Role of Central Banks in the Economy

Pai­man Ra­ma­zan Ahmad, PhD Stu­dent, Na­ti­o­nal Uni­ver­sity of Pub­lic Ser­vi­ce-Fa­culty of Po­li­ti­cal Sci­en­ces and Pub­lic Ad­mi­nistra­ti­on (Pai­man. ahmad.​ramazan@​uni-nke.​hu).

Sum­ma­ry

In dis­cus­sing the mic­ro­e­co­no­mics of any count­ry, there is a need to analy­ze the tools and po­li­ci­es of this spe­ci­fic eco­nomy and the role of govern­ment in the proper re­gu­la­ti­on and cont­rol of the eco­nomy. Wit­hin this fra­me­work, the role of cent­ral banks is high­ligh­ted; and spe­ci­fic examp­les are given from dif­fe­rent count­ri­es, from both ad­van­ced and de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es. In ac­cor­dance with the func­ti­on of cent­ral banks, the im­por­tance of mo­ne­tary and fis­cal po­li­ci­es is emp­has­i­zed, as “macro po­li­cy in the world eco­nomy can be tho­ught of as a game, each count­ry is a player in the game,”1 and bes­ides, “the macro po­li­cy prob­lem is one of cho­o­sing po­li­cy rules that descri­be how the inst­ru­ments of po­li­cy sho­uld res­pond to eco­no­mic con­di­tions in order to imp­ro­ve the per­for­mance of tar­get va­ri­a­b­les.”2

Role of the cent­ral banks in the eco­nomy

Be­fo­re analy­zing the role of cent­ral banks, it might be im­por­tant to note the main cri­te­ria for the role of a cent­ral bank in the eco­nomy as fol­lows:

– Price sta­bi­lity must be the over­ri­ding, long-term goal of mo­ne­tary po­li­cy;

– An exp­li­cit no­mi­nal anc­hor must be adop­ted;

– A cent­ral bank sho­uld be focus on goals;

– A cent­ral bank sho­uld be in­de­pen­dent of inst­ru­ments;

– A cent­ral bank sho­uld be ac­coun­tab­le;

– A cent­ral bank sho­uld stress tran­spa­rency and com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on;

– A cent­ral bank sho­uld also set fi­nan­cial sta­bi­lity as its ob­jec­tive.3

In es­sen­ce, cent­ral banks can be cons­idered as the en­gi­ne of the eco­nomy, where like the en­gi­ne the power is cont­rol­led and re­gu­lated, any mal­func­ti­on in the en­gi­ne crea­tes a risk and prob­lem in the sys­tem. The­re­fo­re; cent­ral banks are ext­remely im­por­tant tool, Wrights­man sta­ted in de­fi­ning mo­ne­tary po­li­cy, “the de­li­ber­ate eff­ort by the cent­ral bank to cont­rol money supply and cre­dit con­di­ti­on for the pur­po­se of achi­eving cert­ain broad eco­no­mic ob­jec­ti­ves.”4 Cent­ral banks sho­uld have the same role everyw­he­re, but this is not the case. In the int­ro­duc­to­ry part of his book, Cur­zio Gi­an­ni­ni ack­now­led­ged that “if the succ­ess of an ins­ti­tu­ti­on can be fa­irly jud­ged by its dif­fu­si­on, then the cent­ral bank is wit­ho­ut doubt a very succ­ess­ful ins­ti­tu­ti­on.”5 Cur­rently, the num­ber of cent­ral banks is inc­re­a­sing; eco­no­mists stress the sig­ni­fi­cance of ha­v­ing a count­ry’s cent­ral bank, and among the most inf­lu­en­ti­al banks can be the fol­lo­wing:

1. US Fe­de­ral Re­ser­ve Bank (USD)

2. Euro­pe­an cent­ral bank (EUR)

3. Bank of Eng­land (GBP)

4. Bank of Japan (JPY)

5. Swiss Na­ti­o­nal Bank (CHF)

6. Bank of Ca­na­da (CAD)

7. Re­ser­ve Bank of Aust­ra­lia (AUD)

8. Re­ser­ve Bank of New Ze­aland (NZD)

In prin­cip­le, the cent­ral bank­ing sys­tem is not com­pe­ti­tive in the de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es, re­gard­less of the few “re­gions and is­land count­ri­es, only North Korea does not have a cent­ral bank.”6 Howe­ver, in re­a­lity cent­ral banks do not al­ways func­ti­on in the way people and eco­no­mists would like to see. Cent­ral banks sho­uld be in­de­pen­dent, but and the govern­ment over­se­es its ope­ra­tions, so they are ex­po­s­ed to po­li­ti­ci­ans’ in­te­re­fe­ren­ce. Ap­pa­rently, as Charles Good­hart noted, “the cent­ral bank as the fruit of an ins­ti­tu­ti­o­na­li­za­ti­on of rest­ric­tive com­pe­ti­tive prac­ti­ces re­qu­i­red by the very na­tu­re of bank­ing.”7 Cent­ral Banker Re­port Cards, first pub­lis­hed in 1994 in Glo­bal Fi­nance, rate cent­ral bank gover­nors in al­most 75 count­ri­es on a scale from “A” to “F”. The only gover­nor rated “A” in the 2015 re­port among the gover­nors of the Midd­le East was the gover­nor of Is­ra­el’s cent­ral bank, while the gover­nors of the cent­ral banks of “India, Ma­lay­sia, Phi­lip­pi­nes, Ta­i­wan” were all rated “A”.8 In de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es, Al­ba­nia heads the list as the best among the cent­ral banks in the world, be­ca­u­se “the bank has been able to anc­hor in­fla­ti­on­ary ex­pec­ta­tions well based on its in­fla­ti­on tar­ge­ting fra­me­work, as Al­ba­ni­an eco­nomy re­jo­i­ces over a fluid, well-ca­pi­ta­li­zed and li­qu­id bank­ing sec­tor, mak­ing it able to hand­le the cris­is bet­ter than most Euro­pe­an Count­ri­es.”9 The ef­fec­ti­ve­ness of cent­ral banks is not al­ways seen as the main pil­lar of the eco­nomy: in his book “From here to eco­nomy: a short­cut to eco­no­mic li­te­racy” Todd G. Buch­holz noted that “cent­ral banks can­not do much to make fac­tor ma­nag­ement more ef­fi­ci­ent, or to make wor­kers work hard, or to ins­pi­re in­ven­tors to in­vent more.”10 In other words, the duty of cent­ral banks is only fa­ci­li­ta­ti­on, the provi­si­on of ef­fi­ci­ent supply and fi­gu­ring out how much the eco­nomy needs. The im­por­tance of cent­ral banks was known in some sta­tes in their early years of their eco­no­mic growth, for ins­tance, “the cent­ral bank of the Uni­ted State was est­ab­lis­hed in 1913 as the Fe­de­ral Re­ser­ve Sys­tem by the Cong­ress. In this re­gard, the Cong­ress, the Pres­ident and Fed all to­get­her cont­ri­bu­te to mac­ro-eco­no­mic po­li­cy.”11 The role of cent­ral banks in the de­ve­lop­ing world was ex­ten­ded later than in de­vel­oped count­ri­es, and so, “many cent­ral banks in de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es no­wa­days pro­ac­ti­vely, seek to promo­te sus­ta­in­ab­le eco­no­mic de­ve­lop­ment.”12 Since cent­ral banks are the main inst­ru­ments in imp­ro­ving com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness in any eco­nomy, they must be in­de­pen­dent from the govern­ment in de­ci­si­on-mak­ing, which means no po­li­ti­cal in­ter­vent­ions in bank­ing af­fa­irs at all. Howe­ver, in ad­van­ced eco­no­mi­es, the in­de­pen­den­ce of cent­ral banks is gran­ted by the govern­ment. Un­der­stand­ing the role of cent­ral banks is not easy, but cru­ci­al, the cent­ral bank was descri­bed in a very in­ter­est­ing way in a de­fi­ni­ti­on as “the len­der of last re­sort,” which con­veys that it is res­pon­sib­le for pro­vi­ding its count­ry’s eco­nomy with funds if com­mer­ci­al banks can­not cover a supply shor­tage. Bes­ides, it also acts “as a re­gu­la­to­ry aut­ho­rity of a count­ry’s mo­ne­tary po­li­cy.”13 Li­ke­wi­se, Thomp­son and Cow­ton write that “banks not only need to watch the di­rect en­vi­ron­men­tal im­pacts of their own ope­ra­tions, but also the im­pacts of their lend­ing ac­ti­vi­ti­es.”14 A sen­sit­ive and se­ri­o­us quest­ion that must be high­ligh­ted is govern­ment cont­rol over cent­ral banks in the de­ve­lop­ing world. Have cent­ral banks in de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es ever been in­de­pen­dent of govern­ments? Na­tu­rally, the cycle model of the bank­ing sys­tem in the de­ve­lop­ing world is fra­gi­le, and if the govern­ment makes mis­gui­ding in­ter­vent­ions in cert­ain si­tu­a­tions, the eco­nomy might col­lap­se. As the Iraqi cent­ral bank’s gover­nor put it after a law­ma­kers’ mee­ting in Par­lia­ment: “The bank is in­de­pen­dent, fi­nan­cially and ad­mi­nistra­ti­vely, and the­re­fo­re all pro­ce­du­res and po­li­ci­es that it adopts are in­de­pen­dent.”15 Li­ke­wi­se, in 2004, the de­puty gover­nor of the Iraqi cent­ral bank con­fir­med that “the in­de­pen­den­ce of the cent­ral bank.”16 In such a si­tu­a­ti­on the blame game is worthw­hi­le, but de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es and govern­ments are al­ways ready to jus­ti­fy fi­nan­cial col­lap­se, in par­ti­cu­lar, du­ring wars and re­gi­o­nal ten­sions ma­inly in the Midd­le East and Afri­ca. Mo­re­o­ver, cent­ral banks are also sup­po­s­ed to pro­tect we­alth, but the sur­pri­sing quest­ion is whose we­alth they pro­tect aga­inst whom. If the govern­ment takes over mo­ne­tary po­li­cy, does it mean a good agent pro­tects every in­te­rest? Cent­ral banks in the de­ve­lop­ing world are not per­fect in con­duc­ting mo­ne­tary po­li­cy, and the quest­ion may arise: what, after all, is the role of a cent­ral bank? Is it fi­nan­cial sta­bi­lity at all costs or does it de­pend on the si­tu­a­ti­on? Cent­ral banks have va­ri­o­us and sig­ni­fi­cant res­pon­si­bi­li­ti­es, inc­lu­ding ove­rall cont­rol over the total amount of money ava­i­lab­le in an eco­nomy, the point where the cent­ral bank wants to fight in­fla­ti­on. In fact, in­fla­ti­on “re­fers to a rise in price le­vels, which ca­us­es a fall in the purc­ha­sing power of a cur­rency. It counts for the en­ti­re bas­ket of goods and ser­vi­ces not only the price of one item”17 In this respect, trac­king and cont­roll­ing in­fla­ti­on is the level where the bank mo­ni­tors the sys­tem. In a de­ve­lop­ing re­gi­on like the Kur­dis­tan Re­gi­on, not only in­fla­ti­on, but also the lack of money cut the purc­ha­sing power. Du­ring in­fla­ti­on people need more money to cover their needs, but du­ring the re­cent eco­no­mic down­turn in the Kur­dis­tan Re­gi­on in 2014–2015, the govern­ment with­held civil ser­vants’ sa­la­ri­es, which are the only sour­ce of in­co­me for many people. For this rea­son purc­ha­sing power dec­li­ned, as the pri­ces of ser­vi­ces and goods dec­re­as­ed, but in­co­mes dec­li­ned more ra­pidly. The rea­son is not rise in the pri­ces or in­fla­ti­on, but wage ma­nag­ement. On the other hand, the 2015 dec­line in oil pri­ces was an ex­ter­nal fac­tor with di­rect im­pact on the eco­nomy in the Kur­dis­tan Re­gi­on. “Kur­dish oil re­ve­nue aver­ag­ed bet­ween $361 mil­li­on and $406 mil­li­on per month, a short­fall that has ca­u­s­ed the KRG to fall be­hind on sa­lary pay­ments for the past four months.”18 In­ter­est­ingly, when oil pri­ces are high in eco­no­mi­es de­pen­dent on oil, most ex­port­ed goods are ge­ne­rally more ex­pen­sive, which af­fects the po­pu­la­tions, while in the pe­ri­ods cha­rac­te­ri­sed by low oil pri­ces, the pri­ces of goods do not chan­ge. Thus, in­fla­ti­on poses a prob­lem for de­pen­dent eco­no­mic re­gions, espe­ci­ally those that de­pend on a sing­le com­mo­dity, like energy. In the Midd­le East and Afri­ca, cert­ain govern­ments seem to have fai­led to co­or­di­na­te fis­cal and mo­ne­tary po­li­ci­es. This is only true, howe­ver, to count­ri­es where cent­ral banks are not strong eno­ugh, and this leads to the emer­gen­ce of un­de­moc­ra­tic and hea­vily cent­ra­li­zed cent­ral banks. The Euro­pe­an cent­ral bank is a good examp­le, as it ef­fi­ci­ently rep­re­sents the in­te­rests of the euro area, alt­ho­ugh not all euro area count­ri­es fol­low this path. Rang­ala high­lights two im­por­tant points:

– The ECB has just shown that cent­ral banks can act when govern­ments can’t, and in doing so, may have inc­re­as­ed the role of mo­ne­tary po­li­cy ver­sus fis­cal po­li­cy.

– World­wi­de, fis­cal po­li­cy has been lar­gely in­ef­fec­tu­al, not so much be­ca­u­se govern­ment eff­orts have fai­led, but be­ca­u­se most govern­ments have fai­led to make an eff­ort.19 One of the key fea­tu­res of the bank­ing sys­tem in de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es is the de­pen­den­ce of cent­ral banks, and heavy govern­men­tal in­vol­ve­ment in bank­ing af­fa­irs.

Crowe and Meade dis­cuss cent­ral banks’ in­de­pen­den­ce as fol­lows:

– In­de­pen­den­ce is grea­ter when the cent­ral bank’s ma­nag­ement is in­su­la­ted from po­li­ti­cal pres­su­re by se­cu­re ten­ure and in­de­pen­dent ap­point­ment.

– The cent­ral bank en­joys grea­ter fre­e­dom when the govern­ment can­not par­ti­ci­pa­te in or over­turn its po­li­cy de­ci­sions.

– In­de­pen­den­ce is grea­ter when the cent­ral bank’s legal man­da­te spe­ci­fi­es a cle­arly de­fi­ned ob­jec­tive for mo­ne­tary po­li­cy.

– In­de­ed, gu­a­ran­tying in­de­pen­den­ce of cent­ral banks

– Fi­nan­cial in­de­pen­den­ce of the cent­ral bank re­li­es upon rest­ric­tions that limit lend­ing to the govern­ment.20

In his lec­tu­re on “Cent­ral Banks and the Fi­nan­cial Sys­tem”, Cor­ri­gan high­lights cru­ci­al points. In the in­te­rest of prog­ress in a num­ber of count­ri­es in Ea­s­tern Euro­pe, he makes the fol­lo­wing re­com­men­da­tions:

– First, the sta­bi­lity of the bank­ing and fi­nan­cial sys­tem is an ab­so­lu­te. Pre­re­qui­site for the growth and sta­bi­lity of the eco­nomy at large.

– Se­cond, of all of the ele­ments of struc­tu­ral re­form that are ne­ces­sary in the tran­sit­i­on from a cent­rally plan­ned and cont­rol­led eco­nomy to a mar­ket eco­nomy, none is of grea­ter im­por­tance than the re­form of the bank­ing and fi­nan­cial sys­tem.

– Third, while the de­ve­lop­ment of ca­p­ital mar­ket­se­spe­ci­ally an ef­fi­ci­ent mar­ket and se­con­dary mar­ket for na­ti­o­nal govern­ment se­cu­ri­ti­es-cle­arly is im­por­tant; the hig­hest pri­o­rity sho­uld be 24 E. Gerald Cor­ri­gan pla­ced on the re­form and adap­ta­ti­on of the com­mer­ci­al bank­ing sys­tem.

– Fo­urth, succ­ess­ful re­form of the com­mer­ci­al bank­ing sys­tem pre­sup­pos­es pa­ral­lel re­form in the cent­ral bank­ing sys­tem.

– Even­tu­ally, com­mer­ci­al banks and cent­ral banks have only one asset that re­ally mat­ters and that asset is pub­lic con­fi­den­ce, re­forms to aim in en­for­cing con­fi­den­ce in the con­text where they app­li­ed.21

Mo­re­o­ver, two cru­ci­al as­pects are ment­ion­ed in a de­fi­ni­ti­on of in­de­pen­den­ce by J.T. Wo­o­ley:

– The Fe­de­ral Re­ser­ve Sys­tem (Fed) is in­de­pen­dent if it can pro­po­se and put into prac­ti­ce a mo­ne­tary po­li­cy that has not pre­vi­o­usly been app­ro­ved by the pres­ident of the Uni­ted Sta­tes, the Cong­ress and all the other in­te­rest gro­ups out­si­de the Fed itself, which may not be to their li­king.

– The Fed is in­de­pen­dent if it is cap­ab­le of re­a­ch­ing its ob­jec­ti­ves wit­ho­ut the help of ac­ti­on by other po­li­cy-ma­kers.22

Jur­gen Stark, mem­ber of the exe­cu­tive board of the Euro­pe­an Cent­ral Bank, ment­ion­ed three key points of un­der­stand­ing and aware­ness of price sta­bi­lity:

– pro­tects the real purc­ha­sing power of money and in­co­mes so that people can con­cent­ra­te on pro­duc­tive ac­ti­vi­ti­es rat­her than on strate­gi­es to pro­tect their we­alth and in­co­me aga­inst in­fla­ti­on or de­fla­ti­on,

– en­han­ces the abi­lity of mar­kets to al­lo­ca­te re­sour­ces to their most ef­fi­ci­ent use by pre­vent­ing sig­nals from changes in re­la­tive pri­ces from be­com­ing blur­red by a ge­ne­ral trend in pri­ces,

– re­du­ces risk pre­mia in lon­ger­term in­te­rest rates, the­reby per­ma­nently lo­we­ring fi­nanc­ing costs for con­su­mers and firms,23

In de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es, cent­ral banks en­de­a­vo­ur to boost eco­no­mic growth, and thus they can be cons­idered as the dri­ving for­ces of the eco­nomy, so there sho­uld be “ad­just­ment bet­ween de­mand and supply of money. A shor­tage of money supply will in­hi­bit growth while an ex­cess of it will lead to in­fla­ti­on. When the eco­nomy de­ve­lops, the de­mand for money is li­kely to go up due to the gra­du­al mo­ne­ti­za­ti­on of the non-mo­ne­ti­zed sec­tor and the inc­re­a­se in ag­ri­cul­t­u­ral and in­dust­ri­al pro­duc­ti­on.”24 With due cons­ide­ra­ti­on to this fact, the quest­ion of cent­ral banks’ cont­rol over in­te­rest rates in the eco­nomy is tan­ta­mount to as­king if the cent­ral bank can ma­in­ta­in the sta­bi­lity of the fi­nan­cial sys­tem, espe­ci­ally in de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es, where fi­nan­cial sys­tems are rat­her fra­gi­le, would this line be the ans­wer for ha­v­ing proper in­te­rest rate po­li­cy. The rea­son the cent­ral bank changes its po­li­cy in­te­rest rate is nor­mally to inf­lu­en­ce eco­no­mic ac­ti­vity.25 The ma­nag­ement of cre­dit con­di­tions and in­te­rest rates must be done by the cent­ral bank ca­re­fully, in the his­to­ry of the Uni­ted Sta­tes, Paul Vol­c­ker with Fed Cha­ir­man Art­hur Burns aimed at “tight money po­li­ci­es and high in­te­rest rates to re­tard in­fla­ti­on.” This has given clear evi­den­ce to the his­to­ry that mo­ne­tary po­li­cy to allow mo­de­ra­te growth in money and cre­dit. In the price con­cern, Vol­c­ker tho­ught “do­m­es­tic and in­ter­na­ti­o­nal price sta­bi­lity went hand in hand.”26

In fact, cent­ral banks are not only de­sign­ed to tack­le price and in­fla­ti­on is­sues, as eco­no­mic growth and emp­loy­ment are also re­le­vant va­ri­a­b­les, in most count­ri­es the cent­ral banks have rest­ric­tions, ma­inly when the mo­ne­tary po­li­cy has lim­it­ations, “Mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is not the only force ac­ting on out­put, emp­loy­ment, and pri­ces. Many other fac­tors af­fect agg­re­ga­te de­mand and agg­re­ga­te supply and, con­se­qu­ently, the eco­no­mic po­sit­i­on of hou­se­holds and busi­nes­ses.”27 The role of the cent­ral bank in the emp­loy­ment cre­a­ti­on is a con­cern for govern­ments glo­bally, ac­cord­ing to the In­ter­na­ti­o­nal La­bour Or­ga­ni­za­ti­on (2019), more than 212 mil­li­on people will be out of work, up from the cur­rent 201 mil­li­on, based on the World Emp­loy­ment and So­ci­al Out­lo­ok – Trends 2015 (WESO). The rise in unemp­loy­ment was due to the fi­nan­cial cris­is in 2008 in which more than 62 mil­li­on jobs have been lost.28 While, ILO re­port has re­cor­ded high unemp­loy­ment re­la­ti­vely as 186 mil­li­on job­less people.29 The main quest­ion of unemp­loy­ment must be add­res­sed as can everyone get a job, if she/he wants? Then that is re­la­ti­vely de­pend­ing on the eco­nomy and the re­gi­on too. Per­haps full-emp­loy­ment “zero unemp­loy­ment” is what many count­ri­es want, but this scope is not easy to get it, since the po­pu­la­ti­on rate, and the dura­ti­on of the unemp­loy­ment can be en­coun­te­red as the va­ri­a­b­les to find out what to do to ab­sorb full-emp­loy­ment. The comp­lex trade-off bet­ween the unemp­loy­ment and in­fla­ti­on both is re­la­ted and as­so­ci­a­ted with the cent­ral bank and how to ma­nage it, Phi­lips ligh­ted “the more unemp­loy­ment di­mi­nis­hes, the more ra­pidly wage rates nor­mally inc­re­a­se, while low wages is cor­res­pond­ingly as­so­ci­a­ted with high per­cen­tage of un-emp­loy­ment.”30 From this point, unemp­loy­ment and wage re­la­ti­on has di­rect re­la­ti­on to price con­cept in the eco­nomy, from the per­cept­ion of Phi­lips, “the po­li­cy ma­kers can­not tar­get both unemp­loy­ment and in­fla­ti­on at the same time, as du­ring the 1960s, the mo­ne­ta­rists emp­has­i­zed price sta­bi­lity (low in­fla­ti­on), while Key­ne­si­ans more emp­has­i­zed on job cre­a­ti­on.”31

What does unemp­loy­ment mean? And what the na­tu­ral rate of unemp­loy­ment is, “the na­tu­ral rate of unemp­loy­ment”, we have de­fi­ned the equi­lib­ri­um real wage as that at which all those people who would be wil­ling to ac­cept jobs at that wage are in emp­loy­ment.32 In­de­ed, the cent­ral bank is wil­ling to ac­cept a hig­her mar­gi­nal inc­re­a­se in the unemp­loy­ment rate in order to pre­vent a furt­her rise in the rate of in­fla­ti­on.33 Ap­pa­rently, some count­ri­es per­form bet­ter in the Phi­lips curve than ot­hers, it seems that whe­ne­ver mo­ne­tary and fis­cal po­li­cy shove unemp­loy­ment below 5%, high rates of in­fla­ti­on are li­kely to occur. It fol­lows from this that if the only way to re­du­ce unemp­loy­ment to 4% “the old in­te­rim tar­get of the Ken­ne­dy-John­son eco­no­mists, is to ac­cept wage and the price inc­re­a­se of 8 or 9%.”34 Im­por­tantly, people, govern­ments and cent­ral banks are con­cer­ned about in­fla­ti­on and unemp­loy­ment at the same time, in­so­far, the Scan­di­na­vi­an count­ri­es have spe­ci­fic model of in­te­grat­ing everyone into a sing­le, skil­led la­bour force, which is not ex­pe­ri­en­ced glo­bally, espe­ci­ally the de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es. While the cent­ral bank tar­gets the in­fla­ti­on rate, the Phi­lips curve ar­gues that “ri­sing unemp­loy­ment ought to be ac­com­pa­ni­ed by slo­wing in­fla­ti­on.”35 Cons­ider­ing the si­tu­a­ti­on in de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es, where la­bour force, espe­ci­ally the young ge­ne­ra­tions are was­ted, Left­wich and Sharp re­marks that unemp­loyed re­sour­ces could have cont­ri­bu­ted to so­ci­ety’s well-be­ing: the eco­no­mic value of their lost cont­ri­bu­ti­on of goods and ser­vi­ces is the eco­no­mic cost of unemp­loy­ment. Unemp­loy­ment does not only af­fect cur­rent but also fu­tu­re pro­duc­ti­on.36 Unemp­loy­ment is eit­her fric­ti­o­nal (vo­lun­tary unemp­loy­ment, usu­ally for a short term) or struc­tu­ral (long-term) in the na­tu­re and usu­ally ori­gi­na­te on the de­mand side of la­bour. Very im­por­tantly, it is noted that struc­tu­ral unemp­loy­ment is ca­u­s­ed due to the de­mand side of la­bour in a sec­tor which has a high mar­ket value, which means an eco­no­mic need for a spe­ci­fic type of la­bour.37 Ad­di­ti­o­nally, cyc­li­cal unemp­loy­ment is ca­u­s­ed by fluc­tu­a­ti­on in the agg­re­ga­te de­mand for goods and ser­vi­ces in the ove­rall eco­nomy, as a dec­line re­du­ces total pro­duc­ti­on and ca­us­es ge­ne­ral unemp­loy­ment th­ro­ug­ho­ut the eco­no­mic sys­tem.38 Cent­ral banks are re­qu­i­red by laws to sup­port job cre­a­ti­on, but in some eco­no­mi­es the cent­ral bank does not have any role in emp­loy­ment cre­a­ti­on agen­da, but the govern­ment has a major role in job cre­a­ti­on. Ac­cord­ing to Ep­s­te­in: “One rea­son that ‘in­fla­ti­on-fo­cu­s­ed mo­ne­tary po­li­cy’ has ga­ined so many ad­he­rents is the com­mon per­cept­ion that there is no viab­le al­ter­na­tive mo­ne­tary po­li­cy that can imp­ro­ve growth and emp­loy­ment pros­pects.”39 Mo­re­o­ver, in the de­ba­te over in­fla­ti­on tar­ge­ting or full emp­loy­ment, few cases are cons­idered as best prac­ti­ces. Fren­kel and Ra­petti descri­be the case of Ar­gen­ti­na, where tar­ge­ting a stab­le and com­pe­ti­tive real exc­han­ge rate has been very succ­ess­ful in hel­ping to ma­in­ta­in more rapid eco­no­mic growth and in emp­loy­ment ge­ne­ra­ti­on.40 In his ar­tic­le en­tit­led “What Comes After Full Emp­loy­ment”, James Ro­bert­son sta­ted that “unemp­loy­ment may be be­com­ing an une­co­no­mic way of gett­ing much im­por­tant work done, just as sla­very be­came une­co­no­mic in its time.”41 No­t­ably, Sto­ni­er high­lights that “edu­ca­ti­on will be a sour­ce of creat­ing jobs in the fu­tu­re not only for the in­dust­ri­al count­ri­es in which in­for­ma­ti­on, know­ledge and ser­vi­ce sec­tors ex­pand in the eco­nomy, this can be seen as busi­ness and in­dust­ri­al dri­vers to the scope of job cre­a­ti­on.”42 It is cru­ci­al to look at the sec­tors in each and every eco­nomy to find out which one cont­ri­bu­tes more to emp­loy­ment. In count­ri­es sol­ely de­pen­dent on a na­tu­ral re­sour­ce like oil, gas, dia­mond or cop­per, these sec­tors have scope for more emp­loy­ment, but the shor­tage of tech­no­logy and ca­p­ital makes de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es de­pend on de­vel­oped count­ri­es. It is est­ima­ted that the pur­su­it of eco­no­mic growth will inc­re­a­se unemp­loy­ment rat­her than al­le­via­te it.43 The fol­lo­wing fi­gu­res give more expla­na­ti­on on some of the count­ri­es and re­gions.

Cert­ain count­ri­es, like Japan, have been in re­ces­si­on for years, and yet “the unemp­loy­ment rate is low, ro­ughly is still 3.6 per­cent, since in Japan du­ring re­ces­si­on, wages tend to fall when the eco­nomy gets rough, which keeps people at work, while in the Uni­ted Sta­tes re­ces­si­on tend to lead to high job­less­ness.”44 In terms of agg­re­ga­te supply, unemp­loy­ment is expla­ined very exp­li­citly, as “jobs are crea­ted when the level of goods and ser­vi­ces pro­du­ced ex­pan­ds, and exist­ing jobs are dest­royed when pro­duc­ti­on cont­racts.

Fi­gu­re 1: Japan unemp­loy­ment rate

Figure 1: Japan unemployment rate

Fi­gu­re 2: EU unemp­loy­ment rate

Figure 2: EU unemployment rate

Fi­gu­re 3: US unemp­loy­ment rate

Figure 3: US unemployment rate

Pro­du­cers hire more people to pro­du­ce goods and ser­vi­ces, when pro­fits inc­re­a­se, and when pro­fit dec­re­a­se and los­ses are inc­ur­red, pro­duc­ti­on is cut, and jobs are lost.”45 The cent­ral bank sho­uld not be the only ins­ti­tu­ti­on in the count­ry to be con­cer­ned about the unemp­loy­ment and job cre­a­ti­on, the govern­ment and the po­li­cy ma­kers see this as a real th­re­at to the eco­nomy, and this can be jus­ti­fi­ed from the words of Ro­bert Le­kac­h­man in his book he cla­i­med that “unemp­loyed people pro­du­ce noth­ing. They cost the emp­loyed a lot even in an un­ge­ne­rous pe­ri­od. Put to work, they will pro­du­ce som­eth­ing and cost less.”46 More in­ter­est­ingly, the is­sues is not only about the cent­ral bank or the govern­ment, but the ne­ga­tive ef­fects of unemp­loy­ment, which di­rectly inf­lu­en­ce the human ca­p­ital in every count­ry, in two di­rec­tions, the first is the eco­no­mic ef­fect in­vol­ves the waste and loss of goods and ser­vi­ces when re­sour­ces are unemp­loyed. The se­cond is so­ci­al which af­fects so­ci­al life, such as fa­mily and com­mu­nity re­la­tions.47 This ar­gu­ment on emp­loy­ment is quite close to what Key­nes dis­cus­sed in his work as “the govern­ment not to do things which in­di­vi­du­als are doing al­re­ady, but to do those things which are at pre­sent not done at all.”48 To sum up, the full emp­loy­ment goal is a cri­ti­cal point many cent­ral banks fai­led to tack­le, be­ca­u­se cent­ral banks de­mand in­de­pen­den­ce from the govern­ment.

Mo­ne­tary Po­li­cy

In the eco­no­mic li­te­ra­tu­re many well-known eco­no­mists have given dif­fe­rent de­fi­ni­tions for mo­ne­tary po­li­cy, in one way or anot­her all the de­fi­ni­tions are cir­cu­lat­ing into the same no­ti­on. In dis­cus­sing the eco­no­mic si­tu­a­ti­on of Hun­gary and eco­no­mic growth, Lent­ner re­mar­ked “The me­chan­ism sup­port­ing fis­cal po­li­cy is crea­ted at the disc­re­ti­on of the cent­ral bank on the basis of its res­pon­si­bi­lity for the na­ti­o­nal eco­nomy, which is imp­le­men­ted wit­ho­ut jeo­p­ar­di­zing the pri­ma­ry ob­jec­tive of price sta­bi­lity. Si­mil­arly, mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is the other im­por­tant branch of pub­lic fi­nance po­li­cy”49 In line with this, Harry G. John­son de­fi­ned mo­ne­tary po­li­cy as “A po­li­cy emp­loying the cent­ral banks cont­rol of the supply of money as an inst­ru­ment for achi­eving the ob­jec­ti­ves of ge­ne­ral eco­no­mic po­li­cy is a mo­ne­tary po­li­cy.”50 Si­mil­arly, Hart ment­ion­ed “a po­li­cy which inf­lu­en­ces the pub­lic stock of money substi­tu­te of pub­lic de­mand for such as­sets of both that is po­li­cy, which inf­lu­en­ces pub­lic li­qu­i­dity po­sit­i­on, is known as a mo­ne­tary po­li­cy.”51Ad­di­ti­o­nally, Paul Ein­zig high­ligh­ted that “mo­ne­tary po­li­cy inc­lu­des all mo­ne­tary de­ci­sions and me­a­sures ir­respec­tive of whet­her their aims are mo­ne­tary or non-mo­ne­tary, all non-mo­ne­tary de­ci­sions and me­a­sures that aim of af­fec­ting the mo­ne­tary sys­tem.”52 Bri­efly, mo­ne­tary po­li­cy aims in emp­loying the cent­ral bank’s cont­rol over the supply, cost and use of money as an inst­ru­ment for achi­eving the cert­ain given ob­jec­ti­ves of eco­no­mic po­li­cy.53 The role of mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is cru­ci­al, mo­ne­tary po­li­cy aims in “ad­just­ment bet­ween the de­mand for and supply of money, price sta­bi­lity, cre­dit cont­rol, crea­te and ex­pan­si­on of fi­nan­cial ins­ti­tu­tions, su­i­tab­le in­te­rest rate struc­tu­re, debt ma­nag­ement.”54Eco­no­mic growth log­i­cally means more money de­mand, since cor­res­pond­ing to growth will be by in­jec­ting more money into the eco­nomy. Yet this phe­no­me­non must be re­gu­lated by the govern­ment and the cent­ral bank ca­re­fully, since more money crea­tes fi­nan­cial con­cerns for the eco­nomy. In other words, it means “a proper cont­rol upon the supply of money will pre­vent eco­no­mic fluc­tu­a­tions and pave the ground for rapid de­ve­lop­ment.”55 In ge­ne­ral terms most de­ve­lop­ing and un­der­de­vel­oped count­ri­es suf­fer from the eco­no­mic cris­is, or bet­ter to state, those are more fra­gi­le eco­no­mics, since mo­ne­tary po­li­cy, which has a vital role is not well for­mu­la­ted, thus for eco­no­mic growth mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is the tool that fa­ci­li­ti­es growth and sta­bi­lity.

Main Inst­ru­ments of Mo­ne­tary Po­li­cy

The fol­lo­wing mo­ne­tary po­li­cy inst­ru­ments inf­lu­en­ce the cre­dit-creat­ing ca­pa­ci­ty of the com­mer­ci­al banks in the eco­nomy by ope­rat­ing di­rectly or in­di­rectly on their ex­cess cash re­ser­ves.56

– Open Mar­ket Ope­ra­ti­on “OMO”

– Changes in the mi­ni­mum legal cash re­ser­ve ratio

– Changes in the bank / dis­count rate

Ob­jec­ti­ves of Mo­ne­tary Po­li­cy

The six main ob­jec­ti­ves are as fol­lows:

– Exc­han­ge rate sta­bi­lity

– Price sta­bi­lity

– Ne­ut­ra­lity of money

– Cont­rol of cyc­li­cal fluc­tu­a­tions

– Full emp­loy­ment

– Eco­no­mic growth

In analy­zing the im­pacts of mo­ne­tary po­li­cy on the eco­nomy, the ob­jec­tive of mo­ne­tary po­li­cy to be taken into cons­ide­ra­ti­on very se­ri­o­usly, in a count­ry like Iraq with a large bud­get de­fi­cit, it is ne­ces­sary to use fis­cal po­li­cy to re­du­ce the in­fla­ti­on­ary pres­su­re and thus in­fla­ti­on, and to imp­ro­ve the bud­get de­fi­cit. Broadly speak­ing, mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is an equ­ally se­ri­o­us con­cern for ad­van­ced, de­ve­lop­ing and un­der-de­vel­oped eco­no­mi­es. Howe­ver, as the eco­no­mic con­di­tions are dif­fe­rent, “mo­ne­tary po­li­cy re­qu­i­res spe­ci­al at­tent­ion in a count­ry, which seeks to bring about rapid eco­no­mic growth with cont­rol­led in­fla­ti­on.”57 An ap­pe­a­ling point of view is emp­has­i­zed by Jo­seph Stig­litz who thinks that there is no gu­a­ran­tee that fis­cal po­li­cy works, thus the ex­pec­ta­ti­on that mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is a res­pon­se to eco­no­mic ten­sions is a mis­take: du­ring re­ces­sions, mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is in­ef­fec­tive, be­ca­u­se people he­si­ta­te to purc­ha­se goods and ser­vi­ces, and thus mo­ne­tary po­li­cy does not work, while fis­cal po­li­cy can have an im­pact on the agg­re­ga­te de­mand, and pro­vi­des means of sti­mu­lat­ing the eco­nomy.58 Li­ke­wi­se, cons­ider­ing mo­ne­tary po­li­cy as a us­e­ful tool to slow down an over­hea­ted eco­nomy is not al­ways good, thus Stig­litz conc­lu­ding the idea of imp­le­ment­ing both mo­ne­tary and fis­cal me­a­sures as soon as pos­sib­le. Mo­ne­tary po­li­cy prac­ti­ce in de­ve­lop­ing count­ri­es is dif­fe­rent since the fac­tors and en­vi­ron­ment is quite vo­la­ti­le to in­fla­ti­on, the­re­fo­re, “low and stab­le in­fla­ti­on has be­co­me the over­ri­ding goal of mo­ne­tary po­li­cy,” bes­ides, the trade-off bet­ween in­fla­ti­on and emp­loy­ment is anot­her con­cern, “an ex­pan­si­on­ary mo­ne­tary po­li­cy could at­ta­in a low rate of unemp­loy­ment at the long­term cost of mo­dest in­fla­ti­on, while tigh­ter mo­ne­tary po­li­cy would supp­ress in­fla­ti­on but allow unemp­loy­ment to rise.”59 In most count­ri­es cre­di­bi­lity and ac­coun­ta­bi­lity of the mo­ne­tary po­li­cy is ex­pec­ted, and hea­vily de­pends on the cent­ral bank’s role in pro­tec­ting its au­to­nomy and ins­ti­tu­ti­o­nal role re­gard­less of the po­li­ti­cal pres­su­re. In their per­cept­ion, Wal­ton and Wy­koff have poin­ted out the im­por­tance of the first law of eco­no­mics, “the law of de­mand,” which sta­tes that more of any par­ti­cu­lar good or ser­vi­ce will be purc­has­ed as its price falls, less will be purc­has­ed as its price rise. In the case of hig­her pri­ces people purc­ha­se less goods and ser­vi­ces, cont­rary to the fall in price con­di­ti­on, in this re­gard, the po­pu­la­ti­on be­ha­vi­o­ur is chang­ed due to the changes in the price. Bes­ides, high price means low qu­an­ti­ti­es of the goods and ser­vi­ces are purc­has­ed, while low pri­ces means hig­her qu­an­ti­ti­es for purc­ha­se are ex­pec­ted by the con­su­mers.60 The other part of this equa­ti­on, clos­ely re­la­ted to price sta­bi­lity and in­fla­ti­on must be analy­zed as a phe­no­me­non that shows if an eco­nomy is he­al­thy or if it is in tro­ub­le. Cur­rently, Iraq is in a civil war and is po­li­ti­cal un­stab­le, there is hy­per­in­fla­ti­on, and alt­ho­ugh in the case of the Kur­dis­tan Re­gi­on, con­su­mer purc­ha­sing power has dec­re­as­ed re­cently, as the purc­ha­sing power of in­di­vi­du­als is in­co­me­de­pen­dent, at this point the Con­su­mer Price Index (“CPI”) shows the ef­fects of in­fla­ti­on on con­su­mer bud­gets.61 Un­der­stand­ing Fried­man’s law is a cru­ci­al pre­con­di­ti­on to un­der­stand­ing in­fla­ti­on. Fried­man emp­has­i­zed that in­fla­ti­on fol­lows ex­ces­sive mo­ne­tary growth with a long va­ri­a­b­le leg of “about two years”. In more sci­en­ti­fic terms, the rate of price chan­ge fol­lows the rate of mo­ne­tary growth, but after a long and va­ri­a­b­le lag, in­a­de­qua­te mo­ne­tary growth would lead to de­fla­ti­on. In fact, mo­ne­tary po­li­cy af­fects in­te­rest rates, “in the short term, inc­re­as­ed money keeps in­te­rest rates down, howe­ver, mo­ne­tary ex­pan­si­on has dif­fe­rent con­se­qu­en­ces, ex­ces­sive inc­re­as­es in the money supply pro­du­ce in­fla­tions, thus, an inc­re­a­se in in­te­rest rates, thus in the long run mo­ne­tary po­li­cy dri­ves the in­te­rest rates up.”62

Fis­cal Po­li­cy

Fo­cus­ing on fis­cal and mo­ne­tary po­li­cy, pro­fes­sor Jeff­rey Frank­el poin­ted out: “When an eco­nomy is in boom, the govern­ment sho­uld run a surplus; other times, when in a re­ces­si­on, it sho­uld run a de­fi­cit.” No­t­ably, fis­cal po­li­cy is chan­geab­le and govern­ments must shift it du­ring the eco­no­mic growth and cris­is. Frank­el furt­her high­ligh­ted on the role of the fis­cal po­li­cy and com­pa­red it to a par­ked car, which means the role of fis­cal po­li­cy de­pends on its en­vi­ron­ment and time: “But this is no rea­son to fol­low a procyc­li­cal fis­cal po­li­cy. A procyc­li­cal fis­cal po­li­cy piles on the spend­ing and tax cuts on top of booms, but re­du­ces spend­ing and raises taxes in res­pon­se to down­turns. Bud­ge­tary pro­f­li­gacy du­ring ex­pan­si­on; aus­te­rity in re­ces­sions. Procyc­li­cal fis­cal po­li­cy is de­sta­bi­li­sing, be­ca­u­se it wor­sens the dang­ers of over­heat­ing, in­fla­ti­on, and asset bubb­les du­ring the booms and exa­cer­ba­tes the los­ses in out­put and emp­loy­ment du­ring the re­ces­sions. In other words, a procyc­li­cal fis­cal po­li­cy mag­ni­fi­es the se­ve­rity of the busi­ness cycle.”63

Ad­di­ti­o­nally, “fis­cal and mo­ne­tary po­li­cy can be eit­her ex­pan­si­on­ary or cont­rac­ti­on­ary, po­li­cy me­a­sures taken to inc­re­a­se GDP and eco­no­mic growth are called ex­pan­si­on­ary, me­a­sure taken while in­fla­ti­on is too high are called cont­rac­ti­on­ary me­a­sures.”64 In this view, fis­cal po­li­cy to be adap­tive to the si­tu­a­ti­on du­ring the surplus in the eco­nomy, fis­cal po­li­cy to cont­rac­ti­on­ary, while the re­ve­nue is hig­her than spend­ing, while the spend­ing is hig­her than re­ve­nue, the eco­nomy en­coun­ters de­fi­cit, hence fis­cal po­li­cy is ex­pan­si­on­ary in res­pond to eco­no­mic growth.65 Pro­po­s­ed by many eco­no­mists that fis­cal po­li­cy po­sit­i­vely af­fects the eco­no­mic growth, cla­i­med by Agell et al., the ne­oc­las­si­cal model do­cu­men­ted why eco­no­mic po­li­cy can chan­ge the level of the long-term growth path, and that app­rop­ria­te po­li­ces shift the path up­wards, whe­re­as inap­prop­ria­te po­li­ci­es shift this path down­wards.66 In ad­di­ti­on to that Zag­ler and Dür­ne­c­ker se­ar­ched the re­la­ti­onship bet­ween eco­no­mic growth and fis­cal po­li­cy, and pre­sen­ted a uni­fying fra­me­work for the analy­sis of long run growth imp­li­ca­tions of govern­ment ex­pen­di­tu­res and re­ve­nues.67 In Iraqi case, govern­ment ex­pen­di­tu­re is very high while re­cently “the year 2015 star­ted with a bud­get de­fi­cit of $20 bil­li­on on a $103 bil­li­on total bud­get. The si­tu­a­ti­on is ex­pec­ted to wor­sen in 2016, as the Fi­nance Mi­nistry is sett­ing the 2016 bud­get at $99.65 bil­li­on, with a de­fi­cit of $25.81 bil­li­on.”68 In es­sen­ce, the im­por­tance of fis­cal po­li­cy must be un­ders­to­od by the pub­lic and the govern­ment. In par­ti­cu­lar, how fis­cal po­li­cy can af­fect eco­no­mic growth? Ac­cord­ing to IMF, when po­li­cy ma­kers seek to inf­lu­en­ce the eco­nomy, they have two main tools at their dis­pos­al “mo­ne­tary po­li­cy and fis­cal po­li­cy”. Bes­ides, govern­ments ty­pi­cally use fis­cal po­li­cy to promo­te strong and sus­ta­in­ab­le growth and re­du­ce po­verty.69 Furt­her­mo­re, “Fis­cal po­li­cy is the use of govern­ment spend­ing and ta­xa­ti­on to inf­lu­en­ce the eco­nomy.”70 Mo­re­o­ver, the changes in the govern­ment bud­get af­fect the eco­nomy ge­ne­rally and som­etimes spe­ci­fic sec­tor or as­pect. In the me­di­um term, fis­cal po­li­cy is a sig­ni­fi­cant tool for ma­nag­ing the eco­nomy since it has the abi­lity to af­fect the total amount of out­put pro­du­ced the gross do­m­es­tic pro­duct. Ne­vert­he­less, rem­em­bering agg­re­ga­te de­mand du­ring fis­cal ex­pan­si­on is to raise the de­mand for goods and ser­vi­ces, the grea­ter de­mand leads to inc­re­a­se in out­put and pri­ces to­get­her. When the eco­nomy is in re­ces­si­on, inc­re­as­es in de­mand lead to more out­put wit­ho­ut price chan­ge, by cont­rast, when the eco­nomy is at full emp­loy­ment, fis­cal po­li­cy af­fects pri­ces ins­tead of the total out­put.71 From this pers­pec­tive, fis­cal po­li­cy has an au­to­ma­tic sta­bi­li­zing na­tu­re, which makes the eco­nomy to move again. In one very fun­da­men­tal sense, in the ren­ti­er sta­tes, the govern­ments, which are de­pen­dent on sing­le com­mo­di­ti­es for their GDP, like Iraq, which is hea­vily de­pen­dent on the energy sec­tor for fund­ing govern­ment spend­ing, thus Iraq has se­ve­ral years of ex­pe­ri­en­ce in de­fi­cits in a row. Alt­ho­ugh Iraq is a rich count­ry, it is eco­no­mi­cally in­ef­fi­ci­ent, oil re­ve­nues and pro­duc­ti­on ca­pa­ci­ty have bo­os­ted in the 21st cent­ury, yet se­cu­rity, po­li­ti­cal ten­si­on and war has de­vas­ta­ted the inf­ra­struc­tu­re of the Iraqi eco­nomy mas­si­vely. Bud­ge­tary con­cerns, emp­loy­ment, so­ci­al wel­fa­re and fis­cal po­li­cy are all re­la­ted to so­ci­al and fi­nan­cial sta­bi­lity, a major con­cern for govern­ments and fi­nan­cial ins­ti­tu­tions. It is cham­pi­on­ed by Key­ne­si­an that “fis­cal po­li­cy can be a wea­pon in the batt­le aga­inst unemp­loy­ment.”72 Mo­re­o­ver, Key­ne­si­an eco­no­mics is in­fla­ti­on­ary, not be­ca­u­se it leads to big govern­ment, but be­ca­u­se it is re­cog­ni­zed that unemp­loy­ment can be crea­ted by stic­ky wages or by a high mar­gi­nal di­suti­lity of la­bour. To il­lustra­te, the Key­ne­si­an re­vo­lu­ti­on was to est­ab­lish the re­cog­ni­ti­on of the res­pon­si­bi­lity of the govern­ment to ma­in­ta­in a sa­tis­fac­to­ry level of emp­loy­ment in the eco­nomy. In es­sen­ce, many ren­ti­er sta­tes, which are abun­dant with na­tu­ral re­sour­ces in par­ti­cu­lar in de­ve­lop­ing re­gions, the govern­ment works on, full emp­loy­ment, rat­her than ba­lan­ced bud­get, be­ca­u­se govern­ments want to cling to power lon­ger, by hol­ding the pub­lic trust in their job se­cu­rity and emp­loy­ment in the pub­lic sec­tor.

The de­fi­cit and surplus in many count­ri­es are ex­pec­ted, while in the case of Swi­tzer­land fe­de­ral bud­get de­fi­cit of 124 mil­li­on francs (118.5 mil­li­on euros, $133.8 mil­li­on) for 2014. Was not ex­pec­ted, thus govern­ment de­ci­ded to in­vestiga­te and work on bud­get by cut­ting spend­ing and other ex­pen­di­tu­re.73 While Ger­many’s bud­get surplus in a row, helps the govern­ment of Ger­many to spend the money on the cur­rent mig­ra­ti­on cris­is.74

Conc­lu­si­on

Cent­ral banks and the major com­po­nents of the eco­nomy, in par­ti­cu­lar, fis­cal and mo­ne­tary po­li­ci­es are clos­ely in­ter­re­la­ted. As noted by nu­me­rous eco­no­mists, changes in any of the po­li­ci­es af­fect fi­nan­cial se­cu­rity in any state. Two tech­ni­ques may be cons­idered for cris­is ma­nag­ement: “Cent­ral banks and govern­ments are faced with a cont­ra­dic­ti­on of in­te­rest, in which if they act aga­inst the eco­no­mic re­ces-si­on, pump­ing extra state funds into the eco­nomy, the pos­si­bi­lity of inc­re­a­sing the de­fi­cit and ac­ce­le­rat­ing in­fla­ti­on to be ex­pec­ted, whe­re­as, if the pre­fe­ren­ce is to act aga­inst in­fla­ti­on, to re­ta­in the bud­ge­tary ba­lance, they are to ex­pect a re­ces­si­on in the eco­nomy.”75

Jegy­ze­tek