

A letter to the Editor:

Some Reflections on Millennial Retrospections

The *Hungarian Studies Review* (HSR) published a special volume (Vol. XXVIII, Nos. 1-2 [2001]) entitled "Hungary: 1001-2001 – A Millennial Retrospection," written by a group of scholars. It presents an excellent survey of Hungary's history and touches on some key problems of future survival of the Hungarian nation. The Introduction and Postscript of the 236 pages long work consists of approximately 100 pages by the editor of the volume Professor Nándor F. Dreisziger.

Focusing on Hungarian ethnic survival in the past and future in the light of negative demographic trends in Hungary and in the post-Trianon successor states today, the volume presents a novel, bold approach which is worth to note. Unfolding the multiple causes of the country's demographic decline in the 20th Century, the study suggests that in the post-communist era Hungary's future prospects are promising: the economic indicators are positive and this will remove obstacles to higher birthrates, but no major breakthrough can be expected (p. 52). However, Hungary might become a country of immigration from the larger Carpathian area, especially in the east and southeast, attracting new settlers. EU membership would undoubtedly contribute to the desirability of immigration from less developed neighbours who would favour the expanding economic opportunities and stable political system: they would represent people of diverse ethnic and religious background (p. 53).

To bring about these results (of increasing Hungary's population), a "judicious immigration policy is desired" (p. 53), which ought to be the answer to the frustrating experiences: since Trianon Hungary has been unable to affect a lasting territorial revision nor achieve the establishment of (cultural) autonomy in some compact Hungarian areas. The study unequivocally predicts on the aforementioned grounds that Hungary in the 21st Century would become a prosperous country of immigration and stabilize demographic trends. (p. 54) These are essentially the grounds for the proposed population shift and the argument is even more forcefully restated in the Postscript (pp. 227-230). The government should "encourage the immigration of Hungarians from neighbouring countries;" and the lawmakers might well put aside any reservations about the negative implications of their immigration policies for these countries." (p. 228).

The writers of these comments believe that these proposals are worthy of attention as one way to cope with this crucial question. However, they also find that there are significant weaknesses in the

study's future projections and that the empirical bases are on shaky grounds. We put forth the following arguments:

1. The negative demographic trends, the net loss of population in Hungary and in Hungarian minorities abroad are not exact science predictions. Population studies of the Central Statistical Office (KSH) and other assessments indicate several alternative outcomes in the next decades.¹ Although it is unlikely that the trend can be decidedly reversed, it is too early to visualize an apocalyptic outcome. The negative growth is a general phenomenon in the developed world and the successor states' population bases are also contracting. There is no scientific evidence that the migration per se would decidedly change demographic patterns in the society.

2. The key argument of the study is a projection of an optimal growth of the Hungarian economy in the near future; this is perhaps the weakest link in the proposal. Since the writing of this volume (2000), the economic indicators moved in the opposite direction: GDP growth slowed down; the Treasury shows alarming deficits;² unemployment especially in the less skilled populations is officially high and the hidden unemployment numbers are virtually unknown. Partly because of EU integration and expected transition, partly due to its own structural weaknesses the agro-sector is in deep crisis not being able to compete on the market with large scale industrial production. The inevitable transformation to the new farming system will likely yield a new mass of unemployment in the dislodged rural population. Thus the key economic argument for a prosperous magnet country attracting immigrants has no basis in fact.³

3. Because of the above, the suggestion that in the surrounding areas, specifically in the east and southeast, Hungary could become a preferred target for large scale immigration, remains a sterile point of view; furthermore, such an officially legalized attempt would also raise EU concerns if not objections. Hungary so far has not clarified its legal/political position in regards to the minorities, and this is reflected in the ambivalent position about double citizenship, a question resurfacing periodically without solution.

4. The visualized "judicious" immigration policy touches upon raw nerves and sensitivities psychologically, politically and legally. The key concept of "judicious" is not defined in this context. Does it mean a negotiated cooperation in the Carpathian region with minority organizations and/or governments; does it mean limited and by what criteria; does it mean immigration for Hungarian ethnics only or anyone else living in the effected areas of other countries? Depending on the normative content of the term "judicious", a series of legal puzzles arise, e.g. the definition and proof of who is Hungarian and who would have the authority to make a legal decision in the matter. The ill fated Status Law approved by

Parliament in 2001, would caution about the insurmountable maze of problems regarding such issues.⁴

The interstate regional relations between Hungary and Slovakia and Romania, as well as with the European Union were – mildly stated – disturbed and the issues became hot contests between the leading political parties affecting the outcome of the 2002 parliamentary elections. Public opinion regarding foreign immigrants and migrant labour proved unfavourable in connection with the Status Law and it is unlikely that it would be different toward a large scale immigration policy. The political parties - especially the governing party and the major party of opposition would make the issue the hottest political battle ground – the Hungarian voting public is not ready for such a drastic departure from a key issue of Hungarian history since Trianon. It follows that the governing majority party in Parliament would face a risky task to pass large scale immigration measures which would explicitly and implicitly promote the abandonment of the Hungarian minorities' objectives: survival on the place of their homeland. A wrong move on the issue could result in the overthrow of the government at the polls the next time around and hence bold steps in this direction are unlikely and unwise.⁵

5. The controlling authority on the issue would not be solely the Hungarian Parliament but rather the international treaties under the UN Charter and mostly the EU. The precedent of the Status Law shows that ethnic discrimination or favouritism is contradictory to the EU principles and thus immigration of Hungarian ethnics but exclusion of "other" nationalities would be unacceptable.⁶ Under such conditions the study encouraged immigration legislation would open wide the door for non-Hungarian applicants which in time would unlikely not to be blocked politically and *de lege ferenda*. While the Postscript (p. 229) takes the position that such measures would not affect the integrating potential of the Hungarian nation regarding other settlers, this projection is highly dubious.⁷ The unpredictable volume of migration could inadvertently alter ethnic ratios; a large number of Romanian Roma population speaks some Hungarian without identifying themselves as Hungarians.

6. Current public opinion in Hungary does not endorse an influx of "foreign", even if Hungarian-labour. The history of the Status Law and public reaction to its substantial alteration by the Nastase-Orbán agreement opening labour transfer for all Romanian workers, is a case in point.⁸

7. Ultimately, there is an even more vital issue involved. The proposal does not even touch upon the question of what would the affected Hungarian population think. It puts forth an unilateral solution in which the affected have no say. Because of the editorial limitations of these reflections, we confine ourselves to two basic issues: the aspirations

of the minority organizations and the grass-root sentiments of Hungarians abroad.

The Romanian Hungarian Democratic Association (RMDSZ) aims not only at ethnic survival but also to prevent or at least slow down the out-migration, exactly the opposite what the millennial study encourages. The speed up of this process would have catastrophic effect on the Hungarian community if they would be decapitated by the educated elite's massive flight. The RMDSZ enjoys near total support and together with other organizations in Slovakia, takes the view that large scale emigration is an anathema which the democratic public tries to avoid.⁹

The cultural survival is likewise in the focus of Hungarian minorities: the establishment of Sapientia University and the constant concern with the Babes-Bolyai University's Hungarian programs are but a few examples. Numerous church and community leaders underline the strength of solidarity in Transylvania and Slovakia while aware of the downward demographic trends. Outstanding intellectuals take a similar stand while stressing the need for ethnic cooperation which ought to be promoted by the Hungarian side as well.¹⁰

In accordance with these views, there can be some trust in the young generation: a research conducted by the National Youth Research Institute shows that in the 15-29 year old groups, national self-identity is strong everywhere in the successor states, but many would like to study in Hungary; if they would consider immigration, it would be only for economic reasons."

Considering the massive proposals of this study, we ought to look at the grass root sentiments of the affected people. For lack of space in this short comment, we would only refer to our personal experiences with ordinary everyday people, however, if anyone has doubts, he/she ought to consider the meaning of the presence of literally hundreds of thousands on the Csiksomlyo celebrations in Transylvania.¹²

8. The Millenary volume does not offer alternative solutions for the future. We argue that sustained economic and political policies to promote large families should be continued, since improved financial conditions for young families could make a difference. This would be more effective – if at all – than the undoubtedly more expensive tax and budget support needed for the proposals' immigration measures. Instead, it seems more important to expand economic and cultural assistance to Hungarian organizations and individuals and capital investments especially in Romania and Slovakia. The EU principles in force ought to be helpful in protecting alternatives available and used in other economies."¹³

Generational changes could also be expected to contribute to the solution of inter-ethnic animosity. As more we move away from the debilitating trauma of Trianon, as better ought to be the dissolution of tensions arising among the various ethnic groups. Last not least, the

successor states are all on the road to gain EU membership which must make a difference in their internal policies. The entire direction of European integration, the communication revolution result in more openness of information and freedom of movement, all in favour of a hope for a better future of minorities in Europe."¹⁴

In concluding: we acknowledge that the proposal is inventive but it is also asymmetric and premature. Such a complex question does not tolerate a narrow unilateral approach. The study deserves praise for tackling orthodox views and is free from dogmatic nationalist thinking, but in doing so forgot about the realm of possible: the theory is separated from its empirical bases.

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¹ Consult the Central Statistical Office (KSH) trend-assessment 9 June 2001, and also the KSH report on population census data, 23 July 2002.

² GDP growth declined from 5% in 1998-2000, with further decline expected, see Barnabas Racz, "The Left in Hungary and the 2002 Parliamentary Elections," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 55, 5, (2003): 751-752. The budget deficit significantly grew in 2002-2003, foreign investments slowed down or moved out, see Central Statistical Office report, 20 June 2003.

³ Unemployment in 2001-2002 estimated at 6.5% and inching upward, consult András Vértes, "Gyors növekedés, töredező egyensúly" (Fast Growth – Declining Balance) in S. Kurtán, P. Sándor, L. Vass, eds., *Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve* [The political yearbook of Hungary] (Lajosmizse: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, Magyar Hivatalos Közlöny Kiadó, 2001), 169-178. The size of hidden unemployment is virtually unknown.

⁴ The Status Law (officially named the Benefit Law) passed by Parliament 20 June 2001; for full analysis see János Kis "Statustorvény" (Status Law), *Élet és Irodalom*, XLVI, 8 March 2002, pp. 304.

⁵ In the 21st Century society seems to divide into two groups regarding Trianon: those who are still nostalgic and those who are indifferent. The former would oppose immigration measures, the latter would also object if it would put further stress on the economy and the taxpayers.

⁶ See Gyula Hegyi, "A kisebbségek és az ELI" (The minorities and the ELI") *Népszabadság*, 4 November 2002, p. 12. The Hungarian delegation in 2003 submitted a motion at the European Convention to include a clause in the European Constitution Draft about minority and ethnic rights. These norms however, are implicitly included in the general human rights section. The future of the proposal remains to be seen. *Magyar Nemzet*, 24 June 2003.

⁷ The conclusions of the study state that "recent scientific tests show that the genetic makeup of Hungarian characteristics is indistinguishable from their neighbours" on p. 229. The reference is to a study by Judit Béres, "Népünk genetikai rokonsága" (The genetic relationship of our people) *Élet és Tudomány* (Life and Science), no. 38, 2001.

⁸ The December 2001 Nastase-Orbán agreement aimed at opening the labour market in Hungary for all Romanians and extended authority to Romania to control official financial support for Hungarian organizations. Slovak rejection was even stronger and at the time of this writing still awaits solution. The agreement is constitutionally questionable as it altered parliamentary law without legislative authorization.

⁹ Viktor Orbán, prime minister, made references to population transfer in connection with the Status Law; the statement was retracted as it evoked resentment by all shades of minority personalities, *Magyar Nemzet*, also, *Népszabadság*, 9 June 2001. The issue did not play a direct role in the 2002 campaign.

¹⁰ See Béla Biró, publicist's (Kolozsvár – Cluj-Napoca) several excellent analyses in *Népszabadság*, 6 January, 1 May and 17 May 2001.

¹¹ Consult "Mozaik 2001 Research", 25 March 2002.

¹² On the 9th of July 2003, the "István a király" opera was performed in the open; the audience was estimated at 300,000; see for reports all leading press organs, 9-11 July 2003.

¹³ E.g. the extension of retirement age; two jobs and/or overtime; organized guest workers. New technology-generated productivity may also inconveniences alleviate the need for massive influx of new labor and dislodged agricultural workers may also increase the pool of employables.

¹⁴ On the occasion of the Hungarian accession to the EU in Athens, Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy sent a message to Hungarian minorities and stressed that the ELI membership provides increased opportunities to represent and protect minority rights, that Hungary will play a role in this and will not forget the Hungarians abroad in the successor states, *Népszabadság*, 17 April 2003, p. 6.

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Professor Dreisziger replies:

Debating Hungary's Future

In their "letter to the editor," Professors Éva Kiss-Novák, Susan Glantz and Barnabas Racz suggest that I have not done proper research to back my statements regarding the future of Hungary that I had made in my

introduction to the 2001 volume of the *Hungarian Studies Review* (the special issue entitled "Thousand Years of Hungarian Survival"). In some respects they are right, as my rather lengthy introduction (and post-script) to this volume was not intended as a major research effort, especially its concluding passages, which were meant mainly as a kind of endnote to the thousand years of Hungarian history that I surveyed in my essay.

In this endnote I ventured to say that, starting with 1989, Hungary will probably look forward to a more prosperous future than she had had throughout most of the 20th century. Whether my prediction will come true, only our children or our children's children will be able to say with any certainty. I implied of course that this trend toward a brighter future is already evident, but, as the authors of the letter to the editor suggest, I hadn't examined the economic indicators. In other words, to some extent at least, I based my observations on what social scientists call "anecdotal" evidence.

Had I looked for other evidence, for example assessments by Western experts of the performance of the Hungarian economy, I probably would have found some support for my contentions. Let me just cite one positive report on the progress Hungary has experienced since 1989. The study was published by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in 2002. Let me quote a brief excerpt from the conclusions of the organization's 2002 *Economic Survey* on Hungary:

Hungarian structural reforms have permitted an impressive catching up with living standards in more advanced OECD member countries [in Western Europe and North America].... The economy out-performed most of the other countries during the recent slowdown largely due to a strong fiscal impulse and rapidly growing private consumption...¹

Of course, this is very much an interim assessment of Hungary's progress, and it was certainly not meant to be more than that by the experts of the OECD.

Rather than relying on the tools of the economists and political scientists, i.e. studying economic indicators, I have relied on methods used by historians, that is comparing the present situation with what had happened under similar circumstances in the past. This method undoubtedly has its shortcoming since history never repeats itself exactly, but it is still an instructive tool that has its place in historical analysis.

In the thousand years of the history of the Hungarian state, there had been situations similar to 1989, i.e. when the country was liberated or partly liberated from foreign domination. This happened at the end of the 17th century when the Ottomans, who had occupied much of the Kingdom of Hungary since the middle of the 16th century, were expelled by

Christian armies led and financed mainly by the House of Habsburg. A similar "liberation" happened in 1867 when the Kingdom of Hungary received extensive autonomy within a reorganized Habsburg Empire, which in fact became known thereafter as the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. After both of these events involving the re-establishment of a greater degree of Hungarian self-rule, though in neither cases the attainment of full national independence, better times followed for most of Hungary's population.

The improvement in the Hungarian economy, and even in the security of the country's cities, towns and villages — and, indeed, of its population — after a period of stress and adjustment that lasted for a quarter century, is made abundantly clear in János Barta's long essay in our journal's 2001 volume, "Habsburg Rule in Hungary in the Eighteenth Century."²

The economic growth and social and cultural flowering that had taken place in the four decades after the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 has also been abundantly documented, briefly in my introduction to the 2001 volume (see pages 27-30, and endnotes 45-50, on page 63), in essays that had appeared earlier in our journal and, especially, in myriad studies published elsewhere.³

If the reduction of foreign control over Hungary in the past is any guide, then we could expect that the end of Soviet imperium in 1989 will also be followed by better times, similar to those that unfolded in Hungary in the 18th century, and in the decades after 1867. Of course not every social, cultural or religious group in the country enjoyed equally the benefits accrued from the reduction of foreign influence. The Protestant population of Hungary certainly didn't gain from the transition from Ottoman to Habsburg rule, as the former were more tolerant toward Christian Churches that had broken with Rome than were the Habsburgs. The rulers in Vienna in fact persecuted Protestants almost during the entire 18th century and, to some extent, even beyond. Similarly after 1867, some of Hungary's non-Magyar minorities found themselves more disadvantaged than they had been under more direct Habsburg rule. To this we might add that segments of Hungarian society certainly encountered setbacks after 1989. The transition from a one-party state to a pluralistic society ended the privileged position of the country's Communist elite. It brought grief to significant groups in Hungary, whether members of this elite or not, who had made their living through a knowledge of things Soviet, as well as the Russian language. Still other victims of Hungary's capitalist transformation have been the employees — and their numbers must be in the tens if not the hundreds of thousands — of the country's subsidised and unprofitable, state-owned enterprises.⁴ Furthermore, with the transformation that followed 1989, Hungary lost its Russian and some other East European markets for low-quality consumer

goods, and it was no longer eligible to receive cheap and probably politically-motivated loans from the West — just to mention a few more of the "disadvantages" of the passing of Communist rule.

For a few people the comparison of 1989 to 1867 would not work — and I am not suggesting that my critics are such people. For those individuals (and their numbers I could not possibly begin to estimate) who believe that in 1989 a free and prosperous Hungary was brought under the influence of foreign oppressors, inevitably the country's future would appear to be bleak.

The signatories of the letter to the editor also accuse me of predicting that in the future Hungary would rely much more on immigration to assure its demographic growth than had been the case in the past. I have made no such prediction, or if it seems that I did, I did not mean to. I just suggested that immigration, if judiciously pursued, would be beneficial to the nation. It may well be that the Hungarian public wants no influx of foreigners, Hungarian-speaking or not. This public might be in for a shock: with EU membership, the ever increasing intermingling of Hungary's (and the whole of Europe's) populations is probably inevitable.

Drs. Kiss-Novák, Glantz and Racz have also said that my suggestion that Hungarians from neighbouring countries should be encouraged to relocate to Hungary, would be looked upon with aversion in the Hungarian communities of the neighbouring states. Hungarian ethnic leaders in these countries have already complained that the departure of professionals and intellectuals from their midst to Hungary has resulted in the "cultural decapitation" of their ethnic group. Indeed, policies that would strengthen this tendency would be reprehensible. It is for that reason that I had specifically noted in my 2001 comments that Hungarian transmigration should be encouraged only from those regions of the neighbouring countries "where the prospects of the long-term survival of Hungarian culture have become next to non-existent" (p. 228).

Few countries in the world have the privilege of being able to attract immigrants with basically the same culture and traditions as the members of the host society. Hungary should take advantage of this unusual opportunity.

Professors Racz, Kiss-Novák and Glantz view Hungary's situation from the points of view of the political scientist, philosopher, and economist. I have viewed it from the perspective of the historian. This perspective suggests that after each of Hungary's liberations from foreign rule, better times followed, which incidentally, made Hungary more attractive to immigrants. This was so after the end of Turkish rule. To those who say that at the time Hungary exchanged one foreign ruler for another we might reply that Habsburg rule was not quite as "alien" as the Ottoman, after all the Habsburgs were Christians and, more importantly, Europeans. At the end of Habsburg rule in 1867 Hungary achieved even greater self-

rule than it did at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries — and the country prospered. I continue to believe (whatever the economic indicators predict at the moment) that this will probably be the case with the end of Soviet rule — but I admit that on this question the jury is still out.

No doubt the debate over Hungary's future will continue, both on the pages of our journal and elsewhere. In the end, our grandchildren might have a more definite answer, but never a final one, as the terms progress, prosperity, public satisfaction ("consumer confidence"), all defy precise definitions. Affluence and happiness, like beauty, are in the eyes of the beholder.⁵

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¹ *OECD Economic Surveys, Hungary*, Vol. 2002/10 [June 2002] (Paris, 2002), 18.

² And in Barta's several books: a volume on the life of Empress Maria Theresa, another one on Emperor Joseph II, a monograph on the agrarian policies of the enlightened absolutism in the Habsburg and Hohenzollern monarchies, as well as the textbook *A kétféjú sas árnyékában: az abszolutizmustól a felvilágosodásig, 1711-1780* [In the shadow of the two-headed eagle: from absolutism to enlightenment] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1984).

³ Some of the relevant essays that had appeared in our journal are: János Mazsu, "The Intelligentsia in Hungary prior to World War I," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 24, 1-2 (1997): 81-96; and Scott M. Eddie, "Limits on the Fiscal Independence of Sovereign States in Customs Union: 'Tax Union' Aspects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1868-1911," 9, 2 (Fall, 1982): 7-28.

⁴ As well as the employees of "Socialist" Hungary's numerous, Soviet-style research institutes, where academics, unlike most of their counterparts in the West, made their (very modest) living without being involved in teaching.

⁵ I should add here that there had been another critical response to my introduction to the 2001 volume, and it had to do with what I had written (or hadn't written) in connection with Hungarian history. Professor Stanislav Kirschbaum of York University's Glendon College regretted the fact that I had not mentioned, in the paragraphs that covered the coming of the establishment of the Hungarian state at the turn of 10th and 11th centuries, the existence in the 9th century of Svatopluk's "Slovak empire" in the Carpathian Basin. In our correspondence on this subject I pointed out the historical debate on this "empire," including its precise geographical location. In this connection it should be mentioned that historian Imre Boba (1919-1996) has argued that Svatopluk's "Magna Moravia" existed south of the Danube and Sava (Száva) rivers, that is largely outside of the Carpathian Basin. (See his *Moravia's History Reconsidered: A Reinterpretation of Medieval Sources* [The Hague, Nijhoff, 1971]). In the end we agreed that the precise location of Magna Moravia remains an historical conundrum. Professor Kirschbaum declined to write a "letter to the editor" in this matter. For his views on this matter, and on the evolution of the Slovak nation in

the Carpathian Basin, see his *A History of Slovakia* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

Professors Glanz, Kiss-Novák and Racz reply:

Professor Dreisziger's reply intends to clarify his position, however he does not dissolve the basic dilemmas of his proposals. The question is not whether the author relied on "proper research" but rather the theses he derived from the used data. We continue to argue our published positions and put forth the following short comments in reply to Dreisziger's response.

1. The economic arguments become a mute question as we write this in 2004-2005. Undoubtedly it cannot be excluded that in the long term the country's economic potential would improve, but currently both the government budget deficit and the economic climate in the EU do not signal the arrival to the Promised Land.

2. We have difficulty accepting the statement that the immigration argument was only "a kind of endnote." As quoted in our comments precisely the Dreisziger reasoning for a "judicial immigration policy" — undefined as it is — was a major plank in his introduction (pp. 1-71) and the Postscript (pp. 209-236) as well.

3. The historical analogies to by-gone eras may or may not provide a clue for future perspectives. We do not question the possibility of future improvement but at this juncture there are no guarantees. The budgetary consequences tied to large-scale influx of populations into Hungary became sharply focused in the public debate and political conflicts regarding the national referendum in December 2004 about the double citizenship proposal.

4. Prof. Dreisziger's reference to his original statement on p. 228 according to which the "transmigration should be encouraged only from those regions ... where the prospects of the long-term survival of Hungarian culture have become next to non-existent" is inaccurate. This reasoning appears to be out of context since on pp. 227-230 he argues for a general "judicious immigration policy" and does not narrow it down to certain regions, does not specify the ethnic issue, does not specify who are those to be chosen and those who ought not to be considered for relocation in Hungary. As we mentioned in our comments there are many unresolved issues about international treaties and diplomatic agreements, EU principles, questions of ethnic discrimination and the like which ought to be settled for such major population movements across national borders within or without the European Union. Yet the author appears to contra-

dict himself suggesting again in his Reply that Hungary should take advantage of the unusual opportunity to relocate ethnic Hungarians to preserve Hungary's demographic basis. Is this a proposal to "Hungarianize" only on a selective basis (who are Hungarians for this purpose) or is anyone included from the surrounding countries?

5. Since we are editorially limited in our reply we are constrained only to a few key points. Basically Dreisziger touched a sensitive issue as a precursor to the ill-fated Status Law and then to the double citizenship referendum lost in December 2004. Probably the dilemma is not dead and will be revitalized in the future by nationalist political forces. Alas the placing of the issue on the national agenda already had negative psychological effects, irrespective of the outcome of voting.

6. The Millennial airing of a similar but even more far-reaching measure of out-migration was projected on the basis of inadequate reasons and is referred to by some politicians in the public debate as a "second Trianon". While this view appears questionable, in the final analysis the population relocation is not only a rational economic/ demographic issue but also touches upon neuralgic emotional aspects of Hungarian existence: a minimal consensus since 1919 not about irredentism but the survival of Hungarians as Hungarians everywhere they are. To propose substantial out-migration and/or double citizenship on the one hand and demand autonomies on the other is an irreconcilable contradiction unacceptable to the successor states and thus devastating to the Hungarian minorities anywhere.