Valuation of Authentic or “Misleading” Accounting Information in Preparation of Economic Decisions

Dr. Zol­tán Zéman, PhD, uni­ver­sity pro­fes­sor, Szent Ist­ván Uni­ver­sity, Fa­culty of Eco­no­mics and So­ci­al Sci­en­ces (zeman.​zoltan@​gtk.​szie.​hu).

Sum­ma­ry

In sum­ma­ry, re­gard­ing the va­lu­a­ti­on of aut­hen­tic or mis­lead­ing” ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on in pre­pa­ra­ti­on of eco­no­mic de­ci­sions, we can say that ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing pro­vi­des fi­nan­cial and non-fi­nan­cial in­for­ma­ti­on to ma­nag­ement to have an ef­fec­tive de­ci­si­on mak­ing sys­tem. Howe­ver, ac­count­ing in­di­ca­tors were de­vel­oped for mo­ni­tor­ing and re­port­ing pur­pos­es, and even today these are the main area of use. The stan­dards app­li­ed by in­ter­na­ti­o­nal sys­tems inc­re­a­singly try to fol­low and help to imp­ro­ve the cont­ent of in­for­ma­ti­on of in­ves­tors and ma­nag­ement the­re­fo­re; they do not have a pri­ma­ry role in this, so this kind of func­ti­o­na­lity of ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing will not be re­a­ched.


The glo­bal eco­nomy and our mo­dern so­ci­ety is cha­rac­te­ri­zed by comp­le­xity and net­wor­king. In these comp­lex net­work-bas­ed re­la­ti­onsh­ips, trust in in­for­ma­ti­on plays an im­por­tant role. Howe­ver, in the de­ve­lop­ment of eco­nomy and so­ci­ety, fi­nan­cial ins­ti­tu­tions, in­ter­me­di­a­ri­es, ins­urance com­pa­ni­es and the stock mar­ket att­ract more at­tent­ion. En­ter­ing the stock mar­ket – in ad­di­ti­on to the exis­ten­ce of col­la­te­ral – it is well known that tran­spa­rent ac­count­ing and re­port­ing, fi­nan­cial re­port­ing is re­qu­i­red. There is evi­den­ce that the mar­ket will only work if the in­for­ma­ti­on is aut­hen­tic and mar­ket ope­ra­tors and in­ves­tors can ef­fec­ti­vely and ob­jec­ti­vely uti­li­ze it. In the early 2000s, espe­ci­ally events and the known scan­dals of the ca­p­ital mar­ket of the Uni­ted Sta­tes – such as the Enron, World­Com and Art­hur An­der­sen – had raised the quest­ion whet­her cor­pora­te fi­nan­cial-ac­count­ing tra­di­ti­o­nal stan­dar­di­zed order is in a cris­is.1 Inc­re­a­sing mar­ket price of sha­res had be­co­me a pri­ma­ry ob­jec­tive for com­pa­ni­es in order to en­sure the sa­tis­fac­ti­on of in­ves­tors. Mar­ket pri­ces inc­re­a­se due to good eco­no­mic news, then fi­nan­cial re­ports, eva­lu­a­ti­on in­di­ca­tors ap­pear and trust to­ward the com­pa­ni­es’ se­cu­ri­ti­es grow until fraud. The comp­lete­ness, cre­di­bi­lity and re­lia­bi­lity are prin­cip­les that serve as a basis for not only the ope­ra­ti­on of stock mar­ket but also in the cre­a­ti­on of mar­ket re­la­tions of eco­no­mic ac­tors. After the scan­dals au­di­tors were rightly ac­cu­s­ed, and faith in ac­count­ing had sha­ken, it is in­con­ce­iv­ab­le that “eco­no­mic scan­dals” de­vel­oped due to ethi­cal fa­i­lings of au­di­tors, ac­coun­tants. Ma­na­gers, au­di­tors, se­cu­rity analysts, con­sul­tants, in­vestment and com­mer­ci­al banks, lawyers had also cont­ri­bu­ted to false in­form­ing and ma­ni­pu­la­ti­on.

Due to re­cent de­ve­lop­ments in the eco­no­mic si­tu­a­ti­on, ac­count­ing cont­rary to the in­ten­ded func­ti­on – na­mely it pro­vi­des aut­hen­tic in­for­ma­ti­on th­ro­ugh fi­nan­cial re­ports about the fi­nan­cial sta­tus, pro­fit-mak­ing abi­lity of com­pa­ni­es, disc­lo­sing all the data which could inf­lu­en­ce the de­ci­sions of in­ves­tors – had be­co­me a tool for ma­na­gers’ to reach their ope­ra­tive goals and mis­le­ad in­ves­tors. We can say that com­pa­ni­es have been lo­o­king for ac­count­ing so­lu­tions which “ge­ne­ra­te value” in line with mar­ket ex­pec­ta­tions, so for a short time, they could pre­ser­ve the il­lu­si­on of growth.2

The his­to­ry of the de­ve­lop­ment of dis­torting eco­no­mic in­for­ma­ti­on has se­ve­ral con­nec­ti­on points with ma­nag­ement sup­port of ac­count­ing and fi­nan­cial in­for­ma­ti­on. This is con­fir­med by eco­no­mic his­to­ry si­tu­a­tions as well, in which se­ve­ral quest­ions have ari­sen in re­la­ti­on to the fi­nan­cial re­port­ing sys­tem that al­lows the as­sess­ment of the com­pany. For the con­cept of a free mar­ket the abi­lity of cor­rect va­lu­a­ti­on of a com­pany, re­lia­bi­lity of fi­nan­cial sta­te­ments and re­a­lis­tic pre­s­en­ta­ti­on for mar­ket par­ti­ci­pants are es­sen­ti­al.

It is na­tu­ral that these large ac­count­ing scan­dals had quest­ion­ed a num­ber of adop­ted and in use prac­ti­ces. Note that this has not al­ways been like this, ma­inly after the 1920 cris­is the ac­count­ing in­dustry star­ted to look for the opt­ions to res­tore con­sis­tency, tran­spa­rency and con­fi­den­ce. In the early 80s, glo­ba­li­za­ti­on and de­re­gu­la­ti­on has bro­ught new chal­len­ges to the busi­ness en­vi­ron­ment which de­man­ded large amounts of money and re­sul­ted more comp­lex and risky fi­nanc­ing inst­ru­ments were int­ro­du­ced.

Pay sys­tem of com­pany exe­cu­ti­ves were lin­ked to per­for­mance whe­re­u­pon they were di­rectly mo­ti­vat­ed. Pre­pa­ra­ti­on of eco­no­mic in­for­ma­ti­on, the ac­count­ing and fi­nan­cial so­lu­tions which dis­tort real pro­ces­ses na­mely the non-ob­jec­tive view to the eco­no­mic backg­round. Se­ve­ral cases prove that the pri­o­rity goals of ma­na­gers were to have good fi­nan­cial sta­bi­lity in­di­ca­tors for the com­pany in ad­di­ti­on to the va­ri­o­us trans­na­ti­o­nal is­sues.

Imp­ro­ving li­qu­i­dity, rates of re­turn, imp­ro­ve pro­fi­ta­bi­lity ra­ti­os, etc., and of co­ur­se, all this hap­pe­ned in order to ma­in­ta­in share pri­ces, af­fec­ting the ex­ter­nal per­cept­ion with these dis­tor­ted eco­no­mic in­for­ma­ti­on.3 It can be ob­ser­ved that in order to achi­eve their goals, “slick” cre­a­tive ac­count­ing so­lu­tions were wi­dely used among the com­pa­ni­es, to ment­ion a few:

  • Fa­i­lu­re to cons­o­li­da­te busi­ness units and sub­si­di­a­ri­es (which made it pos­sib­le to hide in­vestment los­ses and prob­lem loans, the sale of idle as­sets to sub­si­di­a­ri­es).
  • Tran­sac­tions with no eco­no­mic cont­ent – creat­ing fic­tit­io­us re­ve­nues wit­hin which the swaps are not ac­coun­ted for in the same way.
  • Ac­count­ing do­ubt­ful ac­counts re­ce­iv­ab­le as cur­rent in­co­me.
  • Ac­count­ing sales of as­sets as ope­rat­ing in­co­me.
  • Ac­count­ing ma­ni­pu­la­tions re­la­ted to mer­ger in order to inc­re­a­se sales re­ve­nue/ pro­fit.
  • Le­a­se-re­la­ted ac­count­ing ma­ni­pu­la­tions.
  • Ac­count­ing fu­tu­re cash flows as today’s re­ve­nue, lend­ing or le­a­sing.
  • Wrong app­li­ca­ti­on of value ad­just­ments.

After the eco­no­mic fi­nan­cial and ac­count­ing scan­dal a wi­de-rang­ing analy­sis began to de­tect the ca­us­es. At the same time of eco­no­mic and so­ci­al ef­fects; the ef­fi­ci­ency, self-re­gu­lat­ing ca­pa­bi­lity, cre­di­bi­lity and ethics of the en­ti­re ac­count­ing pro­fes­si­on/ sys­tem is quest­ion­ed. Se­ve­ral stu­di­es had fo­cu­s­ed on in­teg­rity, a “back to ba­sics” idea, which re­minds the time when ac­coun­tancy pro­fes­si­on was called “Gentle­men’s Pro­fes­si­on”. The moral error was clear, but not just for ac­coun­tants, but also for ma­na­gers, bank analysts. Boat­ri­ght4 in se­arch of the origins of fi­nan­cial fraud cla­ims that they do not start with dis­ho­n­esty. The ef­fec­ti­ve­ness and proper func­tion­ing of the cor­pora­te gover­nance sys­tem were also analy­sed. Agra­wal and Chad­ha stu­di­ed with em­pi­ri­cal met­hods, whet­her cor­pora­te gover­nance me­chan­isms are in con­nec­ti­on with the li­ke­li­ho­od of the sub­se­qu­ent cor­rec­ti­on of the fi­nan­cial sta­te­ments of a com­pany.5 It is im­por­tant for the par­ti­ci­pants’ in­di­vi­du­al moral cons­ci­o­us­ness and fi­nan­cial cul­tu­re of a given eco­nomy has a de­ci­sive role.

The role of cul­t­u­ral dif­fe­ren­ces in the eco­nomy ope­ra­ti­on of count­ri­es’ real pro­ces­ses and com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness has been re­pea­tedly analy­sed. So­ci­al and cul­t­u­ral con­text of the im­pact of fi­nan­cial pro­ces­ses can be cle­arly de­monst­ra­ted in which trust, in­teg­rity, ethics and moral backg­round plays an im­por­tant role.6 Howe­ver, the im­por­tance of fi­nan­cial mar­kets has grown in the last five-ten years, which has drawn at­tent­ion to the sys­te­ma­tic as­sess­ment of the glo­bal need for fi­nan­cial li­te­racy. Re­cog­ni­zing the level of fi­nan­cial li­te­racy af­fect fi­nan­cial sta­bi­lity of the eco­nomy and trust mar­ket par­ti­ci­pants.

Se­ve­ral cent­ral banks of de­vel­oped count­ri­es – in Hun­gary it is the Cent­ral Bank of Hun­gary – play an ac­tive role in imp­ro­ving fi­nan­cial li­te­racy of the po­pu­la­ti­on, the de­ve­lop­ment of the fi­nan­cial cul­tu­re. When these eco­no­mic and fi­nan­cial is­sues ment­ion­ed above are glo­bal – such as the geo­po­li­ti­cal ef­fects – glo­bal ca­p­ital flows can be ne­ga­ti­vely af­fec­ted. Con­se­qu­ently, at­tempts to over­come and solve ope­ra­ti­o­nal dif­fi­cul­ti­es ex­ce­ed the li­mits.7 Be­hind them, al­most al­ways there is the pres­su­re for short term re­sults (fi­nan­cial ac­count­ing pres­su­re, achi­eve hig­her share price, meet in­ves­tors’ ex­pec­ta­tions etc.).

For this rea­son, it is im­por­tant to high­light anot­her, som­etimes in­comp­le­te and con­fus­ing areas of ac­count­ing re­gu­la­ti­on. It is well known that eco­no­mic ef­fects de­ter­mi­ne fi­nan­cial be­ha­vi­o­ur eg. inf­lu­en­ce mak­ing purc­has­es, pay­ing bills, sav­ing etc. Con­se­qu­ently, the be­ha­vi­o­ur is an es­sen­ti­al com­po­nent of fi­nan­cial cul­tu­re, one of the most im­por­tant parts.

A per­son with good fi­nan­cial edu­ca­ti­on – ac­tive mem­ber of the so­ci­ety as well – al­ways have an idea about how much he can spend on a ser­vi­ce or a pro­duct. In order to have an ad­van­ced fi­nan­cial cul­tu­re, ac­tive or­ga­ni­za­ti­o­nal skills are ne­e­ded so that in­di­vi­du­als are able to their fi­nan­cial ob­li­ga­tions and avoid fi­nan­cial prob­lems.8 In my opin­ion, in the de­ve­lop­ment and stan­dar­di­za­ti­on of ac­count­ing sys­tems, high exe­cu­tive com­pen­sa­ti­on in­cen­ti­ves lin­ked to fi­nan­cial per­for­mance pla­yed an im­por­tant role. Ins­ti­tu­ti­o­nal in­ves­tors en­co­u­rag­ed this trend, as it se­emed to be cont­ri­bu­ting to good cor­pora­te gover­nance, thus the in­te­rest of sha­re­hold­ers and ma­na­gers har­mo­ni­ze. Mar­ket de­re­gu­la­ti­on which ini­tia­ted the de­ve­lop­ment of new busi­ness mo­dels in the energy in­dustry and in te­le­com­mu­ni­ca­tions, which re­qu­i­red ac­count­ing met­hods tes­ted by GAAP.9

Howe­ver, banks in­vol­ved in in­ter­na­ti­o­nal in­vestments de­vel­oped comp­lex fi­nan­cial inst­ru­ments, which al­lo­wed for ins­tance to ac­count loans as trade.

This de­re­gu­la­ti­on, which had the aim of mak­ing the busi­ness more ef­fi­ci­ent, had unex­pec­ted con­se­qu­en­ces of wea­ke­ning const­ra­ints of com­pa­ni­es and in­vestment banks pro­vi­ding ac­count­ing ser­vi­ces

In my opin­ion, Denis cle­arly high­lights the fac­tors which refer to the high risk of com­pany ope­ra­ti­on and fi­nan­cial sta­te­ments.10

Some of these:

1. Link ma­na­ger com­pen­sa­tions to bo­nus­es, stock opt­ions and other in­cen­ti­ves.

2. Ma­nag­ement is do­mi­na­ted by a sing­le per­son or small group, and is not li­mi­ted by the board of di­rec­tors or audit com­mit­tee.

3. Ma­nag­ement de­fi­nes un­li­mi­ted agg­r­es­sive goals re­la­ted to the ope­ra­ti­o­nal func­tion­ing of the com­pany.

4. Ma­nag­ement igno­res re­gu­la­to­ry-cont­rol re­qu­i­re­ments of aut­ho­ri­ti­es.

5. Ma­nag­ement acts do­mi­nantly aga­inst the au­di­tors.

6. The com­pany car­ri­es out unu­su­al and comp­lex tran­sac­tions at the end of the year.

It can be sta­ted that everyone – ad­vi­sors, ac­coun­tants, au­di­tors, lawyers, bankers, analysts, ma­na­gers – is res­pon­sib­le for pro­vi­ding real in­for­ma­ti­on.

Board of di­rec­tors, the ma­nag­ement, ac­coun­tants, and mar­ket analysts have com­mon in­te­rest and res­pon­si­bi­lity to in­form in­ves­tors and cre­di­tors about past pro­ces­ses and fu­tu­re pers­pec­ti­ves of the com­pany.

Howe­ver, it can be said that le­aders who are com­mit­ted to serve the in­te­rest of sha­re­hold­ers – ma­ni­pu­la­ted ear­nings, hid debts and fal­si­fi­ed ac­count­ing data – to en­for­ce their stock opt­ions, on sha­re­hold­ers ex­pen­se, au­di­tors al­lo­wed “agg­r­es­sive ac­count­ing” and cer­ti­fi­ed fi­nan­cial sta­te­ments, which turned out to be false.

Re­qu­i­re­ments of the ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on sys­tem:

Exa­mining the cont­ents of the ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on, I agree with those sci­en­tists who came to the conc­lu­si­on11 that the ob­jec­ti­vity of in­for­ma­ti­on en­sures the cre­di­bi­lity, ne­ut­ra­lity and cla­rity of in­for­ma­ti­on.

These can be sum­ma­ri­zed in the fol­lo­wing five points:

  • Proof of ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on means that all ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on based on a re­ce­ipt.
  • Cre­di­bi­lity means that in­for­ma­ti­on is re­vie­wed by an in­de­pen­dent per­son and ob­jec­tive.
  • The most im­por­tant qu­a­lity att­ri­bu­te is re­le­vance. Ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on is es­sen­ti­al when it as­sists to de­ci­si­on mak­ing and imp­le­men­ta­ti­on of plans.12
  • Cla­rity means that ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on needs to be un­der­stan­d­ab­le, clear and con­ci­se. Ac­cord­ing to Mrs. dr. Tangl ex­ces­sive comp­r­es­si­on leads to less ef­fec­tive use of in­for­ma­ti­on.13

Se­ve­ral app­ro­ach cons­iders that ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on needs to be up to date that is to be ava­i­lab­le after the ac­count­ing pe­ri­od” as an ad­van­tage. In my opin­ion ti­me­li­ness of ma­nag­ement sup­port­ing in­for­ma­ti­on is ne­ces­sary, be­ca­u­se late sub­mit­ted ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on lose its im­por­tance. It is im­por­tant to ment­ion that sub­mitt­ing ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on in time leads to the inc­re­a­se in the cost of ac­qu­i­ring them. Se­ve­ral re­se­ar­chers have mo­deled and as­so­ci­a­ted the costs of ad­di­ti­o­nal in­for­ma­ti­on with the be­ne­fits of it. As­sum­ed it can de­ter­mi­ne a point after which the cost of ad­di­ti­o­nal in­for­ma­ti­on is grea­ter than the be­ne­fits.

Users com­pa­re ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on of dif­fe­rent com­pa­ni­es, thus it is ne­ces­sary to me­a­sure and eva­lu­a­te eco­no­mic events the same way. The main pur­po­se of the com­pi­la­ti­on of ac­count­ing po­li­cy is to pro­vi­de a true and fair view of the fi­nan­cial per­for­mance, as­sets and in­co­me of a com­pany. The va­lue-ori­en­ted pre­s­en­ta­ti­on of the com­pany’s ac­ti­vity has to be in line with the ad­mi­nistra­tive ac­count­ing and must be built into its func­ti­o­na­lity.

Howe­ver, wit­ho­ut the com­pa­ra­bi­lity of in­for­ma­ti­on, the ad­mi­nistra­tive ac­count­ing value cre­a­ti­on (ac­count­ing ad­mi­nistra­ti­on value) can­not be achi­eved which is re­qu­i­red by the sha­re­hold­er and in­ves­tor at­ti­tu­des more and more.14

Ac­count­ing re­cords what hap­pe­ned and what is hap­pe­ning in the com­pany, in re­la­ti­on to its en­vi­ron­ment and wit­hin the com­pany as well. The con­di­ti­on of the ful­fil­ment is de­ter­mi­ning users how and from what they re­ce­ive in­for­ma­ti­on from.

Based on this, it is pos­sib­le to de­ter­mi­ne what in­for­ma­ti­on ac­count­ing needs to pro­vi­de. In some or­ga­ni­za­ti­o­nal form when ow­ners have the le­aders­hip of the com­pany, they can cont­ri­bu­te to all ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on, which they need for their de­ci­sions. If the owner of the com­pany is se­pa­ra­ted from the di­rect ma­nag­ement, ow­ners do not have ac­cess to ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on. This in­for­ma­ti­on is re­ce­i­ved in­di­rectly in the form of fi­nan­cial sta­te­ments, re­ports ac­cord­ing to which ma­nag­ement make such de­ci­sions that re­qu­i­res more in­for­ma­ti­on than other users.

Studying le­ader cont­rols, it is re­ve­aled that feed­back func­ti­on of ac­count­ing is about pro­vi­ding in­for­ma­ti­on whet­her the com­pany has re­a­ched the plan­ned le­aders­hip goals. In case of a dif­fe­ren­ce, ma­nag­ement makes a de­ci­si­on about the ne­ces­sary ac­tions si­mil­arly as the analy­ti­cal func­tions of busi­ness and ma­nag­ement eco­no­mics. The imp­le­men­ta­ti­on of the re­port­ing func­ti­on can be disp­la­yed with con­ti­nu­o­us mo­ni­tor­ing of the de­ci­si­on and ac­count­ing pro­vi­des in­for­ma­ti­on when de­ci­si­on is imp­le­men­ted. This in­for­ma­ti­on in­forms about the in­ves­ted as­sets in the eco­no­mic ac­ti­vity and their changes. When de­ve­lop­ing an ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on sys­tem, cha­rac­te­r­is­tics and in­for­ma­ti­on needs have to be taken into ac­count, be­ca­u­se busi­ness pro­ces­ses can only be fol­lo­wed properly.

It can be seen that ac­count­ing in­di­ca­tors were de­vel­oped for re­port­ing and mo­ni­tor­ing pur­pos­es and even no­wa­days these are the main area of use the­re­fo­re pri­ma­rily they do not have de­ci­si­on sup­port roles. Ac­count­ing in­di­ca­tors pro­vi­de a lot of in­for­ma­ti­on about the past, bes­ides they are used as a cri­ter­ion for de­ci­si­on mak­ing plans with dif­fe­rent time ho­ri­zons. Est­imat­ing mul­tip­li­er num­bers, sales re­ve­nue, book value or ear­nings be­fo­re in­te­rest and taxes can be used as a base for the eva­lu­a­ti­on. Ac­count­ing me­a­sure­ment in­di­ca­tors inc­lu­de ear­nings per share, Price/ear­nings ratio and dif­fe­rent rates of re­turn.

In fact, if we ac­cept the con­di­ti­on that per­for­mance of com­pa­ni­es do not match with their eco­no­mic per­for­mance, than in­for­ma­ti­on pro­vi­ded by them may not be as us­e­ful for ma­na­ge­ri­al de­ci­sions. It is noted that in­ves­tors do not judge on the basis of ac­count­ing pro­fit but the re­turn on the com­pa­ni­es’ in­vestments. In case of lis­ted com­pa­ni­es, re­turn is based on the chan­ge in share price and com­bi­ned value of di­vi­dends; on the other hand (which can be cal­cu­lated in va­ri­o­us ways) in pri­vate com­pa­ni­es, mar­ket value and loans give the fair value of ow­ners in­vestments and this is com­pa­red to the ori­gi­nal value of the in­vestment.

The de­ci­sions of in­ves­tors are inf­lu­en­ced by risk, fu­tu­re per­for­mance of the com­pany. In­ves­tors are think­ing long term, mak­ing up ac­count­ing re­sults do not inc­re­a­se but dec­re­a­se the trust of in­ves­tors. Many aut­hors such as Stern Stewart & Co. (2000) – found more than 120 dis­tor­tions in the US-GA­AP sys­tem – ment­ion dis­torting fac­tors of ac­count­ing sys­tems and lack of de­ri­ved in­di­ca­tors. Keith and Ma­du­ra be­li­eve that the most se­ri­o­us prob­lem is that ac­count­ing is past ori­en­ted not the sup­port of de­ci­sions; in­for­ma­ti­on in ge­ne­ral is agg­re­ga­ted with in­cor­rect struc­tu­res, not su­i­tab­le to analy­se fac­tors inf­lu­enc­ing the re­sults. In ad­di­ti­on, it in­di­ca­tes the over­weight of fi­nan­cial in­di­ca­tors and the need for non-fi­nan­cial in­for­ma­ti­on. Ac­count­ing dis­tor­tions cause major prob­lems in three areas of va­lue-bas­ed the­ory – in­ven­to­ry va­lu­a­ti­on, de­pre­ci­a­ti­on and ac­ti­va­ti­on of ca­p­ital costs.15

So we can say that ac­count­ing in­di­ca­tors can be bad ad­visers in de­ci­si­on si­tu­a­tions. Due to these, the mo­ti­va­ti­on of ma­nag­ement can mis­le­ad, since de­ve­lop­ment” is based on ac­count­ing ca­teg­ori­es. Mayer al­re­ady poin­ted out the im­por­tance of the real cont­ent of ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on that is the big­gest di­sad­van­tage of ac­count­ing re­ports is the focus on ac­count­ing costs” which en­co­u­ra­ges ma­nag­ement to mi­n­imi­ze these num­bers.16

Se­ve­ral aut­hors cha­rac­te­ri­ze the con­cept of fi­nan­cial ac­count­ing as pe­ri­o­dic re­ports, tran­sac­tions of ac­ti­vi­ti­es of a com­pany or other eco­no­mic en­tity. Re­ports, that have eit­her ge­ne­ral or spe­ci­fic tar­gets, pro­vi­de in­for­ma­ti­on to ma­na­gers, ow­ners, cre­di­tors, ins­ti­tu­tions and to the pub­lic. Ac­cord­ing to Zéman ac­count­ing is an in­for­ma­ti­on sys­tem about the eco­no­mic events of the com­pany so that mar­ket par­ti­ci­pants can get a true and fair pic­tu­re of the com­pany. In my opin­ion, fi­nan­cial ac­count­ing shows the con­ti­nu­o­us re­cord of eco­no­mic events from which the fol­lo­wing conc­lu­sions can be drawn:

  • Fi­nan­cial ac­count­ing is the re­cord of eco­no­mics events in mo­ne­tary units and com­pi­la­ti­on of sta­te­ments that are pre­pa­red to meet the in­for­ma­ti­on needs of ex­ter­nal users, de­ter­mi­ning the eco­no­mics re­sults of the com­pany.
  • The cont­ent of fi­nan­cial ac­count­ing as a mo­dern con­cept can be in­terp­re­ted broadly. Many re­se­ar­chers think that se­ve­ral in­for­ma­ti­on re­qu­i­re­ments can be clas­si­fi­ed here such as the abi­lity of com­pany ma­nag­ement to ra­ti­o­nally fi­nance the ac­ti­vity of the com­pany and the cho­i­ce of the op­ti­mal fi­nanc­ing form, op­ti­mal com­po­sit­i­on of re­sour­ces.

Tra­di­ti­o­nal ac­count­ing sys­tems do not deal with the ef­fects of added eco­no­mic va­lues, una­b­le to eva­lu­a­te the com­pany’s en­vi­ron­men­tal as­sets, tak­ing into ac­count the in­te­rests of cur­rent so­ci­ety and fu­tu­re ge­ne­ra­tions re­gard­ing the ef­fects of cor­pora­te ac­ti­vity on en­vi­ron­ment.17 Ac­cord­ing to Pál the exis­ten­ce of ex­ter­na­li­ti­es is ignor­ed and only fi­nan­cial ca­teg­ori­es and im­pacts are taken into ac­count.18 Ac­cord­ing to Zéman ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing pro­vi­des in­for­ma­ti­on about the past and est­ima­ted data of the fu­tu­re for cor­pora­te gover­nance ac­ti­vi­ti­es and strategic plan­ning thus it pro­vi­des in­for­ma­ti­on that are ne­e­ded by the ma­na­gers to make de­ci­sions and mo­ni­tor busi­ness pro­ces­ses.19

In Ang­lo-Sa­xon count­ri­es the cont­ent of ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing is wider re­gard­ing cost ac­count­ing and data of fi­nan­cial ac­count­ing. Le­slie Chad­wick and Pa­u­line We­et­nei be­li­eve that ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing can be sum­ma­ri­zed in 10 points:

  • Cost ac­count­ing, which aims to me­a­sure the per­for­mance of de­part­ments, pro­ducts and ser­vi­ces.
  • Pro­vi­de in­for­ma­ti­on to ma­nag­ement which aims to en­sure proper flow of in­for­ma­ti­on for ma­na­gers (re­ports, sta­te­ments, tab­les etc.) as and when it is re­qu­i­red. A re­gu­lar flow of in­for­ma­ti­on al­lows ma­nag­ement to res­pond as soon as to any prob­lems that may arise.
  • Ma­nag­ement con­sult­ing – give ad­vi­ce to ma­nag­ement in con­nec­ti­on with de­ci­sions and eco­no­mic con­se­qu­en­ces and imp­le­men­ta­ti­on of al­ter­na­tive ac­tions.
  • Fo­re­casting, plan­ning and cont­rol. Ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing links to fu­tu­re and pre-de­ter­mi­ned sys­tems such as audit plan and other cost ac­count­ing met­hods. These met­hods exa­mi­ne the dif­fe­ren­ces which are re­sult­ing from the dif­fe­ren­ce of ac­tu­al and pro­jec­ted per­for­man­ces.
  • Com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on. In order to have an ef­fec­tive ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing sys­tem it is es­sen­ti­al that a re­li­ab­le and ef­fi­ci­ent com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on sys­tem is as­so­ci­a­ted with it.
  • Sys­tems. The ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing de­part­ment sho­uld be ac­ti­vely in­vol­ved in cost cont­rol and de­sign of fi­nan­cial re­port­ing sys­tems.
  • Fle­xi­bi­lity. Ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing must be fle­xib­le in order to res­pond qu­ickly to any changes that may occur.
  • Tak­ing into ac­count other busi­ness tasks. In­for­ma­ti­on pro­vi­ders sho­uld be aware of the roles of other busi­ness func­tions as well. They sho­uld en­sure co­ope­ra­ti­on and co­or­di­na­ti­on with other func­tions too.
  • Train­ing of emp­loye­es. Ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing de­part­ment must pro­vi­de the ne­ces­sary in­for­ma­ti­on.
  • Gu­ard­ing gate”. Ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing is in a kind of po­sit­i­on of aut­ho­rity what pro­vi­des the re­qu­i­ring ac­cess” (can re­ce­ive and send in­for­ma­ti­on) to ma­nag­ement, ma­in­ta­ins re­la­tions and re­ce­i­ves in­for­ma­ti­on from the ex­ter­nal en­vi­ron­ment.

Con­se­qu­ently, it inc­lu­des all met­hods and pro­ce­du­res that help ma­nag­ement de­ci­si­on mak­ing. In my opin­ion, we need to find a com­mon in­for­ma­ti­on set, which help ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing in de­ci­si­on mak­ing and est­ab­lish ac­count­ing po­li­cy based on those. In sum­ma­ry, re­gard­ing the va­lu­a­ti­on of aut­hen­tic or mis­lead­ing” ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on in pre­pa­ra­ti­on of eco­no­mic de­ci­sions, we can say that ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing pro­vi­des fi­nan­cial and non-fi­nan­cial in­for­ma­ti­on to ma­nag­ement to have an ef­fec­tive de­ci­si­on mak­ing sys­tem. Howe­ver, ac­count­ing in­di­ca­tors were de­vel­oped for mo­ni­tor­ing and re­port­ing pur­pos­es, and even today these are the main area of use. The stan­dards app­li­ed by in­ter­na­ti­o­nal sys­tems inc­re­a­singly try to fol­low and help to imp­ro­ve the cont­ent of in­for­ma­ti­on of in­ves­tors and ma­nag­ement the­re­fo­re; they do not have a pri­ma­ry role in this, so this kind of func­ti­o­na­lity of ma­nag­ement ac­count­ing will not be re­a­ched.

Notes

  • 1. N. Byr­nes et al.: Spe­ci­al re­port – The Enron scan­dal: re­form is ur­gent. Here’s what needs to be done. Busi­ness Week On­line, 2002 Ja­nu­ary 28.
  • 2. Hor­váth Ágnes: A vál­la­la­ti ér­ték­te­rem­tés szub­jek­tív té­nye­zői. [Sub­jec­tive of fac­tors cor­pora­te value cre­a­ti­on.] E-tu­do­mány, 2005/1.
  • 3. A. S. At­kin­son: Can money and ethics mix? Chang­ing ho­ri­zons for the ac­count­ing pro­fes­si­on. Strategic Di­rec­ti­on, Vol. 19, No. 6., 2003, 18–20.
  • 4. John R. Boat­ri­ght: Ethics for a Post-En­ron Ame­ri­ca. Phi Kappa Phi Forum, Vol. 83, No. 2., Spring, 2003, 10–15.
  • 5. Anup Agra­wal – Sa­hi­ba Chad­ha: Cor­pora­te Gover­nance and Ac­count­ing Scan­dals. Jour­nal of Law and Eco­no­mics, Vol. 48, No. 2., Oc­to­ber, 2005, 371–406.
  • 6. Ce­cí­lia Szi­ge­ti – Anita Bor­zán – Csaba Lent­ner: Com­pa­ra­tive Analy­sis of Land-Struc­tu­re of Hun­gary and Ro­ma­nia. Stu­dia Uni­ver­si­ta­tis Va­si­le Gold­is. Seria Sti­in­te Eco­no­mi­ce, Vol. 20, No. 1., Va­si­le Gold­is Uni­ver­sity Press, Arad, 2010, 1–7.; Csaba Lent­ner: The Com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness of Hun­ga­ri­an Uni­ver­sity – Based Know­ledge Cent­res in Euro­pe­an Eco­no­mic and Hig­her Edu­ca­ti­on Area. Trans­for­ma­tions in Busi­ness and Eco­no­mics, Vol. 6, No. 2., 2007, 87–100.
  • 7. Csaba Lent­ner: Un­certainty Fac­tors in Na­ti­o­nal Eco­nomy Plan­ning – In­ter­na­ti­o­nal Ef­fects and Hun­gary’s Out­lo­ok Up to 2050. Cent­ral Euro­pe­an Po­li­ti­cal Sci­en­ce Re­view, Qu­ar­terly of Cent­ral Euro­pe­an Po­li­ti­cal Sci­en­ce Al­li­ance, Vol 16, No. 62., Win­ter 2015, 9–26.; Zol­tán Szen­te – Csaba Lent­ner: Pub­lic Ad­mi­nistra­ti­on Re­forms in Hun­gary and Unort­ho­dox Me­a­sures in Hun­ga­ri­an Eco­no­mic Po­li­cy. In: Pub­lic Ad­mi­nistra­ti­on Re­forms in Tran­sit­i­o­nal Pe­ri­od. What and How? Eds.: Lee Eun-Jae, Ser­gei L. Ser­gev­nin, Korea Ins­ti­tu­te of Pub­lic Ad­mi­nistra­ti­on, Nor­th-West Ins­ti­tu­te of Ma­nag­ement of the Rus­si­an Pres­iden­ti­al Aca­demy of Na­ti­o­nal Eco­nomy and Pub­lic Ad­mi­nistra­ti­on, 2014, 29–48.
  • 8. Csaba Lent­ner – Ce­cí­lia Szi­ge­ti – Anita Bor­zán: New Di­men­sions of Banks So­ci­al Res­pon­si­bi­lity. In: Sus­ta­in­ab­le Eco­no­mics, Com­mu­nity Strate­gi­es. Ab­st­ract of the 3
  • rd. In­ter­na­ti­o­nal Con­fe­ren­ce of Eco­no­mic Sci­en­ces. Szerk.: Szen­te Vik­tó­ria et al., Ka­pos­vár Uni­ver­sity Fa­culty of Eco­no­mic Sci­en­ce, 2011, 241. Zol­tán Zéman – Va­lu­a­ti­on of Aut­hen­tic or “Mis­lead­ing” Ac­count­ing In­for­ma­ti­on…
  • 9. Tibor Tar­nó­czi – Ve­ro­ni­ka Feny­ves – Zol­tán Bács: Real opt­ions in busi­ness va­lu­a­ti­on. Acta Oe­co­no­mi­ca Uni­ver­si­ta­tis Selye, 2015/2., 41–52.; G. Peter Wil­son: Don’t throw out the re­port­ing baby with the Enron bath water. Cri­ti­cal cons­ide­ra­tions when re­form­ing the re­port­ing sys­tem. Fi­nan­cial Re­port­ing, BDO Se­id­man, 22 April, 2002; Zol­tán Mus­insz­ki: Chang­ing World, Unc­hang­ing Ac­count­ing? Cost Sys­tems for Hun­ga­ri­an Ag­ri­cul­t­u­ral Com­pa­ni­es. The­ory Met­ho­do­logy Prac­ti­ce, Vol. 7, No. 2., 2011, 39–45.
  • 10. Jo­seph W. St. Denis: Co­o­king the Books: Tricks of the Trade in Fi­nan­cial Fraud. Uni­ted Sta­tes At­tor­ney’s Bul­le­tin, May 2003, 19–26.; Mark Jick­ling: Ac­count­ing Prob­lems Re­por­ted in Major Com­pa­ni­es Since Enron. CSR Re­port for Cong­ress, Ja­nu­ary 2003, 1–6.
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  • 13. Ist­ván Vajna – Anita Vaj­na-Tangl: The Com­pa­ri­son of the dif­fe­rent ways of the int­ro­duc­ti­on of the 5S met­hod in par­ti­ce and the ef­fect ont he pro­duc­ti­vity and the ac­count­ing in­for­ma­ti­on. In: Pro­ce­e­dings of the 5th In­ter­na­ti­o­nal Con­fe­ren­ce on Ma­nag­ement 2015. Ma­nag­ement, Le­aders­hip and Strategy for SMEs’ Com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness. Ed.: Anna Dunay, Szent Ist­ván Uni­ver­sity Pub­lish­ing, Gö­döl­lő, 2015, 119–125.
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  • 15. Keith P. Mc­Mil­lan: Trust and the vir­tues: a so­lu­ti­on to the ac­count­ing scan­dals? Cri­ti­cal Pers­pec­ti­ves on Ac­count­ing, Vol. 15, No. 6–7., 2004, 943–953.; Jeff Ma­du­ra: What Every In­ves­tor Needs to Know about Ac­count­ing Fraud. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2004.
  • 16. Jane Mayer: The ac­coun­tant’s war. The New Yor­ker, April 22 and 29, 2002, 64–71.; Alan Re­ins­tein – Jeff­rey J. Mc­Mil­lan: The Enron de­bac­le: more than a per­fect storm. Cri­ti­cal Pers­pec­ti­ves on Ac­count­ing, Vol. 15, No. 6–7., 2004, 955–970.
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  • 18. Pál Tibor – Vár­ko­nyi­né Ju­hász Mária – Fü­re­di-Fü­löp Judit: A könyv­vizs­gá­ló és a vál­la­la­ti mű­kö­dés. [The au­di­tor and cor­pora­tive per­for­mance.] Cont­rol­ler Info, 2015/4., 21–26. o.
  • 19. Zéman, op. cit.