylvania. It is undoubtedly true that the granting of this permission is a great help, but it must not be forgotten that the Hungarians in Rumania have more than this one economic union, as the

whole of the Hungarian minority population is not composed of farmers alone. Though with the new Constitution the whole internal political life of Rumania is now in the process of being remodelled on the basis of a system of professional representation, the results of which cannot be guessed as yet, this attempt to remodel it must not serve as a pretext for ignoring the national unity of the various national groups. The division according to professions is intended to destroy the existing framework of national unity among the minority population. The fact that the Agricultural Society is the only one which is allowed to function as a separate Hungarian society or union, means that no other professional organization of the minorities will be allowed to be based on the foundation of national unity. In other words, this means that agriculture will be the only profession in which the Hungarians will be taken into account as a national minority. But it must not be forgotten that the Hungarians still form a large part of the industrial labouring class, that the tradesmen represent an ancient class of Hungarian society in the towns, and that the Hungarian intelligentsia is still the leading class of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

It is vitally essential for the Hungarians in Transylvania to maintain a national minority organization if they are to defend their own political, cultural and economic interests and if they intend to have a national relief fund of their own. And it is just the recognition of, and permission to, establish this organization that we do not find in the edict, though without them it will be impossible to reach an agreement. No national minority can ever be expected to give up this most essential instrument of self-defence if it wishes to survive. Without this, there is no recognition of nationality as a collective term applied to a group of people of the same origin. This is, however, the very reason why we do not find the term "*nationality*" in the new "Statute"-edict. This attitude agrees with the intentions of the new Constitution, which describes Rumania as a national State in the sense that all its citizens are Rumanians, though of different ethnic origin, language and religion. The mere fact, however, that *all the citizens of Rumania are put down as Rumanians on paper* does not actually make Rumanians of them.

Though the edicts and laws, or decree-laws, may deny the fact: there *are* nationalities in Rumania, and there are many millions of them. Rumania is, therefore a State composed of nationalities, and no serious regulation of the nationality problem may be imagined without the recognition of this fact. This Government edict, which was dished up as "Minority Statutes", is a mere promise in general, a moderate repetition of promises previously made. Should it fail to produce any good results at all, it will merely be throwing dust in the world's eyes, but it will hardly serve as a satisfactory regulation of minority rights.

OSZK  
Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

## FROM MUNICH TO VIENNA

The Munich protocol states that the Hungarian and Polish claims have to be met within three months; or if this does not happen, they will be the subject of further discussion. With this the Munich Agreement desired to insure that the areas inhabited by Magyars should be annexed by Hungary, while the territories with a Polish population should be joined to Poland. With respect to Hungary and to Poland this is the meaning and the significance of the Munich Four Power Agreement. In accordance with this Hungary immediately turned to Prague and addressed a note to the Czecho-Slovak Government re the opening of negotiations. The date proposed by the Hungarian Government in its note of October 3, for the opening of negotiations, was October 6. This note, also demanded certain pledges as guarantee of the serious character of the negotiations; viz. the surrender of two communities which came after the Great War under Czech rule, the release of political prisoners, the disarming of Hungarian soldiers, the organisation in the areas inhabited by Hungarians of joint organs for keeping order. The Prague Government acquiesced in principle in the terms of the Hungarian note, but in practice it followed a policy of procrastination. Thus the negotiations could only be opened on October 9.

The Czecho-Slovak point of view was stated to be the following: Czecho-Slovakia does not wish to have alien nationalities within its boundaries after the reconstruction, i. e. it will surrender the areas inhabited by aliens. This view had been repeatedly expressed in responsible quarters and as basis offered a possibility of agreement. In Hungary's case the disputed areas should have been surrendered, for obviously the same principle upon which the surrender of the Sudeten German territories had been based might have served as a starting-point for the surrender of the areas with a Magyar majority. The situation of twenty years ago — previous to the unfair change effected by the peace treaty of Trianon — i. e. the results of the last census in the Hungarian era could have served as a standard. The application of this principle to the Hungarian claims is the more justified as the areas in question are inhabited by Magyars only and as they were alienated twenty years ago illegally and forcibly from Hungary, the country to which they belonged politically for over 1000 years, whereby

the Wilsonian principles were brought into derision. The fundamental principle of readjustment could therefore only have been: a return to the conditions existing previous to the injustices sanctified by the peace treaty of Trianon.

However, as soon as the *pourparles* were opened at Komárom, certain symptoms were manifest which clipped the wings of the Hungarian hopes, even the most legitimate of them. The aim of the Czecho-Slovak delegation, viz. to ignore the principle of territorial revision, became evident as soon as the first Hungarian demand, the surrender of two towns, was mentioned. It seemed almost impossible to obtain a counter-proposal from Czecho-Slovakia. It came to light that the Czecho-Slovak Government intended to grant something like an autonomy to the Magyars instead of consenting to their reunion with the mother country. The Hungarian delegation naturally rejected this plan most categorically. A new plan was then devised by the delegation representing the Czecho-Slovak Government. According to this the delegation declared itself ready to surrender part of the island formed by the Danube — called Csallóköz — but not an inch of the territory to the north and to the east of that region — except Komárom, here also reserving the right to use it as a free port. Thus while the Czecho-Slovak Government had been trying to make other countries believe in their desire to have a national state and their willingness to give up each of the alien and unfairly incorporated nationalities prior to reconstruction, in practice it nevertheless wished to keep masses of Magyars under its sway. Obviously the Hungarian delegation could not accept this plan.

A second preposal had been promised then by the Czecho-Slovak delegation for October 13. The latter did not however contain any essential improvement on the former proposals. While the Hungarian point of view adhered firmly from the very outset to the basis laid down in the Four Power Agreement, viz. the right of self-determination, and to a consistent application of this principle, — the Czecho-Slovak delegation, inspired by Prague, submitted a plan devised with an utter disregard for the ethnographic principle and based on strategic considerations and one-sided interests of communication. On this basis the Czecho-Slovak Government not only claimed all the railway lines, but also wished to keep all the Hungarian towns as well.

The transparency of the Czecho-Slovak delegation's tactics, as well as their open sabotage of negotiations, forced the leader of the Hungarian delegation, on October 13, to address the following question to them!

"Is this your last word — and is this your last proposal?" The leader of the Hungarian delegation was left without any answer to his question. The Czecho-Slovak delegation neither

gave an answer in the affirmative nor an answer in the negative. The Hungarian question was left unanswered.

Hungary was thus obliged to wind up the *pourparlers* which seemed absolutely hopeless and to establish the fact that the negotiations at Komárom had been unsuccessful. M. Koloman de Kánya, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs had every right and reason to state in his declaration — read at Komárom — that the gap between the two standpoints on the fundamental principles of readjustment was too wide. *Pourparlers* would not be able to span it with a bridge.

This is where the Czecho-Slovak attitude of postponement and tactics, and lacking from the very outset the least willingness to come to an agreement, has led. A series of circumstances indicates that Czecho-Slovakia had not been in favour of an agreement even when she sent her delegates to negotiate. In the first place she did not demobilize. On the contrary, she tried to make use of her mobilized and armed condition to influence the tenor of the *pourparlers*. On October 13 General Vjest, broadcasting from Pozsony, emphasized the necessity of armament and preparedness. He urged amongst other things, that sacrifices were demanded from the people in their own future interest. As soon as the General finished his talk at 5.10 p. m. exactly — i. e. an hour before the delegations met to continue the *pourparlers* and before negotiation had been broken off — another address was broadcast from the Pozsony station. This address emphasizing the force of the Czech arms, contained definite threats against Hungary. — The proper Hungarian answer to this has since been broadcast from Budapest. We must however lay particular stress on the fact that the party whom we met at Komárom with the sincere intention of coming to an agreement tried to threaten us with its army while negotiations were still in process thereby betraying that it had no serious intention of making peace with us.

The only answer we could give to this attitude was that addressed by M. Koloman de Kánya, to the Czecho-Slovak delegation.

After the failure of Komárom, there have been several Czech proposals, but neither of them could be considered as a basis for discussions. Only the fifth of the different Czech notes gave a new basis for negotiations.

#### *Czech Note No. V.*

On 26th October, M. Chvalkovsky, Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, handed to M. John Wettstein, Hungary's Minister in Prague, the Czecho-Slovak Government's reply to the Hungarian Note of 24th October containing Hungary's territorial demands. This Note, the fifth sent by the Czecho-Slovak Government, ran as follows:

The Czecho-Slovak Government has made a careful and profound study of the Hungarian Government's proposals as contained in the communication dated No. 39, 24th October of the current year, which Your Excellency was kind enough to convey to me.

The Czecho-Slovak Government again begs to stress the point that the present negotiations can only refer to the question of the Hungarian minority. Namely, since items 1 and 2 of the Protocol to the Munich Agreement of 29th September, 1938, make no mention of any but the Hungarian and Polish minorities, all other ethnic questions must remain outside the framework of the present negotiations. As regards the question of the Hungarian minority, the Czecho-Slovak Government continues to entertain a cordial desire to arrive at a sincere, rapid and complete solution. To further this end the Czecho-Slovak Government, on 22nd October, submitted proposals referring to the whole closed Hungarian national area. These proposals were submitted as a general basis of fresh negotiations, with the possibility of subsequent modifications.

In view of the fact that these proposals were not considered satisfactory by the Hungarian Government, the Czecho-Slovak Government, agrees to refer the question of the Hungarian minority to arbitration by Germany and Italy, as signatories of the Munich Agreement.

The possible inclusion of other arbitrators should be subject to the decision of those two Powers. Should they agree to Hungary's suggestion regarding Poland, the Czecho-Slovak Government would suggest that Rumania should also take part in the work of arbitration.

The arbitral award should determine the time limit and methods of the evacuation by the Czech troops and authorities of the territories to be ceded and of their occupation by the Hungarian troops and authorities. The Czecho-Slovak Government suggests that a mixed commission of Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak military experts meet forthwith, in order to make preparation for, and facilitate, the execution of all necessary arrangements.

#### *The Hungarian Government's reply.*

Within twenty-four hours the Hungarian Government replied to Prague's fifth Note. The text of the Hungarian Note handed to M. Chvalkovsky, Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs by M. John Wettstein, Hungary's Minister in Prague, at 6 p. m. on 27th October, was as follows:

The Royal Hungarian Government regrets that the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic completely ignores the Hungarian Government's suggestion *re* plebiscites. This attitude of the Czecho-Slovak Government came as a great surprise to the Hungarian Government, the more so as the latter's suggestion was

in complete accord with the spirit of the Munich Agreement by which the Czecho-Slovak Government was guided hitherto during its negotiations. In the above-mentioned Note of the Czecho-Slovak Government it was stated that "the present negotiations can only refer to the question of the Hungarian minority", and this because "items 1 and 2 of the Protocol to the Munich Agreement of 29th September, 1938, make no mention of any but the Hungarian and Polish minorities". True though it is that the text of those agreements mentions only Germans, Poles and Hungarians, it is nevertheless incontestable that the right of the peoples to self-determination was laid down as the basis of the reconstruction of the Czecho-Slovak Republik. From this it follows that the right to dispose of themselves by way of a plebiscite cannot be denied to any minority that wishes to avail itself thereof. Considering the contradictory attitude of the Czecho-Slovak Government regrettable, the Hungarian Government is constrained to adhere to its original standpoint.

In the above-mentioned Note the Czecho-Slovak Government declares itself willing to accept the arbitration of Germany and Italy. This — in the opinion of the Hungarian Government — implies the obligation to submit *a priori* to the decision of those two Powers.

The arbitrators' sphere of authority naturally extends only to the areas under dispute and not to those concerning which an agreement has already been arrived at between the two Governments and the occupation of which by Hungarian troops was suggested in the Hungarian Government's Note of 24th October.

The composition of the tribunal of arbitration and the details of its activity should, in the opinion of the Hungarian Government, be left to the decision of the Great Powers concerned.

As regard the proposal that "The arbitral award should determine the time limit and the methods of the evacuation by the Czech troops and authorities of the territories to be ceded and of their occupation by the Hungarian troops and authorities", it is the opinion of the Hungarian Government that this proposal can only refer to the areas under dispute.

Therefore, the Hungarian Government is ready to accept the suggestion that "a mixed commission of Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak military experts meet forthwith, in order to make preparation for, and facilitate, the execution of all necessary arrangements". For this purpose the Hungarian military attaché in Prague will communicate directly with the proper Czecho-Slovak military authorities.

The Royal Hungarian Government learns with satisfaction that the Czecho-Slovak Government is inspired by a cordial desire to arrive at a sincere, rapid and complete solution.

The Hungarian Government reminds the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic that from the very beginning of the

negotiations Hungary has always considered it to be of vital importance to settle the territorial questions affecting the two States with the greatest expedition possible, and that the Hungarian Government cannot accept responsibility for any consequences that may arise from a protraction of negotiations.

*Czech Note No. VI.*

At 6 p. m. on Friday, 28th October, 1938, M. Chvalkovsky, Czech Foreign Minister, handed to M. John Wettstein, Hungarian Minister in Prague, the reply of the Czecho-Slovak Government to the territorial demands contained in the Hungarian Note of 27th October.

The gist of Czecho-Slovakia's reply was a suggestion that within twenty-four hours of its receipt the two Governments should request the German and Italian Governments to accept the rôle of arbiters. The Czecho-Slovak Government did not share the view that an agreement had been arrived at concerning certain areas, but was willing to submit that question also to arbitration. Regarding the question of their occupation, the Czecho-Slovak Government's Note expresses the conviction that the decision of the arbiters would insure the most rapid settlement possible of that question also.

The Note stated that the Czecho-Slovak military authorities had already entered into communication with the Hungarian military attaché in Prague.

*The Hungarian Government's reply.*

At noon on Saturday, October 29, M. J. Wettstein, Hungarian Minister in Prague handed the Hungarian reply to the Czech Note of 28th October to M. Chvalkovsky, Czecho-Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs. In that reply it was stated that the Hungarian Government had requested the two Powers concerned to undertake the task of arbitration. Pending the reply of the Powers, the Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right to act as it thought best.

The Czecho-Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs intimated to the Hungarian Minister that similar steps had been taken by the Czecho-Slovak Government.

*Germany and Italy accept the rôle of arbiters.*

On Saturday 29th October, in the evening, Count Ciano, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, received first the Hungarian Minister and then the Czech *Chargé d'Affaires*, to both of whom he intimated that Germany and Italy were willing to accept the rôle of arbiters.

By way of the D. N. D. the German Government issued the following communiqué on 31st October.

In consideration of the fact that it has proved impossible to solve the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czecho-Slovakia and the question of a just ethnographic frontier between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia by means of the direct negotiations conducted during the past few weeks, the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Governments have appealed to the German and Italian Governments to settle those questions by arbitration.

During his visit to Rome, Herr von Ribbentrop, Germany's Foreign Minister, discussed these questions with Count Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and indicated to the Italian Government that Germany was prepared to agree to their being settled by arbitration. Since the Czecho-Slovak and the Hungarian Governments have signified their willingness to accept the arbitral decision without dispute and to execute the same without delay, the German and Italian Governments have decided to accept the rôle of arbitrators.

For this purpose Herr von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of the German Reich, and Count Ciano, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, will meet in Vienna on Wednesday, 2nd November. The Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Ministers of Foreign Affairs will also receive an invitation to be present in Vienna on that day.

#### *Herr von Ribbentrop's Opening Speech.*

After the arrival of the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak delegations Herr von Ribbentrop opened the meeting of arbitrators. His opening speech ran as follows:

"Your Excellencies, Gentlemen,

I have the honour of welcoming you to Vienna on behalf of the Government of the German Reich. I welcome in the first place my friend Count Ciano, the Foreign Minister of Fascist Italy, and I also welcome the Foreign Ministers of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. The Kingdom of Hungary and the Czecho-Slovak Republic have appealed to Germany and Italy to pass arbitral judgment on the question of the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries. The Governments of the German Reich and the Kingdom of Italy have acceded to this request and the Italian Foreign Minister and myself are here to pronounce our decision. I see a peculiarly symbolic significance in the fact that Italy and Germany have met just in the house of Prince Eugene of Savoy for this important purpose; for 200 years ago it was that prince of Italian origin who, as a German statesman and military commander, brought peace and justice to the peoples of South-Eastern Europe.

Today our task is to draw, on an ethnographical basis, a permanent frontier between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia and therewith find the solution of all the questions connected with that frontier. The arbitral decision we shall pronounce will be final

and both Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia have undertaken to accept it as such. In essentials we have become acquainted with the standpoints of the two Governments in the course of the recent negotiations. Nevertheless I consider that it would be expedient if the representatives of the two Governments were to recapitulate and explain their several points of view, in order that every argument may be well weighed before the decision of the arbitrators is pronounced.

Before I request them to do so I shall ask His Excellency the Italian Foreign Minister to address the meeting."

*Ciano: "A new era based on international justice will now begin."*

Count Ciano addressed the assembly as follows:

"Your Excellencies, Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Fascist Government I have the honour to greet you all most cordially. To my friend, Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, I express my warmest thanks for the cordial welcome accorded to me in Vienna in the house of Prince Eugene, who — as the German Foreign Minister said — brought peace and justice to the peoples of South-Eastern Europe 200 years ago.

When we acceded to the request of the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Governments, the Rome—Berlin axis decided to make a further important contribution towards the efforts hitherto displayed in the interests of European peace and consolidation. I am sure that our efforts will be crowned with success; that this meeting in Vienna will inaugurate a new order in Central Europe and that a new era based on international justice — which we have always desired and for which we have striven — will now begin."

*M. de Kánya and Count Teleki  
State Hungary's Point of View.*

Following these speeches the forenoon session of the arbitral tribunal began, which lasted without a break from a quarter past twelve till a few minutes past two.

First M. Coloman de Kánya and then Count Teleki addressed the tribunal, after which the Czech delegates were heard.

The members of the two delegations set forth their standpoints at length. No comments were made by the arbitrators, who merely listened to the exposés with keen attention.

In no single case were any of the delegates or experts asked to be present during negotiations.

Shortly after two o'clock the arbitrators thanked the delegations for their information and pronounced the session closed.

M. de Kánya accompanied by Count Teleki went to the room set apart for the Hungarian delegation, where M. de Kánya gave

some information to the Press about the course of the meeting.

A short time afterwards M. Chvalkovsky, Czecho-Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, left the room in which the session was held and went, accompanied by the rest of the Czech delegation, into that reserved for them.

*The Hungarian Demands Submitted to the Arbitration Tribunal.*

The Hungarian demands submitted by M. Kánya were as follows:

1. Hungary demands all the territories lying between the frontier already ceded by Czecho-Slovakia and the present frontier of Hungary.

2. Hungary also demands the following areas: *a)* the Nyitra plebiscitary area; *b)* the Jolsva plebiscitary area; *c)* the Szomolnok-Mecenzéf plebiscitary area; *d)* the town of Kassa and its immediate surroundings; *e)* the district to the east of Kassa; *f)* Ungvár; *g)* Munkács and *h)* the Feketeardó plebiscitary districts.

On the basis of the Munich Agreement the Hungarian Government demands separate negotiation and separate arrangements in the case of Pozsony.

All these demands are absolutely consistent with the terms of the Munich Agreement.

*The Arbitrators Announce Their Award.*

At 2.5 p. m. Herr von Ribbentrop gave a luncheon, and at 4.30 p. m. the final discussion between the German and Italian Foreign Ministers was opened. This *pourparler* lasted till 5.30 p. m., at which hour a definite decision was reached. At 6.30 the award was announced to the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak delegations.

*Herr von Ribbentrop's and Count Ciano's parting words.*

When the decision had been announced and the Protocol signed, Herr von Ribbentrop, in his concluding speech, pointed out that it was after an exhaustive study of all the fundamental points bearing on the issue that he and the Italian Foreign Minister had drawn the frontier which in their opinion was an equitable solution of the problem. He hoped that conditions in these areas would now develop in a spirit of unfeigned appeasement.

Count Ciano expressed his satisfaction that the Rome-Berlin axis had again given proof of its usefulness as a means of consolidating conditions and furthering peace. The two arbitrators were convinced that their decision was objective

and just. It was for Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia to make a practical application of the conclusions inherent in this spirit of consolidation and co-operation.

Herr von Ribbentrop then declared the sitting closed.

*Joint statement by Herr von Ribbentrop  
and Count Ciano.*

The joint statement to the Press made by Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano runs as follows:

"The Rome—Berlin axis has today demonstrated its great significance as an effective arbitrator, especially in cases of complicated international disputes. The axis has once more given proof that it is a factor making for peace and order in European politics.

*The injustices of the Peace Treaties of 1919 made this part of South-Eastern Europe a hotbed of permanent unrest.* That state of matters has now been done away with, thanks to the unbiassed arbitral decision pronounced by the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy after an exhaustice discussion of the matter submitted by both parties. The decision taken was arrived at in a spirit of reciprocal friendship between Germany and Italy and with a sense of our responsibility for the peace of Europe.

*We hope that relations between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia will now develop in a spirit of peaceful and neighbourly co-operation. This will be all the more possible since the new relations between the two countries will now be based on the fundamental principle of absolute equity.*

# POLITICAL MOSAIC

## LORD ROTHERMERE IN HUNGARY

Viscount Rothermere, Hungary's great English friend, arrived in Budapest on 8th November. Lord Rothermere to whom the Hungarian revisionist movement is so deeply indebted was invited by the Hungarian Government to take part in Hungary's celebrations for the restoration of Upper Hungary. The noble Lord was welcomed by the Hungarian people and official Hungary with impressive ceremony and all the warm affection of which this grateful nation is capable and the respect due to our loyal friend. Hungary will never forget Lord Rothermere's momentous article entitled "Hungary's place in the Sun", which appeared in the "Daily Mail" of 21st June, 1927, or that from that time on he never ceased, with unflagging zeal, to draw the attention of public opinion to the question of Hungarian revision and keep that problem in the foreground of international politics. And now that the first chapter of our revisionist programme has been realized the whole Hungarian nation feels that our joy would not have been complete had Lord Rothermere not been with us in these days. Lord Rothermere saw the Regent and the Premier and was entertained to lunch by Admiral and Mme. Horthy. He also took part in the historical re-occupation of Kassa. Before that event the people of Budapest demonstrated their undying gratitude to him at a mass meeting of dimensions scarcely ever seen before in the capital of Hungary.

## THE FOUR POWERS HAVE RECOGNIZED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF HUNGARY'S REVISIONIST POLICY

The result of the Munich Pact signed at the close of September, in that it prevented an outbreak of war, solved to a certain extent the Czech problem, which for months had kept the whole world in a ferment of excitement, and paved the way to a lasting reconciliation of the western Great Powers, was welcomed by the whole Hungarian nation with rejoicings.

Desire for revision is shared by every decent Hungarian, and Hungarian public opinion was gratified to see that certain fundamental principles for which our paper has fought ever since it was founded were accepted by the Great Powers. These fundamental principles are:

1. *The right of the peoples to self-determination.* This principle was first proclaimed at the time of the French Revolution and was adopted in his famous 14 points by President Wilson, but was denied by the Paris Peace Conference of 1919/1920. How much suffering and bitterness the world would have been spared, had every nation of Europe been allowed to exercise this right after the world war, instead of so many nationalities having been handed over to alien rule.

The decision of the Munich Conference to force Czecho-Slovakia to evacuate without delay the Sudeten German areas, order a plebiscite in the disputed areas and recognize the legitimacy of the demands, similar to those of Germany, made by Hungary and Poland, definitely and unequivocally commits the four Powers to the principle of self-determination. This is a source of great satisfaction to the Hungarian nation, which already at the time of the Peace Conference fought for the principle of self-determination and which now desires to effect a final settlement of the Czecho-Hungarian problem in accordance with that principle.

2. *Territorial revision without war.* It was proved in Munich that territorial questions can be settled without war. In terms of Article XIX of the League Covenant, it would have been the duty of the League of Nations to inaugurate a peaceful revision of the unsettled territorial questions, but the institution in Geneva, in this respect as in many others, proved a complete failure. In his dramatic speech in the House of Commons on 28th September Mr. Chamberlain said that if Article XIX of the League Covenant, which provided the possibility of treaty revision, had been applied in the way its drafters intended, instead of waiting until the situation was so acute that revision by negotiation could no longer be postponed, we should have been spared this crisis. For this neglect of duty all the members of the League were to blame.

This is a truth which for years we have proclaimed, and yet there were people who called us peace-breakers. Now the British Premier has established the fact that the peace-breakers were those who prevented an application of Article XIX. In Munich the idea of peaceful revision without war triumphed after all. This fact is not altered by the circumstance that the mighty military power of the German Reich was the force behind this revision. For it cannot be questioned that had France and Great Britain wished to do so, they could have given a turn to events that would have prevented Germany from liberating the Sudeten Germans except at the cost of bloodshed.

Gratitude for this result is due in equal measure to Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier: to Hitler because he refrained from mobilizing, to Mussolini because at the last minute he undertook the delicate mission of a mediator, to Chamberlain who on three occasions spared no effort to save peace and to

Daladier who at the risk of unpopularity saved France from sacrificing millions of her sons for an unjust cause.

3. *Co-operation between the four Great Powers of Western Europe.* This is another thing that we have been urging for years. We were always convinced that nothing else than the co-operation of the four Great Powers of Western Europe would be able to establish order in a Europe unable to find rest, and that those Powers alone would be capable of bringing the minor States, flattering themselves on their imperialistic role, to their senses. We were always firmly convinced that the four Great Powers would find a way out of the impasse if only their leaders would sit down together without the possibility of those well-known masters of intrigue whose interest it was to play off one Power against the other and unscrupulously drive Europe into another world war worming themselves in among them. This was one reason why we welcomed so gladly at the time the Four Power Pact concluded in Rome on 7th June, 1933, and it was also one reason why we were so disappointed that this agreement was not ratified and that the four great European Powers were again at loggerheads in a year. It is with satisfaction we see that those Powers were able to come to an understanding in Munich and we hope that this new concert of the Great Powers will create order in Europe in the place of the present chaos and restore the equilibrium which this old continent has so much need of after twenty years of bitter trials.

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

## THE NATIONALITIES OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA INSIST ON SELF-DETERMINATION

### *The Hungarians.*

As a guide to the Hungarians of Czecho-Slovakia in these hours of bitter struggle and in order to draw the world's attention to the importance of solving the problem of Upper Hungary, the United Hungarian Party of Czecho-Slovakia issued the following appeal, dated Pozsony, 17th September, to the Hungarian people and to international public opinion in general.

The Hungarian ethnic group in Czecho-Slovakia, which in terms of the Treaty of St. Germain, concluded on 10th September 1919, has for the past twenty years been living in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, has never allowed any doubt to arise of their desire to enjoy the rights to which every nation or national group is, by the moral laws of God and man, entitled, — which laws alone are calculated to enable the nations of the earth to live in peace instead of seeking to insure their own vital interests at the expense of their neighbours.

This ethnic group was not allowed to exercise the fundamental principles so nobly espoused by President Wilson, prin-

ciples which are the basis of all democracies and which include the idea of self-determination; nor was it given the chance of asserting its own special interests at the time when the constitution of the new State was being framed. And yet, for twenty years the Hungarians of Czecho-Slovakia, though never ceasing to proclaim their rights, but taking the existing circumstances into consideration, performed their difficult duties as citizens of the Republic with an honest respect for its laws. They were one of the best disciplined peoples in the State, for they were convinced that if the wounds caused by the world war were to be healed, peace above all was necessary.

Now, after twenty years, we are again forced to conclude that the holders of the executive power never accorded due consideration to the interests of the different ethnic groups, including the Hungarians; on the contrary all their measures were aimed at serving the idea of a Czech national State. This was a mistaken policy, the result of which, today, is that the internal affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic have ceased to be of domestic concern and have shifted over to a plane where they have become a question of European politics and international peace.

A great effort was inaugurated, chiefly through British initiative, to find a peaceful solution of the whole complexus of the Czecho-Slovak problem — a means of determining and insuring subjective and objective conditions, based on new foundations, of a peaceful symbiosis of the Central European nations and their States. The responsibility we owe to our own people and our responsibility towards the State to which at present we belong render it imperative for us to state our point of view frankly, openly, and straightforwardly. The Hungarian ethnic group in Czecho-Slovakia desires to take the shaping of its own destiny in its own hands. To do so it must be granted the right which in 1919 only certain nations were allowed to exercise: the right of self-determination.

The Hungarians are firmly convinced that the question at issue is of so vital a nature that it cannot be solved except by ideal, absolutely democratic methods, which would lay the foundation of a new and peaceful Europe, in which the future would be built up on the pillars of real equality and a community of interests, instead of on an unequal reparation of the injustices of the world war.

We Hungarians are opposed to any solution which involves the use of violence as a means of establishing the foundations of a new and decent life, for we are convinced that there exist other, peaceful methods of promoting understanding between nation and nation.

Such, we are certain, are self-determination and plebiscites.

Our resolution is dictated by a firm belief in the power of justice and we desire to enforce it in a spirit of peace.

*The Slovaks.*

The manifesto of the Slovak nation which was issued at a meeting of the Executive Committee of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the legitimate political representative of the Slovak nation, on 6th October, 1938, runs as follows:

The pact concluded by the four Great Powers in Munich has effected an important change in the political situation in Central Europe. We Slovaks, as an independent Slovak nation, which for centuries has lived in the territory of Slovakia, now enforce our right to self-determination and therefore demand an international guarantee of Slovak national unity and the indivisibility of the country inhabited by us. We want to be free to regulate all the circumstances of our future existence according to our own will, including our political constitution, in terms of friendship with all our neighbours, and thus contribute in a Christian spirit to a settlement of conditions in Central Europe.

We shall remain on the side of the nations which are fighting against the Marxist-Jewish ideology of upheaval and violence.

We desire to settle all disputed question in terms of the Munich Pact.

We emphatically protest against the frontiers of Slovakia being fixed without the assent of the legitimate representatives of the Slovak Nation. We insist on international protection for the Slovak minority in other lands.

We demand immediate demobilization.

On the principle of self-determination we insist that the executive and administrative authority in Slovakia shall be in the hands of the Slovaks. The triumph of the principle of self-determination means for the Slovak nation the end of a struggle waged for many years.

Long live Slovak national liberty!

Long live the Slovak Government of Slovakia.

*The Ruthenes.*

At a joint meeting, held on 20th September, of the Presidency of the Central Ruthenian National Council and the Presidential Council of the Autonomist Ruthenian Farmer's Alliance the following resolution was adopted:

In view of the fact that in the course of eighteen years the Czecho-Slovak Government has not established the autonomy of Ruthenia and has thus neglected to fulfil the obligations undertaken by the Republic in the Treaty of St. Germain and the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, the Central Ruthenian National Council — which was instrumental in attaching Ruthenia to the Czecho-Slovak Republic — feels constrained in these critical hours to enter the lists with all its energy for the rights and liberties of

Ruthenia and the Ruthenian people. On the basis of the Wilsonian principles the Central Ruthenian National Council insists on self-determination and demands by means of a plebiscite the unification in one body of all Ruthenians living in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, a final delimitation of Ruthenia's western frontiers and a guarantee in every respect of the future of our people on the most democratic lines.

### *The Germans.*

At the beginning of October an extremely significant article appeared in the "Karpathen Post," the organ of the German Party of Szepes (Zipser Partei). This article stated that the right of self-determination would continue to be the slogan of the Zipser Germans. The newspaper, which is published in Késmárk, cites the resolutions adopted in that town in 1918 on 13th November and 9th December by the Zipser Germans and the Germans of Upper Hungary respectively, and declares that the Zipser Party refuses to withdraw a single one of the demands contained therein, which are their demands today as much as they were twenty years ago. The text of those resolutions is as follows.

At a mass meeting held at Késmárk on 13th November, 1918, the representatives of the Germans of Szepes made the following declaration:

"For 800 years our ancestors were loyal to Hungary, in whose joys and sorrows they shared. Side by side with the Hungarians, they fought against Mongol and Czech; they fought for the independence of Hungary, to which they adhered with heart and soul. They never considered themselves, and we do not consider ourselves, to be anything but Hungarians. We never experienced any disadvantage from our German origin and German tongue; we were neither slighted nor disparaged. In church and communal life we always used our mother-tongue without let or hindrance and we suffered no detriment in the courts of justice because of our language. Despite their German tongue our forebears always regarded themselves as Hungarians and we, though clinging fast to our mother-tongue, are also Hungarians heart and soul, and Hungarians we wish to remain for ever. We therefore deny all Czecho-Slovak claims to our native land, as contrary to human and divine right and unreasonable both from an historical and a cultural point of view, and we declare that we shall remain loyal to our Hungarian fatherland, to which we desire to continue to belong."

On 9th December, 1918, the Germans of Upper Hungary also held a mass meeting, at which the following resolution was adopted:

"From the Kings of Hungary our ancestors received such privileges as for centuries insured their independence and

guaranteed them complete autonomy. Hungary became our fatherland, which provided for us, in whose joys and sorrows we shared, and of which we were citizens, enjoying the same rights as the Hungarians, to whom we felt we belonged and with whom we wish to remain for ever."

The attitude adopted by the organ of the Zipser Party of Szepes proves that in these historical days the Germans of Szepes re-affirm the resolutions adopted twenty years ago immediately before the occupation of Slovakia by the Czechs.

## DETERMINED ACTION OF SLOVAK EMIGRANTS FOR THE LIBERATION OF SLOVAKIA

The recent decisive events which took place in relation to the Czech question have spurred all the emigrant Slovaks to urgent action. All their organisations are roused and energetically demand the liberation of the Slovak country from under Czech rule.

The "Slovak Council" — which was founded at Geneva under the leadership of Francis Jehlicka and Victor Dvorchak in 1933 — addressed a proclamation on September 25th of this year to the civilized peoples of the world. Herein the Slovak Council states that the decisive moment has come when the ruling nations of Europe have set about correcting the mistakes made at the Paris Peace Conference in connection with the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia.

The Slovak Council refers to the statement made recently by Benito Mussolini, viz. that the right of self-determination must be granted not only to the Sudeten Germans but to all the other non-Czech peoples as well. Of such are the Slovaks, who never were Czechs.

Benito Mussolini declared furthermore that all those groups of people which were allotted without plebiscites to the Czech state should be consulted now. The Slovak people had not been asked for their opinion at the time.

The Italian Premier also declared that the problem has to be solved totally. A total solution is, however, impossible unless the Slovaks are also consulted.

In consequence of this the Slovak Council declares that the Czecho-Slovak problem cannot be solved properly except on the basis and in the spirit of justice.

The motto of justice is the following: *Suum cuique*. To every man his own. The Czechs should therefore have Bohemia and not Czecho-Slovakia!

The Czechs should be guaranteed that part of the country which is their own by ethnographic right — no less and no more.

Should justice be disregarded and Slovakia left and guaranteed to the Czechs, it would be the death sentence of the Slovak nation. But the Slovaks do not want to die — they want to live!

We therefore, — continues the Slovak proclamation, — appeal for a fair sentence in the name of justice and in the interest of world-peace!

The "Preparatory Committee of the Slovak Free State", which is the executive organ of the "Slovenska Revisia" (Slovak Revision League) founded in Pasiac (U. S. A.) in 1934. addressed, on October 4, the following declaration to the Prague Government, by way of the Czecho-Slovak legation at Warsaw.

"Authorised by the Committee formed for the establishment of the Slovak Free State, as the representative of the Committee abroad, I invite you to hand over the political power exerted over territories inhabited by Slovaks to us, namely to the chairman of the Committee, Mr. Lewis Koren, in the course of the next twenty-four hours. Should you not satisfy our demand we will take the government of our country in our own hands without the consent and without the co-operation of the Prague Government, this being necessary in the interest of a smooth liquidation of Czecho-Slovak political relations. Ladislav Globusicki."

After the agreement at Zsolna (Oct. 6 1938) by virtue of which Slovakia was granted autonomy on paper, the Preparatory Committee of the Slovak Free State addressed a note to Dr. Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, in which their demands were summed up in three points:

1. Immediate amnesty for Slovak political emigrants and the issue of a Government decree annulling in Slovak territory the law framed for the defence of the Czech republic. This condition was made necessary by the changed circumstances.

2. In the territory of Slovensko a plebiscite should be decreed in order to decide whether the Slovak nation wants self-government within the boundaries of the Czech State — or whether it wishes the Czechs to be driven out and the Free State of the Slovaks to be founded.

3. The portfolios of war and of public safety in the transitional Government should be guaranteed to the Slovak revisionists. Due regard must be given to the fact that the Slovak revisionists had so far no opportunity of legal political action in their own country.

## THE HUNGARIAN NATION WILL NOT BE SATISFIED WITH THE MUNICH PACT UNTIL JUSTICE IS FULLY DONE TO HUNGARY

On Saturday, 1st October, Dr. Béla Imrédy, Hungarian Premier, speaking from the Budapest studio, broadcast an address to the Hungarian nation.

Speaking of the Munich Agreement he declared the following:

Was the decision arrived at in Munich fruitful? Yes, it was — very fruitful indeed. The fruit it bore was that, with their signatures, four European Great Powers established the fact that Hungary had a just claim to be considered when the lot of the nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia was being readjusted, a claim that must be satisfied, and that the injustice done twenty years ago when that State was being created, for which ignorance misled by guileful propaganda was responsible, must be repaired.

This result, which we would scarcely have dared to hope for a few months ago, must not be underrated, and — regarded as an initial step — we have every reason to rejoice in it.

This is not the time to ask to whom within our own borders is due — and in what measure — the credit for this result. One thing is certain: the foreign policy which has won for the country two powerful friends and which has promoted an approachment between them has not proved futile.

The harmonious support of those two powerful friendly nations — support upon which we may safely rely in the future — has been instrumental in securing for us this very important result. Every Hungarian owes a debt of sincere gratitude to the leaders of those nations, to the two unyielding men whose determination, steely strength of will and dynamic force directed the stagnant waters of European politics into a new and life-giving channel.

And what is our answer to the second question: Are we Hungarians satisfied with this result?

The answer is unequivocal: we are not. Hungary cannot be satisfied until that justice, in the spirit of which the lot of the nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia must be readjusted and which was inaugurated in Munich, has been fully applied to Hungary.

Hungary's attitude towards the Czecho-Slovak problem has from the outset been based on one clear, elementary and incontrovertible principle, namely, that a readjustment of the lot of the nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia must be accomplished on the principle of self-determination and equal treatment.

We cannot resign ourselves to any discrimination which would be to our disadvantage. We have always kept this guiding principle in view and shall continue to do so until the question has been settled. Everybody must be given to understand that no difficulty can make us desist in our efforts to assert this standpoint of ours.

## THE SLOVAKS OF HUNGARY PROTEST AGAINST THE CALUMNIES OF THE POZSONY RADIO STATION AT A MASS MEETING IN BÉKÉSCSABA.

The Slovak citizens of the town of Békéscsaba assembled on October 15-th to protest against the allegation of the Pozsony (Bratislava) radio station that they (the Slovaks in Hungary) suffered from Hungarian oppression and wished, therefore, to break away from Hungary.

The Slovaks settled in the County of Békés after the Turkish wars, when the Hungarian population of this formerly populous county had become so sparse in consequence of the century-old strife that only nine villages with 2520 inhabitants were left. Three poor Slovak settlers came into the county in 1717; soon they were followed by many thousand Slovak families. They were endowed with privileges, and by and by they became the wealthiest people in this most fertile part of Hungary. All the lands adjoining the wealthy cities — Szarvas and Békéscsaba and the similarly rich village of Tótkomlós — belong to them. There are no large estates in this area; on the contrary, the descendants of the poor Slovak settlers have bought up the neighbouring estates, such as Count Apponyi's estate in Gerendás. Sámuel Tessedik, the great scholar of Slovak origin and a native of Szarvas, describes the feelings of the Slovaks in the following words: "Our ancestors came here like beggars, yet we have become the happiest people of our beloved country, Hungary."

## HUNGARIAN AND POLISH DEMONSTRATIONS IN FAVOUR OF A COMMON FRONTIER

The impetus of historical events has caused, both in Poland and in Hungary, spontaneous outbursts, impressively unanimous, enthusiastic and vigorous, of public opinion in favour of the traditional, and by the logic of history legitimate demand that the two countries should acquire a common frontier; this to be effected by means of a plebiscite, based on the principle of self-determination, in Ruthenia, the outcome of which is unquestionable.

During the month of September Hungarian social organizations, youth societies and institutions, one by one, made a stand for this. Particularly impressive was the mass meeting which on 21st September demanded a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. On this occasion an enthusiastic and energetic crowd of three hundred thousand, in which every important Hungarian organization was represented, signified their willingness to enter the lists for Hungary's cause. In response to this the whole country replied with demonstrations in almost every town and village. Special mention must be made of the standpoint adopted on 24th Sep-

tember by the Society of Upper Hungary, and the meetings on 4th and 9th October respectively of the Budapest university students and the Ruthenians residing in Hungary. After the mass meeting on 21st September a procession of youths bearing torches marched to the Polish Legation, where they enthusiastically cheered the Polish Minister. Telegrams were sent from most of the meetings to Mussolini, Hitler and the Polish Premier.

Similarly enthusiastic and energetic were the manifestations of public opinion in Poland. A monster meeting of all the Polish social organizations and political parties was held on 22nd September in Warsaw at Pilsudski Square. At this meeting about two hundred thousand people demanded the restoration of the Polish territory in Czecho-Slovakia, after which they marched to the Hungarian Legation, where scenes of wild enthusiasm took place.

"Give us a common frontier with Hungary," — cried the loudly cheering crowd — "Long live Regent Horthy! Long live the brave Hungarian army!"

One after another, spontaneous demonstrations demanding a common Polish-Hungarian frontier took place in the various towns and villages of Poland. Two of the biggest demonstrations were those held on 23rd September in Cracow and on 24th September in Vilno. But the most moving of all was certainly the demonstration made in Teschen on 4th October, when the population of the newly liberated Polish town expressed the wish that, now that Poland had freed them of their fetters, she should add the crowning touch to her historical mission by regaining the common frontier with Hungary to which by historical right and justice she had a claim.

On 17th October the representatives of the Polish Reservists' organization, which numbers two hundred thousand members, held a meeting at which the following resolution was unanimously adopted: "In the interest of peace, the maintainance of which in this part of Europe is closely connected with the vital interests of the Polish Power, the representatives of the Polish Reservists' Association, together with the whole Polish nation, demand a common frontier with the noble Hungarian nation."

On the same day a delegation from the university students' organizations in Warsaw paid a visit of respect to Andrew Hory, Hungary's Minister in Poland and stated to him that they demanded a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. They also asked him to forward a telegram from the Polish youth to the Regent of Hungary.

A few extracts from the daily press will serve to reveal the prevailing mood of the Polish people. Particularly illustrative is an article, published in the "Express Poranny" on 15th October, which explains that Ruthenia must undoubtedly be attached to Hungary, to which it in every respect belongs. The whole world knows why the Czechs needed Ruthenia. They needed it as a

corridor to Russia. Through that province the Czechs can insure the danger of Red contagion. And they also need it because the railway communicating with Russia runs through the Hungarian ethnic areas of Ruthenia. Two solutions are possible. Either the artificial construction which serves as a bridge towards the east for Czecho-Slovakia's interests will be maintained, or Ruthenia must be restored to Hungary. The second solution is advocated not only by justice and the historical past, but also by the geographical situation, and it would conform with Europe's interests as well. The "Wieczor Warszawski" writes that on the problem of Ruthenia hangs the question of European reconciliation. Those who wish to prevent this reconciliation must be shown up.

The "Czas" of 16th October states that a common Polish-Hungarian frontier is justified not only by historically acquired rights, but also by its necessity, if trade between Poland and Hungary is to proceed normally and develop satisfactorily.

The organ of the Polish army, the "Polska Zbrojna", in its issue of October 17, energetically demands a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, as does the same issue of the "Kurjer Warszawski."

The "Gazetta Polska" of 17th October sets forth that Czecho-Slovakia's appetite for Ruthenia has three explanations. First, the possession of Ruthenia enables the Czechs to clasp hands with Russia. Secondly it provides the Czechs with a corridor towards Rumania and thirdly Ruthenia is a barrier between Poland and Hungary. Ruthenia was the cradle of the disturbances in East Galicia. It may be impartially stated, — continues the newspaper, — that the inhabitants of Ruthenia were closely connected with Hungarian civilization and this connection was but strengthened by the economic fact that Ruthenia cannot exist without the Great Plain of Hungary.

### EVEN RUMANIA RAISES TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE

The "Express Poranny" states that of late Rumania has begun to raise territorial claims against the Czecho-Slovak State and now demands the most eastern corner of Ruthenia. Rumania's claim is based on the 50.000 Rumanian nationals living in Czecho-Slovakia. In the part demanded, — says the "Express Poranny," — there are important strategic lines and lines of communication.

Our only comment is that according to the figures of the Czech official census the number of Rumanians in Czecho-Slovakia in 1930 was only 13.004. This does not mean that the number is correct, for as everybody knows the Czechs falsified the nationality figures. It is typical of the Czechs that — friendship here

or there — Prague oppressed the Rumanians too. This is proved by a statement contained in the "Buna Vestire" of 25th March which says that "under Hungarian rule the Rumanians on the Czecho-Slovak side of the Tisza were better treated than they are today."

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### THE HUNGARIAN PREMIER ANNOUNCES HIS PROGRAMME.

As a rule during the parliamentary vacation the Hungarian Government as well as the leaders of the opposition make their most important announcements in the provinces. This is what happened at Kaposvár on September 4th when M. Béla Imrédy stated the Government's programme in the matter of both home and foreign policy. But while it contained no new information concerning the Government's foreign policy and was confined to a simple statement of Hungary's traditional principles, in dealing with his home policy the Premier struck the note of a courageous and straightforward spirit of reforms, which was received with warm sympathy both at home and abroad.

"I do not wish to dictate," declared the Premier, "but so long as I feel the confidence and support of the constitutional factors of this country behind me I shall lead and point the way."

This is the leading idea of his magnificent speech, and it is this leading idea that defines its political value and importance.

The first and foremost task of the Government after the reassembling of Parliament, the Premier declared, will be the introduction of the bill dealing with compulsory military service; the bill will also determine the period of military service and the period for the organisation of compulsory physical training as a systematic preparation for military service. The law to be passed on these lines will be a striking manifestation and mainstay of Hungary's national sovereignty.

The Premier then proceeded to announce a series of social measures which the legislation is to consider, some of which may no doubt attract also the attention of other countries. Such, for instance, will be compulsory medical examination before marriage and the appointment of "social secretaries" to assist parish clerks and county lieutenants in the guidance and performance of the work of social welfare. The same purpose will be served by the creation of a social and family protection fund, which is to be based on the principle of a more progressive taxation in respect of death (inheritance) duty. Another reform of outstanding importance will be the introduction of a family wage and a children's education

premium; opportunities will also be found for the physical and mental recreation of the working classes in their spare time.

The Premier also mentioned the *land reform* which is just now being elaborated. The principle underlying this reform is that one third of every entailed estate over 300 acres and one fourth of every free state over 500 acres may be requisitioned by a special Government department for the purpose of forming small leases. Many thousands of acres will thus be employed to enable a large number of poor people to start a normal life.

M. Imrédy also referred to the Jewish problem:

Four edicts have recently been published containing instructions for the enforcement of the "law concerning a more effective assurance of the balance of social and economic life." These four edicts deal with the establishment of the chambers of stage actors, film actors and journalists. *The publication of these edicts marks the conclusion of that process of legislative regulation which was inaugurated with the above mentioned bill.*

The Premier then gave a description of the international situation. In another part of this issue we publish the Premier's statement concerning the resolution of the Bled Conference. The relations of Hungary to Italy and the German Empire, the Premier summed up as follows:

In the course of the last few weeks I succeeded in strengthening those ties which the Cabinets of my predecessors established between ourselves and two friendly powers: Italy and Germany. In July I went to Rome in the company of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I am glad to say that I was able to accomplish the object of my journey. We may safely state that the friendship between the two States has completely fulfilled the expectations attached to it, that the Rome Protocols have lost nothing of their validity in the relations between the two countries, and that Italy's warm interest in the development and recovery of our country has remained unchanged.

His Highness the Regent of Hungary, accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Home Defence, and myself, has recently visited the other country of the Rome-Berlin axis, Germany. This visit of the head of the State was an event of such eminent importance that it is impossible to overestimate its significance.

Nevertheless, the cultivation of these friendly relations is — as we have repeatedly pointed out — not directed against any other State. It is meant to do its share in the joint work for the material, spiritual and moral welfare of the nations.

The Premier laid great stress on the fact that *the fundamental principles of Hungary's foreign policy have remained unchanged.* Ever since Hungary has been responsible for her

own independent foreign policy her shield has always borne the motto: "Justice and Peace".

## DEMONSTRATIONS IN BULGARIA

A message from Reuter's states that the population of Sophia are arranging street demonstrations against Rumania. The present spirit of national enthusiasm — which is now sweeping all over Europe — has also stirred up Bulgaria's feelings, especially in respect of those territories — such as Dobrudja — which have been annexed by Rumania. It is believed in Bucharest — says Reuter's message — that these demonstrations might ultimately lead to hostilities between the two countries, causing an even more serious crisis than the problems of the German and Hungarian minorities in Rumania may cause.

## THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF HUNGARIANS LIVING ABROAD

In 1929 the Hungarians living abroad held a congress in Budapest at which it was decided to organize a world alliance of the Hungarians in foreign countries. The committee entrusted with the task of organization now considers the time has arrived to submit a report of the work done and, in view of the results achieved, to propose the formation of the alliance. For this purpose the second world conference of the Hungarians was convened in Budapest on 16th August.

1151 societies and unions from 65 foreign countries were represented by 686 delegates. 106 of the societies and unions represented are in the U. S. A. A considerable number of the delegates represented the Hungarians in Germany, France, Brazil, Argentina, Belgium and Italy. The guiding principle of the congress was that *every Hungarian must be a loyal subject of the country which has adopted him, must not only obey its laws, but also cling to its traditions, become imbued with its spirit and make its aims and aspirations his own.* At the same time he must be proud of his origin, hold fast to the cultural and sentimental ties that bind him to Hungary and, while bringing up the next generation to be absolutely loyal citizens of the new country and to adopt its language and civilisation, spare no effort to give them a knowledge of Hungary's history and civilization and if possible teach them to speak Hungarian. The Hungarians of the Succession States are not members of this world alliance, so that the resolutions adopted by the congress do not apply to them.

After the members of the congress had laid wreaths on the statues of Francis Rákóczi II, Louis Kossuth, George Washington and the American General Bandholtz and on the tomb of the unknown warrior, the congress was opened by Baron Sigismund Perényi, Keeper of the Regalia, who said: —

"You Hungarians who have wandered far abroad are the citizens of foreign countries to which you owe allegiance, whose laws and conventions you must respect, but you are indelibly marked with the stamp of the old country, the birth-mark we all bear."

Count Paul Teleki, Minister of Education, said that Hungarians were united not by definitions, but by the national consciousness, will and traditions of generations. Dr. Hóman, former Minister of Education, requested the Hungarians living abroad to be the spokesmen and champions of the Hungarian cause and to be proud of their origin, since the Hungarians had always been and would remain a civilized nation.

The delegates of the world congress were received by the Regent, who in reply to their address among other things said: —

"You have come from far-off countries to witness to your firm faith in the future and vocation of Hungary. Return home confirmed in that faith and with the assurance that the blows of fate have been powerless to destroy the vital energy of the Hungarian race, that amidst trials and vicissitudes this nation has merely become hardened and that it is busy at work building up a happier country on the ruins of its former greatness and adding to those values that will be of benefit to the whole human race."

The delegates then saw the Prime Minister, who in his reply to their address said: —

"You have obligations and duties towards your new countries and we know and appreciate the fact that you are discharging them faithfully. But I am also firmly convinced that you will always be the loyal supporters of the honourable ambitions which guide this nation on its historical path. You will be the representatives, exponents, on foreign soil, under a foreign sky, of Hungarian intelligence, perseverance and honesty."

A number of resolutions were adopted by the congress. One of the most important of these was that a larger number of the second generation of the Hungarians living abroad should visit Hungary for the purpose of study. Another was that a home should be built in Budapest to provide accomodation for them, where they could engage in their studies under supervision and where a bureau to attend to their legal interests and supply them with advice and information would be established. It was also resolved to popularize in America the fact that the first statue of George Washington on the Continent was erected in Buda-

pest, the money for which was collected by the Hungarians in America, and that there is also a statue of the American General Bandholtz in the Hungarian capital.

At its close, the congress was addressed by M. Nicholas Kozma, former Minister, on the subject of emigration. M. Andrew Lázár, former Minister of Justice, established the fact that the dismemberment of Hungary decreed by the Peace Treaties had been as powerless to destroy the sentimental and cultural unity of the Hungarians living in the Basin of the Carpathians as had been the Mongol invasion of the XIII century or the long years of the Turkish conquest. Dr. Julius Kornis, Speaker of the House of Commons, appealed to the Hungarians abroad to be the most loyal and reliable citizens of their new countries.

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OSZK  
Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

# HOW MINORITIES LIVE

## CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

### HOW THE CZECHS BEHAVED DURING THE CRISIS

Czecho-Slovakia was always known to international public opinion as a State that never fulfilled the obligations undertaken in her international treaties. Newspapers were always full of the various legal and other grievances of the Czecho-Slovak national minorities. But the nationalities compelled to live under Czech rule never suffered so much perhaps as in the days when commonsense should have told the Czechs to treat their minorities as well as they possibly could, in order to convince the world of the truth of the assertion, which Czech propaganda still continues to make, that the national minorities are treated nowhere so well as in Czecho-Slovakia. The international Press has dealt fully with the venom and cruelty displayed towards the Sudeten Germans and the Poles at the height of the crisis. The imprisoning, court-martialing and atrocious mishandling of these unfortunate people was practically the order of the day in the Sudeten German and Polish areas. Now that their problems have been solved, we consider it imperative to draw the attention of international public opinion to those instances of crying injustice that are typical of the sufferings of the Hungarian minority in Czecho-Slovakia during the past few weeks. When Czecho-Slovakia lost two important minorities through the instrumentality of the Munich Pact, the Czechs began to strive to intimidate the Hungarian population with all the means at their disposal, and their fury was so great that a large number of dead mark the destructive path of the Czech mercenaries and the Communist bands co-operating with them. Below we publish in chronological order some data relating to the persecution of the Hungarian minority in Czecho-Slovakia. To these data copied from unexaggerated reports published in a semi-official Hungarian daily, the "Budapesti Hirlap", we add no comment. (The dates signify the days on which the reports were received by the newspaper and cover a period from immediately before the Munich Pact to the date on which the Kórmárom negotiations were broken off.)

September 25. Paul Szvatkó, author of the "Prágai Magyar Hirlap's" leaders, and other prominent Hungarians arrested. — The mobilized Hungarian soldiers and the Hungarian population

of the frontier zone demonstrate in favour of restoration to Hungary. — September 28. Hungarian women forced to draw carts to the fortifications while the Czech frontier guards mock them. — Paul Szvatkő, journalist, and the leaders of the Hungarian Party under arrest released through the intervention of the United Hungarian Party. — September 29. Hungarian married women and girls forced to dig trenches. — 100 Hungarians arrested in Rimaszombat, 70 in Feled. — September 30. One hundred Hungarian citizens, including the leaders of the Hungarian Party, arrested in Pozsony, allegedly in order to insure that mobilization should proceed smoothly. — The secretaries of the Hungarian Party in Losonc and Párkány arrested. — October 1. The Hungarian population of the districts around Kassa ordered out to build fortifications; they were often dragged out of their beds at dead of night. — 14 Hungarian soldiers of Tornaalja conveyed to the German frontier and shot. — Several fresh arrests in Rimaszombat of prominent Hungarians, who are being treated as hostages. One of them is the Reformed Church pastor of the town, who is ill in bed. — October 2. Czechs close frontier and stop all telephone and telegraph communication. Rails taken up at frontier stations. The crops of Hungarian and Slovak farmers carted away. The inhabitants, especially the men, flee in large numbers. The Czechs cruelly beat the members of their families who remain behind. At the same time they tell their mobilized Hungarian soldiers that the Hungarians ill-treat and starve those who desert to Hungary. October 4. The Czechs place mines under the famous Dobsina Ice Grotto and the stalagmite cave at Baradla, to be able to blow them up if forced to surrender them. — Béla Csutor, a Hungarian farmer who had been forced not long ago to make a speech praising the "good treatment" received by the Hungarians from the Czechs, arrested. — October 5. Two leaders of the Dunaszerdahely branch of the Hungarian Party, a lawyer named Géza Szeif, and a parish priest named Gabriel Markwarth, arrested and their cars confiscated. — October 6. The Czechs force every citizen of Slovakia and Ruthenia between 14 and 30 years of age to sign a statement. The inhabitants know that these statements will be employed to falsify the figures of any census that may be taken. — October 7. The Czech legionaries flee from the Hungarian frontier zone and bands of Communists immediately begin to despoil the Hungarian villages. The cruelty of the Communists so embitters the inhabitants that in several places they set fire to, or blow up, the barracks of the customs guards and the military (e. g. at Nagy-gères and Perenye). — Ignoring the Czech terror the mobilized Slovak and Hungarian soldiers sing Hungarian songs and cheer Regent Horthy. October 8. At the demand of the Hungarian delegation the Czechs release their political prisoners of Hungarian nationality (When negotiations were broken off they were immediately arrested again.) — October 13. Order issued forbidding

people to be on the street in the Hungarian towns of Slovakia after 8 o'clock. All cafés and restaurants must close at 7. The inhabitants of Ruthenia break out in open revolt against the cruelties of the Czech authorities. Simultaneously bands of Czech Communists disturb the peace of the inhabitants at night, October 14. Czech policemen disperse with their rubber batons and the butts of their rifles the crowds gathered to take leave of the Hungarian delegation.

Needless to say the above-enumerated data by no means exhaust the tale of cruelty repeated daily. We merely wanted to give our foreign readers an idea of what conditions in Czecho-Slovakia are like and of the treatment meted out to the minorities still remaining in the Republic. These atrocious acts are being committed at a time when the Czech wireless loudly proclaims in every language to its domestic and foreign audiences that it is a pity for the Hungarians to wish to rejoin Hungary, and a pity for the Slovaks and Ruthenians to struggle for their independence, when "their Czech fatherland insures them a better lot than any other country, or even a country of their own, could possibly offer them."

### THE CZECHO-SLOVAK GOVERNMENT ARRESTED ITS OWN RUTHENIAN PRIME MINISTER

According to the special correspondent of the "Kurjer Warszawski", the Volosin Government has organized rifle corps in Ruthenia, which were named after Colonel Konovalec. (Konovalec, who was shot dead recently in Brussels by a terrorist, was the colonel who fought for Ukrainian independence.) The leaders of these war-like rifle corps are citizens of a friendly Great Power, says the Polish newspaper. They are being organized on the model of similar bodies that formerly existed in Eastern Galicia. One of M. Volosin's first acts was to dissolve all other organizations in Ruthenia.

*How M. Bródy, Ruthenian  
ex-Premier was removed from office.*

The Prague correspondent of the "Stampa" tells us (31st October, 1938) "How Bródy was thrown out of the Hradsin." In this article he reports on the latest developments of the Ruthenian question.

Among other things we are told that the weakest point of the Czecho-Slovak Government's argument is that they will not hear of a plebiscite either in Slovakia or Ruthenia. Who — says this correspondent — can guarantee that the Pozsony and Ungvár Governments really represent the majority of the Slovaks and Ruthenians? Did they do so, why was Bródy thrown out of his office by Prague? Why was he arrested and Volosin, the

leader of the minority Ukrainian Party, appointed Premier in his place? The story of this sudden change of Premiers is extremely characteristic of the state of affairs.

The article contains an exact account of how Bródy was thrown out of office.

At a Cabinet Council meeting on 25th October M. Andrew Bródy declared that a plebiscite must be held in Ruthenia. On hearing this his colleagues, especially M. Tiso, tried to silence him. From the room in which the Cabinet Council meeting was being held a great din of shouting was heard, and then came silence, which was broken by the voice of General Sirovy, who said to M. Bródy: "I am sorry you are taking this attitude. You have proved yourself unworthy of your office."

"I refuse to take cognizance of your words." replied M. Bródy.

"And I, continued General Sirovy," declare that under Article 80 of the Constitution you have ceased to be a Minister without Portfolio in the Czecho-Slovak Cabinet and Prime Minister of Ruthenia."

*After arresting M. Bródy the Czechs now want to imprison the leaders of his Party.*

The autochthonous inhabitants of Ruthenia are in a state of great excitement because of the acts of terror perpetrated by the Czech police and gendarmes. At the end of September a warrant for the apprehension of the leaders of ex-Premier Bródy's Party and an order to arrest the secretary were issued. These facts are another illustration of how the Czechs want to establish autonomy in Ruthenia.

*M. Volosin wanted to place his own Ministers under arrest.*

According to the Polish "Express Telegraphic Bureau" M. Volosin asked General Sirovy for authority to arrest the Ruthenian Minister, M. Fencik on the charge of high treason. After M. Bródy, M. Fencik would be the second Ruthenian Minister to see the inside of a Czech prison.

*The Ruthenians do not want the Volosin Government.*

According to a report from Ungvár published in the "Dobry Wieczor" of 31st October, 1938, the Ruthenians do not want the Volosin Government. A sign of this is that they smashed all the windows of M. Bachinski's house. The stones which were thrown into the Minister's house were wrapped in paper, and on each paper was written in Ruthenian: "Wretched traitor! Servant of Prague!" When M. Bachinski went to the Ministry he was accompanied by four gendarmes on bicycles.

*Slovaks remove Prof. Seaton Watson's memorial tablet.*

Pozsony, November 3. One after another, the souvenirs of the Masaryk-Beneš era in Slovakia are being removed by the Hlinka Guards. Recently the memorial tablet erected in Rozsahegy in honour of Professor Seaton Watson (who as Scotus Viator was in the service of Czech propaganda) was removed at the express instructions of Mayor Mederly, and now the statue of Liberty set up in the main square of that town to commemorate Slovakia's incorporation with Bohemia has shared the same fate. A statue of Andrew Hlinka is to take its place. In Liszkófalú, a place near Rózsahégy, the tablet marking the house where Lawrence Srobár, first Slovak Minister, was born has also been removed.

## UNBRIDLED CZECH TERROR

It is typical of the nervousness of the Czech frontier guards that on October 15th they turned their rifles and machine-guns on a Hungarian sentry who was patrolling the frontier in County Gömör. The Hungarian sentry took shelter in time and escaped without hurt. He did not fire back. Rifle firing took place between a detachment of gendarmes and the insurgents at a place between Ungvár and Munkács, as well as in several villages to the north of the latter town. Several officers and men of the gendarmery were killed. A large number of tanks were despatched to Ungvár, Munkács and Beregszász for distribution as necessity arose. Armed cars are patrolling the highroads in pursuit of the insurgents, who flee to the hills after a skirmish, but without success.

On 15th October the Hungarian Telephonic News and Broadcasting Co. reported that in order to quell the revolt described as a "trifling incident" the Czechs were obliged to concentrate a large number of rapidly moving units — armed, cars, armed trains, considerable forces of the gendarmery and several battalions of soldiers — in the affected areas. The Czech wireless stations broadcast reports of some of the acts of terror under the title of "The Voice of the Army", describing them as trifling incidents, but at the same time stating that a regular battle had been fought near Munkács with a larger contingent of insurgents. That battle, reliable reports of which were brought across the frontier by refugees from Munkács, could scarcely be described as a "frontier incident", seeing that it lasted several hours and that the Czechs sent three tanks to support the gendarmes and the regular troops. Besides this Munkács is at least twenty-five miles distant from the Hungarian frontier as the crow flies. A fierce battle lasting for hours to which — according to the refugees — only nightfall put an end and from which, after darkness had set in, the Czechs, and not the insurgents, who also suffered

severe losses, were forced to retreat because they were threatened in the rear by another rebel force, could hardly be called an incident.

### RIOTS IN RUTHENIA AND SLOVAKIA CAUSED BY THE INTOLERABLE ACTS OF TERROR OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITIES EGGED ON BY THE GOVERNMENT.

On 14-th October, when the shilly-shallying of the Czecho-Slovak delegation and the absurd nature of their proposals made continuation of the Komárom negotiations impossible, the Czecho-Slovak Government changed its tactics and made no further attempt to disguise the rage felt by the Czechs, which hitherto had been more or less concealed. The Czech authorities embarked openly on a campaign of terror and in Ruthenia resorted to the most energetic acts of repression against the Hungarians and those of the Ruthenians and Slovaks who were friends of the former. Namely, some time before this the population of those provinces had made demonstrations in favour of Hungary, which, however, were of an entirely peaceful nature and nowhere overstepped legitimate bounds. They were encouraged to do so by the fact that though the Sudeten Germans and the Teschen Poles had given much freer reign to the manifestation of their sentiments in similar circumstances, the Czechs had taken no steps against them out of consideration for the two Great Powers.

But against the peace-abiding inhabitants of Slovakia and Ruthenia the Czech Government acted with the greatest brutality. The loyal and legitimate manifestation of their feelings was made the excuse. That the situation became aggravated was due to the intentionally provocative behaviour of the Czechs, and not to inspiration from without. The inhabitants, made desperate by repression, the numerous deserters from the army and the refugees who had been driven out of the country earlier and who had begun to drift back, tried to defend themselves against these acts of terror at the risk of their lives. And even when these phenomena assumed dangerous dimensions, the Czech Government, to prevent the fact leaking out that they were no longer masters of the situation, tried to make foreign countries believe it was only a question of minor incidents. To further this purpose they muzzled the Press there, so that the only information that comes through are the absolutely reliable and substantiated statements of refugees fleeing cross the Czecho-Slovak frontier. That the situation is extremely grave is best proved by the fact that the Provincial Governor of Slovakia, on 13-th October, placed three frontier zones in Slovakia under a state of siege, which was followed by similar measures in the three frontier zones of Ruthenia on 15th October.

REFUTATION OF THE FIGURES OF THE  
CZECHO-SLOVAK CENSUS

Czech statisticians lament that the population is steadily decreasing in the Czech districts and even — according to Professor Chura — in the Slovak areas too, while in Bohemia proper the decline is positively alarming. In view of this it is very strange that official statistics establish a rapid increase of the Slav population in the Hungarian districts and a similarly rapid decrease of the Hungarian elements, and this, although the birth and death figures among the Hungarian are much more favourable than among the Slavs. For this reason no one will seriously believe that it is the result of natural causes that the Czecho-Slovak population increased between the two last censuses by 350 per cent. in the Feled Prefecture, by 320 per cent. in the Zseliz Prefecture, by nearly 400 per cent. in the Tornalja Prefecture, by almost 100 per cent. in the Szepes Prefecture and by wellnigh 100 per cent. in the Galánta Prefecture, while during the same time the number of Hungarians declined from 8100 to 3500 in the Kassa Prefecture, from 9000 to 3530 in the Terebes Prefecture, from 20.600 to 16.700 in the Szepes Prefecture, from 8000 to 6000 in the Rimaszombat Prefecture, from 15.700 to 12.000 in the Léva Prefecture, and from 29.000 to 25.000 in the Feled Prefecture. This is stated in spite of the fact that the natural increase of the population in those districts presents a perfectly satisfactory picture. In 1921 the census showed 472 Czecho-Slovaks and 2958 Hungarians in Galánta, but according to the 1930 Census the number of Czecho-Slovaks had increased to 1471, while the Hungarian population had decreased to 1670.

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## RUMANIA

BIRTH REGISTERS IN SZÉKLERLAND FALSIFIED TO  
DETRIMENT OF ROMAN CATHOLIC HUNGARIANS

In three villages of County Csik (Gyimesbükk, Gyimesfelsőlak and Gyimesközéplak) the parish clerk registers new-born Roman Catholic children — especially if any of their ancestors were of another religion or had Rumanian-sounding names — as Greek Catholics and Rumanianizes their names. In Gyimesbükk alone 22 abuses of this kind occurred in the past year ("Magyar Lapok," Sept. 10.). This is how the "principles governing the activity of the Minority Commission" laid down in the Cabinet Council resolution of 4th August are being put in practice, which resolution announces that "family names are always to be written in their original form" (§. 19).

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RUMANIAN SCHOOL ESTABLISHED IN CONFISCATED  
BUILDINGS OF HUNGARIAN SCHOOL

In the last school-year the buildings of the Roman Catholic elementary school in Gyergyóditró (attended by several hundred children and with a staff of seven teachers) were confiscated and a Rumanian school opened in them this September. The Church authorities would like to provide for the Catholic children left without a school and the teachers deprived of their livelihood by establishing a Roman Catholic school in the concert hall belonging to the church. They have asked the Minister's permission to do so. The rights of a public school have not yet been restored to the Hungarian gymnasium in Temesvár, the only Hungarian secondary school in the Banate. ("Brassói Lapok," August 4. and 21.)

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MANAGEMENT OF HUNGARIAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION  
SENT TO PRISON FOR HANGING PETŐFI'S AND KÖLCSEY'S  
PORTRAITS ON THE WALL

Mention has already been made in this paper of the attempt to denationalize the more than a hundred-year-old Hungarian "Citizens Circle" of Szatmár (Satu-mare). The method employed was that about 600 Rumanians applied for membership. The management rejected their application, Thereupon a commission from the authorities appeared in the premises of the club to examine its attitude towards "the official language and the Rumanian State." The commission found fault with the circumstance that the portraits of Francis Kölcsey — the author of the Hungarian National Anthem now just a century old, — who was once president of the club, and of Alexander Petőfi, the great Hungarian poet, hung on the same wall with the portrait of the King of Rumania and that there were also inscriptions in Hungarian on that wall. The military courts pronounced a sentence of one month's jail on Dr. Joseph Tót, president of the club, imposed a fine of 2000 lei on its legal adviser Dr. Stephen Mák, and suspended its activities for 6 months ("Magyar Kisebbség," Sept. 1.).

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SENTENCES INFLICTED ON HUNGARIANS BY MILITARY  
COURTS

*Because of a Hungarian flag that had been forgotten in the attic of the St. Erzsébet Home for the Aged in Kolozsvár, the concierge, Martin Szabó, was fined 2000 lei by the military courts. („Magyar Kisebbség”, Sept. 1.)* The Rev. Ernest Gál a Unitarian

pastor, was arrested and brought before the military courts because on the occasion of a domiciliary visit the gendarmes found an old magazine and some old maps in his possession („Magyar Ujság," Augt. 21). *Because of an article that appeared in the "Székely Nép,"* a Hungarian weekly published in Transylvania, Dr. Gabriel Kabai, a lawyer of Sepsiszentgyörgy, as responsible editor, and M. Gaspar Tamás, journalist, as editor, were sentenced by the Brassó military courts to 6 months' imprisonment and a fine of 1000 lei and 2 years' imprisonment and a fine of 5000 lei respectively ("Keleti Ujság," Sept. 3.).

### REAL VALUE OF NEW EDUCATIONAL DECREE

Before schools opened the Ministry of Education issued a decree to school-inspectors' offices which, among other facilities, allows parents to send their children to minority schools, irrespective of their creed or the denomination to which those schools belong, the only criterion to be the mother-tongue of the pupils. With this the decree would seem to do away with the system of name-analysis. But this is only a sham, for the last section of § 4 stipulates that pupils whose ethnic origin is undoubtedly Rumanian must attend State schools. This stipulation offers a wide scope for further name-analysis and coercion. When the registration was over a flood of complaints poured in to the Church authorities maintaining the Roman Catholic and Protestant denominational schools, stating that in certain places the directors of the State schools ignored the decree and — particularly in the Székler districts — prevented the Hungarian children from registering at denominational schools. In this way very little improvement is noticeable. ("Magyar Ujság," Sept. 14.)

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### HUNGARIAN ASSOCIATIONS SUSPENDED FOR BEING ENGAGED IN CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

The club of the Merchants' Society in Székelyudvarhely has been closed by the police on the ground that of late it had been pursuing activities serving cultural aims ("Brassói Lapok," Aug. 3.) The activities of the Temesvár Hungarian Choir and Hungarian Women's Association have been suspended because their premises were said to be those of the Hungarian Party, which was dissolved with all the rest of the political parties. In Kolozsvár (Cluj) it is forbidden to print posters advertizing films in Hungarian, and Hungarian captions are also forbidden. ("Ellenzék," Sept. 16.) The Rumanian Football Association has resolved to effect a gradual and systematic Rumanianization of all sporting

associations. By 1940 only 5, by 1941 only 4 and by 1942 only 3 minority players may figure in representative teams. ("Románia," Augt. 1.)

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## MORE LANGUAGE EXAMINATIONS FOR MINORITY EMPLOYEES

At the State Tobacco Refinery of Sepsiszentgyörgy, 80% of the 700 workers are Hungarians. The directors of the Tobacco Monopoly now endeavour to decrease this percentage by ordering the minority employees to pass further language tests. This new regulation is all the more surprising as the workers of the refinery are not allowed to speak to each other. ("Népujság", September 18). The minority employees of the Electricity Works of Kolozsvár (Cluj) were again ordered to pass a language test. ("Brassói Lapok", September 10). — Several minority officials at the Prefecture of the County of Kolozs (Cluj) also had to pass an examination in Rumanian. ("Estilap", September 21). — 200 minority railway employees at Kolozsvár (Cluj) were again examined in their knowledge of Rumanian. ("Ellenzék", September 10). — At Nagyvárad (Oradea Mare), about 100 railway men received similar orders. ("Keleti Ujság", September 18). — At Arad, too, minority railway employees had to be examined in Rumanian. ("Hirlap", September 17). — The number of railway employees who failed in the language tests is 4—5%, while another 5—6% were transferred to the Old Kingdom (the "Regat") on account of insufficient knowledge of Rumanian. Those railway employees who were dismissed have recently started a legal action for the remittance of their pensions. ("Magyar Ujság", September 23).

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## YUGOSLAVIA

### M. KOROSHETZ'S MISTAKE

In his speech delivered on 11th September at Muraszombat (Murska Subota), M. Koroshetz, Minister of the Interior, amongst other things said that there were only 7.607 Hungarians living in the Mura district (Prekomurje), whereas even according to the figures of the 1921 census the number of Hungarians in that region was 14.429. "These Hungarians" — said the Minister — "are not oppressed by us." He then went on to speak of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes living in Hungary, "who are constituent elements of the whole Yugoslav nation." According to M. Koroshetz, the number of Serbs in Hungary is 6.078, that of the Bonyevatz and Sokatz peoples, whom he described as Croats, 150.312, and that of

the Slovenes 6.057, a total of 162.477 souls. But according to the Hungarian census of 1930, the figures are: Serbs 7.031, Croats 27.683, Bonyevatz, Sokatz and Vend peoples (but not Slovenes) 20.564, that is to say 55.278 Southern Slavs. This is only one-third of the number stated by M. Koroshetz. — y —

#### OPENING OF THE HUNGARIAN SECTION OF THE STATE TEACHERS' TRAINING CENTRE AT BELGRADE.

M. Imre Várady, a former Hungarian member of the Skupstina, and M. János Vámos, a retired school-master from Zenta, appeared before M. Branko Magarashevitch, the minister of Education, and — reminding him of his formed promise — asked him to arrange for the opening of the first class of the Hungarian section of the State Teachers' Training Centre at Belgrade. This time the Minister has kept his word and instructed — in an order issued under no. 15.564/L. — the director of the above mentioned school to open the first class of the parallel Hungarian section. The first class which has now been opened, together with the second class, has only 41 pupils in all. On this basis we may count that — after the opening of the other three classes of the school — not more than 20 or 25 Hungarian teachers will receive certificates every year; if, then, we consider the shortage of Hungarian teachers in Yugoslavia it appears that it would take at least 40—45 years before the necessary number of Hungarian teachers — about 900 or 950 — can be qualified. So that if the Government really intends a radical reform of Hungarian minority education and seriously considers the question of establishing so called parallel Hungarian sections in all those parishes where this is prescribed by law, it can only be done by a more extensive organisation of the training of Hungarian teachers; this regulation must be undertaken by legislation with due regard to the lawful claims of the Hungarian minority.

#### MEMBERS OF REFORMED CHURCH IN THE BACSKA NOT ALLOWED TO ATTEND CALVINIST MASS MEETING IN DEBRECEN

Hungarian Calvinists from all the five continents in the last week of August held a mass meeting in Debrecen, where they organized the World Alliance of Hungarian Calvinists. From Yugoslavia only the Hungarian Calvinists of the Banate were able to be present; permission to attend was withheld from the Hungarian Protestants of the Bácska, although some of the Hungarian villages of that part, from whence hundreds intended to go to the meeting, are Hungarian settlements from the Nagy-kunság (Great

Plain of Hungary). Such for instance are Rácskossuthfalva (Stara Moravica), Bácsfeketehegy (Feketic), Pacér and Piros.

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NAME-ANALYSIS STILL IN FORCE

On 2nd September M. Branko Magarashevitch, Minister of Education saw two leaders of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia, Dr. Imre Várady, former M. P. and M. John Vámos, retired professor, of Zenta, who in the course of their representations complained of the system of name analysis and the serious abuses perpetrated at the time of school registrations. These grievances were again put before the Minister on 27th September by Dr. Leo Deák, former member of the Provincial Diet and M. John Vámos, who begged the Minister to fulfil his old promise to cancel name analysis and enforce all the relevant provisions. The Minister of Education again promised to redress the grievances referred to.

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OSZK

Nemzeti Széchényi Könyvtár

## B O O K S

### THE REAL ANDREW HLINKA

*Francis Jehlicka's book.*

A little book by Dr. Francis Jehlicka was published recently (André Hlinka. A la conférence de la Paix de Paris. Le véritable Hlinka: par François Jehlicka, professeur, président du Conseil Slovaque, Genève 1938) in which he portrays the life and career of the late leader of the Slovaks with particular reference to the rôle he played during the past 20 years.

No one is better qualified to describe Father Hlinka's life than Professor Jehlička. The two Slovak priests once sat side by side in the Hungarian Parliament, where they were the representatives of the Slovak people. This was at the time when the Slovaks were living in happiness and prosperity in the thousand-year-old Hungarian State, in the bosom of the Kingdom of St. Stephen, where they were always understood and where they enjoyed a share out of all proportion to their numerical strength of the highest positions in the land, not only in the Slovak territories, but also in the other parts of the country and in the centre at Budapest.

The piously disposed Slovaks liked to elect popular and scholarly priests to be their parliamentary representatives, who in this way were not only the spiritual mentors, but also the political leaders of their folk. Hlinka was one of them and Jehlička another. Two good friends, who were deeply attached to their mountainous native land, Slovakia, and to the honest Slovaks, and who devoted all their energies to the promotion of the welfare and development of their compatriots. The Slovaks have now sustained a cruel blow in the loss of their most popular, most real leader — in fact perhaps their only real leader at home. *Andrew Hlinka is dead*, and nobody is better fitted to take leave of him and speak to the world about the real Hlinka than Professor Jehlicka.

At the very beginning of the memorial booklet Dr. Jehlicka stresses the point that "Opinion may differ concerning the character and activities of Andrew Hlinka, but one thing is sure: Hlinka was devoted to the Slovaks and would have gone through fire and water for them. Therefore the Slovaks

trusted him, followed his leadership and on many occasions, as at his funeral, gave conspicuous proofs of their devotion to him."

When the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy began to show signs of disintegration towards the close of a losing struggle and Hlinka saw that the Czech maffia not only wanted to establish Czech independence, but was also casting its net over Slovakia, it was he who negotiated with the Hungarian Premier with a view to *the establishment of Slovak autonomy within the framework of the Hungarian State*. The plan had been worked out by Premier Wekerle and would have been passed by Parliament in a few weeks. For, in any case, the other Slav national minority, the Croats, had by then for half a century been enjoying the widest territorial self-government within the framework of the Hungarian Monarchy. They had a Croat Diet, Croat regiments, gendarmerie and police, Croat education, from elementary schools up to the university in Zagreb, and independent, exclusively Croat administration in every field. Today the national minorities anywhere would be happy to enjoy such extensive territorial, constitutional and military autonomy.

Now the Hlinka who was negotiating for Slovak autonomy was a man otherwise imbued with panslav ideas. Some of the leaders of the Slovaks — Stur, Mudron, Vajansky, etc — dreamt dreams of the establishment of a mighty Slav State under Russian hegemony, that is to say of a union of all European Slavs, those of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Balkans, as well as the Poles, under Russian sovereignty. Happily for all the world those dreams, inspired for decades by Moscow, were never realized; had they materialized, Slovakia today would be a Soviet groaning under Stalin's red rule. It was only natural that because of its pan-Russian activities the scientific society of the Slovaks, the *Slovenska Matica*, whose official shield bore a motto in Russian, was dissolved. "Because of his panslavism", writes Jehlicka, "Hlinka got into trouble with the Hungarian authorities and the feeling of bitterness remaining in his soul induced him to refuse the Hungarian Premier's offer of autonomy." It was then accepted by Messrs Dula and Hodza and Drs. Ruman and Markovic. But by this time the Czech maffia was hard at work in Paris and London. The Czechs demanded Slovakia's attachment to Bohemia, whose independence had been recognized, on ethnographic grounds, declaring that Czechs and Slovaks were one "Czecho-Slovak" race and therefore should belong to one political State, and that the idea of a plebiscite should be dropped. Already in 1915 Dr. Masaryk had submitted a memorandum to the British Foreign Office, in which it was stated that "Slovaks are Czechs", and in 1916 Dr. Benes published his notorious pamphlet "*Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie*" in Paris, which contained the

assertation that Czechs and Slovaks were "two branches of one Czecho-Slovak, or Czech, race." But the Peace Conference was sceptical about this innovation and therefore the Czech maffia, with promises and by other means, induced a little panslav group of Slovaks to issue a declaration at Turc. Sv. Martin to the effect that the Czechs and Slovaks were one people and desired to live in one State. The signatories were 106 in all, 95 of whom were Lutherans, although 90% of the Slovaks are Catholics. Nobody believed them and to give greater weight to the declaration Hlinka was with difficulty induced by means of the most subtle promises to sign it. For a long time he hesitated, refusing to add his signature, but he was at length persuaded that the wildest dreams of the Slovaks would be fulfilled by the victors and that the Slovaks and the Czechs would receive all they wished. He was told that Masaryk would be the president of the new State, who at Pittsburgh in America had recognized an autonomous Slovakia. In any case it was only a temporary arrangement to last for ten years, at the end of which the Slovaks would be free to determine their own lot (the famous clause).

When shortly before his death Hlinka in the Prague Parliament protested sharply against the "Czecho-Slovak" humbug, a Czech deputy shouted to him: — "What are you talking about? You signed the Declaration of Turc. sv. Martin yourself!" Hlinka, beside himself with rage, shouted back: — "We were fools. We helped the Czechs to cheat Europe." ("Slovak", March 11, 1938)

Professor Jehlicka tells us that Hlinka soon realized that the Czechs had deceived, not only Europe, but also the Slovaks. With the Rev. John Vojtassák, a Slovak parish priest now Bishop of Szepes, they visited Jehlicka in Budapest in the November of 1918 and begged him to return to Slovakia. "The Czechs", said Hlinka to Jehlicka, "have deceived us. Come home with us and help us." Cardinal Csernoch, Prince Primate of Hungary, who himself was a Slovak, consented to Jehlicka's returning to Slovakia. He did so, was elected member of Parliament in Prague and together with Hlinka founded the Slovak People's Party and a newspaper called the "Slovak", and in spite of the fact that he was appointed Chancellor of the Pozsony University by the Czechs, turned against them because they would not keep their promise to allow Jehlicka make a Slovak university of the Hungarian one at Pozsony. Instead of this they turned it into a Czech university and Professors Prazak and Chaloupecky were not ashamed to tell the Slovak students "*ex cathedra*" that their mother-tongue was a bastard, Asiatic language. And in Prague the draft of the new Constitution denied the Slovaks self-government and cheated them out of everything.

Then Paul Siska arrived home from America, bringing to Jehlicka a copy of the Pittsburgh Convention bearing Siska's as well as Masaryk's name. He also brought a message from the Slovaks in America, asking Jehlicka and his associates to go to the Peace Conference and enforce the demands of the Slovaks. The Slovaks sent both Jehlicka and Hlinka to the Peace Conference, but the Czechs refused them a passport, so they went to Warsaw. Other delegates were J. Kubala, a merchant, and the Rev. Dr. Rudinsky. They were met at the railway station in Zsolna and sped on their way by the Rt. Rev. K. Kmetkó, the present Bishop of Nyitra, who explained his reason for not accompanying them, saying he was afraid they would have trouble and it would be better for him to stay at home and protect them against the Czechs.

In Warsaw Marshall Pilsudsky said to them: — "*You Slovaks are entitled to liberty and fair treatment. You are right to go to the Peace Conference in Paris. You will receive Polish passports and I shall instruct our delegation to give you all assistance. And if they refuse to listen to you in Paris, you should come to terms with the Hungarians and Slovakia should return to Hungary. History, your geographical position and all your vital interests demand this.*"

These words of Marshall Pilsudsky are well remembered today in Slovakia and Poland.

In Paris Hlinka and Jehlicka visited each of the prominent members of the Peace Conference in turn and protested against the Czechs and Slovaks being regarded as one folk. Invoking the Pittsburgh Convention on which the ink was hardly dry, *they demanded a plebiscite in the whole of Slovakia.* M. Paderewski, Polish Premier, supported their demand. As their mission seemed likely to be successful, Benes induced the French authorities to order them to leave France. Hlinka asked M. Patek, Polish Minister, and two Polish generals to send the Polish army to Slovakia and drive out the Czechs. He also gave them strategical advice, recommending them to occupy Zsolna (Zilina) first. But the Poles were engaged with their own affairs and were greatly surprised to find that while they had to hold no fewer than five plebiscites, the Czechs were given the whole of Upper Hungary without any plebiscite at all. Why no plebiscite was ordered was confessed by M. Tardieu in his work "*La Paix*," where he says: "We had to choose between a plebiscite and the creation of Czecho-Slovakia."

"Before we left Paris" — writes Jehlicka — we met to discuss matters and decided to accept Pilsudski's advice and try to come to terms with the Hungarians. The Slovak Conference sent myself and Stephen Mnohel to Budapest to negotiate with the Hungarian Government. Rudinsky and Kubala were sent to

America to collect money among the Slovaks living there. Hlinka was to go home to lead and strengthen the Slovak People's Party.

Hlinka took leave of me in the Hungarian Pazmaneum College in Vienna. I am going back — he said — and you will stay abroad to work for our cause. You will be our minister of foreign affairs. On his return to Slovakia Hlinka was dragged out of his bed next night by Czech soldiers and taken to a Czech prison at Mirov, where he lay for six months before he was tried. This was a foretaste of the "Slovak liberty" brought to us by the Czechs. An attempt was made in the Czech prison to murder Hlinka with a slow poison, which brought on a disease of the stomach that never left him. Kubala on his return was reduced to beggary."

In the January of 1920 Jehlicka came to terms with the Hungarian Government regarding Slovak autonomy. The Czechs did their best to ruin Hlinka financially too: the People's Bank of Ruzomberok was driven into bankruptcy, and, to save the poor Slovak peasants from ruin, Hlinka was forced to accept a recovery loan of 12 million Czech crowns and join the Czech Government Coalition. But when, after the Slovaks had been repeatedly cheated by the Czechs, Professor V. Tuka, head of the press department of the People's Party, was falsely accused and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, Hlinka broke off relations entirely with the Czechs and embarked anew on the struggle for autonomy. He did so in spite of Masaryk's reiterated statement: "We cannot give the Slovaks autonomy, for if we did, they would desert us and return to Hungary." Masaryk also repudiated the Pittsburgh Convention, which he himself had drafted and copied and which he was the first to sign.

In order to support the struggle of their brethren languishing under Czech terror and at their request, the Slovak refugees abroad formed a *Slovak Council* in Geneva in 1933 and addressed a memorandum to the League of Nations, begging that tribunal to liberate Slovakia from the Czech yoke and restore it to Hungary.

The Czechs were greatly alarmed and persuaded a few of their mercenaries to draw up a declaration stating that the Slovak Council had no right to speak on behalf of the Slovaks. On this declaration they clumsily forged the signatures of the Members of Parliament and Senators belonging to the two autonomist parties. "Both autonomist parties protested publicly and energetically against this infamous act," writes the "Slovak" of 28th December, 1933, and, as we are told by Jehlicka, "No brutal Czech threats were able to induce them to issue a statement against us. Prague, however, still operates against us with that forged document, both at home and abroad."

The *Anschluss* came and now the Sudeten Germans, the Poles of Teschen, the Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians, the peoples who "were placed under Czech rule against their own wishes, have

begun a vigorous new campaign for self-determination. Hlinka's party has joined hands with Henlein's and the rest of the national minorities in a fight against Prague. First at Zsolna (Zilina) and then on 5th June in Pozsony (Bratislava) Hlinka, speaking on behalf of the Party to a great gathering of Slovaks — at which the delegates of the one million Slovaks in America who had brought over the original copy of the Pittsburgh Convention were present, — declared that if the Czechs did not grant them full autonomy the Slovaks would break away from them. Hlinka made the Slovaks promise to do this on oath, and this oath was repeated on 15th August when the American delegation took their leave. After Hlinka's death the Slovaks announced that they regarded this oath as Hlinka's political last will and testament ("Slovak" issues 183 and 194, 1938).

Beneš' paper, the "*Cesko Slovo*" once wrote as follows: "We have no confidence in the Slovaks; their only desire is to destroy the Republic and return to Hungary." "We Slovaks," — says Jehlicka, — have no ambition to establish an independent political State, therefore we must attach ourselves to another nation. We cannot exist without the Great Plain of Hungary. The history of the past thousand years binds us to it. This is understood by the Poles too. When the American Slovak delegation passed through Poland en route for Slovakia, the "*Nase Przyslosc*" (1938, May and June), a periodical of the Polish Government's, gave the following advice to the Slovaks: "Your place is in Hungary; your rivers and mountain ranges point in that direction and this is also dictated by your economic interests and the history of the past thousand years. This — continues the article — was also the advice of the late Marshall Pilsudski. The American Slovak delegation — says the Polish paper in conclusion — came over to Europa in the *Báthory*, a ship with a Hungarian name. Let the ship named after the great Hungarian, Báthory, be a symbol of the political orientation which you, our beloved Slovak brethren, must follow after the disintegration of the Czech State."

\*

On the day of Hlinka's funeral at Ruzomberok, the Czechs arranged a dance in the neighbourhood at a watering-place called Lubochna and the Czech manager, A. Prosek, with a glass of wine in his hand cried: "He should have died long ago! ("Slovak" No. 195, 1938). On the occasion of his funeral the Czech "*Narodni Listy*" wrote: "Hlinka is dead. Since the collapse of the Empire his life had been one long and increasingly violent struggle against our State. He spoke against it already at the revolutionary assembly, he spoke against it at the Peace Conference, and he worked against it together with Jehlicka and Tuka. It is fortunate that he died now when he could have done more harm to the Republic than ever."

Hlinka is dead; Tuka is not free to make his voice heard, and the leaders of the Slovaks are either intimidated or broken into the Czech yoke. Only Jehlicka and a few others have escaped imprisonment or death by flight to foreign countries, where they are working for the emancipation of the Slovaks.

And this emancipation is at hand, for the Slovaks have lost all their illusions about "Czech liberty" and panslav brotherhood. This little nation is also entitled to decide its own future on the Wilsonian principle of self-determination with which the war was concluded.

### AN EXTOLLER OF DISCREDITED IDEAS

In his work "What next in Central Europe? The problem of Security and the indivisibility of Peace" (Oxford. The Shakespeare Head Press, 1938) M. Victor Cornea, a Rumanian publicist discusses the problem of the Danube Valley and its solution. His thesis is correctly put: the minor States of the Danube Valley created on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire ought to collaborate in maintaining peace and tranquility in that region and so insure the peace of the whole of Europe. But he makes a cardinal, if not ill-intentioned, mistake in making a scapegoat of Hungary's efforts to secure revision and blaming them for the failure hitherto to establish understanding and co-operation among the Danube Valley countries. M. Cornea rigidly adheres to the obsolete idea of the *status quo*. He refuses to realize that the main cause of unrest in the Danube Valley lies in the injustices of the Peace Treaties, without a reparation of which there can be no permanent peace, order and tranquility in that region. It is not the revisionist aspirations of a mortally wounded Hungary that stand in the way of co-operation; it is the obstinate and stubborn attitude which endeavours to petrify those injustices and condemns *a priori* any commonsense change. Public opinion practically all the world over has now realized, and even the British Prime Minister has proclaimed, the need of "peaceful change;" it is only the usufructuaries of the unfair advantages of the Paris Treaties, the States of the Little Entente, that still refuse to recognize the truth. It is not only that M. Cornea's way of putting matters, which condemns Hungary's revisionist aspirations as the chief source of conflict between the Danube States, is biassed; his arguments are also insulting, for his explanation of Hungary's aims is that this country clings to its feudal institutions, that a privileged class wishes to keep the masses under oppression and that Hungary is not desirous of co-operation with the Little Entente, because co-operation would result in the oppressed masses labouring under Hungarian rule seeing the much more favourable situation of similar classes in Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania and in their rebellion

against the rule of a privileged class in Hungary. This way of putting the matter, besides being incredibly malevolent, also reveals a regrettable ignorance. M. Cornea declares, for instance, that there is no secret balloting in Hungary, while, in fact, a codified Act of Parliament provides that balloting shall be secret not only in the large towns, but also in the country constituencies. Then again he boldly asserts that the Hungarian Constitution is based on privileges and that the social construction of the country is still feudal in character. He simply takes no notice of the great constitutional and social reforms of the XIX century, which completely transformed our medieval Constitution, building up the social edifice of the country on the foundation of the equal rights and liberties of all citizens. He is also oblivious to the widely expansive social policy of the present Hungarian Government, a policy destined to insure the health, education and economic welfare of the lower classes. An utter blindness to the actual state of conditions is revealed in the author's statement that the reason for Hungary's orientation towards Italy and Germany is that it is only through these autocracies that the hegemony of the privileged classes over the oppressed masses can be maintained. He does not even shrink from publishing the calumny that as Hungary in the past accepted the sovereignty of the Habsburgs merely because under their protection the ruling classes could exploit the working masses unhindered, so now she is willing to play the role of a German colony in Central Europe only because she hopes in this way to save her feudal construction and regain possession of Slovakia, Transylvania and Croatia. Parallel with this slander M. Cornea uses all his skill as a writer in praising the regional alliance of the Little Entente. According to him the democratic alliance of the Little Entente States should, with the Balkan Alliance and a Scandinavian confederation, form a peace *bloc* together with the great democracies of Western Europe, Great Britain and France, the task of which would be to render more effective the system of collective security laid down in the Charter of the League of Nations. Instead of the present, more or less negative, system of advice and counsel, he urges activity, such activity of the above-mentioned *bloc* as would by force of arms compel peace-breakers to desist. That Great Britain should undertake the organization of this peace *bloc* within the framework of the League of Nations is M. Cornea's wish, who would evidently like to insure Great Britain's support of his scheme in the knowledge that England is always on the look out for a means of increasing the efficacy of the system of collective security, which in its present form as organized in the League Charter has not proved viable. In one word: M. Victor Cornea extols that system of collective security which has repeatedly failed just because instead of being a guarantee of peace it has proved rather to be a factor which thrusts nations with no desire for war into it against their will.

And the author of "What next in Central Europe?" wishes to make this bankrupt system more rigid than before.

To sum up: M. Cornea sings hosannas in praise of the obsolete idea of the *status quo* and of the bankrupt system of collective security; he continues to laud as a model that Little Entente which is on the point of dissolution owing to the disunion of its members, and he makes revision appear to be a menace to peace, whereas it is because of those who idolize the *status quo* of the Paris Treaties that peace cannot take root in Europe.

In view of all this we may safely establish the fact that M. Cornea's work has not brought the Danube Valley problem one single step nearer solution. Not even in theory.

OSZK  
Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

## POLITICAL ECONOMY

### THE SITUATION IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER THE MUNICH AGREEMENT

In consequence of the enforcement, in the spirit of the Munich agreement, of the principle of national self-determination, Czecho-Slovakia loses the following territories: the Sudeten German areas to the German Empire, former Upper Hungary, the districts inhabited by Hungarians, to Hungary, and the Oderberg—Teschen—Karvin—Jablonka district to Poland. *This circumstance completely changes the conditions of economic life in lesser Czecho-Slovakia.* The loss of the Sudeten German district and of the basin so rich in coal surrendered to Poland means that the most valuable territories from an industrial point of view of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are under foreign sway. The part remaining under Czech rule loses much of its economic value, not only because of the decrease of territory and population, but also, because the change has altered the entire economic structure of the part beyond the Morava. *Most of Czecho-Slovakia's industry was situated in the Sudeten German districts and is now incorporated with the German Empire. A great part of the coal and lignite beds and the ore-mines are also lost and thus the expressly industrial character of the remaining territories has ceased.* According to the findings of the census for 1930, the percentage of the agrarian population in Bohemia was 24.6% and 28.66%, in Moravia and Silesia; the industrial population in the former province was 41.78% and 40.82% in the latter. These figures will be radically changed now. The agrarian character of what remains of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia will be much more pronounced and this in itself will cause an inevitable decline in the standard of living of the population. Beneš' imperialist Czech policy had in any case laid heavy burdens

on the population. Now, in consequence of the changed conditions of production, the national income will decrease in the reduced territory and in addition to this, the burden of supporting the host of Czech officials who lost their posts in the alienated territories, will also fall on the new Czech State.

The disruption of the trans-Morava provinces of Czecho-Slovakia will also be attended by other grave consequences. For centuries they were a single unit both in a political and an economic sense. Their industry, originally set up to meet the requirements of an Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with a population of 50 millions, was sufficiently prosperous, even although part of it was ruined or had to contend with great difficulties in the new State, to insure, with the help of agriculture, a satisfactory standard of living to the majority of the population. Industry made an over-development of social institutions possible; mining and industrial exports kept Czecho-Slovakia's balance of payments in equilibrium.

The system of roads and railways in the parts of Czecho-Slovakia lying beyond the Morava was evolved to meet the requirements of a uniform territory. As a result of the detachment of the Sudeten German districts what remains of Bohemia is squeezed by the German pincers, which means that it is indefensible from a military point of view. Even if Czecho-Slovakia feels protected against this danger by the Munich Pact and the guarantee of its signatories and her own neighbours, she will undoubtedly be compelled to abandon her former policy and enter into economic co-operation with her neighbours.

All this refers primarily to the part beyond the Morava, to the so-called historical provinces. *The territories torn away from Hungary were never closely connected with those areas, except in so far as all the territories within the customs frontiers of the old Monarchy had been.* It has been clearly shown that the incorporation of Slovakia and Ruthenia with the Czech State has done nothing whatsoever to develop economic relations between these territories and the historical provinces.

*It is Beneš and Masaryk and not the people now liberated who are to be blamed for the turn for the worse the situation in the so-called historical provinces has taken in conse-*

*quence of the territorial losses.* For they induced the Great Powers to split up the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for the sake of a fictitious Czech national State. When the founders of the Republic determined the course the new State was to pursue in foreign politics, they left the economic standpoints out of consideration and forgot to reckon with the national consciousness and the susceptibilities of the incorporated peoples. This must have been the case; for otherwise it is incomprehensible why Beneš' foreign policy should have been directed openly against Germany and Hungary.

*The part of the historical provinces left under Czech domination will have to make the best of the changed situation and accept the grave consequences incident to the change. The situation of the Slovak and Ruthenian peoples detached from Hungary is quite different.* They only took a seeming part in the direction of Czecho-Slovak politics; in reality they were the misled and exploited victims of the short-sighted Czech policy. This is why they are in no way accountable for the new situation, and this is why it is a fair demand that they too should be given the opportunity to avail themselves — free from all external influence — of their right to national self-determination.

The detachment of the German, Hungarian and Polish territories has produced such important changes in the lot of the Slovaks and Ruthenians that no one has any right to debar them from availing themselves of their right to self-determination. This right is theirs not only on the principle of equality, but also by virtue of their right to exist.

*If their existence was so miserable under the guardianship of a Czech State playing the rôle of a Great Power, what, they may well ask, can they expect from now on?*

## ENGLAND AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Since the time of the Anschluss, England has displayed a fresh and growing interest in the Danube and Balkan States. It would be too early to guess the probable effect of this fact upon the future development of trade in these States, since the records of the first quarter of this year show no signs of England's growing interest in this direction.

In 1936, the six Danube and Balkan States (Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey) sold raw material of the value of 366 million pengő to England; in 1937 the value of their exports to England amounted to 360 millions, while in the first quarter of this year the value of those imports rose to nearly 64 millions. This means that if we were to calculate the average for the whole year on the basis of these 65 millions, the total value of exports in 1938 would not be even so much as 300 million pengő.

On the other hand, the import records show that England has increased her imports to the above countries from 187 million pengő in 1936 to 216 millions in 1937, while in the first quarter of this year the value of those import rose to nearly 65 millions. In other words, these records would seem to indicate that this year will show an increase of England's exports to these countries, and not the increase of their exports to England.

In 1937 Hungary exported goods of the value of 62 million pengős to England; in 1936 the value of her exports to England amounted to 56 millions. Yugoslavia: 63 millions in 1937 and 47 millions in 1936. Bulgaria: 27 millions in 1937 and 25 millions in 1936. Turkey exporting 41 millions in 1937, exceeded her exports of 1936 by 8 millions, Greece: 53 millions in 1937 and 54 millions in 1936. Of the above six countries. Rumania was in 1936 the most successful as she was able to place almost one third of her exports on the English market, though in 1937 she could not place more than 14.7% in England. In 1937, Greece was the most successful country, because 18.1% of her exports went to England. As regards Hungary, she is more concerned with England in respect of her exports than her imports; in 1937, 10.5% of her exports went to England, in 1936 11.5%, while her imports derive from England only at the rate of 3% in each case.

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